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EDITORS’ FOREWORD
On January 18, 2013, the Villanova Law Review hosted its annual Nor-
man J. Shachoy Symposium.  The title of the symposium was Assessing the
CISG and Other International Endeavors to Unify International Contract Law:
Has the Time Come for a New Global Initiative to Harmonize and Unify Interna-
tional Trade?  The event brought together many of the world’s leading ex-
perts on international contract law, and their contributions have been
recorded in the pages that follow.
This Issue is organized in the same way as the symposium itself.  Ac-
cordingly, the articles are presented as a series of “panels.”  For additional
information about the symposium, including videos and presentation
slides, please visit www.law.villanova.edu/lawreview.
(xii)
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Introduction
AN OVERVIEW OF THE CISG AND AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
DEBATE ABOUT THE FUTURE CONVENTION
MICHAEL BRIDGE*
Ladies, Gentlemen, and Colleagues,
THE organizers of this Villanova conference have invited me to addressto you a few remarks under the heading of “An Overview of the CISG
and an Introduction to the Debate About the Future Convention.”  It is a
privilege to be asked to do this, but it is a matter of some regret that I
cannot be with you.  I am not sure whether I should say “Good Morning,”
“Good Afternoon,” or “Good Evening,” as, while I am recording these re-
marks in rainy London, you will be hearing them in a rather colder Penn-
sylvania town where it may even be snowing.  I shall at that time be in the
rather warmer confines of Singapore.  Let’s proceed to the introduction.
The CISG has now been in force for just over a quarter of a century,
and has been adopted by nearly eighty states.  Its progress has been de-
scribed by some as slow, but I do not see it that way.  By the standards of
international uniform commercial law, that is a highly impressive achieve-
ment.  It is bested only by the New York Convention on International Arbi-
tral Awards.  There is of course the case of marine carriage liability, but
there you are looking at four different uniform models of liability: the
Hague Rules, the Hague-Visby Rules, the Hamburg Rules, and the recent
Rotterdam Rules.  We of course are looking at only one uniform instru-
ment.  UNCITRAL will not rest on its laurels, I know this, and will con-
tinue to promote the adoption of the CISG and may even, in time, attract
the adherence of the most intractable states, including my own country.
It is more than just a case of creating uniformity; the real challenge, I
think, lies in maintaining uniformity.  This is because a uniform law does
not exist as inert matter on a printed page—it is, instead, a living thing in
a stream of continuing legal development.  One reason for the success of
the CISG, apart from the commitment shown by UNCITRAL to promote it
and to maintain it as a uniform instrument by means of a CLOUT system
of reported cases and a digest of cited cases, has been the immense effort
* Cassel Professor of Commercial Law, London School of Economics.
(487)
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put in by the so-called “private sector” into the process of maintaining
uniformity.  Now, it is always invidious to set up particular cases, but obvi-
ous examples that spring to mind are the various websites dedicated to the
task (of which the Pace website is perhaps the best known).  Mention
should also be made of the CISG Advisory Council, which seeks to give
practical assistance to courts and tribunals in the form of measured and
authoritative opinions on particularly important aspects of the CISG.  I
should here declare an interest as a member of that Council, but then go
on to say that its process of monitoring developments and scrutinizing
texts are exacting.
Turning now to case law and scholarship, it can hardly be doubted
that the private programs of rendering national cases available in full-text
form, particularly when the cases are translated into English (here I think
Pace and Queen Mary University of London should take a bow), is proving
to have a striking impact on the maintenance of uniformity.  The cross-
citation of authority, though not as fully developed as one would want it to
be, is much more pronounced than in the early stages of development of
the CISG.  My impression is that decided cases are becoming both more
predictable and more settled.
Let us contrast that with the case of legal scholarship.  It is not clear to
me how any tribunal can hope to deal with the deluge of material, in vary-
ing degrees of quality, that comes out and is published, often in full-text
form, on websites.  Article-by-article commentaries in the German tradi-
tion seem to me to have the best prospects of commending themselves to
courts and tribunals.  For all the rest, it seems to me, at any rate, to be as a
matter of accident whether those adjudicating cases have accessed the ma-
terial in law reviews and printed collections.  Now, it would be pompous
and ahistorical to seek a return to the Emperor Augustus’s ius respondendi
(which of us would be Ulpian, Paulus, Papinian, and so on?), but there is
an itch that prompts the thought.
We turn now to substantive law: sale and contract.  In my opinion, the
greatest handicap the CISG has to face as it promotes international uni-
formity lies in its isolation.  It is not tethered to any other body of uniform
private law.  There is no true hinterland for international sales of the type
that exists for national sales instruments.  The problem is acute, because,
to a very substantial extent, the separation of special sales law and general
contract law is an artificial exercise.  In national systems, the division only
can be made in matters concerning property; this is one of the two areas,
along with validity, that is actually excluded from the CISG, which other-
wise deals in a plenary way with the rights and duties of seller and buyer
arising out of a contract of sale.  Enormous difficulties therefore arise in
determining the scope within the CISG of doctrines such as mistake or
misrepresentation.  All this is before we even begin to survey the boundary
between sale and tort law.  This means that constructing a link to a body of
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general contract law, as a minimum measure, is essential to the future wel-
fare of the CISG.
Now, let us take a look at the UNIDROIT Principles of International
Commercial Contracts.  These, in my opinion, amount to a highly impres-
sive achievement in promoting international uniform contract law.  They
nevertheless have their limitations.  They suffer from the fact that they are
avowedly not a contract code as such, though how this status is compatible
with mandatory standards of good faith and cooperation in the Principles,
as well as rules concerning contract formation and vitiated consent, is not
something I have ever been able to determine.  What is clear to me is that
they cannot be shoehorned into the CISG as a supplementary source
under Article 7(2), or as a usage under Article 9.  They do not constitute
the basis on which the CISG was devised (though they are somewhat com-
patible with CISG), and they do not proclaim themselves to be established
usage, though some provisions, such as those dealing with payments,
might individually in fact prove to be usage.
So there is further work that UNCITRAL can carry out.  The case for
taking up the reins and promoting a uniform contract law instrument is a
compelling one.  The Swiss Proposal seems to be timely.  I do realize that
there are political forces at work in this area, and that in a world of limited
financial resources the decision to take this matter forward would re-
present a hard choice at the expense of other initiatives.  If such an initia-
tive were nevertheless to be taken, the gains arising out of its success would
be very great.  A venture into general contract law is the next logical step
in the development of a uniform private commercial law.  UNCITRAL
would not and should not start with a clean slate; it does have the
UNIDROIT Principles themselves, just as earlier it had the two Uniform
Sales Laws of 1964.  Moreover, and I cannot speak to the political feasibil-
ity of this proposal, a measure of joint action on the part of UNICTRAL
and UNIDROIT might yield very impressive results.
The full measure of this initiative needs to be considered.  There are
various formats that might be used.  The most modest possibility would be
to have a legislative guide, akin to the one developed by UNCITRAL for
secured transactions.  Modest and quick, nevertheless, might not amount
to the same thing.  If an agreement could be reached on the general prin-
ciples of contract law at a level of detail that was not merely bland, such as
“let there be freedom of contract,” it would be better to take the extra step
by moving either to a model law or a uniform law convention.  In my view,
the latter approach, the uniform law convention, would have the greater
chance of producing tangible results at the national level.  The internal
political will in a nation state to work on a model law would in many cases
be rather weak, especially in the case of contract, whose familiar contents
might not give many nation states an incentive to take action.  As for the
formulation of the UNIDROIT Principles themselves, with rule, comment,
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and case illustration, this would not lie well with the current shape of the
CISG and would probably not be suited to the treaty-making process.
There is a danger in delaying any such movement forward.  The obvi-
ous danger comes from various and varying regional initiatives which may
or will not be suited for integration with the CISG, and may even (as is the
case with the Common European Sales Law) entail a departure from the
basic rules of the CISG.  This process is likely to continue, and to under-
mine the present uniformity achieved in sales law unless UNCITRAL inter-
venes.  The Common European Sales Law seems to me to have acquired
traction, or at least some traction, for two reasons.  First, because it avoids
the awkward exclusion of validity that at present has happened with the
CISG.  This is a good reason for intervening, but it does not justify rewrit-
ing the rules for some commercial sales as though these were quasi-con-
sumer transactions.  Second, the Common European Sales Law is
presented as modern while the CISG is described as showing its age.  Now,
I do not agree with the second reason at all.  The whole point of a conven-
tion treated as a living instrument is that it is more than just the words
written on a diplomatic page.  It develops and adapts.  The process of ar-
riving at international agreement is painful and arduous, and cannot be
regarded as something to be done at quite regular intervals.  This process
gives rise to a new instrument that must go through the pains of clarifica-
tion in litigation.  A succession of new uniform sales laws attracting differ-
ent groupings of adopting states, as is now the case for marine carriage
liability, is plainly undesirable.
Let us finally turn to other possibilities.  To start with, the New Year is
a time for optimism, but calls for an international commercial code do
seem to me to be premature, unless they are to be furthered by means of
an instrument that is incremental and part of a long-sighted road map,
coming in, as it were, in installments over a lengthy period.  That apart,
there is much to be said for beginning with issues concerning the transfer
of ownership from seller to buyer.  Property issues are frequently repre-
sented to be issues where securing international uniformity is profoundly
difficult.  As true as this might be in cases dealing with land and succes-
sion, it is in my belief far from true about the passing of property rights
under a sale of goods transaction.  Intention-based national systems move
in the direction of exceptions based upon delivery.  Delivery-based na-
tional systems move in the direction of exceptions based upon intention.
In this area above all, we can draw considerable comfort from the compar-
ative law adage that “profound difficulties of national approach are heavily
outnumbered by the numbers of identical national solutions.”
Now I think that is a proper point with which to conclude these re-
marks.  May I wish you the best for the coming conference and the series
of discussions that will be carried out in the next day or so.  Thank you.
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POSSIBLE FUTURE WORK BY UNCITRAL IN THE FIELD OF
CONTRACT LAW: PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS
FROM THE SECRETARIAT
RENAUD SORIEUL, EMMA HATCHER, & CYRIL EMERY*
IT is with pleasure that I have the opportunity to address the topic: As-sessing the CISG and Other International Endeavors to Unify International Con-
tract Law.  My contribution to this issue will briefly consider the various
standards relevant to international contract law today, together with the
numerous proposals that have been made to further harmonize this im-
portant area of law.  When considering opportunities for the future, we
are often prompted to reflect upon our past achievements.  In this regard
I will examine the practical steps that UNCITRAL has undertaken to sup-
port the implementation of the CISG, and in particular the obligation cre-
ated by Article 7 for the uniform interpretation of its provisions.  I will
close by introducing a proposal recently made by UNCITRAL to further
efforts in this area.  This discussion will, I hope, remind us that the crea-
tion of a harmonizing instrument is one possible first step toward actual
harmonization which, in practice, requires effective implementation to be
truly realized.
In 2013, we anticipate that membership of the CISG will surpass
eighty states.1  This is a remarkable achievement when we consider the
history leading to its development.  States from every geographical region,
every stage of economic development and every major legal, social, and
economic system are Parties to the CISG.  Looking back in time, when we
celebrated the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Convention in 2005, mem-
bership of the Convention was approaching seventy states.2  Together,
* The authors hold official positions as international civil servants at the
Secretariat of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL).  The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do
not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations.  The text is based on a
presentation made by Renaud Sorieul on January 18, 2013.  The oral style of the
presentation has been kept.
1. At the time of writing this paper in January 2013, the number of state par-
ties to the CISG stood at seventy-eight. See Status 1980—United Nations Convention
on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, UNCITRAL, http://www.uncitral.org/
uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/sale_goods/1980CISG_status.html (last visited Apr. 9,
2013).
2. See Yernej Sekolec, Welcome Address, in CELEBRATING SUCCESS: 25 YEARS
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF
GOODS 18, 19 (2006), available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/
sekolec.html.
(491)
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these seventy states were said to represent over two-thirds of the total vol-
ume of international trade.  Since that anniversary, with the inclusion of
Japan as a state party,3 and Brazil advanced in its domestic procedures to
become a state party,4 the total volume of international trade represented
is likely to be even greater still.  These adoptions combined with the con-
tinued withdrawal of limiting declarations in Europe5 make it evident that
the CISG remains highly relevant for states and the international sale of
goods more broadly.  We have to be careful not to upset such dynamics.
However, the CISG is not the only instrument that may provide rules
for international contracts for the sale of goods.  Indeed, a diverse range
of instruments have developed since the birth of the CISG in 1980.  These
instruments include both binding and soft law texts, as well as global and
regional initiatives.  Depending on the location of contracting parties, and
their choice of instrument, a range of rules—including domestic rules—
potentially govern international contracts in today’s modern commercial
world.  The CISG is complemented by its “sister” instrument—the United
Nations Convention on the Limitation Period in the International Sales of
Goods,6 regulating the period of time within which a party under a con-
tract for the international sale of goods must commence legal proceedings
against another party to assert a claim arising from that contract.  There
are, of course, a range of other international conventions, covering issues
such as transport, finance, and e-commerce, to name a few that are rele-
vant in determining legal rights and obligations in international
transactions.
Further, the Unidroit Principles of International Commercial Con-
tracts (Unidroit Principles), which were heavily influenced by the CISG
and first released in 1994, recently went through a third revision.7  While
assessing their actual influence is difficult, we are told that they are in-
creasingly being used by contracting parties as the basis of contracts, not
3. See Press Release, United Nations Information Service, Japan Accedes to
the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods
(CISG), UNIS/L/120 (July 4, 2008), available at http://www.unis.unvienna.org/
unis/pressrels/2008/unisl120.html.
4. For information on the Brazilian Senate’s approval of the Convention, see
Projecto de Decreto Legislativo, Nº 73, de 2012, SENADO FEDERAL (Oct. 24, 2012), http:/
/www.senado.gov.br/atividade/materia/detalhes.asp?p_cod_mate=104615.
5. For example, Latvia’s withdrawal of its “written form” declaration in No-
vember 2012. See Press Release, United Nations Information Service, Latvia With-
draws “Written Form” Declaration Under the United Nations Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG), UNIS/L/177 (Nov. 15,
2012), available at http://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/pressrels/2012/unisl177.
html.
6. See United Nations Convention on the Limitation Period in the Interna-
tional Sales of Goods, as amended by the Protocol of 11 April 1980, Apr. 11, 1980,
1511 U.N.T.S. 99, available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/sales/
limit/limit_conv_E_Ebook.pdf.
7. See INT’L INST. FOR THE UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAW, UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES
OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS (2010), available at http://www.uni
droit.org/english/principles/contracts/main.htm.
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just for the international sale of goods, but for a broad range of interna-
tional commercial transactions.  Much like the CISG, the Unidroit Princi-
ples have provided a source of inspiration for the reform of domestic
contract laws in a diverse range of countries.  However, reflecting their soft
law status, the way the Unidroit Principles have been incorporated into
domestic legislation has varied, somewhat limiting the potential unifying
effect.
Finally, and of no less importance, are the range of regional initiatives
currently being taken with respect to contract law approaches.  Examples
of work being done in this area include: the Draft Common European
Sales Law (CESL), embodying contemporary efforts to harmonize con-
tract laws in Europe; the Preliminary Draft Uniform Act on Contract Law
developed in OHADA; and of course the Principles of Asian Contract Law
(PACL), on which Professor Shiyuan Han is providing an update today.
My focus in this presentation does not include a detailed analysis of
how these various instruments work together in providing a legal frame-
work for international contracts.  Needless to say, however, it is the simple
existence of these numerous instruments which, at the very least, creates
the impression of a complex web of international standards interacting
with domestic and regional contract law.  This has no doubt contributed
to calls for further harmonization, and indeed unification, of international
contract law.
The idea of further harmonization in the area of international con-
tracts is not new.  Indeed, even at the time of the diplomatic conference in
1980 that led to the finalization of the text of the CISG, when agreed posi-
tions could not be reached on certain elements even at that late stage,
there were concerns about the scope of the CISG and the fact that it did
not provide rules for the entire life-cycle of an international sales contract.
The so-called “gaps” in the CISG have, of themselves, been the catalyst for
calls for further work in this area.  To some extent, through the work of
Unidroit, that call has been answered in the form of the Unidroit Princi-
ples.  In this sense, the Unidroit Principles can be considered a comple-
mentary instrument to the CISG.  UNCITRAL acknowledged this
relationship as part of its 2012 endorsement of the “use of the 2010 edi-
tion of the Unidroit Principles of International Commercial Contracts, as
appropriate, for their intended purposes.”8
Professor Joachim Bonnell has written extensively on ideas to inte-
grate and formalize the relationship between the CISG and the Unidroit
Principles.  His ideas include having UNCITRAL recommend use of the
Unidroit Principles to interpret and supplement the CISG.9  As part of this
recommendation, the Unidroit Principles would only be used where the
8. Rep. of the U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, 45th Sess., June 25–July 6,
2012, ¶¶ 137–40, U.N. Doc. A/67/17; GAOR, 67th Sess., Supp. No. 17 (2012).
9. See Michael Joachim Bonnell, The CISG, European Contract Law and the Devel-
opment of a World Contract Law, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 27 (2008).
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issue at stake falls within the scope of the CISG and where the individual
provisions of the Unidroit Principles referred to can be considered an ex-
pression of a general principle underlying both instruments.  Professor
Bonnell has suggested that such a formal recommendation would help to
promote uniformity in the application of the CISG and at the same time
ensure that, in practice, recourse to the Unidroit Principles is made only
within the limits of, and on the conditions provided by, Article 7 of the
CISG.10
UNCITRAL, however, has not embraced a solution of this type.  It
considered the issue of integration of the CISG and the Unidroit Princi-
ples in 2007, as part of its endorsement of the 2004 Principles.11  It, how-
ever, observed that the CISG already contains comprehensive rules on
contracts for the international sale of goods that, when properly applied,
exclude application of the Unidroit Principles.  The Commission further
noted that questions concerning matters governed by the CISG not ex-
pressly settled in it were to be settled, as provided in Article 7 of the Con-
vention, in conformity with the general principles on which the
Convention was based or, in the absence of such principles, in conformity
with the law applicable by virtue of the rules of private international law.
Thus, the optional use of the Principles was subordinate to the rules gov-
erning the applicability of the CISG.
Professor Bonnell has also suggested reproducing the Unidroit Princi-
ples in the form of a model law to be applicable unless the parties have
excluded its application.12  Bonnell considers that the direct involvement
of governments in preparing such a model law would enhance the author-
ity of the Unidroit Principles.  He also considers that, given the non-bind-
ing nature of a model law, such an approach would minimize the risk of
the Unidroit Principles losing their innovative characteristics and being
reduced to the lowest common denominator.  This concept of a practical
link between the CISG and the Unidroit Principles, in the form of a model
law, which has proven to be a type of harmonizing instrument that is pop-
ular with states, is a suggestion worthy of further consideration in the cur-
rent discussion.
With respect to Bonnell’s proposed elevation of the Unidroit Princi-
ples to a model law, he considers that this could be a stand alone under-
taking or alternatively undertaken in the context of a broader and even
10. See id.
11. See Rep. of the U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, 40th Sess., ¶ 211, U.N.
Doc. A/62/17; GAOR, 62nd Sess., Supp. No. 17 (2007).
12. See Michael Joachim Bonnell, Towards a Legislative Codification of the
Unidroit Principles?, in MODERN LAW FOR GLOBAL COMMERCE: PROCEEDINGS OF THE
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW
HELD ON THE OCCASION OF THE FORTIETH SESSION OF THE COMMISSION 230, 238
(2007), available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/congress/09-83930_
Ebook.pdf.
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more ambitious project, such as the preparation of a “Global Commercial
Code.”13
The idea of a Global Commercial Code re-entered the spotlight in
2000 through comments made by former Secretary of UNCITRAL Gerold
Herrmann.14  He suggested that a Global Commercial Code would,
through a single binding global reference law, provide a coherent and
consistent body of commercial law and therefore certainty in the rights
and obligations of parties to commercial transactions.
The development of a Global Commercial Code would involve review
and consolidation of the alternative “competing” texts in the light of mod-
ern trends and usage.  The broad acceptance and success of the CISG in
so many countries is considered by a number of commentators to indicate
a need for a Global Commercial Code.  It is felt that the need for such an
instrument has continued to grow with expansion in communications and
cross-border commerce.  It has been suggested that a Global Commercial
Code could be prepared by UNCITRAL in cooperation with other inter-
ested international organizations.
While Professor Bonnell envisages the incorporation of the Unidroit
Principles into a Global Commercial Code in the form of a model law or
similar non-binding representation, an alternative view has been ex-
pressed by Professor Ole Lando.  Professor Lando considers that, as part
of a Global Commercial Code, the Unidroit Principles should be
mandatorily applied to international contracts.15  To achieve maximum
uniformity, in Lando’s view, a global market requires one law—including
general principles of contract law—with the Unidroit Principles, to be ele-
vated as binding upon courts and tribunals, an integral inclusion in that
Code.
There will no doubt be continued debate about whether such harmo-
nization is a worthy and achievable objective.  As Professor Henry Gabriel
has written,16 because uniform laws reduce transaction costs by providing
known default rules, this is often reason enough to choose a uniform legal
regime and justify the time-consuming and expensive efforts of undertak-
ing uniform law projects at both the domestic and international levels.
Many commentators believe that the proliferation of diverse legal
rules that have developed, and continue to be drafted today, imposes seri-
ous costs on enterprises doing business in more than one jurisdiction.  At
13. Bonnell, supra note 9, at 27.
14. See Gerold Herrmann, The Future of Harmonisation and Formulating Agencies:
The Role of UNCITRAL, in FOUNDATIONS AND PERSPECTIVES OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
LAW 28, 36 (Ian Fletcher, Loukas Mistelis & Marise Cremona eds., 2001).
15. See Ole Lando, Tradition Versus Harmonization in the Recent Reforms of Con-
tract Law, 3 COLLECTED COURSES XIAMEN ACAD. INT’L L. 87, 95 (2010).
16. See Henry Gabriel, Choice of Law, Contract Terms and Uniform Law in Practice,
in MODERN LAW FOR GLOBAL COMMERCE: PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONGRESS OF THE
UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW HELD ON THE OCCA-
SION OF THE FORTIETH SESSION OF THE COMMISSION 224, 228 (2007), available at
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/congress/09-83930_Ebook.pdf.
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the same time concerns have been expressed, for example by Gerhard
Wagner,17 that harmonization efforts while of considerable merit, can re-
move the benefits of experimentation, learning, and adaptation facilitated
by the range of diverse instruments that currently exist.
Along with varied views on the costs and benefits of harmonization
efforts, there will also be continued debate about what form harmoniza-
tion efforts should take and if the idea of a Global Commercial Code is a
desirable and feasible objective.
The merits and drawbacks of international harmonization through
hard and soft law have been discussed extensively in academia.  The bene-
fits of a soft law approach, with more open and flexible rules, able to be
developed, updated, and amended without a formalized codification pro-
cedure are well articulated.  When compared with a formal law-making
process, known to be slow, expensive, and full of compromise, including
concerns that legal certainty and foreseeability of outcomes may actually
be sacrificed in order to achieve the harmonization goal, a soft law option
may appear, prima facie, very appealing.  There are, of course, persuasive
counter-views that soft law rules, which do not go through a formalized
codification procedure, with the broad participation of states with differ-
ent legal traditions and expectations, lack the authority, security, and pre-
dictability that an internationally developed codification of black letter
rules offers—and therefore do not ultimately achieve harmonization.
These conflicting views will no doubt continue to be expressed and chal-
lenged—both within the academic communities and between states.
Recognizing these issues, even strong advocates of a Global Commer-
cial Code such as Ole Lando have recognized that an iterative approach
towards a Global Commercial Code may be necessary.  Professor Lando
suggests that the development of a set of core principles for international
contract law would be a useful first step, and would lay the groundwork for
a Global Commercial Code to be developed in due course.18
Lando has identified eight basic principles addressing: freedom of
contract; pacta sunt servanda; informality; unilateral promises; good faith
and fair dealing; reliance; reasonable foreseeability; and proportionality
that could be introduced to “penetrate” the law of contracts of the
world.19  If widely accepted, Lando suggests that these principles would be
taken into account by national and international legislators when they re-
form their contract laws, and might even be applied by the courts to inter-
17. See Gerhard Wagner, Transaction Costs, Choice of Law and Uniform Contract
Law, in MODERN LAW FOR GLOBAL COMMERCE: PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONGRESS OF
THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW HELD ON THE OC-
CASION OF THE FORTIETH SESSION OF THE COMMISSION 39, 40 (2007), available at
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/congress/09-83930_Ebook.pdf.
18. See Lando, supra note 15, at 95.
19. See Ole Lando, CISG and its Followers: A Proposal to Adopt Some International
Principles of Contract Law, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 379, 401 (2005).
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pret or supplement international uniform law instruments and their
domestic law.20
Jan Smits has similarly advocated a step-by-step approach towards
achieving uniformity.  He considers that a model should be adopted which
allows for amendment and correction at an early stage, allowing businesses
to get acquainted with a new contract law regime before it is mandatorily
applied.21  In this sense an optional contract code is suggested, which
Smits considers would allow harmonization to take place from the “bottom
up.”
My contribution to this discussion is not to promote a particular
course of action or outcome in favour of another.  What I will say, how-
ever, is that there are clearly a multitude of worthy ideas in circulation—
and it is a legitimate and worthwhile exercise to examine and debate these
ideas to determine what further work, if any, should be done in the area of
international contract law.  What I can add to this discussion is some com-
ments on the process and elements that will be fundamental to successful
work in this area and perhaps, more importantly, emphasize that the crea-
tion of a text or instrument is only one (possibly small) element in achiev-
ing harmonization.  The implementation and creation of unified “laws in
action” is a crucial element which is unfortunately often overlooked in
such discussions.
If it was ultimately determined that a harmonization effort in some
form or another would be of benefit, there are several ways in which UN-
CITRAL could uniquely contribute to the development of such a text.
With the benefit of a clear and established commitment and leader-
ship from member states, where scarce resources are efficiently and effec-
tively directed towards identified and agreed priorities, UNCITRAL is
undoubtedly a competent forum to develop modern harmonizing instru-
ments in this area.  I am not going to recite a list of our achievements.  I
do note, however, that some instruments have, for a variety of reasons,
enjoyed smoother paths to creation than others.  UNCITRAL takes these
experiences, learns from the various challenges and successes, and applies
the knowledge gained in developing the approaches to the creation of
new instruments.
Enjoying universal participation, UNCITRAL allows member states
with varied expertise and experience to share with others, to express their
aspirations or concerns, and to state the conditions under which they
could accept certain texts.  In doing so, UNCITRAL can ensure that any
instrument developed reflects a fair balance between the competing do-
20. See id. at 384.
21. See Jan Smits, Economic Arguments in the Harmonization Debate: The Practical
Importance of Harmonization of Commercial Contract Law, in MODERN LAW FOR GLOBAL
COMMERCE: PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION
ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW HELD ON THE OCCASION OF THE FORTIETH SESSION
OF THE COMMISSION 46, 52 (2007), available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/
english/congress/09-83930_Ebook.pdf.
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mestic legal traditions to ensure the use of these instruments facilitates
international trade and provides predictable and fair outcomes for com-
mercial entities.
The value of having the preparatory work being undertaken in the six
official languages of the United Nations should not be underestimated.
Such a process, while expensive and time consuming, aids understanding
and interpretation of complex legal issues.  This is clearly a better process
than having a final text produced in a single language then later trans-
lated, with limited opportunities to ensure that concepts are accurately
represented and understood.
A further element that will be crucial to the success of the develop-
ment of any further harmonizing instrument on international contract law
will involve effective engagement and coordination with the other private
law formulating agencies.  This is an area where UNCITRAL has worked
successfully in the past in terms of drawing on the experience and exper-
tise of other agencies, and making sure that we make the best use of our
limited resources.  I am confident that further work on contract law would
allow us to build upon these established relationships, in particular with
Unidroit, in the development of the desired instrument.
Of equal importance will be outreach to the regional integration and
economic cooperation organizations and law reform bodies who are un-
dertaking efforts in contract law reforms.  We must recognize that these
bodies have contemporary perspectives to bring to bear on the issues that
require examination and we would be short-sighted not to avail ourselves
of opportunities to engage with them and become informed of their ex-
periences in these areas.
The combination of these processes may not, of themselves, ensure
the development of the very “best” law (however such an assessment might
be made) that might otherwise be produced in a purely academic exer-
cise.  However, I believe that UNCITRAL’s processes and work methods
are capable of producing texts that can achieve harmonization, and that
can facilitate international trade.  That, of course, is the core business of
UNCITRAL.
Formulating a harmonizing instrument, of itself, is only part of the
story. Harmonization is only truly achieved through implementation—be-
ing the adoption of such laws, their consistent interpretation, and practi-
cal application to commercial transactions.
Promoting the adoption of texts is an increasingly important focus of
UNCITRAL, including educating stakeholders on the existence and bene-
fits of the respective harmonizing instruments produced under our aus-
pices.  A large part of this education process includes facilitating an
understanding of the processes and costs of the effective realization of
implementation and the actual adaptation requirements of the reforms
(which can differ markedly from the perceived adaptation requirements).
This process commonly happens through conducting and participating in
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seminars (regional and national), briefing missions, and training courses,
and often is delivered in conjunction with other organizations.  The unfor-
tunate fact is that, increasingly, the scarcity of resources sometimes pre-
vent the secretariat from meeting the demand for these services, thereby
undermining our ability to effectively promote texts.
As has been widely acknowledged, the preparation of a substantive
uniform text is a time consuming and costly undertaking.  As an example,
I recall Gerold Herrmann stating that the estimated cost of preparation of
the CISG to the United Nations alone was in the realm of 6 million U.S.
dollars.22  In 1980, that was probably regarded as a considerable amount.
In retrospect, it may also illustrate the cost-effectiveness of the process.  In
any event, we must ensure that adequate resources are available for pro-
motion of the end product to relevant stakeholders after a significant in-
vestment—to not do so would be wasteful, and would jeopardize the
ultimate success of the entire undertaking.  This is a matter that we need
to be mindful of, even in these early exploratory discussions considering
harmonization opportunities.
Of course, without effective implementation, the adoption of any har-
monizing instrument amounts simply to harmonization “on paper,” and
may not have any practical positive impact on legal predictability sought by
commercial parties to international transactions.  Some commentators will
suggest that only the existence of a competent court, binding on all states’
parties, to interpret an international instrument such as the CISG would
achieve legal certainty and predictability of outcomes for commercial par-
ties.  Without such a court, they say that the application of laws will invaria-
bly differ between jurisdictions—reflecting not only the different legal
traditions, and varied rules of procedure and evidence, but also the varied
capacity of courts, resulting in different interpretations and solutions.23
I would not agree that a single review court is necessary, but I think it
is true to say that the CISG will, in the long run, only be successful in
harmonizing the law of international sale of goods if courts in adopting
states are consistent in interpreting its provisions.24  If, instead, they insist
on looking at the Convention through the lenses of their differing domes-
22. See Herrmann, supra note 14, at 33.
23. For a brief list of proponents of a review court, see Camilla Baasch Ander-
sen, Applied Uniformity of a Uniform Commercial Law: Ensuring Functional Harmonisa-
tion of Uniform Texts Through a Global Jurisconsultorium of the CISG, in THEORY AND
PRACTICE OF HARMONISATION 30, 39 n.36 (Mads Andenas & Camilla Baasch Ander-
sen eds., 2011).
24. See, e.g., John Felemegas, The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods: Article 7 and Uniform Interpretation, in PACE REVIEW OF THE
CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 115, 147
(2002), cited in Alexander S. Komorov, Internationality, Uniformity and Observance of
Good Faith as Criteria in Interpretation of CISG: Some Remarks on Article 7(1), 25 J.L. &
COM. 75, 75 (2006).
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tic laws, thus creating divergent precedents, uniform law will not be
achieved and the benefits of a harmonized regime will not be realized.25
This is, of course, not a new observation, and the drafters of the CISG
addressed this issue through Article 7, which, as you know, states that, in
interpreting the Convention, “regard is to be had to its international char-
acter and to the need to promote uniformity in its application.”26  While
most of the CISG concerns the actions of contractual parties, this article
imposes a public international law obligation on states, through their
courts, to properly interpret the Convention.  Unfortunately, many states
appear to forget or fail to realize that they have a treaty obligation in this
area, giving no further thought to the Convention after its adoption and
leaving questions of interpretation entirely to courts with no guidance or
instruction.
There is general agreement that the Article 7 obligation requires in-
terpretation that is autonomous, without regard to national law, and that
takes into account foreign case law.27  So, are courts interpreting CISG
cases in line with this standard?  When looking at this question, scholars
tend to take two approaches.
The first method is primarily quantitative, basically counting the num-
ber of cases that cite foreign authorities.  The idea here is that if a court
cites foreign case law, it is obviously meeting part of the Article 7 require-
ment.  Under this test, there is little evidence that states and their courts
are achieving great success.  While the total number of CISG cases identi-
fied as citing foreign case law has risen, this number as a percentage of all
identified CISG cases appears to have remained static from the late 90s
until today.28  Thus, in relative terms, foreign case law is not being cited
any more today in CISG cases than it was in the last millennium.
A second common method to examine whether courts are interpret-
ing the CISG in line with Article 7 is to track the persistence of homeward
bias in significant case law.  This is, obviously, a more qualitative approach.
I probably don’t have to tell this audience, but courts are not faring much
25. See, e.g., John O. Honnold, The Sales Convention in Action—Uniform Interna-
tional Words: Uniform Application?, 8 J.L. & COM. 207, 208 (1988).
26. U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, United Nations Convention on Con-
tracts for the International Sale of Goods art. 7, Apr. 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter CISG], available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/sales/
cisg/V1056997-CISG-e-book.pdf.
27. See, e.g., Spiros V. Bazinas, Uniformity in the Interpretation and the Application
of the CISG: The Role of CLOUT and the Digest, in CELEBRATING SUCCESS: 25 YEARS
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF
GOODS 18, 19 (2006), available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/
bazinas.html; JOHN O. HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER
THE 1980 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION 92 (Harry M. Flechtner ed., 4th ed. 2009);
Ingeborg Schwenzer & Pascal Hachem, Article 7, in COMMENTARY ON THE UN CON-
VENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) 120, 124 (Ingeborg
Schwenzer ed., 3rd ed. 2010).
28. See Larry A. DiMatteo, Case Law Precedent and Legal Writing, in CISG METH-
ODOLOGY 113, 130 (Andre´ Janssen & Olaf Meyer eds., 2009).
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better under this test.  Even in states with highly developed legal systems,
there is still a significant amount of case law exhibiting a startling level of
homeward bias.29
I don’t mean to paint too grim of a picture.  The CISG is widely used
and well applied in many jurisdictions.  Furthermore, as mentioned, the
total number of cases citing the CISG and citing foreign case law is rising,
and there is very promising anecdotal and statistical evidence that legal
practitioners are becoming more familiar with the CISG and more amena-
ble to its use.30  That said, lack of visible progress in implementation is
disturbing and, what is more, neither of the scholarly approaches I have
mentioned take into account the even less-visible situation where courts
apply national law in cases where the CISG clearly should apply, a practice
that unfortunately persists.31
While the CISG can be considered a success when measured by the
number of adopting states, its huge impact on domestic law reform, or the
total number of cases citing its provisions, there is less certainty and great
room for improvement if we are to consider the quality of the cases imple-
menting the Convention.  UNCITRAL and the UNCITRAL secretariat
have long been aware of the potential problems caused by poor imple-
mentation of the CISG and have pursued multiple strategies in attempting
to aid states and courts in implementation.  The two most significant are
the Case Law on UNCITRAL Texts (CLOUT) system and the UNCITRAL
Digest of Case Law on the United Nations Convention on Contracts for
the International Sale of Goods (CISG Digest).
The CLOUT system is a publicly accessible collection of case abstracts
on UNCITRAL texts, in particular the CISG.32  The theory behind the
CLOUT system is simple enough.  By making abstracts of cases interpret-
ing UNCITRAL texts, in this case the CISG, available in the six UN lan-
guages, it makes it possible for courts and legal practitioners around the
globe to take those decisions into account, thus facilitating autonomous
and uniform interpretation.  There are now several other admirable sys-
29. See, e.g., Franco Ferrari, Homeward Trend: What, Why and Why Not, in CISG
METHODOLOGY 171, 185–92 (Andre´ Janssen & Olaf Meyer eds., 2009) (detailing
example of homeward trend in U.S. case law).
30. See Lisa Spagnolo, Green Eggs and Ham: The CISG, Path Dependence, and the
Behavioural Economics of Lawyers’ Choice of Law in International Sales Contracts, 6 J.
PRIVATE INT’L L. 417, 424 n.35 (listing studies showing increased exposure in
American law schools); id. at 427–28 (noting decreases in opting-out rates in
United States and Europe).
31. While evidence of this sort is difficult to gather, practitioners and judges
at UNCITRAL-sponsored trainings often anecdotally recount instances where
courts should have applied the CISG, but it was not plead, or it was ignored by the
court.  This type of anecdotal evidence is also found in academic literature, where
it is asserted that the CISG is little-known in some contracting states. See Spagnolo,
supra note 30, at 421–23 (citing various academic papers).
32. See Case Law on UNCITRAL Texts, UNCITRAL, http://www.uncitral.org/
uncitral/en/case_law.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2013).
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tems that complement CLOUT and also make consideration and applica-
tion of foreign case law on the CISG possible.
In general, these case databases have been very successful in compil-
ing case information. The CLOUT system, which relies on a network of
national correspondents for case abstracts, currently has over 700 CISG
cases. The Pace CISG database has over 2,500.33  Despite these numbers,
there are obvious limits on what these databases can accomplish in terms
of harmonizing interpretation.
First, there are now so many cases in these databases that courts at-
tempting to evaluate the foreign case law found in them may suffer from
information overload, making the task of interpreting the CISG more diffi-
cult while it should be easier.  Secondly, and I will say more on this in a
moment, the availability of more cases by definition also means the availa-
bility of more divergent views, all of which should be considered by a court
when rendering a decision, once again increasing the difficulty of
interpretation.
In addition, with regards to CLOUT specifically, there is always the
issue of the timeliness of reported abstracts.  This delay is not only due to
dependence on national correspondents but also the significant resources
required for translation and publication.  The existence of sufficient re-
sources is a significant issue for the CLOUT system, and I imagine for the
other databases as well.  Over time, lack of resources has meant that it is
difficult to keep CLOUT’s interface up to date, a deficiency which hinders
usability.  This problem has become so significant of late that the UNCI-
TRAL secretariat has redirected a small portion of its limited resources to
an update of CLOUT’s user interface.  While we hope that this update
invigorates CLOUT in the short term, the system’s long-term viability will
be dependent on increased financial support from states and the commit-
ment and energy of national correspondents.
Some of the CLOUT system’s limitations have been addressed by UN-
CITRAL’s other major effort in this area, namely the CISG Digest, a pro-
ject with which many of the speakers at this conference have assisted over
the years.34
The Digest is a significant contribution to uniform interpretation in
that it significantly reduces the burden on courts and legal practitioners to
search and analyze all CISG jurisprudence.  On an article-by-article basis it
concisely digests cases, highlighting divergences and identifying interpre-
tive trends.  In this way, the CISG Digest certainly helps address the prob-
lem of information overload and, at the very least, enables courts to
quickly identify and assess interpretative divergences.  The latest version of
33. See Albert Kritzer, CISG Database, INST. INT’L COM. L., http://www.cisg.law.
pace.edu (last updated Apr. 3, 2013).
34. See United Nations, UNCITRAL DIGEST OF CASE LAW ON THE UNITED NA-
TIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (2012),
available at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/case_law/digests.html.
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the Digest was published electronically last year and is now also available
in print thanks to the University of Pittsburgh Journal of Law and
Commerce.
Nonetheless, while both the CLOUT system and the Digest are impor-
tant strategic tools to assist in uniform interpretation, the lack of substan-
tive progress I mentioned earlier can only be an indication that additional
efforts are required.  Certainly, interpretive divergences remain.  Con-
sider, for example, the impact of differing approaches on key concepts
and issues such as burden of proof, estoppel, and whether computer
software is a “good” covered by the Convention.35  The fundamental hur-
dle seems to exist in moving from a situation where foreign case law is
available and cited to one in which courts in practice always refer to the
CISG when it is applicable and are effectively guided in interpreting its
provisions in a uniform manner.
Neither the CLOUT system nor the CISG Digest can assist a court if it
simply does not know the CISG is the applicable law in a certain case.  If a
court fails to apply the CISG in this scenario, it is not only a problem of an
incorrect legal outcome and a blow to harmonization, but it is a scenario
placing the state in violation of its treaty obligations.  Furthermore, even if
a court does apply the CISG, simply having notice of foreign case law and
divergent approaches does not necessarily arm it to choose the approach
which is likely to be more harmonizing in the long run.
The accepted wisdom is that foreign CISG case law should be evalu-
ated by courts on a qualitative basis and that better reasoned and more
commercially sound approaches should prevail over time.36 This assertion
is necessary because it is simply not possible that foreign CISG case law
precedent could be assessed and weighed in the manner used by common
law courts considering domestic decisions.  If this assertion were conclu-
sively true in practice, it would be a superlative method for unifying
interpretation.
In fact, however, given the time and resource constraints felt by most
courts, one cannot help but wonder if in many cases the wide availability
of foreign case law and knowledge of divergent approaches simply serves
as a mechanism for a court to pick and choose an approach with which it
is most comfortable.  If that is the case, I am afraid that choice will likely
be the one that reflects the largest degree of homeward bias and not the
one that is most well-reasoned.
Even if courts are more responsive to the goal of unification than I
have suggested, it is difficult to imagine that judges from various legal sys-
tems find it equally easy to weigh the reasoning of foreign courts.
35. See Bazinas, supra note 27, at 25.
36. See, e.g., Francesco G. Mazzotta & Camilla Baasch Andersen, Introduction:
The Nature of CISG Case Law: The Key to Uniformity and Many Persuasive Examples for
Counsel to Draw From, in A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO THE CISG xvii, xx (Camilla
Baasch Andersen et al. eds., 2010).
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Even if courts are capable of undertaking a qualitative review of for-
eign cases, relying solely on that case law without further investigation or
guidance will mean the failure to take into account legal reasoning from
jurisdictions whose courts do not produce very detailed legal opinions.
Courts in many civil law jurisdictions, including France, produce very brief
opinions that may not stand up to more detailed common law opinions
even if the legal reasoning behind them is quite sound.37  Less sophisti-
cated reviews of the case law may also give undue weight to the legal rea-
soning of courts that hear numerous disputes and, correspondingly,
produce numerous opinions.
UNCITRAL has long considered the potential value for promoting
the uniform interpretation of the CISG and other texts with something
beyond a simple and neutral case reporting system.  In 1988, it considered
a proposal to establish a permanent editorial board that would have com-
pared and analyzed decisions. More recently, when approving the CISG
Digest it considered a proposal that the Digest should provide more de-
tailed guidance as to the interpretation of the CISG.  Neither of these pro-
posals was adopted.38  In both cases, the Commission was concerned that
any evaluation might lead to criticism of national court decisions.  It also
noted that an editorial board would be difficult to organize in a way assur-
ing viewpoints from all Convention state parties.39  In sum, since the CISG
is incorporated into national law, it is easy to understand how the notion
of an outside body weighing national court decisions might raise sover-
eignty concerns, especially if that body does not include a representative
from every state party.40
The idea of developing an interpretive guide on how provisions of the
CISG should be construed (possibly in a similar form to the UNCITRAL
legislative guides relating to insolvency and security interests, or recom-
mendations regarding arbitration rules and particular aspects of the New
York Convention) is a suggestion that may warrant consideration.  How-
ever, at this point in the maturity of the instrument and its jurisprudence,
this idea would likely raise similar concerns about the need to evaluate
national court decisions.  It is further recognized that, even in the form of
a declaration by the United Nations General Assembly itself, such gui-
dance would at best be persuasive, but not binding, on courts.  Neverthe-
less, there may be merit in examining what value such explanatory
memoranda may bring to the CISG or to any future harmonizing effort in
the field of international contract law.
37. See Felemegas, supra note 24, at 254.
38. See Bazinas, supra note 27, at 21, 23.
39. See Rep. of the U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, 21st Sess., Apr. 11–Apr.
20, 1988, ¶¶ 107–109, U.N. Doc. A/43/17; GAOR, 43rd Sess., Supp. No. 17
(1988).
40. See Joshua D. H. Karton & Lorraine de Germiny, Can the CISG Advisory
Council Affect the Homeward Trend?, 13 VINDOBONA J. INT’L COM. L. ARB. 71, 74
(2009).
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In the meantime, it is evident that outside actors have been able to
develop some of these ideas.  As a self-appointed group of experts, the
CISG Advisory Council constitutes, of course, a valuable initiative to pro-
vide the kind of considered interpretive advice on CISG issues long
needed.41  This advice, however is unofficial and non-binding, and this
approach, unfortunately, does not resolve the sovereignty issues at play
when looking at the issue from the UNCITRAL perspective.
In addition to its efforts to provide case law and digests, UNCITRAL
and the secretariat have adopted other smaller-scale strategies for encour-
aging uniform interpretation of the CISG.  These strategies include ad hoc
provision of judicial training, support of educational efforts, such as the
Vis Moot, and dissemination of information on scholarly works via the UN-
CITRAL bibliography.  These efforts, however, are modest and are not al-
ways a very direct method of assisting courts.
For all of these reasons, the UNCITRAL secretariat has proposed a
new strategy for implementation of commercial law reform at the domes-
tic level.  In the context of the High-Level Meeting on the Rule of Law,
held in September of last year at the 67th Session of the United Nations
General Assembly, the UNCITRAL secretariat proposed to states the estab-
lishment of national centres of expertise in the field of commercial law.
Understanding the strong connection between economic development
and rule of law, the General Assembly has acknowledged the importance
of UNCITRAL’s work in promoting rule of law in the economic field as an
important component of promoting the rule of law more generally.
The goal behind the proposed national centres would be to
strengthen the nexus between international rule-making in the field of
commercial law and national legislation, policy-making, and implementa-
tion.  This would include, of course, implementation of the CISG, one of
UNCITRAL’s most prominent texts.  As a related proposal, the secretariat
described specific functions that could take place in the context of these
national centres.  Explicitly, they could serve as a mechanism to (a) col-
lect, analyze, and monitor national case law related to UNCITRAL texts,
(b) report the findings to UNCITRAL, and (c) address the need of the
judiciary to better understand the internationally prevailing application
and interpretation of UNCITRAL standards and achieve effective cross-
border cooperation.
This is a proposal that obviously goes beyond the current national
correspondent system of CLOUT.  The idea is that these national centres
could serve as a direct resource for judges and practitioners.  In fact, these
centres could function very similarly to the permanent editorial board I
mentioned earlier or even as a kind of domestic CISG advisory body, even
endorsing CISG Advisory Council opinions if desired.  In addition, they
could review decisions and communicate directly with courts failing to ap-
41. See CISG ADVISORY COUNCIL, http://www.cisgac.com (last visited Apr. 9,
2013).
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ply the CISG where required.  By placing these centres at the national
level, sovereignty concerns would be mitigated.  Furthermore, the staff or
researchers in these centres would be better situated to understand do-
mestic law concerns than an international body.  Certainly, with its small
staff and limits in how it can interact on domestic law issues, the UNCI-
TRAL secretariat has proven to be not adequately resourced or appropri-
ately situated to assist courts globally in the task of uniform interpretation.
That said, the secretariat would have an important residual role in the
context of a network of national centres of expertise, coordinating their
activities and continuing to offer the CLOUT system and other services.
A system of national centres would, of course, raise possible concerns
related to homeward bias, but if these centres are staffed by experts in the
international trade law field and mandated explicitly to promote uniform
implementation of texts such as the CISG, these concerns should be
minimized.
The biggest obstacle to such a system is, of course, resources.  One of
the advantages of UNCITRAL texts is that they do not have direct financial
implications for contracting states.  That said, states are required to fulfill
their international law obligations in any case, including those found in
CISG Article 7.  These national centres of expertise are one proposed
method for assisting them to do that since other, lower-cost, methods have
not entirely succeeded.  The centres themselves would constitute a cost,
and there would also be costs for the UNCITRAL secretariat related to
coordination, not to mention the ongoing costs related to its continuing
implementation efforts, such as CLOUT.
When addressing this proposal to states, the UNCITRAL secretariat
noted that such centres, considering their strong connection to the devel-
opment of economic rule of law, could rely on the assistance of multilat-
eral and bilateral donors to ensure sufficient human and financial
resources.  There are many donors available to fund projects related to the
rule of law, particularly projects in developing countries and those with
economies in transition.
I hope this proposal is of interest to states as they consider possible
ways forward in the area of uniform contract law.  These centres could be
valuable resources for the dissemination and implementation of any texts
to be developed or already developed in this area.  Furthermore, they
would act to continue the development at the national level of interna-
tional trade law expertise, something necessary to keep the work of bodies
such as UNCITRAL vibrant and relevant.  Whether or not this proposal is
acted upon by states, I hope it will encourage discussion and the develop-
ment of other strategies as states continue to look at the development of
rule of law and uniform international trade law.  At the least, I hope it will
remind states of their ongoing treaty obligations under the CISG and
other trade law instruments.
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So, in closing, the calls for further harmonization of contract law raise
a number of interesting issues about additional work that can be done in
this important area.  In considering some of the options that have been
proposed, we are reminded of the challenges we have faced not only in
the creation of such harmonizing instruments but also the adoption and,
possibly most importantly, the implementation of such instruments.  We
can draw upon the experiences of the implementation of the CISG to
chart a way forward for the development of any such future projects in this
area.
The challenges that we face in developing a truly harmonizing instru-
ment are well recognized.  It is up to us, collectively, to develop creative
responses to ensure that the potential of harmonization efforts are fully
realized.  These opportunities are not only important in considering the
creation of new harmonizing instruments, but allow us to reflect upon
how well we are doing in fulfilling our mandate with respect to existing
instruments and identifying what more can be done.  To be effective,
meeting these challenges will require the development of innovative solu-
tions, adequate resourcing, and a strong commitment not only from orga-
nizations such as UNCITRAL, but also from member states and the
broader academic and legal community.  Let us hope that, when the op-
portunity next presents itself for an examination of these issues, we can
report concrete progress in this area.
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A NEW GLOBAL INITIATIVE ON CONTRACT LAW IN UNCITRAL:
RIGHT PROJECT, RIGHT FORUM?
KEITH LOKEN*
I. IS A NEW GLOBAL INITIATIVE NEEDED AND FEASIBLE?
AT its 45th meeting last summer, the United Nations Commission onInternational Trade Law (UNCITRAL) considered a proposal for pos-
sible future work in the area of international contract law.1  The propo-
nents suggested that there is an urgent need for a new “global initiative” in
UNCITRAL to further harmonize contract law in order to significantly
boost international trade.  Although the chair of the Commission ulti-
mately ruled that there was a prevailing view in the room in support of
further exploratory work in this area, the response among participating
states was quite mixed.  A number of delegations—including that of the
United States—expressed strong reservations about undertaking such a
project.2
The U.S. government has considered carefully the proposal presented
to the Commission.  We have consulted extensively with key domestic
stakeholders on this issue.  In October 2012, it was the subject of a panel at
the annual meeting of the State Department’s Advisory Committee on Pri-
vate International Law (which includes academicians, practitioners, and
representatives of business interests).3  At that meeting, the proposal
made to UNCITRAL was not supported.  The Executive Committee of the
Uniform Law Commission (ULC)—the organization that co-developed,
with the American Law Institute, the Uniform Commercial Code in the
United States—recently adopted a resolution stating that the ULC op-
* Assistant Legal Adviser for Private International Law, Office of the Legal
Adviser, U.S. Department of State.  The author is grateful for the assistance of
Harold Burman, Michael Dennis, and Timothy Schnabel, also of the Office of
Private International Law.
1. See UNCITRAL, Possible Future Work in the Area of International Contract Law:
Proposal by Switzerland on Possible Future Work by UNCITRAL in the Area of International
Contract Law, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/758 (May 8, 2012) [hereinafter Swiss Proposal].
2. A summary of the debate is contained in the Report of the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law. See Rep. of the U.N. Comm’n on Int’l
Trade Law, 45th Sess., June 25–July 6, 2012, ¶¶ 127–32, U.N. Doc. A/67/17;
GAOR, 67th Sess., Supp. No. 17 (2012) [hereinafter Report of 45th Session] (sum-
marizing debate).  Several delegations expressly objected to the ruling of the Chair
as not accurately reflecting the opinions voiced during the debate and—unusu-
ally—those objections were recorded in the official Report of the Commission.
3. The State Department’s Advisory Committee on Private International Law
(ACPIL) holds a plenary meeting annually. See Private International Law, U.S. DEP’T
OF STATE, www.state.gov/s/l/c3452.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2013) (providing infor-
mation regarding ACPIL, including summary of October 11–12, 2012 annual
meeting).
(509)
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poses the proposal made in UNCITRAL because the project is very un-
likely to be successful and because an attempt to develop the type of
instrument proposed would not be a prudent use of resources.4
On the basis of these consultations and other analysis, it is our view
that the time is not right for undertaking a global initiative.  We reach this
conclusion because:
1. The need for an initiative of the scale proposed has not been
demonstrated (taking into account, inter alia, the availability of the
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts
(UNIDROIT Principles)5 and the ability of parties to designate those Prin-
ciples as the law governing their contract).
2. We are not aware of demand for such a major initiative from U.S.
parties to international commercial contracts.
3. Even if the international legal system would be better if a broad
instrument of the sort advocated by the proponents were successfully
drafted and adopted, it is likely that the attempt to draft and adopt such
an instrument would expend considerable institutional resources of UN-
CITRAL and its member states, detracting from UNCITRAL’s continuing
efforts to achieve broader adoption of the United Nations Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG), as well as other
projects of UNCITRAL.  Moreover, we conclude that such an initiative
would have little chance of coming to a successful conclusion at this time.
A. Need for a New Global Initiative?
Currently, the global harmonization and unification of international
commercial law relies primarily on two key international instruments: the
CISG6 and the UNIDROIT Principles.
With respect to the CISG, UNCITRAL is engaged in an ongoing effort
to promote the treaty’s worldwide ratification and uniform implementa-
tion.  The CISG was the culmination of a half-century of work by the inter-
national community, including a decade of work in UNCITRAL.  At the
2005 UNCITRAL Colloquium celebrating the 25th anniversary of the
CISG, the Convention was recognized as probably the single most success-
ful treaty in the history of modern transactional commercial law.7  Since
that colloquium, fifteen more states have become party to the Convention,
4. See UNIF. LAW COMM’N, MINUTES: MID-YEAR MEETING OF THE EXECUTIVE
COMMITTEE (2013), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/execu-
tive/2013jan12_EC_Min_Midyear_Final.pdf.
5. See INT’L INST. FOR THE UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAW, UNIDROIT PRINCI-
PLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS (2010), available at http://www.
unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/main.htm.
6. See United Nations Convention on Contracts for the Int’l Sale of Goods,
Apr. 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CISG], available at http://www.uncit
ral.org/pdf/english/texts/sales/cisg/V1056997-CISG-e-book.pdf.
7. See Herbert Kronke, The UN Sales Convention, the UNIDROIT Contract Princi-
ples and the Way Beyond, 25 J.L. & COM. 451, 458–59 (2005).
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bringing the total number of states to seventy-eight.8  The success of the
Convention can be gauged by the fact that it has proved acceptable to
nations with different legal systems, varying levels of economic develop-
ment, and diverse political systems.  It is said that the CISG has become
the lingua franca of sales.9
As was discussed during the 2005 UNCITRAL Colloquium, the focus
of UNCITRAL in this area has been to promote global awareness of the
CISG and to facilitate uniform interpretation and application of its provi-
sions.10  Pursuant to decisions by the Commission, including in 1998 and
2009, the UNCITRAL Secretariat is devoting resources to developing and
maintaining the CISG Digest and Case Law on UNCITRAL Texts
(CLOUT) in the six official languages of the United Nations.11  The sys-
tem relies on a network of national correspondents designated by those
states that are parties to the CISG and other instruments.12
The 2005 UNCITRAL Colloquium also highlighted the widespread
use of the UNIDROIT Principles as a complement to the CISG.  In 2007
and 2012, UNCITRAL concluded that the 2005 and 2010 editions, respec-
tively, of the Principles “complement a number of other instruments in-
cluding the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods (1980),” and further “commend[ed]” the use of the Princi-
ples as appropriate for their intended purposes, which are reflected in the
Principles’ Preamble:
They shall be applied when the parties have agreed that their
contract be governed by them.
They may be applied when the parties have agreed that their con-
tract be governed by general principles of law, the lex mercatoria
or the like. . . .  [And] when the parties have not chosen any law
to govern their contract.
They may be used to interpret or supplement international uni-
form law instruments. . . .  [And] to interpret or supplement do-
mestic law.
8. See Status 1980—United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods, UNCITRAL, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/
sale_goods/1980CISG_status.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2013) (listing parties to
CISG).
9. See, e.g., Hiroo Sono, Contract Law Harmonization and Non-Contracting
States: The Case of the CISG 1 (July 9–12, 2007), available at http://www.uncitral.
org/pdf/english/congress/Sono_hiroo.pdf (providing text of presentation given
at UNCITRAL Congress Modern Law for Global Commerce).
10. See Jernej Sekolec, 25 Years UN Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods: Welcome Address, 25 J.L. & COM. xvii (2006), available at http://www.
cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/sekolec.html.
11. See Report of 45th Session, supra note 2, ¶¶ 149–53, 157.
12. See id. ¶¶ 150–52.
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They may serve as a model for national and international
legislators.13
The UNCITRAL 1985 Model Law on International Commercial Arbi-
tration14 and the 2010 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules15 specify that the ar-
bitral tribunal shall apply the rules of law designated by the parties as
applicable to the dispute.  In this context, the term “rules of law” refers to
non-state law such as the UNIDROIT Principles.  Moreover, there are con-
temporary international efforts to promote the availability and use of rules
of law.  For example, the Hague Conference on Private International Law
is developing principles on choice of law in international commercial con-
tracts, and those draft principles endorse giving effect to the choice of
parties to have their contract governed by “rules of law that are generally
accepted on an international, supranational or regional level as a neutral
and balanced set of rules.”16  That definition of rules of law includes the
UNIDROIT Principles, enabling parties who so desire to have their con-
tracts governed by the UNIDROIT Principles.17
13. See INT’L INST. FOR THE UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAW, supra note 5, at
pmbl. (providing 2010 Commission decision); Rep. of the U.N. Comm’n on Int’l
Trade Law, 40th Sess., June 25–July 12, 2007, ¶ 213, UN Doc. A/67/17 (Part I);
GAOR, 62d Sess., Supp. No. 17 (2007) (reporting 2007 Commission decision).
14. See UNCITRAL, UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Ar-
bitration art. 28 (1985) (as amended in 2006), available at http://www.uncitral.
org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/1985Model_arbitration.html.
15. See UNCITRAL, UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules art. 35(1) (2010) (as re-
vised in 2010), available at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/
arbitration/2010Arbitration_rules.html.
16. HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT’L LAW, DRAFT HAGUE PRINCIPLES ON
CHOICE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS art. 3 (2012), available at http://
www.hcch.net/upload/wop/contracts2012principles_e.pdf.  The Draft Hague
Principles were initially approved by the Special Commission on Choice of Law in
International Contracts held in The Hague on November 12–16, 2012.  The Princi-
ples will be considered for final approval by the Council on General Affairs and
Policy (the Conference’s governing body).
17. Many institutional arbitration rules permit the tribunal to apply directly
the UNIDROIT Principles even in the absence of a choice of law.  For example,
Article 21(1) of the ICC Rules provides “[t]he parties shall be free to agree upon
the rules of law to be applied by the arbitral tribunal to the merits of the dispute.
In the absence of any such agreement, the arbitral tribunal shall apply the rules of
law which it determines to be appropriate.” See INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE,
RULES OF ARBITRATION art. 21(1) (2012), available at http://www.iccwbo.org/Prod
ucts-and-Services/Arbitration-and-ADR/Arbitration/ICC-Rules-of-Arbitration/#
top; see also INT’L CTR. FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION, ARBITRATION RULES art. 28(1)
(2010), available at http://www.internationalarbitrationlaw.com/icdr-arbitration-
rules/; LONDON COURT OF INT’L ARBITRATION, LCIA RULES art. 22(3) (1998), avail-
able at http://www.bu.edu/lawlibrary/PDFs/research/portals/pdfs/lcia_rules_
arbitration_english.pdf; AUSTL. CTR. FOR INT’L COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, ACICA
ARBITRATION RULES, art. 34.1 (2005), available at http://www.acica.org.au/down
loads/ACICA_Arbitration_Rules.pdf; NETH. ARBITRATION INST., NAI ARBITRATION
RULES art. 46 (1998), available at http://www.asser.nl/default.aspx?site_id=6&level
1=14433&level2=14445; STOCKHOLM CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, SCC ARBITRATION
RULES 2010 art. 22(1) (2010), available at http://www.sccinstitute.com/filearchive/
3/35894/K4_Skiljedomsregler%20eng%20ARB%20TRYCK_v1_100927.pdf; VI-
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We do not think the case has been made that the current interna-
tional framework is inhibiting trade or presents transactional problems to
such a degree that a major international negotiation—which assuredly
would be a difficult, lengthy exercise—is warranted.  We have thus far not
heard requests for such an initiative from U.S. practitioners or their cli-
ents—those directly involved in international sales transactions.  Moreo-
ver, there is a risk that a global undertaking to revise and expand the CISG
could have a chilling effect on further action by states to ratify or accede to
the 1980 instrument.
As discussed at the 2005 Colloquium, the CISG was never intended to
stand alone as a comprehensive framework: from the outset states envi-
sioned that it would coexist with, and complement, other sources of law, as
well as with private self-regulation and party autonomy.18  More recently,
at the 2007 UNCITRAL Colloquium on Modern Law for Global Com-
merce it was observed that parties are increasingly selecting the CISG to
govern their international contracts.19  Initiating a new global initiative at
this point in time designed to change the CISG could slow that promising
trend.
ENNA INT’L ARBITRAL CTR., RULES OF ARBITRATION & CONCILIATION art. 22(2)
(2012), available at http://www.viac.org.vn/Uploads/Quy%20tac%202012%20Eng
%20-%20Final.PDF; WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., WIPO ARBITRATION, MEDIA-
TION, & EXPERT DETERMINATION RULES & CLAUSES art. 59(a) (2009), available at
http://www.wipo.int/freepublications/en/arbitration/446/wipo_pub_446.pdf.
On a regional level, the 1994 Inter-American Convention on the Law Applicable to
International Contracts states in Article 9 that “[i]f the parties have not selected
the applicable law . . . .  The Court . . . shall also take into account the general
principles of international commercial law recognized by international organiza-
tions.”  Inter-American Convention on the Law Applicable to Int’l Contracts art. 9,
Mar. 17, 1984, 33 I.L.M. 732.  Article 10 further recognizes that “principles of inter-
national commercial law as well as commercial usage and practices generally ac-
cepted shall apply in order to discharge the requirements of justice and equity in
the particular case.” Id. art. 10.  The references to general principles of interna-
tional commercial law include the UNIDROIT Principles.  On a domestic level,
Comment 2 to U.C.C. § 1-302, as revised in 2001, states that “parties may vary the
effect of [the Uniform Commercial Code’s] provisions by stating that their rela-
tionship will be governed by recognized bodies of rules or principles applicable to
commercial transactions . . . [such as] the UNIDROIT Principles of International
Commercial Contracts.”  U.C.C. § 1-302 cmt. 2 (2001).
18. See generally Filip De Ly, Sources of International Sales Law: An Eclectic Model,
25 J.L. & COM. 1 (2005).
19. Several papers presented at the UNCITRAL Congress on Modern Law for
Global Commerce at the 40th Annual Session of UNCITRAL (Vienna, July 9–12,
2007) addressed the CISG’s increased use. See, e.g., Harry M. Flechtner, Changing
the Opt-Out Tradition in the United States, (July 9–12, 2007), available at http://
www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/congress/Flechtner.pdf (providing text of presen-
tation); Eckart Bro¨dermann, The Practice of Excluding the CISG: Time for
Change? (July 9–12, 2007), available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/con
gress/Broedermann-rev.pdf (same).
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B. Feasibility of a New Global Initiative?
It is also necessary to consider whether it is feasible to achieve the
ambitious goals that the proponents of the initiative have identified.  If
this ambitious initiative were launched, what might be achieved?
It is not clear what the expected product of global negotiations might
be.20  The topics of contract law that have been proposed for such an initi-
ative are already substantially covered in the UNIDROIT Principles.21
There would appear to be little value in having UNCITRAL duplicate
UNIDROIT’s work by developing a competing non-binding instrument.
Moreover, the proposal submitted to UNCITRAL characterizes the
UNIDROIT Principles’ status as a soft law instrument as being a perceived
shortcoming.22
The merits of a new global commercial code as either a soft law or a
hard law instrument were addressed at the UNCITRAL Colloquium cele-
brating the 25th Anniversary of the CISG.  At that gathering, Professor
Herbert Kronke, then Secretary-General of UNIDROIT, reviewed what he
termed “the never-subsiding charm of codes” and concluded that the time
would be better spent on, inter alia, greater cooperation with respect to
existing instruments.23  He also emphasized the complementary nature
between the binding nature of the CISG and the non-binding nature of
the UNIDROIT Principles:
What we see looking at the two instruments—the CISG as the
mother of all modern conventions on the law of specific con-
tracts and the UPICC as the (inevitably) soft-law source of mod-
ern general contract law—are neither competitors nor apples
and pears.  What we see is actually, and even more, potentially, a
fruitful coexistence . . . .  [T]he UNIDROIT Contract Principles
are, obviously, complementary in that they address a wide range
of topics of general contract law which neither the CISG nor any
20. See Swiss Proposal, supra note 1, at 7.
21. The proponents of a global initiative acknowledge that the UNIDROIT
Principles “now cover all areas that are perceived as contract law in most legal
systems.” Id. at 4.
22. See id. at 5.  The Hague Conference on Private International Law has de-
termined that a soft law approach—involving principles—is preferred in develop-
ing an instrument on choice of law in international commercial contracts. See
HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT’L LAW, supra note 16.
23. See Kronke, supra note 7, at 462–63.  Professor Kronke points out that
“While Professor Bonell is envisaging the [UNIDROIT Principles] assuming that
function in maintaining their present status of soft law, Professor Lando insists on
their being elevated to binding rules, to be mandatorily applied to non-domestic
and non-inter-European transactions.” Id. at 463; see also, Michael Joachim Bonell,
Towards a Legislative Codification of the UNIDROIT Principles? (July 9–12, 2007),
available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/congress/Bonell.pdf (providing
text of presentation).
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other existing or future convention devoted to a specific type of
transaction would ever venture to touch upon.24
The negotiations relating to the CISG demonstrate the difficulty of
the task.  The drafters were confronted with widely different legal tradi-
tions as well as different approaches to international business transactions
and different policy approaches between developing and industrialized
countries.  Topics such as validity, including mistake, and agency were left
out of the CISG because they were not at that time considered suitable for
harmonization.25  Though a few states may have done so, we are not aware
of, in the years since those negotiations, states reaching a broad consensus
on the many very challenging issues deliberately left out of the CISG or
insufficiently addressed by the CISG, or that such a consensus is likely to
be found in a new global negotiation.
24. Kronke, supra note 7, at 458–59.  Professor Kronke continues with an ex-
ample concerning the concept of good faith:
While it is true that governments would be well-advised not to again dis-
cuss, for example, the concept of good faith in the context of developing
rules for a specific transaction, as they did in Vienna where they finally
settled on papering over disagreements in Article 7 CISG, we can say so
only now that we have discovered an alternative vehicle for the promo-
tion of that concept: Article 1.7 UNIDROIT Contract Principles.
Id. at 459.
25. For example, issues of substantive validity were generally excluded from
the scope of the CISG pursuant to Article 4, based primarily on a Secretariat report
finding that: (1) these issues rarely arise, and that there was no indication that
differences in the laws with respect to contract validity lead to significant problems
in international trade; and (2) “rules on duress, or similar rules on usury, uncon-
scionable contracts, good faith in performance and the like also serve as a vehicle
by which the political, social and economic philosophy of the society is made effec-
tive in respect of contracts” and
[i]t is by the extensive or the restrictive interpretation of such rules that
many legal systems have effected the balance between a philosophy of
sanctity of contract with the security of transactions which that affords
and a philosophy of protecting the weaker party to a transaction at the
cost of rendering contracts less secure.
U.N. Secretary-General, Formation and Validity of Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods, ¶ 26, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/128, annex. II, reprinted in [1977] VIII Y.B. UNCI-
TRAL 93, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/SER.A/1977.  States subsequently decided to ex-
clude specific rules on validity with regard to mistake because of their inconsistent
treatment under various legal systems. See Report of the Working Group on the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods on the Work of Its Ninth Session, Sept. 19–30, 1977, ¶¶ 48–69, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.9/142, reprinted in [1978] IX Y.B. UNCITRAL 65–66, U.N. Doc. A/
CN.0/SER.A/1978 (decision to exclude specific rules on validity, particularly with
regard to mistake).  Similarly, efforts to address issues related to agency were not
successful. See, e.g., Rep. of the Working Group on the Work of Its Sixth Session,
Jan. 27–Feb. 7, 1975, ¶ 47, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/100, reprinted in [1975] VI Y.B. UN-
CITRAL 53 (“There was opposition to a special article on agency relationships in a
convention on sales and no consensus was reached on the adoption of this propo-
sal.  At the same time it was agreed to delete any reference to agency relationship
in other articles of the Convention.”).  UNIDROIT subsequently developed a Con-
vention on Agency in the International Sale of Goods, but only a few countries
have ratified it and it has never entered into force. See Convention on Agency in
the Int’l Sale of Goods, Feb. 17, 1983, 22 I.L.M. 249.
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The drafting of the UNIDROIT Principles was achievable for a num-
ber of reasons, as pointed out by Professor E. Allan Farnsworth, one of the
key contributors to the development of the Principles:
[D]o we not tremble when we meet at the thought of drafting
principles for the entire world? . . . .  We do not tremble for at
least four reasons.  One, we are drafting mere principles and not
a uniform law, so that whatever rules we write are only likely to be
applied if they find favor with someone concerned with a particu-
lar transaction or dispute. . . .  Two, most of our principles are
unlikely to miscarry because they are framed with evident gener-
ality (e.g., “good faith and fair dealing”) or they have built-in
safety valves (e.g., “unless the circumstances indicate otherwise”),
giving them enough flexibility to permit a judge or arbitrator to
use common sense in applying them so as to avoid an arbitrary or
unfair result.  Three, in some instances we have declined to deal
with tough questions, as in the area . . . of invalidity on a variety
of grounds under the applicable domestic law.  And four, . . .
UNIDROIT is free to amend the Principles . . . from time to time
to take care of problems that later surface.26
Moreover, the negotiations were largely conducted by experts who
were not representing governments bound by national policies but rather
participated in their individual capacities, thereby enjoying more flexibil-
ity in developing the Principles.27  Even so, the negotiations in
UNIDROIT regarding the first version of the Principles took fourteen
years.
In UNCITRAL, the dynamic would be far different—governments
would conduct the negotiations with more direct implications for national
interests, and policy positions that must be defended.  As a result, reaching
consensus would inevitably be more difficult.  As Professor Peter Schlech-
triem observed with regard to the CISG:
No codification is ever perfect, and every legal text, therefore
needs instruments and concepts that allow adjustments, develop-
ment and gap-filling to cope with issues not foreseen by its draft-
ers.  This is even more so in the case of codifications based on
international conventions, for, while a domestic legislator might
26. E. Allan Farnsworth, Closing Remarks, Contract Law in a Changing World, 40
AM. J. COMP. L. 699, 699–700 (1992).
27. See Roy Goode, Rule, Practice, and Pragmatism in Transnational Commercial
Law, 54 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 539, 553–54, 556 (2005) (stating that Principles
demonstrate “that the formulation of international rules of general law, whether
relating to international trade or otherwise, is best left to scholars,” who have
“technical expertise and freedom from political restraints,” while governments can
“focus on more specific areas—for example, competition law and consumer pro-
tection—where the rules are essentially mandatory rules or rules of public policy
rather than dispositive provisions.”); see also Bonell, supra note 23.
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be willing and competent to enact necessary improvements and
reforms, the chances that another United Nations conference
can be convened on the CISG, that it will reach results, and that
all states that have enacted the Convention will also enact re-
forms, is almost zero.  So there must be safety valves.  They are
interpretation and gap-filling.  The basis is article 7 of the CISG,
the formulation of which can now be found in a number of other
international conventions, model laws and drafts.28
With regard to the discussion of codifying international commercial
law, it has been suggested that the experience of the United States’ Uni-
form Commercial Code (U.C.C.) may be instructive.29  Yet the United
States has never attempted a comprehensive codification of the law gov-
erning the sale of goods.  Rather, Article 2 of the U.C.C., while codifying
many important rules in a systematic way, still relies heavily on general
principles of law outside the U.C.C.—which were not the subject of har-
monization efforts—to fill its many gaps.  Examples include agency; what
constitutes an offer to enter into a contract; and the circumstances in
which a contract might be avoided on grounds such as mistake, misrepre-
sentation, duress, and illegality.  The experience in the United States sug-
gests that certain aspects of contract law are not good candidates for
codification.  In the 1990s, the American Law Institute and the Uniform
Law Commission considered revising Article 2 to cover certain service con-
tracts related to contracts for the sale of goods (i.e., contracts to install,
maintain, support, and repair goods).  Although drafts were prepared and
considered, the effort was quickly abandoned as not feasible.
The difficulties encountered in trying to codify these issues within
one common law country suggest that trying to do so internationally—
across common law and civil law jurisdictions—would be quite challeng-
ing.  Within the United States, these topics have been dealt with through
approaches such as the Restatement of Contracts, which can address the
issues as principles rather than seeking codification as in the U.C.C.  Simi-
larly, the limited approach taken with regard to the CISG left these topics
to be dealt with internationally in soft law instruments such as the
UNIDROIT Principles.30
28. Peter Schlechtriem, Requirements of Application and Sphere of Applicability of
the CISG, 36 VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 781, 789 (2005).
29. See, e.g., CLIVE M. SCHMITTOFF, COMMERCIAL LAW IN A CHANGING ECONOMIC
CLIMATE 30 (2d ed. 1981) (“[The] attempt to draft a world code on international
trade law . . . is not an idle dream. . . .  [T]here is the example of the Uniform
Commercial Code of the United States.  It started as an academic venture but be-
came reality when it was adopted by 49 of the 50 jurisdictions of the United
States.”); see also Michael Joachim Bonell, Do We Need a Global Commercial Code?, 106
DICK. L. REV. 87, 89 (2001).
30. Just as the U.S. has had difficulty in developing a comprehensive code of
contract law domestically, the European Union has, in the course of considering a
series of initiatives, experienced similar problems with the development of a set of
uniform regional principles.
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In short, the historical example of the CISG speaks for itself.  Those
negotiations, building on forty years of work in the international arena in
other organizations, still took nearly ten years—and elected not to tackle
some of the hardest issues.
II. MAXIMIZING PRODUCTIVE USE OF UNCITRAL’S RESOURCES
What, then, might UNCITRAL productively do in the area of interna-
tional contract law?  It is important to recognize that in fact UNCITRAL is
already doing a good deal in that regard in line with its primary mandate
to promote coordination and cooperation in the development of interna-
tional trade law:31
• encouraging more widespread ratification of or accession to the
CISG;32
• developing and maintaining the CISG Digest (now third edition)
and CLOUT in the six official languages of the United Nations,
thereby promoting the uniform interpretation and application of
the CISG;33
• endorsing the UNIDROIT Principles as complementary to the
CISG, including most recently the 2010 edition;34 and
• endorsing the ICC’s Incoterms, including most recently the 2010
edition.35
Other UNCITRAL activities could be explored, keeping in mind the
factors previously noted: demonstration of need and feasibility; scarcity of
resources and competing priorities; and the value of collaboration with
other organizations.  For example, UNIDROIT is developing model
clauses to be used by parties to ensure that the UNIDROIT Principles will
govern their contracts.36  When that project is complete, UNCITRAL may
consider whether to endorse them.
31. Establishment of the United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law, G.A. Res. 2205 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/
6594 (Dec. 17, 1966); see also Gerold Herrmann, The Role of UNCITRAL, in FOUNDA-
TIONS & PERSPECTIVES OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 28, 34 (Ian Fletcher, Loukas
Mistelis & Marise Cremona eds., 2001).
32. See Report of 45th Session, supra note 2, ¶¶ 159–60.
33. See id. ¶¶ 149–53.
34. See id. ¶¶ 137–40.
35. See id. ¶¶ 141–44.  For a comprehensive list of texts of other organizations
endorsed by UNCITRAL, see Texts of Other Organizations Endorsed by UNCITRAL,
UNCITRAL, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/other_organizations_texts.
html (last visited on Apr. 4, 2013).
36. The UNIDROIT Governing Council, at its 91st session in May 2012, de-
cided to set up a restricted Working Group for the preparation of Model Clauses
for use by parties intending to indicate in their contract more precisely in what way
they wish to see the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts
used during the performance of the contract or when a dispute arises.  The Work-
ing Group, composed of experts in the field of private international law and arbi-
tration, held its first session in Rome February 11–12, 2013. See Model Clauses for
Use by Parties of the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts,
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The United States has long been a strong supporter of UNCITRAL.
We consider UNCITRAL a real success story—one of the most practical
and productive organs in the UN system.  It creates tangible legal products
that can have a real impact in promoting international trade, while at the
same time contributing to the rule of law globally.  This record of achieve-
ment continues under the very capable leadership of Secretary Sorieul.
Yet UNCITRAL, like other elements of the United Nations, is under in-
creasing budget pressures, as are member and observer states, including
developing countries.37  Thus, it is important that UNCITRAL marshal its
resources and be selective in its choice of projects.
One must also take into account competing priorities.  With regard to
possible new projects, the Commission has expressly assigned priority to
another topic, which has broad support particularly among developing
countries: microfinance and other means of creating an enabling legal
environment for micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises.38  UNCI-
TRAL held a colloquium on that topic January 16–18, 2013 in Vienna.
The Commission also endorsed exploratory work in the area of public-
private partnerships and project finance.39  UNCITRAL will hold a collo-
quium on those issues in May 2013.  With the ongoing work in several
working groups, UNCITRAL’s resources are already spread thin.
Also, the Commission has in the past recognized that the Secretariat
can face resource shortfalls with regard to efforts to promote the ratifica-
tion and implementation of the CISG.40  As Gerold Herrmann, then Sec-
retary of UNCITRAL, observed a decade ago regarding such efforts:
[T]he Secretariat’s lack of resources is a particularly disap-
pointing feature here . . . [because] the preparation of a uniform
law is an extremely expensive affair (the Sales Convention cost
the United Nations alone an estimated 6 million U.S. dollars)
which would mean a considerable waste if, for lack of a compara-
tively minute amount, the text will not be made known to the
relevant people.41
UNIDROIT, http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/modelclauses/main.
htm (last updated Mar. 26, 2013).
37. In 2011, the United States and other UNCITRAL members had to mobil-
ize to protect UNCITRAL’s budget from proposed cuts that would have ended the
traditional practice of alternating UNCITRAL meetings between Vienna and New
York, a practice that the United States and other UNCITRAL members consider
highly important to maintaining the diversity of representation at its meetings, the
quality of UNCITRAL’s work, and the global impact of its instruments.  Those
funds were ultimately restored, but only after extensive discussions. See Rep. of the
U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, 44th Sess., June 27–July 8, 2011, ¶¶ 334–44,
U.N. Doc. A/66/17; GAOR 66th Sess., Supp. No. 17 (2011).
38. See id. ¶¶ 124–26.
39. See id. ¶¶ 115–23.
40. See Report of 45th Session, supra note 2, ¶ 157.
41. Herrmann, supra note 31, at 33.
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Such efforts are equally important today.
III. CONCLUSION
Achieving further harmonization and unification of international
contract law is a worthy goal.  However, we must be pragmatic.  Key domes-
tic constituencies and trusted advisers tell us that the time is not right for a
global initiative, principally because the desired results simply cannot be
achieved at this time.  If such a major undertaking were to be pursued at
the present time, we envisage a contentious, multi-year negotiation that
would likely not bring significant results, and at great expense to UNCI-
TRAL and its members.  There is also the risk that it could detract from
existing efforts to secure widespread adoption of the CISG.  The U.S. gov-
ernment believes that there are less ambitious but more practical alterna-
tives for achieving progress in this area, and that UNCITRAL should
continue to focus on such alternatives.
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THE SOFT LAW APPROACH TO UNIFICATION OF
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACT LAW: FUTURE
PERSPECTIVES IN LIGHT OF UNIDROIT’S EXPERIENCE
ANNA VENEZIANO*
I. INTRODUCTION
I am grateful to the organizers of the 2013 Villanova Law Review NormanJ. Shachoy Symposium for the invitation to contribute to a most interest-
ing symposium on the future of uniform law in the field of international
contracts.
This Article is centered on the advantages and disadvantages of differ-
ent methodological approaches to the development of uniform rules for
international trade.
In the following, I will first deal with what has been achieved so far,
focusing on the two most successful uniform law instruments in the field
of international contract law—namely the United Nations (UN) Conven-
tion on Contracts for the International Sales of Goods (CISG)1 and the
International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT)2
Principles for International Commercial Contracts (PICC).3
Turning to the recent debate on the further development of uniform
law for international contracts which is taking place within UNCITRAL
and elsewhere, in Part III I will then attempt to give some answers to the
question posed by the present Symposium—i.e., “Has the time come for a
new global initiative to harmonize and unify international trade?”  In do-
ing this, I will be assessing the suitability and the need, at the present
stage, to make use of either legislative or non-legislative means to achieve
further worldwide harmonization of general contract law.
* Professor of Comparative Law, University of Teramo (Italy); Deputy
Secretary General, UNIDROIT.  The views expressed in this Article are those of
the author only and do not necessarily reflect the official position of UNIDROIT.
1. In 1980, the CISG was drafted under the auspices of the UN Commission
on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), which was established in 1966 as a Per-
manent Commission within the UN General Assembly.
2. See generally UNIDROIT: An Overview, UNIDROIT, http://www.unidroit.
org/dynasite.cfm?dsmid=103284 (last visited Apr. 13, 2013).  UNIDROIT was
founded in 1926 as an auxiliary organ of the League of Nations, and in 1940 be-
came an independent intergovernmental organization whose membership pres-
ently encompasses sixty-three states from all five continents. See id.
3. See generally INT’L INST. FOR THE UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAW, UNIDROIT
PRINCIPLES FOR INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS (2010).  The first edition
of the UNIDROIT Principles was published in 1994, the second edition in 2004,
and the third edition in 2010.  For further discussion of UNIDROIT’s PICC, see
infra notes 4–28 and accompanying text.
(521)
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II. WHAT HAS BEEN ACHIEVED THUS FAR
A review of the most successful instruments for the worldwide unifica-
tion of contract law cannot but start with the CISG.  The Convention in-
deed constitutes an extraordinary achievement not only for the
unprecedented width of its scope of application and the high number of
states from all continents which participated in the Diplomatic Confer-
ence in Vienna,4 nor just for its subsequent undeniable success in terms of
ratifications5 and its practical application.6  Perhaps even more signifi-
cantly, it has played a major role in building a universally shared vocabu-
lary and a common denominator of rules which have since represented
the basis for any academic discourse on international contract law, as well
as serving as a model for national legislation7 and international8 and su-
pranational9 instruments alike.  Last but not least, it has offered the op-
4. See Legislative History: 1980 Vienna Diplomatic Conference, PACE L. SCH. INST.
OF INT’L COM. LAW, http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/conference.html (last up-
dated July 13, 2007) (detailing Diplomatic Conference proceedings).  The formal
development of uniform rules for international sales has a long history and dates
back to 1929, when UNIDROIT discussed Ernst Rabel’s first proposal.
UNIDROIT’s work, which concluded with the adoption of The Hague Uniform
Laws in 1964, was resumed by UNCITRAL and led to the adoption of the CISG.
See generally PETER SCHLECHTRIEM & INGEBORG SCHWENZER, COMMENTARY ON THE
UN CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG)
1–12 (Ingeborg Schwenzer ed., 2010).
5. At the time of this writing, there are seventy-eight contracting states from
all five continents and including most major participants in the world trade.  Ratifi-
cations have been steadily growing since the CISG’s entry into force in 1988.  In
addition, a number of states have withdrawn reservations made at the outset (e.g.,
on the requirement of the written form or the exclusion of Part II of the Conven-
tion). See United Nations, UNCITRAL DIGEST OF CASE LAW ON THE UNITED NA-
TIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 436,
445 (2012) [hereinafter UNCITRAL DIGEST], http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/en
glish/clout/CISG-digest-e.pdf; Ministry of Commerce, China Contract Law and CISG
Become More Consistent in Provisions on Contract Form and Their Applicability, PEOPLE’S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA, (Feb. 25, 2013), http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/news
release/significantnews/201302/20130200038302.shtml.
6. The by-now significant amount of international case law applying the CISG
(both by national and by arbitral courts of more than thirty states) is collected in
online databases which provide search facilities as well as detailed abstracts in En-
glish. See Albert H. Kritzer, CISG Database, PACE L. SCH. INST. OF INT’L COM. LAW,
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu (last updated Apr. 3, 2013); UNCITRAL DIGEST
supra note 5; Welcome to UNILEX, UNILEX, http://www.unilex.info/dynasite.cfm?
dssid=2375&dsmid=14276.
7. See Ingeborg Schwenzer & Pascal Hachem, The CISG—Successes and Pitfalls,
57 AM. J. COMP. L. 457, 461–63 (2009); Franco Ferrari, General Report, in THE CISG
AND ITS IMPACT ON NATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS 413 (Franco Ferrari ed., 2008).
8. The most notable example being the PICC. See MICHAEL JOACHIM BONELL,
AN INTERNATIONAL RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACT LAW: THE UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS 306 (3d ed. 2005) (“[T]o the extent that
the two instruments address the same issues, the rules laid down in the UNIDROIT
Principles are normally taken either literally or at least in substance from the cor-
responding provisions of CISG.”).
9. Suffice it to refer, at a legislative level, to the 1999 EC Consumer Sales
Directive.  International uniform law, including CISG, influenced also the DCFR as
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portunity to develop various methods to strive for uniformity in the
interpretation by domestic courts and arbitral tribunals in different
jurisdictions.10
Notwithstanding its merits, however, the CISG also shows the limits of
uniformity achieved through legislative means.  The need to reach a gov-
ernmental consensus through the process of negotiating an international
treaty reduced the chances of dealing with more controversial subjects
such as contracting under standard terms or through an agent, invalidity
issues, change of circumstances, pre-contractual liability, stipulated dam-
ages, many aspects of restitution, just to mention a few notable gaps.
Other provisions are difficult to apply because they were the outcome of a
compromise (such as the ones regarding the role of the principle of good
faith, the right to specific performance, the relationship between funda-
mental breach and the seller’s right to cure, interest for late payment).11
Thus, when UNIDROIT, more than three decades ago, set up a spe-
cial working group for the development of rules for international com-
mercial contracts in general, it was decided that the innovative approach
of a “soft law” instrument should be followed, instead of continuing with
the traditional model of a multilateral treaty.12  The drafters, therefore,
opted for a non-binding set of rules, not assisted by force of law nor ex-
pected to principally serve the purpose of becoming legislation.13  They
clearly had in mind the example of U.S. restatements of the law, whose
well as the recent 2011 Commission Proposal for EU Regulation on optional Com-
mon European Sales Law (CESL). See PRINCIPLES, DEFINITIONS AND MODEL RULES
OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW: DRAFT COMMON FRAME OF REFERENCE (DCFR) (Chris-
tian von Bar et al. eds., 2009); Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and
of the Council on a Common European Sales Law, COM (2011) 635 final (Oct. 11,
2011). See generally Eric Clive, Key Concepts in Uniform and Regional Private Law In-
struments: An Emerging Consensus?, 2013 UNIF. L. REV. 1.
10. The question of the uniform interpretation of the CISG has always been
one of the most debated among scholars and has found its way even in case law
applying the CISG. See Pilar Perales Viscasillas, Article 7, in UN CONVENTION ON
CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) 111 (Stefan Kro¨ll et al.
eds., 2011).  The CISG Advisory Council, an independent commission established
in 2001 and composed of well-known experts in the field coming from different
jurisdictions, has already published a number of opinions which suggest solutions
based on the review and critical assessment of interpretative trends in case law. See
Welcome to International Sales Convention Advisory Council, CISG ADVISORY COUNCIL,
http://www.cisgac.com (last visited Apr. 11, 2013).
11. As the drafters of the CISG were well aware. See PETER SCHLECHTRIEM,
UNIFORM SALES LAW—THE UN-CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNA-
TIONAL SALE OF GOODS 55, 61, 77 (Peter Doralt & Helmut H. Haschek eds., 1986).
12. The project, initially labeled “Progressive Unification of International
Trade Law” and approved by UNIDROIT as early as 1971, was assigned to a special
working group in 1980 and assumed its definitive title “Principles for International
Commercial Contracts” in 1985.
13. See Stefan Vogenauer, Introduction, in COMMENTARY ON THE UNIDROIT PRIN-
CIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS (PICC) 4 (Stefan Vogenauer &
Jan Kleinheisterkamp eds., 2009).
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effectiveness in practice is based solely upon their persuasive value for
judges and lawyers.14
This approach was chosen for a number of different reasons.  It was
felt that the adoption of the CISG had represented the “maximum that
could be achieved at the legislative level”15 through inter-governmental
negotiations.  While a conventional text is binding and therefore, at first
sight, much stronger than a mere soft law product, it is precisely its bind-
ing character which makes it problematic.  A “soft law” regulation would
not only avoid the pitfalls of the negotiation and ratification process, but
also produce a more flexible text, which could be more easily adapted to
“take care of problems that later surface.”16
This method had the additional advantage of allowing the partici-
pants in the working group—composed of renowned international ex-
perts with different legal backgrounds and sitting in a personal capacity
and not as representative of governments17—more freedom in endorsing
solutions which, though different from the ones present in their own legal
systems, were considered to be either common practice in international
transactions or, in some cases, better suited to international commercial
contracts.  The informal method minimized the political constraints and
shifted the focus to the reasonability and economic soundness of the pro-
posed rules.18  This enabled the drafters to develop over the years a wide
set of rules covering virtually all issues which are traditionally ascribed to
the general part of the law of contracts and obligations.19
Finally, though no less importantly, it was felt that the acceptability of
rules concerning international contracts in general should be evaluated
first and foremost by the parties to the contract, because contract law for
the most part is dispositive.20
Clearly, the choice of a non-binding set of rules does not come with-
out costs in terms of both legitimacy and practical impact.21  Their appli-
cation depends upon the parties choosing to be bound by them, and, in
the absence of such a choice, adjudicators will apply them only if—and
14. See E. Allan Farnsworth, Closing Remarks, 40 AM. J. COMP. L. 699 (1992).
15. See Michael Joachim Bonell, Towards a Legislative Codification of the
UNIDROIT Principles?, 12 UNIF. L. REV. 233–34 (2007).
16. Farnsworth, supra note 14, at 700.
17. See UNIDROIT, UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
CONTRACTS 2010 x–xiii (2010) (listing drafters and other contributors).
18. See Joseph M. Perillo, UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Con-
tracts: The Black Letter Text and a Review, 63 FORD. L. REV. 281, 284 (1994).
19. General principles, formation, authority of agents, validity (including ille-
gality), interpretation, content, third party rights, conditions, performance, hard-
ship, non-performance, set-off, assignment of rights, transfer of obligations and
assignment of contracts, limitation periods, and plurality of obligors and obligees.
20. See ROY M. GOODE, COMMERCIAL LAW IN THE NEXT MILLENNIUM 234
(1998).  For a discussion of the merits of an “informal approach,” see KLAUS P.
BERGER, THE CREEPING CODIFICATION OF THE LEX MERCATORIA 154 (1999).
21. As clearly recognized by the UNIDROIT Governing Council itself when it
approved the new instrument. See UNIDROIT, supra note 17, at xxiii.
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insofar as—they are persuaded by their intrinsic value.22  All the more so,
since the PICC are not limited to offering a “restatement” of existing prac-
tices in international trade, but in some cases introduce innovative
provisions.23
Almost twenty years after the publication of their first edition, it is fair
to say that the PICC, notwithstanding their non-binding nature—or maybe
precisely as a consequence of their soft law character—have enjoyed great
success when compared with other international uniform law regulations
(including the ones which have binding force).
More than three hundred decisions rendered worldwide and refer-
ring one way or the other to the PICC are recorded;24 their actual num-
ber, however, is likely to be higher, due to the fact that the majority of
cases involving the PICC are decided by arbitral courts which tend to
abide by a policy of confidentiality.
While it is true that the number of reported instances where parties
have expressly opted in favor of the PICC or where arbitral courts have
applied the PICC as the rules of law governing the substance of the dis-
pute is still relatively limited,25 their mere existence is already proof of the
importance of the PICC, especially taking into account the traditional re-
sistance of parties and their counselors against adopting new regula-
tions.26  Of particular interest in this respect are the cases where the PICC
are invoked as constituting an authoritative expression of general princi-
ples of law, lex mercatoria, or the like.  Even more interesting, however, is
the circumstance that in half of the collected decisions the PICC are cited
by either arbitral tribunals or, increasingly, domestic courts, as an aid to
interpret or supplement the applicable domestic law (including CISG).
This is particularly the case when the issue under consideration is disputed
under the applicable law and the adjudicator refers to the PICC in order
to support the adoption of one of the possible solutions, as being better
suited to international transactions.27
22. See Bonell, supra note 15, at 237.
23. See Vogenauer, supra note 13, at 6.
24. See UNILEX, supra note 6.  At the time of this writing, 308 cases are re-
ported, of which 167 are arbitral awards and 141 are domestic court decisions.
25. However, by now that number is not less than 1/6 of all reported cases.
26. See Michael Joachim Bonell, Model Clauses for Use of the Unidroit Principles of
International Commercial Contracts in Transnational Contract and Dispute Resolution
Practice (Feb. 2013), available at http://www.unidroit.org/english/documents/
2013/study50/mc/s-50-mc-01rev-e.pdf.  UNIDROIT has recognized the need to fa-
cilitate the choice of the PICC by the parties in the contract.  A restricted Working
Group was set up with the aim of preparing “Model Clauses for Use of the
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts in Transnational
Contract and Dispute Resolution Practice.”
27. See Ralf Michaels, Preamble I, in COMMENTARY ON THE UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES
OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS (PICC) 65 (Stefan Vogenauer & Jan
Kleinheisterkamp eds., 2009) (analogizing function of PICC to traditional func-
tions of US Restatements).
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Finally, though the PICC are not primarily aimed at becoming bind-
ing legislation, they have been expressly used as a model for contract law
reforms in many national jurisdictions around the world as well as interna-
tional regulations.28
III. IS THERE A NEED TO DRAFT A NEW INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENT
ON GENERAL CONTRACT LAW?
I will now turn to the question posed by the present symposium on
the desirability of a new international instrument concerning interna-
tional trade law, with particular regard to general contract law.
The question is prompted by a recent proposal by the Swiss govern-
ment requesting that UNCITRAL take action to explore the possibility of
preparing a new instrument in the area of contract law.29  The proposal,
starting from the perceived need to further the uniformity of the law of
international sales, urges UNCITRAL to “undertake an assessment of the
operation of the [CISG] and related UNCITRAL instruments” and to “dis-
cuss whether further work both in these areas and in the broader context
of general contract law is desirable and feasible on a global level.”30
Because the proposal leaves open the issues of the precise scope as
well as of the precise nature of the instrument which could be envisaged, I
will first address the “desirability and feasibility” of a new binding interna-
tional regulation in the form of a convention covering issues of general
contract law, and then consider the merits of other possible approaches,
again regarding general contract law.
The idea of drafting a legislative instrument at a global level for inter-
national commercial transactions in general has already been authorita-
tively suggested in the past.31  It was prompted by the desire to enhance
the effectiveness of existing uniform law and to overcome the more obvi-
ous disadvantages of an opt-in uniform regulation such as the PICC.  This
view was radically opposed on the grounds that contract law is essentially
ruled by party autonomy and legislation should only intervene in those
sectors where mandatory provisions or debated policy choices are
concerned.32
I would like to respectfully disagree with both positions.  While I am
personally not against the idea of developing a binding set of rules for
international contracts as a matter of philosophy, my perplexity regards
the advisability of such an overambitious endeavor at the present stage.  As
28. See BONELL, supra note 8, at 268.
29. See UNCITRAL, Possible Future Work in the Area of International Contract Law:
Proposal by Switzerland on Possible Future Work by UNCITRAL in the Area of International
Contract Law, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/758 (May 8, 2012).
30. Id.
31. See generally Ole Lando, CISG and Its Followers: A Proposal to Adopt Some Inter-
national Principles of Contract Law, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 379 (2005).
32. See Roy Goode, Rule, Practice and Pragmatism in Transnational Commercial
Law, 54 INT’L COMP. L.Q. 539, 553 (2005).
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mentioned above, all those who are familiar with the process of going
through governmental experts’ sessions first, and a diplomatic conference
afterwards, are fully aware of the difficulties that arise in this connection.
It is a costly and burdensome procedure, which is further complicated by
the possibility of introducing reservations in order to reach consensus, and
by the need to obtain ratifications afterwards.  I suspect that if govern-
ments are involved, the resistance to depart from domestic law will be even
greater for a project regarding the veritable “core” of domestic private law
concepts such as the general law of contracts.  Even if limited to cross-
border transactions, it would still involve a dramatic change in national
legal systems.
By expressing my strong doubts concerning the feasibility of a bind-
ing instrument covering general contract law I do not mean, however, to
summarily dismiss also the idea to prepare a so-called “Global Commercial
Code,” which was discussed some years ago at the prompting of then-UN-
CITRAL Secretary Gerold Herrmann.33  The PICC could well constitute
the “general part” of such a compilation of existing uniform law instru-
ments and be used as a point of reference to develop binding rules regard-
ing international contracts not yet covered by an international convention.
If the proposal to draft an international convention covering general
contract law is in my view overambitious, I must admit that I find the possi-
ble alternative solution of developing a set of non-binding rules on gen-
eral contract law even more difficult to accept from a substantive point of
view.  At the very least, it would appear to be unwise to duplicate efforts at
a global level and start developing yet another set of non-binding rules
with a potentially universal application on the same issues already ad-
dressed by the PICC.  The very success of the latter does not seem to war-
rant a reopening of the same issues within another global forum.  All the
more so, as both the 2004 and the 2010 editions of the PICC have been
endorsed by UNCITRAL and their use commended “as appropriate, for
their intended purposes.”34
A more fruitful course of action, in my opinion, would be to enhance
the future development of uniform law for international trade through a
better understanding and coordination of the existing instruments.  In
this regard, the efforts of scholars in introducing international instru-
ments in their teaching materials, in disseminating information, and in
offering authoritative interpretation cannot but continue to play a central
role.  An equally important element is the furthering of the cooperation
among international organizations in order to promote a coherent and
33. See Bonell, supra note 15, at 237.
34. UNCITRAL, U.N. Doc. A/62/17 (June 25–July 6, 2012); UNCITRAL, 62d
Sess., Supp. No. 17 at ¶¶ 209–13 (2008); UNCITRAL, U.N. Doc. A/67/17 (June
25–July 6, 2012); 67th Sess., Supp. No. 17 at ¶¶ 137–40 (2008) (“[The General
Assembly] commends the use of the 2010 edition of the UNIDROIT Principles of
International Commercial Contracts, as appropriate, for their intended
purposes.”).
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rational employment of the (unfortunately increasingly scarce) resources
devoted to the development of uniform law.35  To further this aim,
UNIDROIT will continue to be open to cooperation with UNCITRAL and
other international organizations.
35. For more discussion of the different modalities of cooperation among in-
ter-governmental organizations, see Jose´ Angelo Estrella Faria, Future Directions of
Legal Harmonisation and Law Reform: Stormy Seas or Prosperous Voyage?, 14 UNIF. L.
REV. 21 (2009).
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ARTICLE 35 OF THE CISG: REFLECTING ON THE PRESENT
AND THINKING ABOUT THE FUTURE
DJAKHONGIR SAIDOV*
I. INTRODUCTION
THE rules on the conformity of goods are not only an integral part ofsales law, but they also lie at the core of the seller’s primary obliga-
tions by being inextricably linked to its obligation to deliver the goods.1
The goods are the very subject matter of a sales contract and the rules on
conformity are what help define this subject matter.2  Without these rules,
it would often be impossible to say what it is that the seller has agreed to
deliver.  The rules on conformity are also essential in terms of the function
of allocating commercial risks between the parties.  Many buyers will com-
plain about the conformity of the goods, allege a breach, and invoke reme-
dies.  It is essential, therefore, that there be fairly clear legal rules,
particularly those applied by default, that are capable of allocating risks,
thereby producing legal certainty and possibly reducing litigation.3  How-
ever, the inevitably broad nature of these rules, together with their consid-
erable conceptual and practical significance, still makes them one of the
most frequently litigated issues.4  All this leads to the conformity rules oc-
cupying a central place in any sales law, lying at the crossroads between
the point where, on the one hand, the law enables the contract and par-
ties’ legal relationship to function and, on the other, determines whether
the performance has gone astray, paving the way for a remedial route.
A look at this important issue can tell us much about the level of
success and effectiveness of a sales law.  With this in mind, this Article
seeks to take a critical look at the rules on conformity in Article 35 of the
United Nations Sales Convention (CISG or the Convention).  The objec-
tive is to assess some aspects of the Convention’s experience accumulated
as a consequence of the application of this provision.  This assessment will
identify the Convention’s emerging strengths and the areas that have
given rise to controversy.  This Article will present its author’s views in re-
* Reader, University of Birmingham, United Kingdom.
1. See Handelsgericht [HG] [Commercial Court] Nov. 30, 2008, docket no.
HG 930634/O (Switz.), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/981130s1.
html (“The seller’s liability for the defect of goods follows from its primary obliga-
tions under the contract, i.e., delivery of the agreed goods.”).
2. See U.C.C. § 2-313 cmt. 4 (1977) (“[T]he whole purpose of the law of war-
ranty is to determine what it is that the seller has in essence agreed to sell . . . .”);
MICHAEL BRIDGE, THE SALE OF Goods ¶ 7.11 (2d ed. 2009).
3. Cf. U.C.C. § 2-313 cmt. 7; BRIDGE, supra note 2, ¶ 7.02.
4. See, e.g., Stefan Kro¨ll, The Burden of Proof for the Non-Conformity of Goods Under
Art. 35 CISG, 3 BELGRADE L. REV. 162, 162 (2011); Clarence J. Morrow, Warranty of
Quality: A Comparative Survey, 14 TUL. L. REV. 327, 327 (1940).
(529)
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spect of how these issues need to be dealt with under the CISG.  However,
in light of the fast-changing realities, with their increasingly complex com-
mercial transactions, practices, and continuous technological advances, a
question may well be posed as to whether the CISG has exhausted itself
and whether the time is ripe for a new sales law.5  Therefore, this Article
will also tentatively reflect on whether there is room for improving or re-
forming the Convention’s structure and experience.
All of this reflection will be done in the context of the following is-
sues.  First, the seller is exempt from liability for breaching the Conven-
tion’s default rules if the buyer knew or could not have been unaware of a
lack of conformity.  This provision, however, does not apply to the contrac-
tual provisions on conformity.  It will be discussed whether the buyer’s
knowledge of a lack of conformity should also be relevant to contract in-
terpretation.  Second, the paper will explore whether there is a need for a
quality standard or test to underpin the Convention’s ultimate default rule
and, if so, what that standard should be.  Third, the Article will assess the
Convention’s experience in dealing with cases of non-compliance with
public law regulations.  Finally, it will examine the relationship between
the application of the Convention’s provisions on conformity and issues of
proof.
II. THE BUYER’S KNOWLEDGE OF A LACK OF CONFORMITY
Article 35(1) embodies the principle of the parties’ freedom to con-
tract by stating that “[t]he seller must deliver goods which are of the quan-
tity, quality, and description required by the contract and which are
contained or packaged in the manner required by the contract.”6  Where
the parties have not agreed otherwise,7 paragraph (2) of Article 35 pro-
vides for several rules, which are intended to determine the content and
parameters of the seller’s obligations in respect of the conformity of the
goods.  Once it is established that there was no agreement to depart from
these default rules, the first question that needs to be asked is whether the
goods “are fit for any particular purpose expressly or impliedly made
known to the seller at the time of the conclusion of the contract.”8  This
rule, contained in paragraph (2)(b), is preceded by another rule in para-
graph 2(a), but it is widely acknowledged that because the paragraph 2(b)
rule is more specific—in that it requires the determination of whether in
the circumstances there is any particular purpose made known to the
5. See, e.g., Olaf Meyer, Constructive Interpretation—Applying the CISG in the 21st
Century, in CISG METHODOLOGY 319, 319–42 (Andre´ Janssen & Olaf Meyer eds.,
2009).
6. U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, United Nations Convention on Con-
tracts for the International Sale of Goods art. 35(1), Apr. 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter CISG], available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/sales/
cisg/V1056997-CISG-e-book.pdf.
7. See id. art. 35(2).
8. Id.
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seller—it has priority over Article 35(2)(a).9  The latter rule, in turn, is the
ultimate fall-back rule according to which the goods are conforming if
they “are fit for the purposes for which goods of the same description
would ordinarily be used.”10  Article 35(2) contains two other require-
ments: according to paragraph (c), the goods ought to “possess the quali-
ties . . . which the seller has held out to the buyer as a sample or model”;
paragraph (d) requires the goods to be “contained or packaged in the
manner usual for such goods or, where there is no such manner, in a
manner adequate to preserve and protect [them].”11
Paragraph (3) provides that “[t]he seller is not liable . . . for any lack
of conformity of the goods if at the time of the conclusion of the contract
the buyer knew or could not have been unaware of such lack of conform-
ity.”12  This provision, however, is expressly said to apply only to paragraph
(2).  The question that arises, therefore, is whether paragraph (3) needs
to be extended to paragraph (1) and, even if not, whether the buyer’s
knowledge, usually derived from having an opportunity of pre-contractual
examination of the goods, should be relevant to deciding what conformity
obligations were imposed on the seller by the contract.
There hardly seems to be any basis in the argument in favour of ex-
tending the application of paragraph (3) to paragraph (1).  A specific
statement of its applicability to paragraph (2) strongly points to the draft-
ers’ intention not to do so.  But this does not mean that the buyer’s knowl-
edge of the actual state and condition of the goods prior to the conclusion
of the contract is not relevant to interpreting the contract under Articles
35(1) and 8.  It is arguable that if the buyer, having seen the goods, knows
that the seller’s representation in respect of them is untrue, the buyer can
hardly have a reasonable expectation that the representation will form
part of the seller’s contractual obligations.13  The buyer’s reliance on the
seller’s representation is a powerful factor in favour of the parties’ inten-
tion to treat that representation as binding on the seller, and no such
reliance is present where the buyer knows the statement to be untrue.
These points are too obvious for the Convention’s drafters not to
have been aware of them, and their answer is that Article 35(1) does not
concern the terms implied by default, but concerns what the contract itself
9. See PETER HUBER & ALASTAIR MULLIS, THE CISG: A NEW TEXTBOOK FOR STU-
DENTS AND PRACTITIONERS 135 (2007); PETER SCHLECHTRIEM & INGEBORG
SCHWENZER, COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF
GOODS (CISG) art. 35, ¶ 12 (Ingeborg Schwenzer ed., 3d ed. 2010); THE UNITED
NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS: AR-
TICLE BY ARTICLE COMMENTARY art. 35, ¶ 61 (Stefan Kro¨ll, Loukas Mistelis & Maria
del Pilar Perales Viscacillas eds., 2011) [hereinafter ARTICLE BY ARTICLE
COMMENTARY].
10. CISG, supra note 6, art. 35(2)(a).
11. Id. art. 35(2)(c).
12. Id. art. 35(3).
13. See John E. Murray, Jr., “Basis of the Bargain”: Transcending Classical Con-
cepts, 66 MINN. L. REV. 283, 294–95 (1982).
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provides.14  The buyer has the right to demand fully what the seller has
agreed to do and the buyer’s knowledge of the actual state of the goods
cannot change the content of the seller’s obligation.  This argument is
primarily targeted at the express provisions, which, in commercial con-
tracts, are powerful evidence of the parties’ intentions and agreement.  It
is much weaker when the terms are implied into the contract from the
surrounding facts because the buyer’s knowledge is part of these facts and
hence cannot be ignored.15
The level of influence this factor exerts on contract interpretation de-
pends on the particular circumstances.  At times, the fact of the buyer’s
inspection is hardly relevant, as was the case where the contract required a
pony to be “fully fit” and where the buyer had carried out a pre-sale veteri-
nary examination, which, whilst adequate, revealed no signs of injury or
health problems.16  The correctness of the decision—holding the seller in
breach—is evident by the express contractual stipulation, which was also
preceded by the seller’s representation of full fitness of the pony.  In some
other cases, in contrast, what has been fatal to the buyer’s case is that it
had actually seen the alleged lack of conformity and could be regarded as
having given its unconditional consent to the receipt of those particular
goods.  This was the case where the buyer, before buying second-hand
cars, inspected them and became aware of the defects, which were appar-
ently referred to in the contract along with the requirement that the vehi-
cles were to be in “good condition.”17  The latter was presumably not
meant to indicate perfection but only a condition, which could reasonably
be expected from a second-hand car that had been previously subjected to
a normal use.18
A more complex case involved the sale of a textile (rotary printing)
machine.19  The contract referred to the “rapport equipment length 641
mm–1018 mm.”20  Before the contract was made, the buyer, a trader in
textile machinery, had an opportunity to inspect the machine, which was
not a new model (being fourteen years old) and was not capable of operat-
ing at a full rapport length.21  Prior to the conclusion of the contract, the
seller sent a fax to the buyer referring to the same rapport length as that
14. See COMMENTARY ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW 273 (Cesare Massimo
Bianca & Michael Joachim Bonell eds., 1987).
15. See CISG, supra note 6, arts. 8, 9.
16. See Rettin i Københaven Oct. 19, 2007, m.nt. (Gustavsson/LRF N.V.)
(Neth.), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/071019d1.html.
17. S.T.S., Jan. 17, 2008 (J.T.S., No. 81) (Spain), available at http://cisgw3.
law.pace.edu/cases/080117s4.html.
18. See id. (“[T]he particular damages known to the Buyer did not indicate
any signs that the vehicles had been involved in accidents.”).
19. See Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal Supreme Court] Dec. 22, 2000, docket
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included in the contract, stating that the machine was “complete and op-
erating as viewed.”22  After concluding the contract, the buyer also sent a
purchase confirmation in which it declared that it would take over the
machine “complete and operating as viewed.”23  The buyer’s breach of
contract claim that the stencil holders for a rapport length of 1018 mm
were missing was dismissed on the ground that, being an expert, the buyer
ought to have known that the machine would not conform to the latest
technical specifications.  Moreover, the seller “was entitled to expect that
the Buyer had concluded the contract in full knowledge of the technical
possibilities of the machinery and its equipment.”24  In relation to contrac-
tual rapport length specification, the Swiss Supreme Court appears to have
affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance that “rapport equip-
ment was meant as technical information in respect to the possible rap-
port length, which could be printed if the necessary equipment was
used.”25
The Swiss Supreme Court faced a difficult dilemma.  On the one
hand, the contract appeared to have expressly required full rapport
length.  On the other hand, the surrounding factual evidence—an oppor-
tunity to inspect, the buyer’s expertise, the seller’s pre-contractual letter
and the buyer’s confirmation of purchase—was overwhelmingly in the
seller’s favour.  The court interpreted the contractual clause restrictively
by assigning purely an informative function to it.  Faced with an imperfect
fit between the contract and the surrounding facts, the court seemed to
have done its best to achieve a fair result.
A. Does Article 35(2)(a) Imply a Certain Level of Quality?
1. Does Article 35(2)(a) Require an Inquiry Into the Notion of Quality?
In fixing the ultimate default rule of conformity of the goods, many
domestic legal systems rely on some notion of quality, such as “average,”
“merchantable,” or “acceptable,” which is intended to indicate some level
of quality that the buyer can expect.  In some of these systems, “fitness for
an ordinary or a common purpose” is merely one of the components that
make up the notion of quality, or one of the questions to be asked in
answering the question whether the goods meet the required standard of
quality.26  Against this background, the Convention’s default rule in Arti-
cle 35(2)(a) appears narrow and limited in its content and scope.  On its
face, this provision does not rely on any notion of quality,27 with the only





26. See, e.g., Sale of Goods Act, 1979, c. 54, § 14(2)–(2)(B) (Eng.), available at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1979/54; U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(c) (1977).
27. See COMMENTARY ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW, supra note 14, at 280;
see also FRITZ ENDERLEIN & DIETRICH MASKOW, INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW: UNITED
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poses for which goods of the same description would ordinarily be
used.”28  In other words, the Convention only seems concerned with
whether the goods are fit for their ordinary purposes and not with quality.
Rather, quality is a broader notion that may include not only fitness for
ordinary purposes, but a number of other aspects such as the goods’ physi-
cal state and condition, intrinsic qualities and features, safety, durability,
appearance, finish, and freedom from minor defects.29  However, fitness
for purpose will often depend on quality, meaning that there is a close link
between them.30  Does this mean that there are cases where the inquiry
into the level of quality is necessary?
It is difficult to conceive of a scenario where the fitness for ordinary
purposes will be totally incapable of resolving a situation.  However, some
circumstances will require this test to embrace fully the particular facts.
The type of case that is likely to pose challenges to this test is that involving
goods of varying grades (e.g., different grades or classes of wheat) or levels
of performance (e.g., the amount of fruits a juice-making machine can
process within a certain time period).  The delivered wheat may be capa-
ble for being processed into flour or the juice-making machine may be
more than suitable for making a fruit juice, but the buyer may contend
that to be fit for the ordinary purpose(s), the wheat had to be of a higher
grade or the machine ought to be capable of processing more fruits per
hour than it actually does.31  Such a contention will not be justifiable if the
ordinary purpose is construed in very simple and abstract terms, that is,
whether the wheat can be processed or whether the machine is capable of
making a fruit juice.
The test is only workable if the ordinary purpose(s) is (are) inter-
preted in light of the surrounding facts, such as where they point to a
highly sophisticated nature of the buyer’s business and its strong reputa-
tion for high-end products, in which case the buyer may be entitled to
demand goods of a higher grade or level of performance.  To be workable,
the ordinary purpose has to be interpreted not with reference to what are
generally common or ordinary purposes, but to what can be reasonably re-
garded as ordinary in the particular circumstances of the buyer and the
NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS ¶ 3.1
(1992).
28. See CISG, supra note 6, art. 35(2)(a).
29. See, e.g., Sale of Goods Act § 14(2)–(2)(B).
30. See ARTICLE BY ARTICLE COMMENTARY, supra note 9, art. 35, ¶ 73.
31. Such a contention may not be justifiable if the ordinary purpose is con-
strued in very simple and abstract terms, that is, whether the wheat can be
processed or whether the machine is capable of making a fruit juice.  But if it is
appropriate to interpret the ordinary purpose(s) in light of the surrounding fac-
tual setting, pointing to a highly sophisticated nature of the buyer’s business and
its strong reputation for high-end products, it may demand goods of a higher
grade or level of performance.  The crucial question is whether the ordinary pur-
pose is to be interpreted with reference to what is a generally common or ordinary
purpose, or to what can be reasonably regarded as ordinary in the circumstances
of the buyer and the seller.
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seller.  That said, if the Convention specified some general level of quality
that buyers could normally expect, it could possibly provide greater clarity
as to the content of the seller’s duty.32  If so, an inquiry into the notion of
quality can supplement and facilitate the test of fitness for ordinary pur-
poses, but it does not seem essential.33
2. Different Quality Tests: The Debate
Much of the discussion in cases and writings on the CISG seems to
reflect a view different from that taken in the previous section, implying
that the inquiry into the notion of quality is necessary.  This discussion, in
turn, makes it necessary to choose between various quality tests.  In one
well-known case, the buyer alleged non-conformity in oil condensate,
known as Rijn Blend, due to a high level of mercury.34  The buyer, a major
player in the oil and gas business, contended that the levels of mercury
made Rijn Blend unacceptable for further processing and sales.35  The
arbitration tribunal, applying Article 35(2)(a), identified three main ap-
proaches to quality.36
One approach, derived from the English common law, is the mer-
chantable quality test which, in the tribunal’s words, raises the question of
whether “a reasonable buyer would have concluded contracts for Rijn
Blend at similar prices if such a buyer had been aware of the mercury
concentrations.”37  Relying on the evidence of the seller’s resale of the
condensate at reduced prices after the buyer’s non-acceptance, the tribu-
nal held that if this standard were applied, there would be a breach by the
seller because “other buyers in the market for Rijn Blend were . . . unwill-
ing to pay the price [sellers] had agreed with [buyer].”38  Considering the
second test of average quality used in some civil law jurisdictions, the tribu-
nal held that the buyer had failed to meet its burden of proof as regards
the issue of “whether there [was] a common understanding in the refining
32. For a further discussion of the meaning of various quality tests, see infra
notes 34–75 and accompanying text.
33. Some writers suggest that such an inquiry is needed even where the goods
are fit for the ordinary purpose(s). See ARTICLE BY ARTICLE COMMENTARY, supra note
9, art. 35, ¶ 74; Clayton P. Gillette & Franco Ferrari, Warranties and “Lemons” Under
CISG Article 35(2)(a), 1 Internationales Handesrecht 2, 7 (2010), available at http://
cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/gillette-ferrari.html.  However, it is respectfully
argued that a quality standard, in addition to the fitness for purpose standard, is
unnecessary because, as explained in Article 35(2)(a), the Convention is not con-
cerned with quality as such, but with fitness for purpose. See CISG, supra note 6,
art. 35(2)(a).  The suggestion that a further inquiry into quality is necessary even if
the fitness of purpose has been established unjustifiably extends the scope of Arti-
cle 35(2)(a), and transforms it into a test of quality, which it is not.
34. See Condensate Crude Oil Mix Case (Neth. v. U.K.), Case No. 2319 (Neth.




38. Id. (alterations in original).
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industry what average quality for blended condensates (such as Rijn
Blend) should have been and what levels of mercury [were] tolerable.”39
The buyer would thus not be liable if that test were applied.  Having found
no overwhelming support in cases or in writings for either of these two
approaches, and noting their domestic law origins and the fact that the
Convention’s legislative history indicated the rejection of both standards,
the tribunal held them not to be applicable.40
Instead, the standard of reasonable quality was applied.41  In the tri-
bunal’s view, the standard was more in line with the Convention’s interna-
tional character and the need to promote uniformity in its application, as
well as based on its general principle of reasonableness.42  It was held that
the seller was in breach of the reasonable quality standard for two rea-
sons.43  First, the tribunal once again noted that the contract price could
not, in all likelihood, have been obtained from selling Rijn Blend if other
buyers were informed about the levels of mercury.44  The Rijn Blend with
low levels of mercury was apparently valued more highly than that with
increased mercury content.45  Second, the parties have had a long-term
business relationship and the buyer sufficiently established that when the
condensate was delivered under the previous contracts, the condensate
had not contained the increased level of mercury found in the delivery
under the contested contract.46  Therefore, the buyer “was entitled under
the contracts to a constant quality level of the Rijn Blend corresponding to
the quality levels that had been obtained during the . . . initial period of
the Contracts and on which [buyer] and its customers could reasonably
rely.”47
The reasoning and the choice of a legal basis for the decision are far
from flawless.  The reasonable quality test was applied along the same lines
as the merchantability test would have been, had it been used: that is, a
critical point was the evidence that the Rijn Blend with a higher level of
mercury could not have been sold to any other buyer, who was aware of
the true level of mercury, at the same price as that fixed in the contract
with the buyer.48  Not only does this interpretation create confusion as to
whether there are any differences between the two tests, but it also weak-
ens the tribunal’s case for the rejection of the merchantability test.  Look-
ing at the tribunal’s reasoning, the relevance of Article 35(2)(a) also









47. Id. (alteration in original).
48. See Gillette & Ferrari, supra note 33, at 8.
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price and the delivery of the condensate with a low level of mercury under
the previous contracts were the decisive factors leading to the seller’s lia-
bility.  However, these factors have little to do with the ordinary purposes
test in Article 35(2)(a) and are primarily relevant for the purpose of con-
tract interpretation under Article 35(1), in conjunction with Article 8, and
possibly Article 9, if the parties’ prior course of dealing amounted to a
“practice” within the meaning of Article 9.49
Despite these shortcomings, the decision is helpful in several respects.
It highlights several quality tests that can potentially be relevant to the
application of Article 35(2)(a).  It also demonstrates that although these
tests are inherently vague, they may not be entirely devoid of distinct con-
tent and consequences, contrary to the view of some writers.50  In fact, the
decision illustrates how the tests, namely the merchantability and the aver-
age quality tests, can produce different results, which shows the possible
significance of choosing between them.
Choosing between these standards is difficult.  The merchantable
quality standard does entail the danger of its strong association with some
common law systems,51 but it has the advantage of being based on a fairly
clear and workable test: if the goods can be resold on a market without the
abatement of the price,52 the goods are of merchantable quality and the
seller is not in breach.  From the standpoint of economic considerations,
the test has received some support53 on the basis that, in contrast with the
49. See id. at 9.
50. See P.S. ATIYAH, JOHN N. ADAMS & HECTOR MACQUEEN, ATIYAH’S SALE OF
GOODS 166 (12th ed. 2010).
51. For a discussion of the development of this test in English law, which
viewed the merchantability test as comprising more than just saleability on the
same terms as those in the parties’ contract (with description, fitness for purpose,
and acceptance being other relevant aspects of merchantability), see BRIDGE, supra
note 2, ¶¶ 7.42–.55.
52. A classic formulation of this version of the test was made in Australian
Knitting Mills Ltd. v Grant (1933) 50 CLR 387, 413 (Austl.).  In Australian Knitting
Mills, the court held that:
[The goods] should be in such an actual state that a buyer fully ac-
quainted with the facts and, therefore, knowing what hidden defects exist
and not being limited to their apparent condition would buy them with-
out abatement of the price obtainable for such goods if in reasonable
sound order and condition and without special terms.
Id.
53. See Gillette & Ferrari, supra note 33, at 12.  There are cases on the CISG
that have explicitly interpreted Article 35(2)(a) as based on the merchantability
test. See Clothes Case (Austl. v. China) (China Int’l Econ. & Trade Arb. Comm’n
2003), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/030603c1.html (expressly
stating that Article 35(2)(a) means that goods must be merchantable, in noting
that “the goods delivered by the [seller] were [of] poor quality and . . . could not
be resold even at a discounted price.  Therefore, the goods delivered by the
[seller] were not resalable”) (alterations in original).  Several additional cases were
decided in common law jurisdictions where the courts simply read the
merchantability test into the CISG with no attempt to explain the reasons for do-
ing so. See Fryer Holdings v Liaoning MEC Grp. [2012] NSWSC 18 (Austl.), available
at http://www.globalsaleslaw.org/content/api/cisg/urteile/2325.pdf; Int’l
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\58-4\VLR405.txt unknown Seq: 10 10-JUL-13 15:48
538 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58: p. 529
other two tests, it does not give rise to any undesirable incentives for the
seller because it refers to a measurable benchmark—a market price.54  It
also deals with the problem of informational asymmetry by signalling the
quality and other features of the goods, as well as the seller’s investment in
the product:
Assuming relatively competitive markets, price should reflect the
inputs that the seller invests in product quality, and thus it is
likely to incorporate the seller’s information concerning defect
rates.  Price also is likely to incorporate information that buyers
have about the good.  Buyers are unlikely to purchase a good that
carries a price in excess of the buyer’s expected value for it.
When buyers agree to pay a particular price for a good, there-
fore, they have a set of expectations about the good’s characteris-
tics.  Sellers who have superior information about the qualitative
characteristics of the good reveal those features through the pric-
ing mechanism.  Price, in effect, serves as a substitute for a more
detailed description of the goods that would constitute an ex-
press warranty of quality.55
The proponents of this position, resting on the supremacy of eco-
nomic considerations, recognise some of the drawbacks of the
merchantability test.  One is its ability to distort the parties’ negotiations
by virtue of implicitly setting the price limit that the seller can charge:
“[i]n effect, this test can be interpreted to transform price, standing alone,
into a warranty.”56  Another is that the price may accommodate factors
other than those relating to quality (for example, luxury goods, oligopolis-
tic markets, or markets where the seller occupies a dominant market posi-
tion), and this means that the goods’ ability, or lack thereof, to command
certain prices may be due not only to quality but to those other factors.
That, in turn, means that in such cases, the merchantability test is not fully
determinative of the quality of the goods.  For this reason, those favouring
this test have not advocated a firm application of the merchantable quality
standard but have argued in favour of its presumption, which can be dis-
placed upon demonstrating that the price was not fully reflective of
quality.57
Housewares v SEB (2003) CP 395 SD 01 (HC) (N.Z.), available at http://www.cisg.
law.pace.edu/cases/030331n6.html#term; see also Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am.
v. Saint-Gobain Technical Fabrics Can. Ltd., 474 F. Supp. 2d 1075 (D. Minn. 2007).
This approach is clearly unacceptable, as it violates the Convention’s international
character.
54. For a further discussion on the advantages of the merchantable quality
standard, see infra notes 55–57 and accompanying text.
55. Gillette & Ferrari, supra note 33, at 12.
56. Id. at 14.
57. See id. at 15.
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The average quality test has also found some support.58  This test can
be viewed almost as a mathematical test as it implies a “middle belt of
quality.”59  This shows that it also has a discernible content and should
therefore be workable.  The test may also point to a balanced standard,
particularly for the goods of variable quality, by being set in the middle
between high and low quality levels.  The test has, however, been criticised
on the ground that it has the effect of making the products that are below
average quality drop out of the market.  That, in turn, will push the aver-
age quality upwards because the disappearance of quality below average
changes the meaning of average quality, since what was the middle of the
range becomes the bottom end of the range.  As a result, average quality
“becomes meaningless because of the constant change in the standard.”60
Whilst this outcome may well logically follow as a matter of theory, it may
be questioned whether there is evidence of this test actually producing
such results in practice, considering that this test has been used in many
domestic legal systems, some of which govern quality in highly developed
markets and economic systems.61
Some have favoured the reasonable quality standard due to its relative
neutrality.  The standard has no association with the well-known quality
tests in domestic legal systems, which can make it more conducive to pro-
moting uniformity and the Convention’s international character.  Similar
to what has been stated in the arbitration decision discussed above, the
standard has been praised for its flexibility and its consonance with the
idea of reasonableness underlying the CISG.  Flexibility is highly desirable,
in some commentators’ view, because the fitness for the ordinary purposes
may require a level of quality, which is higher or lower than average
quality.62
Still, the standard has been criticised for creating the “lemons prob-
lem.”63  Assume that there is a range of products, from low to high quality,
all of which are fit for the ordinary purpose.  Since reasonable quality does
not fix and signal a level of quality with any precision, the buyers, who
have no means of investigating the goods’ quality before receiving the de-
livery, will fear that what is presented to them as high quality goods are in
fact goods of low quality.  If it turns out that the goods are of low quality,
the seller will not be held liable because those goods are still fit for the
ordinary purpose.  Faced with this prospect, buyers will treat all goods as
58. See, e.g., Landgericht [LG] [District Court] Sept. 15, 1994, 52 S 247/94
(Ger.), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/940915g1.html (“The goods
must be of average quality, and it does not suffice that they can only just be
traded.”).
59. U.C.C. § 2-314 cmt. 7 (1977).
60. Gillette & Ferrari, supra note 33, at 11.
61. See, e.g., INGEBORG SCHWENZER, PASCAL HACHEM & CHRISTOPHER KEE,
GLOBAL SALES AND CONTRACT LAW ¶¶ 31.127–.128 (2012).
62. See ARTICLE BY ARTICLE COMMENTARY, supra note 9, art. 35, ¶ 79.
63. See Gillette & Ferrari, supra note 33, at 10.
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being of low quality and refuse to pay a higher price for higher quality
goods.  This will result in the high quality sellers being gradually driven
out of the market.64
None of these standards emerges as a clear winner and this aspect of
Article 35(2)(a) is likely to remain controversial in the foreseeable future.
If the CISG is ever to be revised or if a new international sales law is ever
adopted, some thought will need to be given to whether there is a need for
an underlying quality standard.  This is a question of policy.  There have
been instances where the CISG has been seen as a vehicle for promoting
quality standards around the world and, if there is some truth in this posi-
tion, it would point strongly to the need to articulate an underlying quality
standard.65  In that case, what minimum level of quality can reasonably be
expected in international trade?  At one end of the spectrum, there is a
view that the lowest grade within the range of contractual description is
sufficient,66 whilst at the other end, some may believe that even such stan-
dards as average or satisfactory67 quality, which tend to be associated with
mediocrity,68 are not good enough in the modern day of increasing con-
sumers’ expectations.
The merchantability standard is helpful in that the price will often be
a powerful signal of a benchmark of quality, and consequently of fitness
for the ordinary purposes, which the buyer can reasonably expect.  The
goods’ ability or inability to be resold on a market at the same price as that
in the parties’ contract is a practically useful test.  However, the suggestion
that it should operate as a presumption seems to overstate its utility for
several reasons.  To begin with, there may not be a market for the goods to
provide a reference point.  What constitutes a market can also be a tricky
question, as markets can be defined broadly or narrowly.69  There are
many variables affecting a market price in the particular circumstances—
the need to transport the goods, location of a market, seasonal nature of
the goods, time frames—and the direct price comparability between the
contract price and the price obtainable on a market may not always be
possible or fully reflective of quality.
In addition, the test’s reference to a sale on a market may be more
suitable for some goods than for others.  For example, a market can be
found more easily in respect of commodities than in the case of heavy and
64. See id.
65. See Hof ’s-Gravenhage Apr. 23, 2003, JOR 2003 (Rynpoort Trading &
Transport NV et al./Meneba Meel Wormerveer B.V. et al.) (Neth.), available at
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/030423n1.html.
66. See HUBER & MULLIS, supra note 9, at 135.
67. See Sale of Goods Act, 1979, c. 54, § 14 (Eng.), available at http://www.
legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1979/54; U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(c) (1977).
68. See ATIYAH, ADAMS & MACQUEEN, supra note 50, at 159.
69. See, e.g., Djakhongir Saidov, The Present State of Damages Under the CISG: A
Critical Assessment, 13 VINDOBONA J. INT’L COM. L. & ARB. 197, 209–14 (2009).
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highly specialised machinery.70  It has also been suggested that the use of
this test is more relevant where the goods are bought for resale, rather
than use.71  Yet another reason against the presumption relates to its likely
consequence of interfering with the parties’ bargain.  The seller may have
managed to bargain for a better price, which would not normally be ob-
tainable for the goods at hand.  Later holding this same seller liable on the
basis that he or she should have delivered the goods of higher quality fails
to respect and uphold the bargain that the parties struck.  If the CISG is
interpreted in this way, it will undermine the freedom of contract and turn
the Convention into an instrument with a greater regulatory drive, closer
to an extreme point of caveat venditor than it should be, considering it is a
legal regime which is intended to encourage participation in international
trade.  Sellers would undoubtedly be discouraged by such a position and
that would hamper trade and lead to the parties’ excluding or derogating
from the CISG, neither of which is in line with the Convention’s aims.
Thus, if a choice had to be made, a flexible standard of reasonable
quality may be the right way to move forward.  To inject greater certainty
into the standard, a key consideration should be that found in the
merchantability test, that is, reliance on a market price and focus on
whether the goods can be resold to a buyer with full knowledge of the
goods’ actual state and condition without any reduction in the price.  Such
a test would be both sufficiently flexible and certain.  Without creating any
presumption, it draws on the practicality and good sense underlying the
merchantability test, while at the same time avoiding not only domestic
law associations but, more importantly, the limitations of merchantability.
For example, if there is no market to provide a reference price, or if a
market price is not fully reflective of quality, the reasonable quality stan-
dard is flexible and broad enough to take account of other relevant con-
siderations.  It also does not presuppose a fixed benchmark, as is the case
under the average quality test.  The lack of a fixed benchmark under the
reasonable quality standard is more in line with the ordinary purposes re-
quirement: this requirement may refer, depending on the circumstances,
to quality which is lower or higher than average.
With quality having to be reasonable, perfection, in the sense that the
goods have to be flawless, would not, as a rule, be required.72  However, in
the case of mass produced and manufactured goods, there may justifiably
be an expectation of a higher level of quality, not far from perfection,
70. See Bristol Tramways Carriage Co. v. Fiat Motors Ltd. [1910] 2 K.B. 831,
840.
71. See Bernstein v. Pamson Motors (1987) R.T.R. 384 (Q.B.) at 387 (Eng.).
72. See Pressure Sensors Case (China v. Braz.) Arbitration Award, ¶ 144 (Arbi-
tral Inst. of Stockholm Chamber of Commerce 2007), available at http://cisgw3.
law.pace.edu/cases/070405s5.html (explaining that seller commits no breach if
defects are minor and can easily be avoided by buyer or end user).  There is much
support for this view in the context of Article 35(2), even without any reference to
the reasonable quality test. See CISG, supra note 6, art. 35(2).
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because “modern manufactured goods are marketed and sold against a
background of high expectations and quality control procedures.”73  In
this context, even minor defects may not be tolerated.  The same may be
the case if the goods are described in the contract as “new,” which almost
naturally signals a greater expectation of high quality, bordering on
perfection.  That said, even a new product, such as a car and such goods as
complex machinery or software,74 will sometimes need a “teething,”75 or
an adjustment period.  In this case, a minor defect, if it is normal or com-
mon for the goods in the initial stages of their operation, is unlikely to
amount to a breach of reasonable quality and, consequently, of the fitness
for the ordinary purposes test.
III. COMPLIANCE WITH PUBLIC LAW REGULATIONS
A situation frequently occurring in international trade is one in which
the buyer complains that the goods do not meet the requirements of pub-
lic law regulations in the country where the goods are intended to be used
or sold.  Which of the two parties is to bear the risk of non-compliance
with the relevant regulations?  Although there is no absolute uniformity in
cases on this matter, a position which has been gaining wider international
acceptance76 is the one set out in what has become known as the New
Zealand Mussels case.77  In the New Zealand Mussels case, the mussels deliv-
73. BRIDGE, supra note 2, ¶ 7.65.
74. See Rb Arnhem June 28, 2006, 82879 / HA ZA 02-105 (Silicon Biomedical
Instruments B.V./Erich Jaeger GmbH) (Neth.), available at http://cis
gw3.law.pace.edu/cases/060628n1.html.  The court of first instance held that:
Although the Court finds that it has to be tolerated that new developed
software may have “teething troubles” or “start-up problems” in the begin-
ning—this is how the Court interprets Art. 7.1 of the contract which reads
“Supplier does not warrant that operation of the Products will be error
free or uninterrupted, or that all non-conformities can be corrected”—it
must be possible to use the software in a normal way from the beginning
on.  The testimonies proved that this was not the case, as there were fre-
quent interferences and as data could not be found or loaded without
consulting a technical clerk.
Id.; see also BENJAMIN’S SALE OF GOODS ¶ 11-069 (Michael Bridge ed., 8th ed. 2010)
(suggesting, in context of fitness for purpose test in English law, that there should
be no strict liability for non-conformities in software).
75. Bernstein, R.T.R. 384 (Q.B.) at 390 (“minor teething troubles . . . could be
expected in any new motor car”).
76. See, e.g., Oberster Gerichtshof [OGH] [Supreme Court], Apr. 13, 2000,
docket No. 2 Ob 100/00w (Austria), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/
000413a3.html; RJ & AM Smallmon v Transp. Sales Ltd. (2011) CIV-2009-409-
000363 (HC) 340 (N.Z.), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/100730n6.
html; Med. Mktg. Int’l., Inc. v. Internazionale Medico Scientifica, S.R.L., No. Civ.
A. 99-0380, 1999 WL 311945, at *1–3 (E.D. La. May 17, 1999) (affirming decision
of arbitration tribunal that accepted approach in New Zealand Mussels, but holding
that general rule did not apply due to presence of one of exceptions). But see Cour
d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, Dec. 13, 1995 (Fr.), available at
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/951213f1.html.
77. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Supreme Court] Mar. 8, 1995, VIII
ZR 159/94 (Ger.), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/950308g3.html.
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\58-4\VLR405.txt unknown Seq: 15 10-JUL-13 15:48
2013] ARTICLE 35 OF THE CISG 543
ered by a Swiss seller to a German buyer did not comply with a recommen-
dation of the German health authorities as to their cadmium content.
The German Supreme Court stated that the seller could not be held liable
for non-compliance with the regulations in the buyer’s country unless: (1)
the regulations were the same in the seller’s country; (2) the buyer specifi-
cally drew the seller’s attention to the regulations; or (3) the seller had a
good reason to know about them, such as where the seller had a branch in
the buyer’s country, had a long-established business relationship with the
buyer, often previously exported the goods to that country, or promoted
them in that country.  Because none of these circumstances were present,
the seller was deemed not to have had a duty to comply with the recom-
mendation of German authorities.
The issue of non-compliance with public law regulations highlights a
major challenge in the application of default rules on conformity.  On the
one hand, the rules’ broad formulation and need to be defined with refer-
ence to the surrounding context unequivocally dictates that they must be
applied on a case-by-case basis.  On the other hand, a lack of any general
guidelines would create uncertainty in this important area of sales law and
give rise to an argument that the rules lack any content and meaning.
This is undesirable because an effective sales law is one that not only pro-
motes a reasonable degree of predictability, but also signals and enhances
a coherent set of objectives, values, and policies.  A balance thus needs to
be struck between formulating a meaningful guideline, based on the Con-
vention’s policies, and responding to the particularities of all relevant cir-
cumstances of the case.
It is submitted that the approach of the New Zealand Mussels case man-
ages to strike this balance. As a starting point, the court’s clear position as
to which of the parties is to bear the risk promotes legal certainty.  How-
ever, this position is neither a fixed rule nor a presumption, and is merely
a general guideline.78  Providing for special circumstances is a way of en-
suring that the Convention is fully responsive to the particular circum-
stances and that the seller will bear the risk where there are good reasons
for doing so.  The next question is whether, as a matter of principle, it is
right to allocate the risk to the buyer.  It is suggested that it is both fair and
efficient to allocate the risk to the party who is in a better position to
access the relevant information, to insure against this risk, or to avoid it.
Subject to the special circumstances listed in New Zealand Mussels, the
buyer is generally in a better position than the seller to know about the
regulations in the country where the goods will be used or sold.  The
buyer can reduce the risk of non-compliance by drawing those regulations
to the seller’s attention, or by including the need to comply with them
78. Cf. JOHN O. HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER
THE 1980 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION 335 (Harry M. Flechtner ed., 4th ed. 2009)
(suggesting that no starting point should be adopted).
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into the contract.79  It is also, as a rule, cheaper for the buyer to carry out
the necessary investigations.  Making the buyer bear the burden of investi-
gating avoids higher costs, which would otherwise have to be incurred if
this burden were borne by the seller.  If sellers were put in the position of
being compelled to investigate the relevant regulations in order to allevi-
ate the risk of being held liable in the future, the prices for the goods
would also have to rise because sellers would have to spread that addi-
tional cost and risk of liability to buyers.  That would only hinder com-
merce by making trade more expensive.  In short, allocating this risk to
the buyer promotes economic efficiency.
New Zealand Mussels seems to represent a rare achievement on the
part of the CISG.  Even those legal systems which attempt to formulate the
rules on conformity in a way which is more detailed and precise than that
found in Article 35(2) recognize that more specific content and meaning
of these rules can only emerge through layers of interpretations given in
cases. New Zealand Mussels has presented rational and fair treatment of a
frequently arising scenario involving both paragraphs (a) and (b) of Arti-
cle 35(2).  It has struck a good balance between flexibility and clarity.
Clarity in the Convention’s position has been advanced considerably
thanks to this case gaining prominence by having influenced other CISG
cases.  In the Convention’s international spirit, this case has paved a way
for a uniform direction in dealing with cases of non-compliance with pub-
lic law regulations.  This direction is based on a coherent framework,
which, at the same time, preserves fairness and avoids automaticity of out-
comes.  If a new international sales law is ever adopted, these cases must
not be forgotten, but also must be built upon.  There may be something to
be said in favour of introducing a provision, formulated along the lines set
out in New Zealand Mussels, dealing specifically with cases of non-compli-
ance with public law regulations.
IV. PROOF
A. Burden of Proof
The legal issues flowing from the need to prove a claim arise in every
area of sales law.  The rules on conformity are by no means an exception
and have, in fact, proved to be a fertile ground for dealing with issues of
proof under the CISG.  The first point to be addressed is that of burden of
proof.  It is now increasingly recognised that burden of proof is a matter
governed by the CISG.80  One relevant general principle under the CISG
is that a party who asserts a right must prove the necessary preconditions
79. See Gillette & Ferrari, supra note 33, at 7; CLAYTON P. GILLETTE & STEVEN
D. WALT, SALES LAW: DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL 363–64 (2d ed. 2009).
80. See, e.g., Handelsgericht [HG] [Commercial Court] Sept. 9, 1993, HG930
138.U/HG93 (Switz.), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/930909s1.
html.
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for the existence of that right.81  This means that under Article 35(2)(b),
for example, the buyer bears the burden of proving that a particular pur-
pose has been duly communicated to the seller.82  In the same vein, a
party who invokes the exception to the other party’s right must prove the
necessary preconditions for the existence of that exception.  The buyer’s
right to rely on the seller’s obligation to ensure the goods’ fitness for a
particular purpose is available unless there was no actual or reasonable
reliance by the buyer.  The reliance provision is, in other words, an excep-
tion to the buyer’s entitlement to the goods fit for a particular purpose,
and the burden of proof of the preconditions for that exception lies with
the seller.  If the seller does not raise the issue of reliance, the goods’
fitness under Article 35(2)(b) will be presumed.  The burden of proof in-
cludes the burden of adducing the relevant evidence and the burden of
persuasion.83
The “rule and exception” principle of the allocation of burden of
proof may not always be applied strictly in practice because the burden of
adducing evidence is sometimes placed on a party who simply has better
access to evidence but who would not otherwise bear this burden on strict
principles of the allocation of burden of proof.84  This approach, known
as “proof proximity,” is sometimes justified on the grounds of equity.85
Although those decisions which have taken this approach may have done
so on the basis of their domestic law,86 some commentators argue in fa-
vour of developing the general principle of proof proximity within the
CISG,87 drawing support from the drafting history of Article 25:
Originally Art. 25, which at the time was Art. 9 provided that a
breach was fundamental if “it results in a substantial detriment to
the other party and the party in breach foresaw or had reason to
foresee such a result.”  The “and” was in the end replaced by the
present “unless” as it would be very difficult for the non-breach-
ing party to prove that the breaching party did not foresee the
result or could not have foreseen it.  As the breaching party was
much closer to the fact the burden of proof was imposed on it.88
81. See, e.g., Tribunal Cantonal Valais [Appellate Court], Apr. 27, 2007, C1 06
95 (Switz.), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/070427s1.html.
82. See Handelsgericht [HG] [Commercial Court] Sept. 9, 1993,
HG930138.U/HG93 (Switz.) (taking this position not specifically in context of Ar-
ticle 35(2)(b), but Article 35 in general).
83. See ARTICLE BY ARTICLE COMMENTARY, supra note 9, art. 35, ¶¶ 188–94.
84. See Tribunal Cantonal Valais [Appellate Court], Apr. 27, 2007, C1 06 95
(Switz.) (“If the buyer rejects the goods by invoking their non-conformity the seller
must prove that the goods are in conformity with the contract; if the buyer already
accepted the goods the buyer would have to prove their non-conformity.”).
85. See ARTICLE BY ARTICLE COMMENTARY, supra note 9, art. 35, ¶ 171.
86. See Tribunal Cantonal Valais [Appellate Court], Apr. 27, 2007, C1 06 95
(Switz.).
87. See ARTICLE BY ARTICLE COMMENTARY, supra note 9, art. 35, ¶ 170.
88. Id. ¶ 171.
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There are undeniably differences in legal cultures, procedural envi-
ronments, and views of the purpose of judicial proceedings—that is,
whether they are strictly adversarial or aim to establish the truth at all
costs—which have a direct impact on the way evidence is taken.  There-
fore, a degree of non-uniformity can be expected in matters of taking evi-
dence and more broadly in allocating burden of proof.  It is suggested,
however, that legal predictability should not be undermined any further
by the introduction of the proof proximity principle into the CISG.  As
already alluded to, proof proximity can easily contravene the rule and ex-
ception principle, and its introduction necessitates a choice between the
two, either as a matter of general principle or in the particular case.  That,
in turn, gives rise to an additional layer of complexity and unpredictability.
Reaching a substantial degree of international agreement on the rule and
exception principle is a hard-earned achievement, which has potential to
promote legal certainty in all areas falling within the Convention’s scope.
From this standpoint, recognising proof proximity as the Convention’s
general principle would be an unwelcome development.
B. Standard of Proof
In contrast, using the Convention’s general principles to develop a
standard of proof does have the advantage of promoting uniformity.  The
standard of proof concerns the amount of evidence and the degree of
precision flowing from it that are sufficient to prove the existence of a
legal right.89  There is a close connection between the burden and stan-
dard of proof,90 and having the former governed by the CISG and the
latter by domestic law makes the Convention’s scope piecemeal, inconsis-
tent, and incoherent.  More importantly, a standard of proof has a direct
impact on the exercise of the innocent party’s rights.  The Convention’s
goal of promoting uniformity in its application is hardly achievable if the
rights, established by the Convention, cannot be exercised in the same way
due to the different standards of proof used by domestic legal systems.  It
is thus submitted that a standard of proof should be regarded as a matter
falling within the CISG, and therefore domestic legal systems should have
no role to play in formulating the applicable standard.  There is now in-
creasing support for the view that the Convention’s general principle of
reasonableness,91 together with the fact that absolute precision in proving
the preconditions of the existence of a legal right are not always achieva-
ble, can lead to the development of the principle that such preconditions
89. See, e.g., Djakhongir Saidov, Standards of Proving Loss and Determining the
Amount of Damages, 22 J. CONT. L. 1, 5 (2006) (explaining standard in context of
proving losses).
90. See SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHWENZER, supra note 9, art. 35, ¶ 56.
91. See Albert H. Kritzer, Reasonableness, CISG DATABASE, http://www.cisg.law.
pace.edu/cisg/text/reason.html#schl (last updated Jan. 23, 2001) (“Reasonable-
ness is specifically mentioned in thirty-seven provisions of the CISG and clearly
alluded to elsewhere in the Uniform Sales Law.”).
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only need to be proved with a reasonable degree of certainty.92  It is sug-
gested, therefore, that, like all other issues falling within the CISG, the
preconditions for the buyer’s rights under Article 35 and for the excep-
tions available to the seller, such as the provision on reliance on its skill
and judgement in paragraph (2)(b), need to be established with reasona-
ble certainty.
C. Admissibility of Evidence
The evaluation and admissibility of evidence are often treated as fall-
ing into the procedural law realm,93 which is outside the scope of the
CISG,94 a substantive law instrument.  In contrast with a standard of proof,
which may be classed as an issue of substantive or procedural law depend-
ing on the applicable legal regime, the admissibility of evidence appears,
at first sight, to fall more clearly into the procedural law realm.  Therefore,
it would seem that the applicable procedural law should govern this mat-
ter.  However, in some domestic systems, the admissibility of evidence may
possibly be regarded as a matter of substantive law.  In one case,95 the
buyer’s evidence, which was based on testimony of a German inspection
company to support its claim that charcoal was non-conforming under Ar-
ticle 35(2) of the CISG, was held inadmissible.  It was so held because the
buyer did not follow a procedure fixed under Article 476 of the Argentine
Commercial Code according to which in order to contest the quality of
the goods, the buyer ought to appeal to expert arbitration.96  The Argen-
tine appellate court reasoned that the CISG did not “contain any rule—
[or] general [principle]—concerning the procedure to follow in order to
determine the quality of goods” and ruled that because “the buyer did not
determine the quality of the charcoal in accordance with the expert arbi-
tration procedures required by Article 476 of the Argentine Commercial
Code, his evidence consisting of a testimony of a German witness, the qual-
92. For similar arguments in the context of damages, see, for example,
Saidov, supra note 89, at 5–6, 56, 70; Int’l Sales Convention Advisory Council, Cal-
culation of Damages Under CISG Article 74, Advisory Council Opinion No. 6 (2006),
available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/CISG-AC-op6.html.
93. In most jurisdictions, the admissibility of evidence is treated as a procedu-
ral law issue. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 138 (1971);
SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHWENZER, supra note 9, art. 11, ¶ 4.
94. See SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHWENZER, supra note 9, art. 35, ¶ 50, art. 74, ¶ 66.
95. Ca´mara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Comercial [CNCom., sala E] [Sec-
ond Instance Court of Appeal], 24/4/2000, “Mayer Alejandro c. Onda Hofferle”
(Arg.), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/000424a1.html#ii.
96. For a detailed explanation of the nature and purpose of an expert arbitra-
tion under Article 476 of the Commercial Code of Argentina, see Anthony J. Mc-
Mahon, Note, Differentiating Between Internal and External Gaps in the U.N. Convention
on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: A Proposed Method for Determining “Gov-
erned By” in the Context of Article 7(2), 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 992, 1020–23
(2006).
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ity of the charcoal could not be determined.”97  A similar decision was
subsequently reached in another Argentine case.98
Whilst the requirement regarding the referral of a matter of a lack of
conformity to expert arbitration may seem to be procedural in nature,99
some writers point out that the fact that this requirement is contained in
the Argentine Commercial Code, as opposed to the Code of Civil Proce-
dure, suggests the possibility that the admissibility of evidence was treated
as a matter of substantive law.100  If so, does the fact that the admissibility
of evidence may be a substantive law issue in some domestic systems mean
that the Convention should now be regarded as governing this issue for
the same reasons as those advanced in respect of the standard of proof?
These Argentine cases reaffirm the point that the distinction between the
procedural and substantive law issues is relative101 and in itself it cannot
constitute an appropriate basis for deciding what falls within or outside
the Convention’s scope.  This does not necessarily mean that the admissi-
bility of evidence can be regarded as a matter governed by the CISG.  The
issue requires careful consideration of issues going beyond the scope of
this Article.  Therefore, only some tentative and general observations will
be made.
As illustrated by the Argentine cases, the admissibility of evidence
does endanger a uniform application of the Convention’s conformity pro-
visions because in a number of other jurisdictions the expert witness’s re-
port may well have been admissible.  A universally agreed approach to the
question of the admissibility of evidence would certainly be a significant
97. Ca´mara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Comercial [CNCom., sala E] [Sec-
ond Instance Court of Appeal], 24/4/2000, “Mayer Alejandro c. Onda Hofferle”
(Arg.).
98. See Ca´mara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Comercial [CnCom., sala E]
[Second Instance Court of Appeal], 21/7/2002, “Cervecerı´a y Malteria Paysandu´
S.A. c. Cervecerı´a Argentina S.A.” (Arg.), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/
cases/020721a1.html.  In Cervecerı´a y Malteria Paysandu´ S.A. c. Cervecerı´a Argentina
S.A., the Argentine appellate court held that:
[T]he [Buyer]’s demand has ignored the procedure fixed imperatively by
article 476 of the Commercial Code, according to which the buyer who
refutes the quality of the goods should appeal to the know-how by arbitra-
tion . . . .  [E]xpert arbitration is the road legally contemplated to settle
this type of controversy as regards commercial sales of goods . . . .  [The
analysis by a German laboratory] does not replace the trial of expert arbi-
trators—without which [Buyer]’s allegations are not proven.
Id. (final alteration in original).
99. See McMahon, supra note 96, at 1028–29.
100. See Ca´mara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Comercial [CNCom., sala E]
[Second Instance Court of Appeal], 24/4/2000, “Mayer Alejandro c. Onda Hof-
ferle” (Arg.).
101. See, e.g., Chiara G. Orlandi, Procedural Law Issues and Uniform Law Conven-
tions, 5 UNIF. L. REV. 23, 30 n.29 (2000) (“[T]here exists no systematic abstract
criterion that would enable a given case to be classified unequivocally and ration-
ally as being either of a ‘procedural’ or a ‘substantive’ nature.”); Ingeborg
Schwenzer & Pascal Hachem, The CISG—Successes and Pitfalls, 57 AM. J. COMP. L.
457, 471–72 (2009).
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step in promoting the Convention’s uniform application.  There are provi-
sions which can, conceivably, be used to develop a relevant general princi-
ple that the CISG takes a liberal approach to admitting evidence, meaning
that all relevant evidence is to be admitted.  Article 11 of the CISG pro-
vides that a contract “need not be . . . evidenced by writing . . . [,] is not
subject to any other requirement as to form,” and “may be proved by any
means, including witnesses.”102  Article 8(3) requires that in interpreting
the parties’ statement and conduct, “all relevant circumstances” need to
be taken into consideration and can therefore be seen as “based on the
principle of the admissibility of all evidentiary materials for the interpreta-
tion of the parties’ declarations.”103
That said, there is still a strong sense that for the CISG to deal with
the admissibility of evidence outside the parameters of Articles 11 and 8 is
to stretch its scope beyond that intended by the drafters.  It has been sug-
gested that these two provisions were included to make it clear that there
is no place in the CISG for the common law doctrines of parol evidence
and statute of frauds.104  Had the drafters intended the CISG to embrace
fully an issue as broad in its reach as the admissibility of evidence, they
would have, surely, indicated that with much greater clarity.  More so, be-
cause the admissibility of evidence is usually regarded as a procedural mat-
ter, many countries would be surprised to discover that the CISG displaces
their procedural law regimes, if the Convention is held to deal with this
issue.  It is highly likely that that was not the understanding the countries
had in deciding to ratify the CISG.105  Considering that any general princi-
ple that can be potentially developed will be inherently general and inca-
pable of matching the level of detail of domestic rules on evidence, such
an approach may also deter the ratification by other countries.
It is also doubtful whether the CISG is capable of governing and em-
bracing this matter in all its complexity.  The relevant domestic rules on
the admissibility of evidence are based on a variety of policies and consid-
erations emanating from different spheres, many of which are outside a
contract law instrument like the CISG.106  Many such policies will un-
doubtedly be worthy of legal protection whilst the CISG will be incapable
102. CISG, supra note 6, art. 11.
103. SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHWENZER, supra note 9, art. 11, ¶ 13.
104. See McMahon, supra note 96, at 1026.
105. See id. at 1026–28.
106. See IAN DENNIS, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 86–87 (4th ed. 2010).  The com-
mon law of evidence, for example, includes rules: against hearsay evidence; on
expert witnesses (who can only give opinion on matters requiring their expertise
without expressing views on the ultimate issues of the case); against evidence of
bad character; on protecting confidential communications between lawyer and cli-
ent; against evidence which might be injurious to public interest (the public inter-
est immunity doctrine).  Each of these rules is based on its particular rationale. See
id.  Perhaps, what all different types of rationale may have in common is that they
“will represent a judgment that the ‘costs’ of the type of evidence in question are
sufficiently great to justify a general rule of restriction.” Id. at 87.  Some of these
types of rationale may also be based on the “need to protect certain rights of par-
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of catering to all those policies.  Finally, it can also be argued that it is best
to leave the admissibility of evidence to domestic legal systems for the rea-
sons of efficiency, speed, and practical convenience.  As explained in the
commentary on Section 138 of the U.S. Restatement (Second) of Conflict
of Laws, the “trial judge must make most evidentiary decisions with dis-
patch if the trial is to proceed with celerity.  The judge should therefore,
as a general rule, apply the local law of his own state.”107  All of these
arguments point in favour of the admissibility of evidence being entirely
outside the CISG, making the outcomes in the Argentine cases correct.
These arguments notwithstanding, uncertainty as regards the Conven-
tion’s relationship with the domestic rules on the admissibility of evidence
has led to the emergence of more flexible approaches.  In the context of
Article 11 it has been contended that what is decisive is not how a rule is
characterised in a given domestic jurisdiction, but its function.  If a domes-
tic rule substantially undermines a party’s evidentiary position, the rule
should be classed as a rule of substantive law and therefore displaced by
Article 11.  If the evidence in question “merely makes it easier to prove
matters,” the domestic rule on the admissibility of evidence, usually being
classified as a procedural rule, should apply as such.108  By analogy, it can
be argued that what is decisive in cases, such as the Argentine cases above,
is whether the buyer’s evidentiary position, and consequently its ability to
establish its rights under Article 35(2) of the CISG, would be substantially
undermined by the domestic rules on the admissibility of evidence.  If so,
the admissibility of evidence should be treated as part of the substantive
law regime that ought to be displaced by Article 35(2).  Underlying this
position is the view that the recourse to domestic evidence rules “must be
the exception, not the rule” in order to avoid undermining the Conven-
tion’s uniform application.109  If this standpoint is taken, the decision in
the Argentine case would be wrongly decided because it deprived the
buyer of an opportunity to rely on the inspection company’s report to
prove a lack of conformity—a piece of evidence which would probably be
acceptable in many other jurisdictions.
D. Concluding Observations
This excursion into matters of proof highlights several areas of uncer-
tainty as to how far the scope of a substantive law instrument should be
stretched.  This work has presented its tentative suggestions in respect of
how these matters should be treated under the CISG.  But if we were once
again to imagine a new international sales law, it would be desirable to see
clearer and more definitive guidance as regards the burden, standard,
ties to litigation or the need to ensure legitimacy of decision in the adjudication.”
Id.  Apart from these, every rule pursues different objectives and policies. See id.
107. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 138 cmt. a (1971).
108. See SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHWENZER, supra note 9, art. 11, ¶ 13.
109. See Orlandi, supra note 101, at 28.
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evaluation, and admissibility of proof.  As explained, all these areas have a
great influence on the exercise of rights available under the substantive
law regime.  The more the international instruments are treated as gov-
erning these matters, the greater the potential for their uniform applica-
tion.  However, before extending their scope in that way, the drafters need
to ensure that the international sales law is capable of governing the issues
of proof.  It has been shown that even an instrument like the CISG, which
says very little on matters of proof, is capable of governing the issue of the
burden and standard of proof in principle.  In relation to the admissibility
of evidence, domestic law is a preferred option.  Even then, for the sake of
legal certainty, an international instrument should still explain its relation-
ship with the applicable domestic law.
V. CONCLUSION
The Convention’s rules on conformity are broad and concise.  This is
understandable, considering that trade involves a nearly infinite number
of goods and equally infinite sets of circumstances surrounding sales con-
tracts.  Nevertheless, the Convention’s considerable practical experience
has now exposed that the simplicity of its rules is deceptive and there are a
number of questions that have no clear answers or are surrounded by con-
troversy.  One such question is whether there is really a need to search for
a quality standard, which can underpin the ultimate default test of the
fitness for ordinary purposes.  This Article’s position is that a quality stan-
dard is not essential because the fitness for the ordinary purposes test will
be capable of resolving all cases unless it is interpreted in abstract terms,
without regard for the parties’ particular circumstances.  If this is correct,
the significance of the debate about the right quality standard may seem,
to some extent, irrelevant.  However, in some cases, such as those involv-
ing goods of different grades or varying levels of performance, a quality
standard may be able to provide greater clarity as to the content of the
seller’s obligation, facilitating the application of the fitness for the ordi-
nary purposes test.  Also, if the Convention’s rules are viewed not only as
tools of contract interpretation and of the allocation of risk, but also as a
vehicle for promoting some benchmark of quality around the world, there
may be a more pressing need to articulate an underlying quality standard.
The rules on conformity are extremely fact-sensitive, which means
that every case is to be decided on the basis of its particular circumstances.
That, together with the general nature of the rules, leaves parties with very
little guidance about how risks are likely to be allocated in a given case.
Certainty is just as important a part of justice as flexibility, and therefore
there is much to be said for promoting those solutions that have so far
received greater acceptance.  The approach in New Zealand Mussels repre-
sents one such solution, which, in addition to its relative prominence,
strikes a good balance between certainty and openness to the individual
facts.  To an extent, a similar point can be made in respect of the courts’
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acceptance that the buyer’s knowledge of a lack of conformity is a relevant
factor in interpreting the contract under paragraph (1) of Article 35, de-
spite paragraph (3) explicitly treating the buyer’s knowledge as relevant
only to default rules in paragraph (2).  Whether the buyer was in the posi-
tion to be aware of a lack of conformity at the time of the contract cannot
be ignored in the face of the Convention’s contextual rules of contract
interpretation.
It has long been evident that the issues of proof have considerable
impact on substantive law rights.  No consistency in the exercise of the
rights available under the CISG can be expected if the issues of proof are
treated differently.  It is for this reason that much work has been done to
advocate bringing the burden and standard of proof into the Conven-
tion’s scope.  There is, however, a limit on how far the Convention’s reach
can be extended.  It has been argued that the CISG is not capable of deal-
ing adequately with the admissibility of evidence.
All in all, there is little doubt that the Convention has proved to be
capable of resolving the issue of conformity of the goods.  But, if a new
international sales law ever replaces the CISG, several questions are worth
thinking about in drafting the new provisions on conformity.  First, would
it be useful to introduce an overarching quality standard?  Second, should
the rules be more detailed by giving guidance for certain specific cases,
such as that given in New Zealand Mussels?  Finally, to what extent should a
sales law instrument govern the matters of proof, such as burden and stan-
dard of proof, and the evaluation and admissibility of evidence?
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DEFINING THE BORDERS OF UNIFORM INTERNATIONAL
CONTRACT LAW: THE CISG AND REMEDIES FOR INNOCENT,
NEGLIGENT, OR FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATION
ULRICH G. SCHROETER*
I. INTRODUCTION
THE creation of uniform international contract law, as of uniform lawin general, is never all-encompassing.  Instead, uniform law instru-
ments are typically limited in their scope, because the uniform provisions
on which the drafters can agree are limited or because there is no need to
unify neighboring areas of law.  The borders of uniform contract law
thereby created in turn create their own problems, most prominently
among them the need to define the relationship between the uniform law
and the rules of non-unified domestic law.1
Under the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods (CISG), this task is particularly important and diffi-
cult when it comes to remedies under domestic law and their applicability
to CISG contracts.2  In such cases, any recourse to local, non-unified law
involves the risk of upsetting the balance of rights and obligations of inter-
national buyers and sellers that has been laid down in the CISG: whenever
domestic law provides a party with a remedy it would not have under the
CISG’s rules, its concurrent application potentially undermines foresee-
ability and legal certainty in international trade.  The arguably most dis-
tinctive CISG features that each party should be able to rely upon are
provisions limiting the access to or the measure of its remedies.  A buyer’s
obligation to give notice of non-conformity to the seller within a reasona-
ble time after he has discovered or ought to have discovered it, under
CISG Article 39(1), plays a significant role in practice, with Article 39(2)
of the CISG cutting off all of the buyer’s remedies when two years after
delivery no notice has been given.3  A party may furthermore only avoid
* Professor of Law at the University of Mannheim, Germany; Director of the
Institute for Corporate Law at the University of Mannheim (IURUM).
1. See FRITZ ENDERLEIN & DIETRICH MASKOW, INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW art. 4,
¶ 1 (Oceana Pubs. 1992), available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/
enderlein.html#art04a.
2. See CA 7833/06 Pamesa Ceramica v. Yisrael Mendelson Ltd. ¶ 58 [2009]
(Isr.) (“[A] complex issue.”); see also Ingeborg Schwenzer & Paschal Hachem, Arti-
cle 4, in COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF
GOODS (CISG) ¶ 19 (Ingeborg Schwenzer ed., 3d ed. 2010) (“A difficult and ex-
tremely controversial issue.”) [hereinafter CISG COMMENTARY]
3. See CA 7833/06 Pamesa Ceramica v. Yisrael Mendelson Ltd. ¶ 52 [2009]
(Isr.) (discussing application of remedies in tort after period for giving notice of
non-conformity had expired); see also U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, United
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods art. 39(1),
(553)
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the contract in cases in which the other party has committed a “fundamen-
tal” breach of contract, under Article 25 CISG, thereby making the bur-
densome unwinding of contracts an ultima ratio (remedy of last resort).4
And the damages that a party may claim for a breach of contract may not
exceed the loss which the party in breach foresaw or ought to have fore-
seen at the time of the conclusion of the contract.5
In trying to prevent these and other rules of the CISG from being
circumvented, the solution is generally seen in international uniform law’s
prevalence over concurring bodies of law:6 “Displacing inconsistent do-
mestic law,” so it has been said, “is of the essence of establishing uniform
law.”7  The theoretical foundations on which this accepted outcome is
based are, on the contrary, not uniform.  One approach that could be
described as “international” is pointing to the rules of the CISG itself, no-
tably Article 7(1), and arguing that the CISG’s international character and
the need to promote uniformity in its application require the preemption
of domestic law.8  A different line of argument with a more “national” fo-
cus primarily looks to the contracting states’ domestic legal order that may
explicitly or implicitly grant prevalence to the CISG.  An example for the
first type of rule can be found in the Australian state of New South Wales,
where an express clause in the parliamentary act implementing the CISG
clarifies that “[the] provisions of the Convention prevail over any other
law in force in New South Wales to the extent of any inconsistency.”9  A
non-CISG-specific rule of prevalence is followed in the United States,
where reference has been made to the CISG’s nature as federal law, which
therefore “trumps” state common law and the Uniform Commercial
Code.10  The difference between these approaches may eventually be
Apr. 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CISG], available at http://www.uncit
ral.org/pdf/english/texts/sales/cisg/V1056997-CISG-e-book.pdf
4. See CISG, supra note 3, art. 25; see also Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal
Court of Justice], Apr. 3, 1996, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 2364,
2366, 2008 (Ger.); Ulrich G. Schroeter, Article 51, in CISG COMMENTARY, supra note
2, ¶ 51.
5. See CISG, supra note 3, art. 74.
6. See Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal Supreme Court] Sept. 15, 2000, CISG-
online No. 770 (Switz.); ENDERLEIN & MASKOW, supra note 1, art. 4, ¶ 4.2; JOHN O.
HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER THE 1980 UNITED NA-
TIONS CONVENTION ¶ 73 (Harry M. Flechtner ed., 4th ed. 2009); Ulrich Magnus,
Wiener UN-Kaufrecht (CISG), in J. VON STAUDINGER’S KOMMENTAR ZUM BU¨RGERLICHEN
GESETZBUCH MIT EINFU¨HRUNGSGESETZ UND NEBENGESETZEN AT EINL ZUM CISG ¶ 42
(rev. ed. de Gruyter 2013); BURGHARD PILTZ, INTERNATIONALES KAUFRECHT
¶¶ 2–125 (2d ed. 2008).
7. HONNOLD, supra note 6, ¶ 73.
8. See MARTIN KO¨HLER, DIE HAFTUNG NACH UN-KAUFRECHT IM SPANNUNG-
SVERHA¨LTNIS ZWISCHEN VERTRAG UND DELIKT 66 (Tu¨bingen: Mohr 2003); PILTZ,
supra note 6, ¶¶ 2–68.
9. See Sec. 6 Sale of Goods (Vienna Convention) Act 1986 No. 119.
10. See Asante Techs., Inc. v. PMC-Sierra, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1151
(N.D. Cal. 2001); JOSEPH LOOKOFSKY, UNDERSTANDING THE CISG § 2.3 (4th ed.
2012); William S. Dodge, Teaching the CISG in Contracts, 50 J. LEGAL EDUC. 72, 72
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small, however, because even the “national” view tends to incorporate an
international perspective, referring to the CISG’s preamble which stresses
that “the adoption of uniform rules which govern contracts for the inter-
national sale of goods and take into account the different social, economic
and legal systems would contribute to the removal of legal barriers in in-
ternational trade and promote the development of international trade.”
U.S. courts have concluded that the expressly stated goal of developing
uniform international contract law to promote international trade “indi-
cates the intent of the parties to the treaty to have the treaty preempt state
law causes of action,”11 thereby supporting the prevalence of the CISG’s
provisions with an interpretation of the CISG itself.
The prevalence of uniform international contract law is, of course,
only needed and only justified where and as far as its rules attempt to
govern exclusively, and not outside the scope of the CISG’s substantive
coverage.  The borders of the CISG therefore also define the scope of its
prevalence and of domestic laws’ corresponding preemption.  Accord-
ingly, the crucial question is: Where exactly do the borders of the CISG
run?12
II. DEFINING THE BORDERS OF THE CISG: A NOVEL TWO-STEP APPROACH
Describing the substantive scope of the CISG is not easily done, both
when attempted in the abstract and with regard to a particular question.
Commentators have criticized that in many of the pertinent cases decided
under the CISG, no detailed reasoning is given why certain issues fall
within or outside the CISG’s scope of application.13  In Part A below, two
“traditional” approaches that can be identified in case law and legal writ-
ings will be discussed, before an alternative approach will be presented in
Part B.
(2000); John C. Duncan, Jr., Nachfrist Was Ist?  Thinking Globally and Act Locally:
Considering Time Extension Principles of the U.N. Convention on Contracts for the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods in Revising the Uniform Commercial Code, 2000 BYU L. REV. 1363,
1372 (2000); David Frisch, Commercial Common Law, The United Nations Convention
on the International Sale of Goods, and the Inertia of Habit, 74 TUL. L. REV. 495, 503–04
(1999).
11. Asante Tech., 164 F. Supp. 2d at 1151; see also Geneva Pharms. Tech. v. Barr
Labs., Inc., 201 F. Supp. 2d 236, 285 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 386
F.3d 485 (2d Cir. 2004).
12. See Peter Schlechtriem, The Borderland of Tort and Contract: Opening a New
Frontier?, 21 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 467, 470–71 (1988).
13. See Stefan Kro¨ll, Selected Problems Concerning the CISG’s Scope of Application,
25 J.L. & COM. 39, 56 (2005).
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A. “Traditional” Approaches
1. Reliance on CISG Article 4
A significant number of courts and authors turn to Article 4 of the
CISG in order to determine where the exact borders of the CISG run.14
This provision states:
This Convention governs only the formation of the contract of
sale and the rights and obligations of the seller and the buyer
arising from such a contract. In particular, except as otherwise
expressly provided in this Convention, it is not concerned with:
(a) the validity of the contract or of any of its provisions or
of any usage;
(b) the effect which the contract may have on the property
in the goods sold.15
By using a strict wording (“governs only”), Article 4 of the CISG at
first sight indeed seems to provide a hard and fast description of the
CISG’s material sphere of application.16  However, this first impression is
soon refuted by the apparent incorrectness of the statement made in its
first sentence: The CISG clearly also governs matters other than the forma-
tion of sales contracts and the rights and obligations of the seller and the
buyer arising from such contracts.17  The CISG notably also governs the
modification of sales contracts, in Article 29, and the obligations of con-
tracting states under public international law arising from the CISG, in
Articles 89–101.18  The first sentence of Article 4 of the CISG could there-
fore in itself be viewed as a misrepresentation, namely one made by the
drafters of the CISG in respect to the CISG’s content.  It would then argua-
bly qualify as a merely “innocent” misrepresentation, as the drafting his-
tory of the CISG indicates that the delegates considered the provision to
14. See Caterpillar, Inc. v. Usinor Industeel, 393 F. Supp. 2d 659, 674 (N.D. Ill.
2005); Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Court of Appeals] Hamm 2010, INTERNATION-
ALES HANDELSRECHT [IHR] 59, 63 (Ger.); Helen Elizabeth Hartnell, Rousing the
Sleeping Dog: The Validity Exception to the Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods, 18 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 19 (1993); Christoph R. Heiz, Validity of Contracts
Under the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods,
April 11, 1980, and Swiss Contract Law, 20 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 639, 647–59
(1987); Rudolph Lessiak, UNCITRAL-Kaufrechtsabkommen und Irrtumsanfechtung,
o¨stJBl 1989 487, 492; LOOKOFSKY, supra note 10, § 2.6; Joseph Lookofsky, CISG Case
Commentary on Pree¨mption in Geneva Pharmaceuticals and Stawski, PACE REVIEW OF
THE CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALES OF GOODS 115
(2004), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/lookofsky8.html.
15. See CISG, supra note 3, art. 4.
16. See LOOKOFSKY, supra note 14, at 115 (“[S]eemingly clear-cut
delimitation.”).
17. See CISG COMMENTARY, supra note 2, art. 4, ¶ 2. R
18. See CISG, supra note 3, art. 29 (involving modification of sales contracts);
see also id. arts. 80–101 (involving obligations of contracting states under public
international law).
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be a correct shorthand description of the CISG’s substantive coverage19—
its lack of precision was apparently overlooked.  In addition, and maybe
equally important, the terms “formation of the contract of sale” and
“rights and obligations of the seller and the buyer arising from such a
contract” are themselves open to interpretation, thus providing no gui-
dance to courts and arbitral tribunals that could not easier be drawn from
an evaluation of the CISG’s detailed provisions in Part II and III of the
CISG.
In its second sentence, Article 4 of the CISG goes on to list two issues
it is particularly “not concerned with,” namely the validity of the contract
or of any of its provisions or of any usage (subparagraph a) and the effect
which the contract may have on the property in the goods sold (subpara-
graph b).  Notably the “validity exception” in subparagraph (a) has gained
widespread recognition as a supposedly important carve-out from the
CISG’s material scope,20 and a heated discussion has developed about the
need to interpret the “validity” concept autonomously21 or in accordance
with domestic law.22
Contrary to the approach just described, it is submitted that the sec-
ond sentence of Article 4 of the CISG in truth is lacking any delimiting use
because the list of issues it contains is neither inclusive nor exclusive in
nature.23  It is not inclusive because it does not provide that any question
concerning the validity of sales contracts or a contract of sale’s effects on
the property in the goods is per se outside the CISG’s scope—on the con-
trary, it specifically assumes that the CISG might govern such questions
elsewhere in its provisions (“[E]xcept as otherwise expressly provided in
this Convention . . .”).  Since one of the express provisions referred to is
CISG Article 7(2) with its reference to general principles underlying the
CISG, the “except as” caveat makes Article 4’s second sentence a mere
19. See UN DOC. A/CONF. 97/5, Official Records 17, art. 14 (using term
“substantive coverage”).
20. See Hartnell, supra note 14, at 4–5; Joseph Lookofsky, In Dubio Pro Conven-
tione? Some Thoughts About Opt-Outs, Computer Programs and Pree¨mption under the 1980
Vienna Sales Convention (CISG), 13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 263, 280–81 (2003).
21. See CISG COMMENTARY, supra note 2, art. 4, ¶ 31; Milena Djordjevic, Article R
4, in THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL
SALE OF GOODS ¶ 14 (Stefan Kro¨ll, Loukas Mistelis & Maria del Pilar Perales Vis-
casillas eds., 2011); ENDERLEIN & MASKOW, supra note 1, art. 4, ¶ 4.3.1; Heiz, supra R
note 14, at 660–61.
22. See KARL H. NEUMAYER & CATHERINE MING, CONVENTION DE VIENNE SUR LES
CONTRATS DE VENTE INTERNATIONALE DE MARCHANDISES: COMMENTAIRE art. 4, ¶¶ 2,
6, 7 (1993); Denis Tallon, Article 79, in COMMENTARY ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALES
LAW: THE 1980 VIENNA SALES CONVENTION ¶ 2.4.3 (Cesare Massimo Bianca &
Michael Joachim Bonell eds., 1987); see also Geneva Pharms. Tech. v. Barr Labs.,
201 F. Supp. 2d 236, 285 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
23. Contra Warren Khoo, Article 4, in COMMENTARY ON THE INTERNATIONAL
SALES LAW: THE 1980 VIENNA SALES CONVENTION ¶ 2.2 (Cesare Massimo Bianca &
Michael Joachim Bonell eds., 1987) (“By specifically enumerating these matters,
the article places it beyond doubt that they are entirely outside the ambit of the
Convention.”).
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reference to the need to establish the CISG’s material scope by way of
interpreting all of its provisions.24  In addition, the statement’s introduc-
tory phrase (“In particular . . .”) makes clear that it is not exclusive in
nature, so that issues not covered by the second sentence of Article 4 may
nevertheless be outside the CISG’s scope.  Through the combination of
two opposed exceptions, the provision is thus deprived of any regulatory
meaning, rendering moot which issues it applies to and how its terms
should be interpreted.
At the end of the day, Article 4 of the CISG therefore neither reveals
with certainty which questions are governed, nor which questions are not
governed by the CISG.  In all but the most obvious cases, courts and arbi-
trators have to look elsewhere for guidance.
2. Reliance on Dogmatic Categories of Domestic Law: Contract v. Tort, etc.
Another frequently used approach relies on dogmatic categories in
determining the scope of the CISG and its relationship to domestic law:
The CISG, so it is said, “is about contracts,” and accordingly neither about
“procedure” nor about “tort” or other presumably “non-contractual” areas
of law.25  With respect to the relationship between the CISG and remedies
for tortious behavior that is of primary interest for the purposes of the
present article, this approach has found some support among
commentators.26
a. Case Law Under the CISG: A Mixed Picture
Case law decided under the CISG, however, has been somewhat more
varied in its recourses to the “contract v. tort” dichotomy.  On one end of
the scale is the decision in Viva Vino Import Corp. v. Farnese Vini S.R.L.27
with its generic “The CISG does not apply to tort claims,” a statement that
has been cited with approval in further U.S. cases like Geneva Pharmaceuti-
24. See Christoph Benicke, Article 4, in MU¨NCHENER KOMMENTAR ZUM HANDEL-
SGESETZBUCH ¶ 4 (2d ed. 2007); Khoo, supra note 23, ¶ 2.1; ULRICH G. SCHROETER,
UN-KAUFRECHT UND EUROPA¨ISCHES GEMEINSCHAFTSRECHT–VERHA¨LTNIS UND WECH-
SELWIRKUNGEN § 6, ¶¶ 149–51 (2005); contra ENDERLEIN & MASKOW, supra note 1, R
art. 4, ¶ 3.1; PILTZ, supra note 6, ¶¶ 2–125.
25. See Zapata Hermanos Sucesores, S.A. v. Hearthside Baking Co., 313 F.3d
385, 388 (7th Cir. 2002) (“The Convention is about contracts, not about proce-
dure.”); Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal Supreme Court] July 11, 2000, CISG-on-
line No. 627 (Switz.).
26. See Michael Bridge, A Commentary on Articles 1–13 and 78, in THE DRAFT
UNCITRAL DIGEST AND BEYOND: CASES, ANALYSIS AND UNRESOLVED ISSUES IN THE
U.N. SALES CONVENTION 235, 246 (Franco Ferrari, Harry Flechtner & Ronald A.
Brand eds., 2004); Djordjevic, supra note 21, art. 4, ¶ 10; Joseph M. Lookofsky,
Loose Ends and Contorts in International Sales: Problems in the Harmonization of Private
Law Rules, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 403, 409 (1991); Lookofsky, supra note 20, at 286.
27. No. 99-6384, 2000 WL 1224903, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 29, 2000).
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cals v. Barr Laboratories,28 Sky Cast v. Global Direct Distribution,29 and Dingxi
Longhai Dairy v. Becwood.30
The court in Geneva Pharmaceuticals, however, did not stop there.  Cit-
ing Professor Schlechtriem,31 it rather went on to caution: “Just because a
party labels a cause of action a ‘tort’ does not mean that it is automatically
not pre-empted by the CISG.  A tort that is in actuality a contract claim, or
that bridges the gap between contract and tort law may very well be pre-
empted.”32  This line of thought was subsequently picked up by yet an-
other U.S. District Court in Electrocraft Arkansas, Inc. v. Super Electric Motors,
Ltd.,33 where the court—once more citing Professor Schlechtriem34—
said:
Thus, a tort that is in essence a contract claim and does not in-
volve interests existing independently of contractual obligations
(such as goods that cause bodily injury) will fall within the scope
of the CISG regardless of the label given to the claim . . . .  The
question for this Court, then, is whether Electrocraft’s negli-
gence/strict liability claim is, as argued by Super Electric, “actu-
ally . . . a breach-of-contract claim in masquerade.”35
It accordingly moved away from primarily focusing on dogmatic cate-
gories towards considering the substance of the remedy concerned.  A sim-
ilar perspective was also adopted by courts outside the United States.  In
ING Insurance v. BVBA HVA Koeling,36 a Belgian Court of Appeals held that
a party to a CISG contract that commits a fault in the performance of the
contract can only be held liable on an extra-contractual basis if the alleged
fault is a not a fault against a contractual obligation but against the general
duty of care, and if that fault causes other damage than the damage
caused by faulty performance of the agreement.37  In Pamesa Ceramica v.
Yisrael Mendelson,38 the Supreme Court of Israel in turn commenced by
asking the rhetorical question: “Does placing the word ‘tort’ at the top of
28. See Geneva Pharms. Tech. v. Barr Labs., 201 F. Supp. 2d 236, 286 (S.D.N.Y.
2002).
29. See Sky Cast, Inc. v. Global Direct Distribution, L.L.C., No. 07-161, 2008
WL 754734, at *7 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 18, 2008).
30. See Dingxi Longhai Dairy, Ltd. v. Becwood Tech. Grp., L.L.C., 718 F.
Supp. 2d 1019, 1024 (D. Minn. 2010).
31. See Schlechtriem, supra note 12, at 474.
32. Geneva Pharms. Tech., 201 F. Supp. 2d at 286 n.30 (citing Schlechtriem,
supra note 12).
33. No. 4:09-cv-00318, 2009 WL 5181854 (E.D. Ark. Dec. 23, 2009).
34. See id. at *5 (citing Schlechtriem, supra note 12, at 473).
35. Id.
36. Hof van Beroep [HvB] [Court of Appeal] Antwerpen, Apr. 14, 2004
(Belg.).
37. See id.
38. CA 7833/06 Pamesa Ceramica v. Yisrael Mendelson Ltd. ¶ 27 [2009]
(Isr.).
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the claim release the buyer from the inspection and notice obligations,
and does it deprive the seller of the defences that the [C]onvention pro-
vides . . . ?”39  The court then, in a very carefully reasoned decision, devel-
oped a balanced approach similar to the ones outlined above.  In
concluding, it held that weight should be given to the interests which the
uniform law on the one hand and the domestic law on the other seek to
protect, and that a claim in tort should only be allowed to be heard along-
side the CISG when those interests are not identical.40
Courts in yet other CISG contracting states have generally given even
less weight to the contract/tort dichotomy.  A German court of appeals
ruled that concurrent tort claims, assuming that they were available, would
in any case be barred once the notice of non-conformity under CISG Arti-
cle 39(1) had not been timely given,41 thereby effectively denying an inde-
pendent application of tort rules where a contract between the parties is
governed by the CISG.  Most recently, the German Supreme Court re-
frained from ruling on the relationship between the CISG’s remedies and
claims for damages under domestic tort law—because the additional avail-
ability of tort claims would not have affected the outcome of the pending
case—but its reference to the disputed nature of the question among legal
writers indicates that the Court did not consider the solution to be
obvious.42
b. Discussion
In the author’s opinion, dogmatic classifications or labels like “con-
tract,” “tort,” or “procedure” can and should play no role at all in defining
the CISG’s substantive scope.  The reason is simple: the CISG itself pro-
vides no autonomous definition of these categories, and their contents as
well as limits in domestic laws are often uncertain43 and—most important
in an international uniform law setting—not internationally uniform.
The institution of common law misrepresentation, occasionally char-
acterized as a “strange amalgam of law and equity and of contract and
tort,”44 is one case in point: while innocent misrepresentation (to be dis-
cussed in more detail below) constitutes an instrument of contract law
39. Id. ¶ 54.
40. See id. ¶¶ 69–70.
41. See Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Court of Appeals Thu¨ringen] May 26,
1998, Transportrecht, Beilage Internationales Handelsrecht [TranspR-IHR] 25, 29
(Ger.).
42. See Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] 2013, NEUE JURIS-
TISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 304, ¶ 17 (Ger.).
43. See Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 726 (1988) (“Except at the
extremes, the terms ‘substance’ and ‘procedure’ precisely describe very little ex-
cept a dichotomy, and what they mean in a particular context is largely deter-
mined by the purposes for which the dichotomy is drawn.”).
44. JOHN BURROWS, JEREMY FINN & STEPHEN TODD, LAW OF CONTRACT IN NEW
ZEALAND 302 (3d ed. 2007).
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under English law,45 it is regarded as part of tort law in the United
States.46  The consequence would be that remedies for innocent misrepre-
sentation under English law would be preempted by the CISG, while reme-
dies under U.S. law would not—a result that hardly seems convincing,
given that the content of both rules is rather similar.  Uncertainties in clas-
sifying particular remedies are similarly reflected in other parts of the law
of misrepresentation, with liability for negligent misrepresentations under
English law having been referred to as “contract in tort’s clothing.”47
Another example is the “contract with protective effect for third par-
ties,” a legal concept developed by the courts under German law, that a
well-known comparative law scholar once characterized as “a mere curios-
ity.”48  It assumes that contracts have protective effects for non-contracting
parties if the contracting parties’ intent—as determined through interpre-
tation of their contract in accordance with the principle of good faith49—
was such, thus resulting in the third party’s own contractual claim for dam-
ages if one of the contracting partners has breached its contractual obliga-
tions.  In “interpreting” the contract, German courts have often gone far
beyond the wording of the contract and the intentions of commercially
reasonable parties,50 thus e.g., deducing a seller’s intent to extend the
protective effects of a contract with a surveyor to any buyer of the house to
be sold51 and even granting a third party a contractual claim for damages
although, due to a valid limitation of liability clause, the contracting party
itself would not have had such a claim.52  The contractual classification of
expert liability towards third parties can arguably only be explained with a
(thinly veiled) attempt to escape German law’s lack of tort liability for
pure economic losses.  Not surprisingly, third party claims in comparable
situations would be classified differently in other legal systems, with U.S.
law potentially granting a claim in tort53 and Swiss law having created an
extra category “between contract and tort.”54
45. See Michael Bridge, Innocent Misrepresentation in Contract, in 57 CURRENT
LEGAL PROBLEMS 2004 277, 278 (Jane Holder et al. eds., 2004).
46. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552C (1977).
47. A.J.E. Jaffey, Contract in Tort’s Clothing, 5 J. LEGAL STUD. 77, 101–03 (1985).
48. 1 HEIN KO¨TZ & AXEL FLESSNER, EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW 253 (Tony Weir
trans., 1997).
49. See BU¨RGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [Civil Code], Jan. 2, 2002,
Bundesgesetzblatt 38, § 242 (Ger.).
50. See Ulrich G. Schroeter, Die Dritthaftung staatlich anerkannter Gutachter im
deutschen und schweizerischen Recht, in PRIVATE LAW: NATIONAL—GLOBAL—COMPARA-
TIVE: FESTSCHRIFT FU¨R INGEBORG SCHWENZER ZUM 60. GEBURTSTAG 1565 (Andrea
Bu¨chler & Markus Mu¨ller-Chen eds., 2011).
51. See Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Mar. 8, 1995,
NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 392, 1995 (Ger.).
52. See id. ¶ 25; Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] 2010,
NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 1277 (1278) (Ger.).
53. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(1) (1977).
54. Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal Supreme Court] Dec. 23, 2003, 130 ENT-
SCHEIDUNGEN DES SCHWEIZERISCHEN BUNDESGERICHTS [BGE] III 345, 349 (Switz.).
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As a third and final example, one may refer to the French instrument
of “action directe,” under which sub-buyers who have purchased goods from
an intermediate seller have a direct claim against the manufacturer of the
goods, relating to defects in those goods or to their unsuitability for their
intended purpose.55  In French case law and legal writing, there is agree-
ment that this claim is contractual in nature,56 despite the fact that this
classification is clearly at odds with the privity of contracts.57  After all, the
manufacturer has undertaken no contractual obligation towards sub-buy-
ers later purchasing the goods in the course of a chain of contracts, whose
identity and domicile is generally unknown to the manufacturer.  It is
therefore not entirely surprising that the European Court of Justice58 has
held that, when measured against the yardstick of the categories of EU
law, the French action directe cannot be regarded as a matter relating to a
contract,59 but rather as a matter relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict.60
In doing so, the Court of Justice noted that “it appears that the relation-
ships between manufacturer and sub-buyer are perceived differently in the
Member States,”61 and that in the great majority of them a manufacturer’s
liability in this context is not regarded as being of a contractual nature.62
All of the examples described above have one thing in common: the
dogmatic classification that the respective legal instruments received has
its source in domestic law, and particularities of the respective domestic
law were the reason why some of the instruments received their dogmatic
labels in the first place.  It is submitted that any approach relying on such
categories should therefore not be followed in an international uniform
55. See Michel Cannarsa & Olivier More´teau, The French “Action Directe”: The
Justification for Going Beyond Privity, in EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES ON PRODUCERS’ LIA-
BILITY 311 (Martin Ebers, Andre´ Janssen & Olaf Meyer eds., 2009).
56. See Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ.,
Oct. 9, 1979, Bull. civ. I, No. 241 (Fr.); Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court
for judicial matters] ass. ple´n., Jul. 12, 1991, Bull. civ., No. 5 (Fr.); Cannarsa &
More´teau, supra note 55, at 312.
57. See Cannarsa & More´teau, supra note 55, at 311.
58. See Case C-26/91, Jakob Handte & Co. GmbH v. Traitements Me´cano-
chimiques des Surfaces SA, 1992 ECR I-3916, ¶ 16 (discussing Article 5 No. 1 Brus-
sels Convention on Jurisdiction and Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments
in Civil and Commercial Matters of 1968); Case C-543/10, Refcomp SpA v. Axa
Corporate Solutions Assurance SA et al., ¶ 32 (2013) (unpublished) (reviewing
Council Regulation 44/2001, art. 5(1)(a), 2001 O.J. (L 12) 1, 4 (EC) on jurisdic-
tion and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial
matters [hereinafter Brussels I Regulation]).
59. See Brussels I Regulation, supra note 58, art. 5(1)(a).
60. See id. art. 5(3); see also Peter Mankowski, in BRUSSELS I REGULATION art. 5,
¶ 200 (Ulrich Magnus & Peter Mankowski eds., 2d ed. 2012).
61. Case C-543/10, Refcomp SpA v. Axa Corporate Solutions Assurance SA et
al., ¶ 38 (2013) (unpublished).
62. See Case C-26/91, Jakob Handte & Co. GmbH v. Traitements Me´cano-
chimiques des Surfaces SA, 1992 ECR I-3916, ¶ 20.
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law setting.63  In essence, it would amount to an interpretation of the
CISG’s material scope in light of domestic law, as represented by the dog-
matic classification of the competing domestic rules of law.  This is argua-
bly incompatible with Article 7(1)’s guidelines, which call for an
“autonomous” interpretation of the CISG’s provisions, including those de-
fining the borders of the CISG.
B. A Novel Two-Step Approach
Against the background of the deficiencies that the “traditional” ap-
proaches described above have shown—most prominently among them
the lack of uniformity created—it seems both necessary and appropriate
to search for an alternative approach which is better in line with the de-
mands made by Article 7(1).  In this spirit, I propose in the following sec-
tion a novel two-step approach designed as a tool allowing for a more
uniform definition of the CISG’s borders.
1. Basic Outline
The two-step approach’s basic formula runs as follows: a domestic law
rule is displaced by the CISG if (1) it is triggered by a factual situation
which the CISG also applies to (the “factual” criterion), and (2) it pertains
to a matter that is also regulated by the CISG (the “legal” criterion).  Only
if both criteria are cumulatively fulfilled, the domestic law rule concerned
overlaps with the CISG’s sphere of application in a way that will generally
result in its preemption.64
The development of this two-step approach and its criteria are based
on the assumption that the CISG’s rules (and not domestic law) must
serve as the starting point in establishing the relationship between the
CISG and concurrent legal rules.65  In developing a suitable methodical
approach, Article 7(1) is the primary provision from which guidance can
be drawn: the directive it provides for courts and arbitral tribunals—to
have regard to the CISG’s international character and to the need to pro-
mote uniformity “in its application”—also needs to be observed when de-
termining the CISG’s scope of application, because any recourse to a
domestic rule of law in place of the CISG effectively means that the latter
is not being applied at all.  It is submitted that the desirable uniform out-
come in this context can best be achieved by combining a factual criterion
with a legal criterion, both of which will be outlined in more detail below.
63. See ENDERLEIN & MASKOW, supra note 1, art. 4, ¶ 4.2; Ingeborg Schwenzer R
& Pascal Hachem, The CISG—Successes and Pitfalls, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 457, 471
(2009).
64. For a further discussion of how the outcome is different only where the
CISG exceptionally governs an issue without doing so exhaustively, see infra notes
207–09.
65. See CA 7833/06 Pamesa Ceramica v. Yisrael Mendelson Ltd. 27, ¶ 53
[2009] (Isr.); Ulrich Huber, in COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION ON THE IN-
TERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) art. 45, ¶ 50 (Peter Schlechtriem ed., 1998).
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\58-4\VLR406.txt unknown Seq: 12 23-JUL-13 11:41
564 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58: p. 553
2. First Step: The Factual Criterion
When investigating the factual criterion somewhat closer, it soon be-
comes clear that a fact-related yardstick at least comparable to the descrip-
tion proposed here has been frequently mentioned by commentators in
the past.  Professor Honnold notably argued that all domestic law rules are
displaced, which turn on “the very same operative facts that invoke the
rules of the Convention,”66 and many writers have followed his approach
or have used a similar test.67
a. Reasons
At least two reasons speak in favor of focusing on the facts of cases
covered by two concurring legal rules in order to establish the relationship
between these rules.  First, this focus avoids the difficulties already de-
scribed above68 which inevitably arise when dogmatic categories of domes-
tic law are being relied upon in an international setting.  By looking to the
substance of the rules rather than their label,69 and with this substance
being identified by factual standards, an internationally uniform solution
will likely be easier to reach.  And second, a factual criterion is arguably
more attuned to the viewpoint of merchants for whose benefit, as can be
seen from its Preamble, the CISG’s rules were eventually written.  From
merchants’ perspective, it is primarily important to know which factual
behavior in the conduct of their business will result in what kind of legal
consequences, so that they will be able to adjust their actions accordingly.
Since the legal consequences depend on which legal rules are applicable,
it is sensible to also base the precise definition of the CISG’s material
scope and thereby the relationship between international uniform law and
domestic law on factual circumstances.  Through this use of factual instead
of dogmatic legal standards, one may hope that it is possible for merchants
to foresee which of two conflicting laws will be applied to their case.  To
this end, the criterion prevents factual situations covered by the CISG
from leading to a surprising application of foreign domestic rules, the lat-
ter appearing (from the merchant’s perspective) like the proverbial
“rabbit out of the hat.”70
66. HONNOLD, supra note 6, ¶ 65.
67. See Enderlein & Maskow, supra note 1, art. 4, ¶ 3.1; CLAYTON P. GILLETTE R
& STEVEN D. WALT, SALES LAW: DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL 49 (2000); Heiz,
supra note 14, at 647 (“[F]actual situation triggers a provision of domestic law as
well as a rule of the Convention.”); KO¨HLER, supra note 8, at 67; PILTZ, supra note 6,
¶¶ 2–148; Schwenzer & Hachem, supra note 63, at 471; Peter Winship, Commentary
on Professor Kastely’s Rhetorical Analysis, 8 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 623, 638 (1988).
68. For a further discussion of the difficulties arising out of dogmatic catego-
ries of domestic law, see supra notes 14–24.
69. See HONNOLD, supra note 6, ¶ 65.
70. See Magnus, supra note 6, art. 4, ¶ 28.
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b. The Need for a Second (“Legal”) Criterion
It is submitted, however, that in many cases the factual criterion is not
enough, and that it will often require a second step in order to decide
whether a given domestic law rule is being displaced by the CISG.  This
second step is necessary because the same factual situation may well be
regulated by different rules from different perspectives and for different
purposes, not all of which are exhaustively covered by the CISG.  The fac-
tual criterion alone may therefore be too blunt an instrument for an as-
sessment that does not stop at finding that a factual setting has at all been
regulated, but also takes into account why and to which end it has been
regulated.
The case Stawski Distributing Co. v. Zywiec Breweries PLC,71 decided by
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois in
2003, provides a practical example.  It involved a longstanding business
relationship between a Polish brewery and a Chicago-based importer and
distributor of beer.  The parties had concluded an exclusive distribution
agreement which, according to the court, was potentially governed by the
CISG.72  When the seller notified the buyer that he intended to terminate
the agreement, the question arose whether the provisions of the Illinois
Beer Industry Fair Dealing Act73—a state law in relation to the beer indus-
try which places a number of restrictions on relationships between beer
wholesalers and brewers—could be applied alongside the CISG, or
whether they were preempted.  In case of the Illinois Beer Industry Fair
Dealing Act, the factual criterion addressed above was clearly fulfilled, be-
cause the Act’s applicability was triggered by a factual situation which the
CISG also applied to.  According to its Section 2(B), the Act “shall be in-
corporated into and shall be deemed a part of every agreement between
brewers and wholesalers and shall govern all relations between brewers
and their wholesalers,” thereby also including agreements and relations
between wholesalers and foreign brewers.  Since the CISG in turn also ap-
plies to contracts of sale between brewers and wholesalers as long as they
have their respective places of business in different states, the applicability
of both the Act and the CISG is triggered by the same factual situation.
Authors who exclusively rely on this factor74 would therefore have to con-
71. No. 02 C 8708, 2003 WL 22290412 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 6, 2003).
72. See id. at *2.  The court held that “if this were a typical case, there could be
little dispute that the CISG would apply and be considered the authoritative law on
this subject.” Id.  The published facts of the case do not make clear whether this
assessment was correct, because exclusive distribution agreements only qualify as
“contracts for the sale of goods” in the sense used by CISG Article 1(1) if they
already create obligations between the parties concerning the delivery of goods,
but not if they leave it to the parties to decide at a later stage whether such transac-
tions will be conducted. See Schroeter, supra note 4, Introduction to Arts. 14–24, ¶
66.
73. 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 720/1 (1982).
74. For a discussion of cases that were decided upon factual criteria, see supra
notes 61–62.
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clude that the Illinois Beer Industry Fair Dealing Act is being displaced by
the CISG75—a result that seems premature,76 because the Act was not nec-
essarily enacted in order to address the same type of risk as the CISG.
3. Second Step: The Legal Criterion (or: What’s the Regulated “Matter”?)
As a second step within the two-step approach proposed here, it is
therefore necessary to determine whether the domestic law rule covering
the factual situation at hand also pertains to a “matter” regulated by the
CISG.77  This second step enables courts and arbitral tribunals to take into
account the regulatory purpose and focus of the concurring legal rules,
limiting the CISG’s preemptive effect to domestic laws that pertain to a
matter already regulated by the CISG, but allowing for their parallel appli-
cation where the regulated matters are different.
This immediately raises the question: What’s the “matter”?  The CISG
itself uses the term “matter” first and foremost in Article 7(2) in address-
ing the filling of “gaps” within the CISG’s rules: it provides that
“[q]uestions concerning matters governed by this Convention which are
not expressly settled in it are to be settled in conformity with the general
principles on which it is based,”78 thereby making clear that “matter” is
understood as a wider term than “question,” with each matter governed by
the CISG potentially involving more than one question.  The term “mat-
ter” furthermore is being employed in Articles 90 and 94, in which the
CISG addresses its relationship towards other instruments of uniform law
or instances of the same or closely related domestic laws that concern
“matters governed by this Convention.”  In this context, there is agree-
ment among commentators that “matter” refers not only to the formation
of the contract of sale and the rights and obligations of the seller and the
buyer arising from such a contract (i.e., the broad areas mentioned in the
first sentence of Article 4), but may also apply to smaller subject areas.79
The only dispute concerns the question of whether a matter in the sense
employed by Articles 90 and 94 requires a certain minimum breadth,80
75. See, e.g., Stawski Distributing Co., 2003 WL 2290412.  This was the position
taken by the Polish brewery in this case.
76. See Lookofsky, supra note 14, at 121.
77. See Schlechtriem, supra note 12, at 473.
78. CISG, supra note 3, art. 7.
79. See Franco Ferrari, Article 94, in SCHLECHTRIEM/SCHWENZER KOMMENTAR
ZUM EINHEITLICHEN UN-KAUFRECHT ¶ 2 (Ingeborg Schwenzer ed., 5th ed. 2008);
Magnus, supra note 6, art. 94, ¶ 4; Peter Schlechtriem, Ingeborg Schwenzer & Pas-
cal Hachem, Article 94, in CISG COMMENTARY, supra note 2, ¶ 4). But see Johnny
Herre, Article 94, in UN CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE
OF GOODS (CISG) ¶ 4 (Stefan Kro¨ll, Loukas Mistelis & Maria del Pilar Perales Vis-
casillas eds., 2011).
80. See CHRISTOPH BRUNNER, UN-KAUFRECHT—CISG art. 94, ¶ 3 (2004);
Magnus, supra note 6, art. 94, ¶ 4.
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with examples given by legal writers ranging from consumer protection81
over late payments82 to product liability.83  The preferable opinion rejects
a minimum requirement of this sort, because neither the wording of these
provisions nor policy considerations support such a narrow reading.84
In our context, a matter can be described as a particular risk that is
being addressed in the CISG and thereby allocated between the parties.85
For this purpose, it is not decisive through which legal tools the respective
risk is addressed and allocated; in other words, it is only relevant that the
matter is governed, but not how.  The matter governed by the CISG in
Article 27 is therefore the risk that certain communications get lost during
transmission, independent of the legal consequences attached to such
loss.  And the matter governed in Article 45 is not the buyer’s right to
claim damages or to rely on other remedies, but rather the risk of the
seller’s contractual obligations not being fulfilled and the allocation of the
consequences.
In defining the CISG’s material scope of application, this “legal” crite-
rion is useful because it allows us to make a reasoned assessment of the
CISG’s relationship towards domestic rules of law in cases that fall into the
scope of both legal rules.  When being applied to the constellation in Staw-
ski, it confirms that the district court was eventually right in holding that
the Illinois Beer Industry Fair Dealing Act could be applied despite the
agreement between brewer and wholesaler being governed by the CISG:86
81. See Peter Schlechtriem, Article 94, in COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVEN-
TION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) ¶ 4 (Peter Schlechtriem &
Ingeborg Schwenzer eds., 2d ed. 2005).
82. See id.; contra Herre, supra note 79, art. 94, ¶ 4.
83. See Magnus, supra note 6, art. 94, ¶ 4.
84. See Schlechtriem, Schwenzer & Hachem, supra note 79, ¶ 4; SCHROETER,
supra note 24, § 10, ¶ 40.
85. See CA 7833/06 Pamesa Ceramic v. Yisrael Mendelson Ltd. 27 [2009]
(Isr.) (providing approaches comparable to, though not necessarily identical with,
position taken here).  The Supreme Court of Israel held that:
[T]he interests which [the buyer] is struggling to protect are not identi-
cal to the interests which the uniform law of the convention seeks to pro-
tect, a distinction which I think should be given weight when making the
decision as to whether to allow a claim in tort to be heard alongside the
arrangements in the convention.
Id. ¶ 70; see also Markus Mu¨ller-Chen, Article 45, in CISG COMMENTARY, supra note 2,
¶ 32 (“[T]he [concurrent] remedy cannot be in conflict with the regulatory goals
of the Uniform Sales Law.”).
86. See generally Stawski Distributing Co. v. Browary Zywiec S.A., 349 F.3d 1023
(7th Cir. 2003).  The district court based this (arguably correct) result on a reason-
ing different from the one developed here, namely the fact that the state of Illinois
had promulgated the Act pursuant to the power reserved to states by the Twenty-
First Amendment to the United States Constitution.  A duly ratified treaty could
not, therefore, override this reserved power.  On appeal, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit characterized the district judge’s suggestion that
the Twenty-First Amendment entitles states to trump the nation’s treaty commit-
ments to its trading partners as “wholly novel” and vacated the judgment. See id. at
1026.
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the Act aims at promoting the public’s interest in fair, efficient, and com-
petitive distribution of malt beverage products by regulating the business
relations of brewers and wholesaler vendors, notably in order to assure
that beer wholesalers are free to manage their business enterprises and
maintain the right to independently establish their selling prices (despite
the typically overwhelming bargaining power of breweries).87  As the CISG
neither attempts to regulate these specific issues arising in the area of beer
distribution nor similar issues in other regulated industries,88 the legal cri-
terion was therefore not fulfilled.
III. DEMONSTRATING THE APPROACH’S PRACTICAL APPLICATION: THE
CISG AND DOMESTIC LAW REMEDIES FOR MISREPRESENTATION
During the early years after the CISG’s adoption, it was the relation-
ship between the CISG and domestic law remedies for mistake that stood
at the center of academic attention.89  More recently, however, the appli-
cability of common law remedies for misrepresentation90 in CISG cases
has started to generate discussions, triggered by an increasing number of
U.S. court decisions in which the issue is being addressed.  The positions
adopted by commentators range from the suggestion that the CISG in
general does not preempt claims for misrepresentation91 to the opposite
position that considers all rescission rights for misrepresentation displaced
by the CISG.92  In this author’s opinion, it is helpful to distinguish be-
tween domestic legal rules providing remedies for innocent misrepresen-
tation, negligent misrepresentation, and fraudulent misrepresentation,
respectively.  Each of these categories will be addressed in turn.
A. Innocent Misrepresentation
Remedies for honest or “innocent” misrepresentations made by a con-
tracting party could be viewed as the example best suited to demonstrate
the dangers inherent in applying concurrent domestic law remedies to
CISG contracts.  In court practice under the CISG, on the contrary, this
constellation has seemingly not yet arisen, with the past cases (as far as
published and accessible) all having involved claims for negligent or
fraudulent misrepresentation.
87. See Illinois Beer Industry Fair Dealing Act, 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 720/
2(A) (West 2009).
88. See Schlechtriem, Schwenzer & Hachem, supra note 79, ¶ 39.
89. See Heiz, supra note 14, at 647–48.
90. See INGEBORG SCHWENZER, PASCAL HACHEM & CHRISTOPHER KEE, GLOBAL
SALES AND CONTRACT LAW 214 (2012) (stressing functional comparability of doc-
trines of mistake and misrepresentation).
91. See, e.g., Lookofsky, supra note 20, at 285–86.
92. See, e.g., Bridge, supra note 26, at 243–44.
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1. Definition
In English law, a misrepresentation as such has conventionally been
defined as a false statement of material fact that at least in part induces
entry into a contract with the maker of the statement.93  In the United
States, the Restatement (Second) of Torts uses a comparable, although not
identical, description when speaking of a misrepresentation of a material
fact for the purpose of inducing the other party to act or to refrain from
acting in reliance upon it.94
The “innocent” nature of a misrepresentation is usually defined nega-
tively.  An innocent misrepresentation is a misrepresentation that is
neither fraudulent nor negligent,95 thus resulting in a form of strict liabil-
ity96 whenever this type of honest misinformation gives rise to rights or
remedies on the side of a misinformed party.  The remedies attached to
innocent misrepresentations differ among the common law jurisdictions
that know this institution, although these differences—as will be further
demonstrated below97—are without effect for their relationship to the
CISG.
2. The Factual Criterion
At first glance, the factual criterion within the two-step approach is
clearly fulfilled in those cases:98 Domestic law rules on innocent misrepre-
sentation and the CISG both cover factual situations in which parties nego-
tiating a sales contract exchange information about material facts.
Upon closer scrutiny, certain doubts may emerge when one remem-
bers the well-known dispute about the CISG’s scope with respect to pre-
contractual duties.  After all, the prevailing opinion among commentators
holds that the CISG does not impose pre-contractual duties on the par-
ties,99 given that a proposal made by the (then) German Democratic Re-
public to introduce a general liability for “culpa in contrahendo” was
93. See Bridge, supra note 45, at 279; 1 CHITTY ON CONTRACTS ¶ 6-006 (30th
ed. 2008); see also SCHWENZER, HACHEM & KEE, supra note 90, ¶ 17.08 (providing
comparative law point of view).
94. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552C(1) (1977).
95. See CHITTY ON CONTRACTS, supra note 93, ¶ 6-094; RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 552C(1) (1977).
96. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552C(1) cmt. a (1977).
97. For a further discussion, see infra notes 155–60.
98. See HONNOLD, supra note 6, ¶ 240.
99. See MICHAEL BRIDGE, THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS: LAW AND PRAC-
TICE ¶ 12.04 (2d ed. 2007); Urs Peter Gruber, Article 14, in MU¨NCHENER KOM-
MENTAR ZUM BU¨RGERLICHEN GESETZBUCH ¶ 12 (6th ed. 2012); PETER HUBER &
ALISTAIR MULLIS, THE CISG: A NEW TEXTBOOK FOR STUDENTS AND PRACTITIONERS
28–29 (2007); Magnus, supra note 6, art. 4, ¶ 42; Lisa Spagnolo, Opening Pandora’s
Box: Good Faith and Precontractual Liability in the CISG, 21 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J.
261, 291, 309 (2007); Wolfgang Witz, Articles 14–24, in INTERNATIONAL EINHEIT-
LICHES KAUFRECHT Vor ¶ 17 (2000). Contra Michael Joachim Bonell, Vertragsverhan-
dlungen und culpa in contrahendo nach dem Wiener Kaufrechtsu¨bereinkommen 693,
700–01 (1990); Diane Madeline Goderre, Note, International Negotiations Gone Sour:
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discussed at the Vienna Diplomatic Conference, but ultimately re-
jected.100  Does this mean that there is in truth no coverage of the same
factual scenarios, because innocent misrepresentation involves the viola-
tion of pre-contractual informational duties which the CISG does not pro-
vide for?
The answer to this question, it is suggested here, must be in the nega-
tive.  At the outset, it should be pointed out that, irrespective of the posi-
tion that one adopts in the abovementioned dispute about pre-contractual
obligations under the CISG, it can hardly be doubted that the CISG covers
some facts that take place at the pre-contractual stage: For once, Part II of
the CISG contains elaborate rules about the two parties’ declarations
through which a contract is formed, namely offer and acceptance.101
Both declarations are by definition made and received during the pre-
contractual phase, since the contract is only concluded once the accept-
ance of an offer becomes effective.102  And second, Article 8(3) refers to
the pre-contractual negotiations between the parties as a factor to be con-
sidered for purposes of interpreting the parties’ declarations and con-
duct.103  That the CISG itself does not regulate the parties’ pre-contractual
duties does therefore not mean that it generally does not apply to any
factual situations at the pre-contractual stage, thereby giving completely
free reign to domestic pre-contractual regulations.
For the purposes of the two-step approach presented here, the deci-
sive factual situation covered by the CISG is the formation of the contract.
This means that the CISG only overlaps with domestic law rules on inno-
cent misrepresentation insofar as they also apply to the formation of a
sales contract, but not as far as they cover misrepresentations made with-
out an ensuing contract formation.  The latter carve-out nevertheless only
insignificantly reduces the degree of overlap as to the factual situations
covered.  Many domestic laws quite similarly restrict the right to claim
damages for innocent misrepresentations made during contract negotia-
tions to cases in which a contract has been concluded, but offer no such
remedy where the representee has refrained from entering into a con-
tract.104  Should a given law on misrepresentation decide otherwise, its
Precontractual Liability Under the United Nations Sales Convention, 66 U. CIN. L. REV.
257, 280–81 (1997).
100. See UN Doc. A/CONF. 97/5, Official Records at 294–95; see also PETER
SCHLECHTRIEM, UNIFORM SALES LAW: THE UN CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 57 (Peter Doralt & Helmut H. Hascheck eds.,
1986).
101. See CISG, supra note 3, arts. 14–17 (governing offer); id. arts. 18–22 (gov-
erning acceptance).
102. See id. art. 23.
103. See Goderre, supra note 99, at 279; Schroeter, supra note 4, Introduction
to Arts. 14–24, ¶ 54.
104. Compare JOHN CARTWRIGHT, MISREPRESENTATION, MISTAKE AND NON-DIS-
CLOSURE ¶¶ 3–50 (3d ed. 2012) (discussing English law), with E. Allan Farnsworth,
Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements: Fair Dealing and Failed Negotiations,
87 COLUM. L. REV. 217, 235 (1987) (discussing U.S. law and noting “[i]ndeed, it
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rules could generally be applied to false statements made during negotia-
tions that could have led to the conclusion of a CISG contract, but eventu-
ally did not.
The interpretation of the CISG’s scope described above is more im-
portant when it comes to national rules on pre-contractual liability that
may grant a party a right to damages where contract negotiations have
failed,105 but that are not triggered by the incorrectness of statements
made but rather by a party’s decision to break off the negotiations.  In
assessing the applicability of such domestic law rules106 alongside the
CISG, the CISG’s limited “factual” coverage with respect to the pre-con-
tractual stage should not conceal that the CISG covers these situations
through its rules on contract formation in Articles 14–24.  By providing,
on one hand, that no offer can be accepted as long as no proposal has
been made that indicates the offeror’s intention to be bound in case of
acceptance107 or valid offers were duly withdrawn108 or revoked,109 and
stipulating, on the other hand, that a contract is only formed once an
offer has been accepted110 and that the offeree even has a right to change
his mind about acceptances made,111 the CISG stresses the parties’ right
to freely walk away from contractual negotiations before their respective
declarations have become binding.  Domestic law rules providing for dam-
age claims in cases where a negotiation has been broken off are therefore
triggered by factual circumstances also covered by the CISG, although the
latter provides that such factual situations should yield no legal
consequences.112
In conclusion, it can be summarized that the factual criterion within
the two-step approach is fulfilled where the relationship between the CISG
and domestic laws on innocent misrepresentation is concerned.113
3. The Legal Criterion
The legal criterion requires more thought: Do domestic law rules on
innocent misrepresentation pertain to a matter also regulated by the
would seem that a party to failed negotiations might have a claim based on any
misrepresentation, including one by nondisclosure, that upon being discovered
caused the negotiations to fail”).
105. See UN Doc. A/CONF. 97/5, Official Records at 294.  The unsuccessful
proposal by the German Democratic Republic in Vienna would also have covered
such cases. See id.
106. See Farnsworth, supra note 104, at 239–49, 282–84.
107. See CISG, supra note 3, art. 14(1).
108. See id. art. 15.
109. See id. art. 16.
110. See id. arts. 18, 23.
111. See id. art. 22.
112. See Schroeter, supra note 4, Introduction to Arts. 14–24, ¶ 63, art. 14,
¶ 29  For a further discussion relating to the fact that national rules on fraudulent
behavior can always be applied alongside the Convention, see infra notes 208–10.
113. See BRIDGE, supra note 99, ¶¶ 12.21–.22; HONNOLD, supra note 6, ¶ 240.
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CISG?  This could be doubted if the matter was framed narrowly, for ex-
ample, as “protection of contracting partners from unintended misinfor-
mation.”  It seems in line with the CISG’s international character,
however, to adopt a more functional view.114  The matter that is indeed
being regulated in both rules is the buyer’s state of knowledge about features of
the goods at the moment of contract conclusion.  The CISG addresses this matter
in a number of provisions in its Part III, thereby preempting concurrent
rules of domestic law:115
a. The Parties’ State of Knowledge About Features of the Goods as
Regulated Matter
It does so first in Article 35(1), albeit only indirectly.  By providing
that the seller must deliver goods that are of the quantity, quality, and
description required by the contract, Article 35(1) refers to the content of
the parties’ sales agreement as understood by the parties.  This common
understanding is to be determined in accordance with the rules on inter-
pretation of party statements and conduct in Article 8,116 with the relevant
point in time being the moment of contract conclusion.117  Article 35(1)
CISG thereby divides the task to inform oneself or the other party between
the seller and the buyer.  If the seller has made a statement about the
quality of the goods and the buyer accepted it, it became part of the con-
tract (as interpreted in light of the negotiations)118 so that the conse-
quences of the delivered goods lacking this quality are governed by Article
45, and not by domestic law rules on innocent misrepresentation.119  If
the parties have mentioned certain technical specifications of the machine
in their contract in a manner that allows a reasonable person in the
buyer’s position to determine the machine’s production capacity, it is up
to the buyer to ask for additional information before concluding the con-
tract if the specifications given are insufficient for his individual
purposes.120
In requiring the goods’ fitness for the purposes for which goods of
the same description would ordinarily be used, Article 35(2)(a) must simi-
larly be read as referring to the “ordinary use” at the moment of contract
formation,121 although the precise point in time will rarely be decisive
114. See CISG, supra note 3, art. 7(1).
115. Note that this is not the only matter regulated in the Convention that
may be the subject of a misrepresentation. See infra notes 188–89.
116. See HONNOLD, supra note 6, ¶ 224; Ingeborg Schwenzer, Article 35, in
CISG COMMENTARY, supra note 2, ¶ 7.
117. See CISG, supra note 3, art. 23.
118. See id. art. 8(3).
119. See HONNOLD, supra note 6, ¶ 240.
120. Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal Supreme Court] Dec. 22, 2000, CISG-
online No. 628 (Switz.); see also CISG, supra note 3, art. 8(2).
121. See Stefan Kro¨ll, Article 35, in THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CON-
TRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS ¶ 68 (Stefan Kro¨ll, Loukas Mistelis
& Maria del Pilar Perales Viscacillas eds., 2011).
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because ordinary uses are not prone to change.  The provision neverthe-
less incorporates a division of informational risks comparable to the one
under Article 35(1) because Article 35(3) declares the seller to not be
liable if, at the time of the conclusion of the contract, the buyer knew or
could not have been unaware of the goods’ lack of fitness for their ordi-
nary use.  In that case, the buyer has no remedy under the CISG122 be-
cause the goods’ non-conforming nature was before the buyer’s eyes to
see.123  Article 35(2)(a) and (3) do, however, impose neither an obliga-
tion on the seller to inform the buyer of such lack of fitness,124 nor an
obligation on the buyer to examine the goods prior to contract conclu-
sion,125 but rather pursue their regulatory goal by granting or taking away
access to the CISG’s remedies listed in Article 45.  Articles 41 and 42 con-
tain a functionally equivalent regulation that deals with the goods’ free-
dom from rights and claims of third parties, and that similarly connects
the availability of buyers’ remedies to the parties’ state of knowledge at the
moment of contract conclusion.  Already at the outset, the seller only owes
the goods’ freedom from those intellectual property rights of which, at the
time of the conclusion of the contract, the seller knew or could not have
been unaware of,126 whereas other (unrecognizable) third party rights127
or rights that the seller only becomes aware of after contract conclusion
do not entail his liability.128  The question under the law of which state the
goods must be free from such rights then partially depends on the parties
“contemplation” regarding the prospective use of the goods at the time of
the conclusion of the contract under Article 42(1)(a).  If, on the contrary,
it is the buyer who knew or could not have been unaware of a right or
claim at the time of the conclusion of the contract, Article 42(2)(a) de-
clares the seller exempt from liability—knowledge only subsequently
gained by the buyer, again, does not yield a similar result.129
With respect to the conformity of the goods, Article 35(2)(b) further
provides that they do not conform with the contract unless they are fit for
any particular purpose “expressly or impliedly made known to the seller”
at the time of the conclusion of the contract.  This provision is another
122. See Magnus, supra note 6, art. 35, ¶ 46.
123. See HONNOLD, supra note 6, ¶ 229.
124. See Magnus, supra note 6, art. 35, ¶ 48.
125. See ENDERLEIN & MASKOW, supra note 1, art. 35, ¶ 20; HONNOLD, supra R
note 6, ¶ 229; Kro¨ll, supra note 121, art. 35, ¶ 160; Magnus, supra note 6, art. 35, ¶
48; PILTZ, supra note 6, ¶¶ 5–52; Schwenzer, supra note 116, art. 35, ¶ 36.
126. See CISG, supra note 3, art. 42(1).
127. A dispute remains as to whether a sellers’s duty flows from CISG Article
42 to investigate intellectual property. See Ruth M. Janal, The Seller’s Responsibility for
Third Party Intellectual Property Rights Under the Vienna Sales Convention, in SHARING
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LAW ACROSS NATIONAL BOUNDARIES: FESTSCHRIFT FOR
ALBERT H. KRITZER ON THE OCCASION OF HIS EIGHTIETH BIRTHDAY 203, 213–17 (Ca-
milla B. Andersen & Ulrich G. Schroeter eds., 2008) (referring to “the adequate
allocation of the contractual risk between the parties”).
128. See Schwenzer, supra note 116, art. 42, ¶ 16.
129. See id. art. 42, ¶ 19.
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example for the allocation of informational rights and duties through the
CISG: Article 35(2)(b) makes the seller’s liability under the CISG depen-
dent on a particular purpose having been “made known” to him, thereby
indicating that the seller is generally under no duty to enquire about par-
ticular, non-ordinary purposes for which the goods could be used, nor is
he under a duty to inform the buyer about the goods’ lack of fitness for
such purpose.  Once an intended use has been made known to him (with-
out its “contemplation between the parties” being required, as under Arti-
cle 42(1)(a))130 and he has nevertheless entered into the contract, the
seller is liable if the goods are unsuitable for the use.131  If, on the con-
trary, the buyer chooses not to inform the seller about the particular pur-
pose for which he intends to use the goods, he cannot expect
compensation—any information not given by the buyer until after the
contract formation does entail the seller’s liability.132  The CISG also de-
fines autonomously how (“expressly or impliedly”)133 and by whom (in
practice usually by the buyer, but information provided by a third party
should similarly suffice)134 the particular purpose must have been made
known to the seller, thereby displacing standards of information and en-
quiry that may exist under domestic laws.135  In addition, however, Article
35(2)(b) in fine demands that, under the circumstances, the buyer relied
and that it was reasonable for him to rely on the seller’s “skill and judge-
ment” before the seller’s liability can ensue.  The CISG’s latter test is re-
markably similar in wording and purpose to the requirement under the
English law of misrepresentation as stated in Esso Petroleum Co. v. Mar-
don,136 where Lord Denning based liability for damages on the representa-
tion by a man “who has or professes to have special knowledge or skill.”137
This similarity indicates that both legal rules indeed pertain to the same
regulatory matter.
The parties’ state of knowledge after the moment of contract conclu-
sion is furthermore addressed in Articles 38–40: once the buyer has discov-
ered or ought to have discovered the goods’ lack of conformity, he has to
inform the seller within reasonable time under Article 39(1) at pain of
otherwise losing his right to rely on the discernible non-conformity.138  If,
however, it is the seller who becomes aware or cannot be unaware of facts
130. See Janal, supra note 127, at 221.
131. See Magnus, supra note 6, art. 35, ¶ 26.
132. See ENDERLEIN & MASKOW, supra note 1, art. 35, ¶ 10; KO¨HLER, supra note R
8, at 233; Magnus, supra note 6, art. 35, ¶ 30; Schwenzer, supra note 116, art. 35,
¶ 23.
133. See Schwenzer, supra note 116, art. 35, ¶ 22.
134. See Kro¨ll, supra note 121, art. 35, ¶ 112.
135. See Khoo, supra note 23, ¶ 3.3.3.
136. See Esso Petroleum Co. v. Mardon, [1976] Q.B. 801 (Eng.).
137. See id.
138. See CISG, supra note 3, art. 39(1).
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giving rise to a non-conformity after the contract has been concluded,139
Article 40 provides that he in turn must either inform the buyer or lose his
right to rely on the buyer’s insufficient notice of non-conformity.  Compa-
rable rules with respect to third party rights or claims attached to the
goods are contained in Article 43.
In summary, Articles 35 and 38–44 therefore install a delicate web of
awareness-related rules which are based on a balanced distribution of in-
formational risks.140  This distribution should not be disturbed by the ap-
plication of rules of domestic law which may (and often will) allocate these
risks differently.
b. The Party’s State of Knowledge About the Other Party’s Ability to
Perform as Regulated Matter
Similarly, the parties’ state of knowledge at contract conclusion about
their contracting partner’s ability to perform and his creditworthiness is a
matter governed by Articles 71 and 72.141  This has important effects for
the CISG’s relationship towards remedies under national law that are trig-
gered by a party’s innocent but incorrect statements about his or her own
ability to perform or creditworthiness (although negligent or fraudulent
misrepresentations about these issues are arguably more important in
practice).142
Article 71(1) addresses the matter by providing that a party may sus-
pend the performance of his obligations if, after the conclusion of the
contract, it becomes apparent that the other party will not perform a sub-
stantial part of his obligations as a result of: (a) a serious deficiency in his
ability to perform or in his creditworthiness or (b) his conduct in prepar-
ing to perform or in performing the contract.  Article 71(2) supplements
this right of suspension by a right of stoppage in transit if the seller has
already dispatched the goods before the grounds described above become
evident, and Article 72 in turn provides for a right to declare the contract
avoided if, prior to the date for performance of the contract, it is clear that
the other party’s serious deficiency in his ability to perform or in his
creditworthiness will result in a fundamental breach of contract.143
Articles 71 and 72 should be read as offering an exhaustive regulation
of the informational risk distribution about the parties’ ability to per-
139. The relevant point in time is a matter of dispute. See Schwenzer, supra
note 116, art. 40, ¶ 8.
140. See also KO¨HLER, supra note 8, at 231, 256.
141. See ENDERLEIN & MASKOW, supra note 1, art. 4, ¶ 3.1; Karin Flesch, Der R
Irrtum u¨ber die Kreditwu¨rdigkeit des Vertragspartner und die Verschlechterungseinrede, Be-
triebsberater 873, 876–77 (1994); PETER SCHLECHTRIEM & PETRA BUTLER, UN LAW
ON INTERNATIONAL SALES ¶ 261 (2009).
142. See infra notes 165–88 and 189–209, respectively.
143. See CISG, supra note 3, art. 25.
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form,144 thereby preempting concurrent rules of domestic law that deal
with the same matter.145  This regulatory intent becomes particularly ap-
parent when looking at the limitations laid down in the provisions’ word-
ing which relate both to the prerequisites of the remedies provided and to
their effect.  By requiring that the serious deficiency in performance abil-
ity or in creditworthiness has only become apparent after the conclusion
of the contract, Articles 71(1) makes it clear that deficiencies that were
already apparent at an earlier stage—although maybe not positively
known to the other party146—do not result in a right of suspension if the
contract has nevertheless been entered into with the respective party.147
The CISG thereby operates on the assumption that each party will gather
sufficient information about his contracting partner in the run-up to the
contract formation in order to determine the contracting partner’s ability
to fulfill the contract148—if doubts arise, he may give the prospective con-
tracting partner a chance to dispel them or refrain from entering into the
contract (caveat creditor).  Should a party choose to neglect this pre-con-
tractual due diligence and to conclude the contract despite his unaware-
ness, he acts at his own risk.  National laws on misrepresentation are often
based on other (and internationally divergent) disclosure obligations and
are therefore incompatible with the CISG’s regulatory approach in this
matter.
The CISG furthermore provides a structured set of remedies for the
situations discussed here: the rights of suspension and stoppage under Ar-
ticle 71 only lead to a right to avoid the contract if the conditions laid
down in Articles 49, 64, or 72 are met,149 and Articles 45(1)(b), 61(1)(b),
and 74 et seq. govern a party’s right to claim damages150 where the other
party is lacking in his performance abilities.  Domestic law rules on inno-
cent misrepresentation may again provide for a right of rescission, damage
claims, or both under different prerequisites and must accordingly be dis-
144. See Djakhongir Saidov, Article 71, in UN CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR
THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) ¶ 16 (Stefan Kro¨ll, Loukas Mistelis &
Maria Del Pilar Perales Viscasillas eds., 2011).
145. See WILHELM ALBRECHT ACHILLES, KOMMENTAR ZUM UN-KAUFRECHTSU¨BER-
EINKOMMEN (CISG) art. 71, ¶ 1 (2000); Christiana Fountoulakis, Article 71, in
SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHWENZER, COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION ON THE INTER-
NATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) ¶ 35 (Ingeborg Schwenzer ed., 3d ed. 2010);
ROLF HERBER & BEATE CZERWENKA, INTERNATIONALES KAUFRECHT art. 71, ¶ 16
(1991); Magnus, supra note 6, art. 71, ¶¶ 40–43; SCHLECHTRIEM & BUTLER, supra
note 141, ¶ 261. Contra Lessiak, supra note 14, at 493.
146. See Flesch, supra note 141, at 873; Saidov, supra note 144, ¶ 16.
147. See Trevor Bennett, Article 71, in COMMENTARY ON THE INTERNATIONAL
SALES LAW: THE 1980 VIENNA SALES CONVENTION ¶ 1.9 (Cesare Massimo Bianca &
Michael Joachim Bonell eds., 1987); Alexander von Ziegler, The Right of Suspension
and Stoppage in Transit (and Notification Thereof), 25 J.L. & COM. 353, 363 (2005).
148. See Fountoulakis, supra note 145, ¶ 24.
149. See Flesch, supra note 141, at 876.
150. See Fountoulakis, supra note 145, ¶ 55; see also Saidov, supra note 144, ¶¶
59–60.
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placed.  Case law under the CISG has confirmed that Article 71 excludes
all legal remedies that are provided under the applicable national law for
the situation where, subsequent to the conclusion of the contract, serious
doubts arise about the other party’s ability to perform his obligations.151
c. Irrelevance of Misrepresentation Becoming Term of the Contract
The qualification of the issues just mentioned as matters regulated by
the CISG must apply irrespective of whether the misrepresentation con-
cerned has become a contractual term or not:152 by providing uniform
rules for the prerequisites under which a certain quality or description of
the goods is “required by the contract” and under which the goods other-
wise “conform with the contract,” the CISG e contrario also defines the con-
ditions under which information exchanged during the contract
negotiations does not trigger a contractual obligation owed by the
seller.153  In the latter case, the CISG therefore implicitly provides that the
seller shall not be subject to any remedies arising from such pre-contrac-
tual information (even if found to be false), thereby comprehensively reg-
ulating the matter and preempting domestic law.  (The situation is
different only where a party acts fraudulently, as will be discussed in more
detail below.)154
d. Irrelevance of Type of Remedy Provided by Domestic Law
What has just been said with regard to the prerequisites for remedies
laid down in the CISG and in domestic law is similarly true for the type of
remedies provided by the respective rules.  If a given matter is being regu-
lated by the CISG, it is therefore the CISG alone which determines what
remedies shall be available to the parties as part of such regulation,
thereby implicitly excluding all other types of remedies that would be
available under concurrent domestic laws.  The CISG’s prevalence over
domestic law accordingly not only secures that the uniform sales law regu-
lates its matters undisturbed, but also how it regulates them.
151. See Oberster Gerichtshof [OGH] [Supreme Court] Feb. 12, 1998, docket
No. 2 Ob 328/97t (Austria) (discussing Articles 1(1)(b), 6, 7(2), 38, 39, 40, 44, 45,
71, 73, 74, 75, 76, and 77); see also Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Court of Appeals]
Cologne May 19, 2008, Internationales Handelsrecht 181, 2008 (Ger.) (discussing
Articles 4, 38, 39, 53, 71, and 81, specifically with reference to rights of retention
under domestic law).
152. Contra Khoo, supra note 23, ¶ 3.3.5. See also BRIDGE, supra note 99,
¶ 12.21.  On the differences in English law between misrepresentations that be-
come part of the contract and those that do not, see BRIDGE, supra note 99, ¶
12.20.  Note that in cases of (failed) contract negotiations that do not result in any
contract being concluded, the “factual criterion” is not fulfilled. See infra notes
198–201.
153. See CISG, supra note 3, art. 35(1)–(2). But see BRIDGE, supra note 99,
¶ 12.21 (expressing doubts in this respect).
154. For a further discussion, see infra notes 207–09.
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The CISG’s relationship towards domestic laws on innocent misrepre-
sentation is therefore the same irrespective of the type(s) of remedies that
the applicable law attaches to such misrepresentation.  Where the two-step
approach has clarified that domestic law is preempted by the CISG, pre-
emption applies no matter whether the misinformed party would other-
wise have had a right to claim damages (as under U.S. law),155 a right to
rescind the contract (as under English law),156 or a right to rely on the
courts’ discretion to declare the contract subsisting and award damages in
lieu of rescission (as under English law).157  Nor does it make any differ-
ence how the measure of damages under the law of misrepresentation is
calculated158 or that avoidance of sales contracts under the CISG is pro-
spective, while rescission for misrepresentation in common law systems is
retrospective.159  Rights to rescission under misrepresentation law do in
particular not escape preemption because they could be classified as a “va-
lidity” issue under the second sentence of Article 4.160  As earlier dis-
cussed,161 where a given matter is regulated in the CISG, the uniform sales
law has—in the words of Article 4—“expressly provided otherwise.”
4. Conclusion
As a result, domestic law remedies for innocent misrepresentations
relating to matters governed by the CISG—most importantly (but not ex-
clusively)162 to the two issues mentioned above, namely features of the
goods and the other party’s ability to perform respectively his or her
creditworthiness—are preempted by the CISG; an outcome about which
there is wide-spread agreement among commentators.163  All other mis-
representations are not preempted, as for example those concerning the
155. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552C(1) (1977).
156. See Misrepresentation Act, 1967, § 2(1) (Eng.); see also CARTWRIGHT,
supra note 104, ¶¶ 4–29.
157. See Misrepresentation Act, § 2(2).
158. But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552C cmt. b (1977) (sug-
gesting that for domestic settings differences in measure of damages may affect
relationship between actions for innocent misrepresentation and actions for
breach of warranty); see also Electrocraft Ark., Inc. v. Super Elec. Motors, Ltd., No.
4:09-CV-00318 SWW, 2009 WL 5181854, at *6 (E.D. Ark. Dec. 23, 2009) (“In addi-
tion, Electrocraft seeks identical damages for its negligence/strict liability claim as
it seeks for its breach of contract and warranty claims.”).
159. See Bridge, supra note 26, at 244.  On the lack of practical differences
between prospective avoidance and retrospective rescission in sale of goods cases,
see Bridge, supra note 45, at 285–86.
160. See Schlechtriem, supra note 12, at 474. But see Khoo, supra note 23,
¶ 3.3.4.
161. See supra notes 14–24.
162. For a discussion of another issue, i.e., the timeliness of the goods’ deliv-
ery, see infra notes 188–89.
163. See BRIDGE, supra note 99, ¶ 12.21; Bridge, supra note 26, at 244; Bridge,
supra note 45, at 303 n.124; CISG COMMENTARY, supra note 2, art. 4, ¶ 18; R
HONNOLD, supra note 6, ¶ 240; Schroeter, supra note 4, Introduction to Arts. R
14–24, ¶ 62.
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identity of the seller or of the buyer.164  The answer to the question “can
domestic law remedies for innocent misrepresentation be applied in CISG
cases?” is therefore the proverbial lawyer’s reply: “It depends . . . .”
B. Negligent Misrepresentation
An issue that has arisen more frequently in practice is the relationship
between the CISG and remedies for negligent misrepresentation.
1. Definition
In the United States, the Restatement (Second) of Torts describes a negli-
gent misrepresentation and its consequences as follows:
One who, in the course of his business, profession or employ-
ment, or in any other transaction in which he has a pecuniary
interest, supplies false information for the guidance of others in
their business transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss
caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the informa-
tion, if he fails to exercise reasonable care or competence in ob-
taining or communicating the information.165
In English law, the functional equivalent reads:
Where a person has entered into a contract after a misrepresen-
tation has been made to him by another party thereto and as a
result thereof he has suffered loss, then, if the person making the
misrepresentation would be liable to damages in respect thereof
had the misrepresentation been made fraudulently, that person
shall be so liable notwithstanding that the misrepresentation was
not made fraudulently, unless he proves that he had reasonable
ground to believe and did believe up to the time the contract was
made the facts represented were true.166
Both concepts thus share the requirement of a lack of reasonable care
(i.e., negligence) on the side of the maker of the statement, although En-
glish law fails to mention this requirement directly: Section 2(1) of the
Misrepresentation Act of 1967 rather focuses on misrepresenting a per-
son’s belief in the statement’s truth.  While it is therefore theoretically pos-
sible that circumstances may exist in which a person may make a statement
without having reasonable ground to believe it, yet in which it would be
held that he was not (having regard to all the circumstances) negligent,167
those cases will be exceedingly rare.  Despite the differences in wording
164. See HONNOLD, supra note 6, ¶ 240.  On further discussion of misinforma-
tion as to the parties’ identity, see SCHWENZER, HACHEM & KEE, supra note 90,
¶¶ 17.35–.36.
165. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(1) (1977).
166. Misrepresentation Act, 1967, § 2(1) (Eng.).
167. See CHITTY ON CONTRACTS, supra note 93, ¶ 6-068.
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\58-4\VLR406.txt unknown Seq: 28 23-JUL-13 11:41
580 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58: p. 553
and in regulatory approach, there is accordingly agreement that liability
under Section 2(1) of the Misrepresentation Act, too, is essentially
founded on negligence.168
In the past, a number of U.S. courts have had to deal with the rela-
tionship between remedies for alleged negligent misrepresentations by the
seller and the CISG.  Most of them allowed the application of damage
claims for negligent misrepresentation alongside the CISG.169  The essen-
tial reasoning they gave was brief and simple: “The CISG does not apply to
tort claims,” and therefore claims for negligent misrepresentation are con-
trolled by state law.170  Some commentators agree,171 but others have
rightly criticized this approach for being incompatible with the CISG’s in-
ternational character and its uniform interpretation.172  After all, it relies
on dogmatic categories of domestic law that are not internationally uni-
form.  In the same spirit, a Belgian Court of Appeals held that a lack of
information by the seller in relation to the use of the goods that the buyer
relied upon constituted a contractual breach; therefore, it could not be
used as a basis for extra-contractual liability unless the buyer could prove
that the damage suffered is different than that caused by the seller’s faulty
contract performance.173
2. The Factual Criterion
When resorting to the alternative two-step approach proposed here,
the factual criterion raises the question: Are cases of negligent misrepre-
sentation factual situations not covered by the CISG because the CISG
contains no specific rules on negligence, making negligent behavior an
168. See Gran Gelato Ltd. v. Richcliff Grp. Ltd., [1992] Ch. 560 at 573 (Eng.);
GUENTER H. TREITEL, THE LAW OF CONTRACT 350 (11th ed. 2003); see also Bridge,
supra note 45, at 301 (“[P]resumed negligence.”).
169. See Miami Valley Paper, L.L.C. v. Lebbing Eng’g & Consulting Gmbh,
No. 1:05-CV-00702, 2009 WL 818618, at *11 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 26, 2009); Sky Cast,
Inc. v. Global Direct Distrib., L.L.C., No. CIV.A. 07-161, 2008 WL 754734, at *6
(E.D. Ky. Mar. 18, 2008); Geneva Pharms. Tech. v. Barr Labs., 201 F. Supp. 2d 236,
286–88 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). But see Electrocraft Ark., Inc. v. Super Electric Motors,
Ltd., No. 4:09CV00318 SWW, 2009 WL 5181854, at *6 (E.D. Ark. Dec. 23, 2009).
170. See Sky Cast, Inc., 2008 WL 754734, at *7 (“Thus, negligent misrepresenta-
tion is a tort claim completely different from a claim for breach of contract.  Being
a tort claim, the court concludes that it is not controlled by the CISG, which only
concerns the sales of good[s] between merchants in different countries . . . .”);
Geneva Pharms. Tech., 201 F. Supp. 2d at 286 (“The CISG clearly does not preempt
the claims sounding in tort.”).
171. See Bridge, supra note 26, at 246. But see id. at 244; Khoo, supra note 23, ¶
3.3.4; LOOKOFSKY, supra note 10, § 4.6; Lookofsky, supra note 20, at 280; Lookofsky,
supra note 26, at 409.
172. See CISG, supra note 3, art. 7(1); Schwenzer & Hachem, supra note 63, at
471.
173. See ING Ins. v. BVBA HVA Koeling, Hof van Beroep [HvB] [Court of
Appeal] Antwerpen, Apr. 14, 2004 (Belg.).
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“operative fact” that, in the words of Professor Honnold, does not “invoke
the rules of the Convention”?174
The answer is that the factual criterion is fulfilled since both rules do
in fact turn on the same operative facts.  The reason can be found in the
Secretariat’s commentary on the CISG, which states: “In order to claim
damages it is not necessary to prove fault or a lack of good faith or the
breach of an express promise, as is true in some legal systems.  Damages
are available for the loss resulting from any objective failure by the seller
to fulfill his obligations.”175  The CISG accordingly embodies a deliberate
choice that the question of negligence is irrelevant to the buyer’s right to
recover from the seller for damage caused by non-conforming goods.176
It therefore does cover factual constellations in which negligence by a
party is involved, although it is does not require that a party acted
negligently.
3. The Legal Criterion
The second criterion works essentially along the same lines as in cases
of innocent misrepresentation.  Again, the matter that is regulated is the
misinformed party’s state of knowledge at the moment of contract conclu-
sion.  This is supported by the traditional categories within the law of mis-
representation where fraudulent misrepresentations were distinguished
from non-fraudulent misrepresentations, the latter category including the
innocent and the negligent variety.177  The additional factor present in
cases of negligence—the failure to exercise reasonable care—merely af-
fects the measure of damages, but does not change the essential character
of the remedy.
When applying the legal criterion to the three U.S. cases mentioned
above, in which the courts found domestic law rules on negligent misrep-
resentation not to be displaced by the CISG, the results are as follows:
Miami Valley Paper v. Lebbing Engineering & Consulting178 concerned false
statements by the seller according to which the goods (used machines)
were “a very good deal” and the current owner was selling them because of
bankruptcy.  Both were considered by the district court to be mere state-
ments of opinion (“puffery”), insufficient to support a negligent misrepre-
sentation claim and furthermore did not relate to a matter regulated by
the CISG because they neither formed part of the goods’ contractual
174. HONNOLD, supra note 6, ¶ 62.
175. UN Secretariat, Commentary on Art. 41 of the 1978 Draft of the CISG,
cmt. 3, UN Doc. A/CONF. 97/5, Official Records 37, 48, 55.
176. See HONNOLD, supra note 6, ¶ 73.
177. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552C cmt. a (1977); CHITTY ON
CONTRACTS, supra note 93, ¶ 6-005; TREITEL, supra note 168, at 349–50.  Under
English law, the point became less clear through Hedley Byrne & Company Ltd. v.
Heller & Partners Ltd. and the enactment of the Misrepresentation Act 1967. See
TREITEL, supra note 168, at 349–50.
178. No. 1:05-CV-00702, 2009 WL 818618, at *12 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 26, 2009).
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description, nor affected the purposes for which they could be used.179  In
Geneva Pharmaceuticals v. Barr Laboratories,180 the alleged negligent misrep-
resentation consisted of the seller’s failure to disclose that he was no
longer willing or able to supply the buyer (a manufacturer of generic
pharmaceuticals) with the goods (clathrate, a chemical substance used in
the manufacture of pharmaceuticals) under future contracts.181  At first
glance, the issue could be considered a matter covered by Article 71(1)
because it pertained to the seller’s ability to perform.  Upon closer scru-
tiny, however, it becomes clear that the legal criterion under our two-step
approach was not fulfilled.  The alleged misinformation by the seller only
concerned future contracts that would have involved the same type of
goods, but not the performance of the contract at hand, the latter being
the only matter regulated by Article 71(1).182  Both cases were therefore
correctly decided when applying the test suggested here.
In Sky Cast v. Global Direct Distribution,183 on the contrary, the legal
criterion was arguably fulfilled, and domestic law remedies for negligent
misrepresentation should therefore have been considered preempted.184
In that case, the timeliness of the delivery of the goods (light poles that
were needed for an ongoing construction project) stood at the center of
the dispute.  After the parties had agreed on delivery dates in their con-
tract, the seller allegedly provided the buyer with false information con-
cerning the actual time of the upcoming delivery, thereby leading to the
buyer’s claim for negligent misrepresentation when the announced deliv-
ery was late.185  It is submitted that in doing so, domestic law was applied
to a matter exclusively covered by Article 33 (time of delivery) and Articles
45 et seq. (buyer’s rights in cases of late delivery) of the CISG.186
4. Conclusion
In summary, domestic law remedies for negligent misrepresentation
are equally preempted as far as they relate to features of the goods sold or
the ability of one party to perform the contract and therefore—in the ter-
179. See CISG, supra note 3, art. 35(1); see also id. art. 35(2).
180. 201 F. Supp. 2d 236 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
181. See id. at 286.
182. See CISG, supra note 3, art 71(1).  The “substantial part of his obliga-
tions” that Article 71(1) speaks of is a substantial part of the party’s obligations
under the present contract (the performance of which may then be suspended by
the other party), not under future contracts. See id.
183. No. CIV.A. 07-161, 2008 WL 754734 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 18, 2008).
184. See SCHWENZER, HACHEM & KEE, supra note 90, ¶ 49.31.
185. See Sky Cast, Inc., 2008 WL 754734, at *11.  The district court concluded
that the information given by seller had in fact not been false and therefore dis-
missed the claim. See id.
186. Contra Schlechtriem, supra note 12, at 475 (mentioning “obligations to
deliver conforming goods in time” as example for topics and interests outside
CISG).
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minology used here—pertain to a matter also regulated by the CISG.187
Again, remedies for other types of negligent misrepresentations remain
applicable, for example, incorrect information about a third party’s will-
ingness to guarantee performance of the contract.188
C. Fraudulent Misrepresentation
This leaves us with the last type of misrepresentation, namely fraudu-
lent misrepresentation.  Does the line of arguments presented above with
respect to negligent misrepresentation also apply to cases of fraud, be-
cause, after all, the CISG operates independently of notions of fault or
lack of good faith?
1. Definition
No, it does not.  Claims for or because of fraudulent inducement,189
fraudulent misrepresentation,190 common law fraud,191 tortious interfer-
ence with business relations,192 arglistige Ta¨uschung,193 absichtliche Ta¨us-
chung,194 duress,195 deceit, or intentional harm all remain applicable
alongside the CISG.  While this result is commonly agreed upon both in
187. See BRIDGE, supra note 99, ¶ 12.21; Michael Bridge, A Comment on “To-
wards a Universal Doctrine of Breach—The Impact of CISG” by Ju¨rgen Basedow, 25 INT’L
REV. L. & ECON. 501, 510 (2005); HONNOLD, supra note 6, ¶ 73; Peter Huber, in
MU¨NCHENER KOMMENTAR ZUM BU¨RGERLICHEN GESETZBUCH art. 45, ¶ 24 (6th ed.
2012); Kro¨ll, supra note 121, art. 35, ¶ 204; Schlechtriem, supra note 12, at 473;
Schroeter, supra note 4, Introduction to Arts. 14–24, ¶ 62; SCHWENZER, HACHEM &
KEE, supra note 90, ¶ 49.31; Ingeborg Schwenzer, Buyer’s Remedies in the Case of Non-
conforming Goods: Some Problems in a Core Area of the CISG, 101 ASIL PROC. 416, 421
(2007); Schwenzer & Hachem, supra note 63, at 471.
188. See Schroeter, supra note 4, Introduction to Arts. 14–24, ¶ 62.
189. See Beijing Metals & Minerals v. Am. Bus. Ctr., Inc., 993 F.2d 1178, 1180
(5th Cir. 1993) (acting under Texas law); Miami Valley Paper, L.L.C. v. Lebbing
Eng’g & Consulting GmbH, No. 1:05-CV-00702, 2009 WL 818618, at *1 (S.D. Ohio
Mar. 26, 2009) (acting under Ohio law).
190. See Dingxi Longhai Dairy, Ltd. v. Becwood Tech. Grp., L.L.C., No. 08-
762, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51066, at *6–7 (acting under Minnesota law).
191. See TeeVee Toons, Inc. v. Gerhard Schubert GmbH, No. 00 Civ 5189,
2006 WL 2463537, at *13–16 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2006) (acting under New York
law).
192. See Electrocraft Ark., Inc. v. Super Electric Motors, Ltd., No. 4:09-CV-
00318 SWW, 2009 WL 5181854, at *8 (E.D. Ark. Dec. 23 2009) (acting under Ar-
kansas law); Viva Vino Imp. Corp. v. Farnese Vini S.R.L., No. CIV.A. 99-6384, 2000
WL 1224903, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 29, 2000) (acting under Pennsylvania law).
193. See Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Court of Appeals] Hamm, INTERNATION-
ALES HANDELSRECHT [IHR] 59, 63 (2010) (Ger.) (acting under German law).
194. Cantonal Court St. Gallen, INTERNATIONALES HANDELSRECHT [IHR] 2009,
161 (Switz.) (acting under Swiss law).
195. See Beijing Metals & Minerals v. Am. Bus. Ctr., Inc., 993 F.2d 1178,
1184–85 (5th Cir. 1993) (acting under Texas law).
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case law196 and in legal writing,197 the precise reasons behind it are not
often spelled out.  In my opinion, they can be described in the manner
explained below.
2. The Factual Criterion
When asking whether domestic law remedies for fraudulent misrepre-
sentation are triggered by a factual situation which the CISG also applies
to, this question cannot be denied simply because a party’s fraudulent in-
tention, i.e., one’s knowledge of the untrue character of one’s representa-
tion,198 is a mere state of mind and as such does not qualify as a fact.  The
state of a man’s mind, as the English Court of Appeals famously put it, “is
as much a fact as the state of his digestion.”199  Where rules on fraudulent
misrepresentation are concerned, the factual criterion is instead fulfilled
because the CISG also covers cases in which the seller is positively aware of
the goods’ non-conformity, but nevertheless concludes the contract.
Some authors, however, have expressed a different view and argued that
the CISG does not address factual situations involving fraud200—a position
which, if followed through, would arguably have to deny parties to CISG
contracts that were induced by fraudulent misstatements any remedies
arising from the CISG.  This differs from the position taken here, which
will be addressed in more detail below.201
3. The Legal Criterion
Rules on fraudulent misrepresentation, however, concern a different
regulatory matter than the CISG’s provisions.  This, again, does not follow
from the fact that many domestic laws treat fraud and its consequences as
a matter of tort law.  The dogmatic classification within national legal sys-
tems should not influence the autonomous interpretation of the CISG’s
scope in accordance with Article 7(1).  Such classification is furthermore
not internationally uniform.  German sales law, for example, until not too
long ago, considered the seller’s fraudulent misrepresentation about the
196. See Zurich Chamber of Commerce, YB Comm. Arb. 128, ¶ 149 (1998).
197. See Benicke, supra note 24, ¶ 19; Johan Erauw & Harry Flechtner, Reme-
dies Under the CISG and Limits to Their Uniform Character, in THE INTERNATIONAL SALE
OF GOODS REVISITED 35, 66 (Petar Sˇarcˇevic´ & Paul Volken eds., 2001); Fountou-
lakis, supra note 145, ¶ 25; Heiz, supra note 14, at 653–54; HONNOLD, supra note 6,
¶ 65; Kro¨ll, supra note 121, art. 35, ¶ 205; Lookofsky, supra note 20, at 280;
Schlechtriem, supra note 12, at 474; Schroeter, supra note 4, Introduction to Arts.
14–24, ¶ 62; Schwenzer, supra note 116, art. 35, ¶ 49; Schwenzer, supra note 187, at
421.
198. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 526 cmt. a (1977).
199. See Edgington v. Fitzmaurice, [1885] L.R. 29 Ch.D. 459 at 483 (Lord
Bowen L.J.).
200. See HONNOLD, supra note 6, ¶¶ 65, 73.
201. See infra notes 207–09.
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quality of goods as one of the few reasons giving rise to a contractual right
of the buyer to claim damages.202
The decisive reason is that domestic legal rules on fraudulent misrep-
resentation deal with violations of the “obligation of honesty” (as the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts puts it)203 or the “general obligation of honesty
in speaking” (as described by an English author),204 which is a matter dif-
ferent from mere breaches of contractual obligations or from a lack of due
care.  The CISG does not attempt to regulate the specific consequences
triggered by such party behavior.  In the Hague Sales Laws of 1964, prede-
cessors to the CISG of 1980, this point was still expressly clarified.  Article
89 of the Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods (ULIS) stated:
“In case of fraud, damages shall be determined by the rules applicable in
respect of contracts of sale not governed by the present Law.”
The fact that ULIS Article 89 has no explicit counterpart in today’s
CISG should not be read as an indication of the CISG’s position being
different.205  The developments during the drafting stage of the CISG
made clear that the provision was merely left out in an attempt to shorten
the overall length of the CISG’s text, combined with the hope that it
would be possible to adopt a new concurring international instrument to
govern questions of fraudulent party behavior—a plan that eventually did
not succeed.  The lack of a provision along the lines of ULIS Article 89 did
not signal an intent of the CISG’s drafters to include fraud among the
matters regulated by the CISG,206 so that remedies for fraudulent misrep-
resentation can be applied alongside the CISG.
4. Concurrent Applicability of Uniform and Domestic Law
The above-mentioned result of the two-step approach raises one last
question to be addressed in the present paper, namely: Does the fact that
the effects of fraudulent party behavior is not among the matters regu-
lated by the CISG mean that the CISG is displaced in favor of national
rules on fraudulent misrepresentation?  The answer must be “no.”  Rather,
both sets of rules apply alongside each other, leaving the aggrieved party
with the choice of which rule to base one’s claims upon.207  This follows
from an interpretation of the CISG.  The purpose of the CISG’s remedies
is the compensation of parties that have suffered a breach of contract,
regardless of whether the conclusion of this contract was fraudulently in-
202. See BU¨RGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [Civil Code] § 463 (Ger.) (as in
force until December 31, 2001).
203. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 cmt. a (1977).
204. CARTWRIGHT, supra note 104, ¶ 6-01.
205. But see LOOKOFSKY, supra note 10, § 4.6 n.71.
206. See SCHLECHTRIEM, supra note 100, at 34; Schlechtriem, supra note 12, at
474.
207. See Cantonal Court St. Gallen, INTERNATIONALES HANDELSRECHT [IHR]
2009, 161 (Switz.); Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Court of Appeals] Cologne May 21,
1996 (Ger.); Schroeter, supra note 4, Introduction to Arts. 14–24, ¶ 62.
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duced in the first place.  A different interpretation would deprive parties
that suffered fraud in addition to a breach of contract of their remedies
under the CISG, a result that would be irreconcilable with the promotion
of good faith that CISG Article 7(1) demands.  This was also the prevailing
opinion under ULIS Article 89.208  At the end of the day, CISG contracts
obtained through fraudulent misrepresentation accordingly constitute
one of the rare cases that the CISG does govern, but not exhaustively.209
IV. CONCLUSION
Defining the exact substantive scope of the CISG is a difficult but nec-
essary task.  It is necessary because the scope determines over which do-
mestic rules of law the CISG prevails, thereby preempting the concurrent
domestic law’s application,210 and difficult because the CISG itself pro-
vides limited guidance about the method through which this definition is
to be achieved.  This article has discussed two approaches used in this re-
gard in case law and legal writings on the CISG: the reliance on Article
4211 and on dogmatic categories of domestic law as “contracts” and
“torts,”212 and found them both wanting, particularly in light of Article
7(1) calling for an internationally uniform interpretation of the CISG’s
scope.
Against this background, a novel two-step approach has been devel-
oped with the CISG’s Article 7(1) in mind.213  According to this approach,
a domestic law rule is displaced by the CISG if: (1) it is triggered by a
factual situation that the CISG also applies to (the factual criterion), and
(2) it pertains to a matter that is also regulated by the CISG (the legal
criterion).  Only if both criteria are cumulatively fulfilled, the domestic law
rule concerned overlaps with the CISG’s sphere of application in a way
that will generally result in its preemption.  In applying this approach to
remedies for misrepresentation known in common law jurisdictions, it has
been demonstrated that remedies for both innocent214 and negligent mis-
representation215 are preempted by the CISG if—and only if—they per-
tain to matters already regulated by the CISG, notably the buyer’s state of
knowledge about features of the goods at the moment of contract conclu-
208. See Ronald Harry Graveson, Ernst Joseph Cohn & Diana Graveson, UNI-
FORM LAWS ON INTERNATIONAL SALES ACT 1967 104 (1968); Weitnauer, Article 89, in
KOMMENTAR ZUM EINHEITLICHEN KAUFRECHT, EKG, ¶ 3 (Do¨lle ed., 1976).
209. Another case that falls into this general category is arguably that of con-
tracting parties demanding a judgment for specific performance.  While the CISG
in principle grants such a right, Article 28 expressly authorizes the adjudicating
court to refer to “its own law” in order to determine whether such a judgment
should be entered.
210. See supra notes 1–12.
211. See supra notes 14–24.
212. See supra notes 25–63.
213. See supra notes 64–88.
214. See supra notes 93–164.
215. See supra notes 165–88.
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sion or the parties’ state of knowledge about the other party’s ability to
perform.  Remedies for fraudulent misrepresentation, on the contrary,
can always be applied alongside the CISG.216
The methodical approach presented here is no more than a means to
a necessary end, namely the uniform and predictable definition of the bor-
ders of the CISG.  As it is clear that the purpose of the CISG—the creation
of a uniform international law—will be frustrated if it is possible to circum-
vent its provisions by bringing claims under domestic law,217 it is hoped
that the two-step approach may also prove useful in determining the rela-
tionship between the CISG and other instruments of domestic law, thereby
allowing international merchants to foresee which rules will apply to their
cross-border sales transactions.
216. See supra notes 190–210.
217. Cf. CA 7833/06 Pamesa Ceramica v. Yisrael Mendelson Ltd. 27, ¶ 54
[2009] (Isr.).
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PRINCIPLES OF ASIAN CONTRACT LAW: AN ENDEAVOR OF




FOLLOWING the development of the globalized economy, it was inevi-table that relevant private law rules would be harmonized and unified.
This kind of harmonization and unification is both a global and a regional
endeavor.  In Asia (especially in East Asia) there is a private initiative by
scholars trying to harmonize rules of contract law, and the aim is to create
a model law called Principles of Asian Contract Law (PACL).
This paper begins, in Part II, with a discussion of how the PACL can
become a continuous project rather than merely an idea.  Part III then
examines why the PACL is necessary for East Asia given that China, South
Korea, and Japan are member states of the United Nations Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG).  Part IV examines
what has been done to create the PACL.  Part V addresses some basic is-
sues with the PACL.  Finally, Part VI discusses the future of the PACL.
II. THE FIRST STEP TOWARD CREATING A PACL
In East Asia, many scholars are conscious of the need for regional
harmonization of private law.  For example, Japanese professor Zentaro
Kitagawa described an idea for a model contract law in the mid-1980s.1
In 2004, at an international symposium in Qingdao, China, Professor
Eichi Hoshino,2 Professor Young Jun Lee,3 Professor Sang Yong Kim,4
* Professor of Law, Tsinghua University School of Law, Beijing.  The author
may be contacted at lawhsy@mail.tsinghua.edu.cn.
1. See Zentaro Kitagawa ( ), Zhongguo de he tong fa yu mo fan he
tong fa [Chinese Contract Law and Model Contract Law], translated in Guo wai fa xue
[FOREIGN LEGAL THEORIES] 3–4 (Chen Wang trans., 1987).
2. See Eichi Hoshino [ ], Ri zhong han min fa zhi du tong yi hua de
zhu wen ti [Issues on the Harmonization of the Civil Laws of Japan, China and South
Korea], translated in 4 Zhong ri min shang fa yan jiu [STUDIES ON CIVIL AND COM-
MERCIAL LAW OF CHINA AND JAPAN] 3–20 (Tao Ju ed., Tao Ju trans., Law Press China
2006).
3. See Young Jun Lee [ ], Dongya tong yi mai mai fa de gou xiang [Ideas
of an Uniform Sales Law in East Asia], translated in 4 Zhong ri min shang fa yan jiu
[STUDIES ON CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL LAW OF CHINA AND JAPAN] 167–76 (Tao Ju ed.,
Lulun Jin trans., Law Press China 2006).
4. See Sang Yong Kim [ ], Zuo wei Dongbeiya pu tong fa de tong yi mai
mai fa de li fa fang xiang [The Direction of the Legislation of a Uniform Sales Law as Ius
Commune in North-east Asia], translated in 4 Zhong ri min shang fa yan jiu [STUDIES
ON CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL LAW OF CHINA AND JAPAN] 210–16 (Tao Ju ed., Lulun Jin
trans., Law Press China 2006).
(589)
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and I5 spoke about the harmonization of civil law in East Asia.  My sugges-
tion during the symposium was to borrow the experience of the Principles
of European Contract Law (PECL) Commission and to start a cooperative
drafting effort of comparative study and model law between Chinese, Japa-
nese, and Korean scholars.  Specifically, I suggested that a “path to the
harmonization of contract law or private law may be to start from scholars,
from non-government initiatives and from model law.”6  However, the
idea has not initiated any action in the following several years.
In October 2009, I organized an international symposium named
“Unification of Private Law in Europe and its Impact in East Asia” at
Tsinghua University School of Law.  The main purpose of the symposium
was to improve the harmonization of private law in East Asia.  The sympo-
sium not only invited European scholars7 to report on the work of unifica-
tion of contract law and tort law in Europe, but also invited several Asian
scholars, including Professor Wang Zejian (Taiwan), Young Jun Lee
(South Korea),8 Sang Yong Kim (South Korea),9 Naoki Kanayama (Ja-
pan),10 Naoko Kano (Japan),11 Kunihiro Nakata (Japan),12 Lei Chen
(Hong Kong), and a number of Chinese scholars from Beijing.
Just after the symposium, Professor Wang Zejian, Young Jun Lee,
Naoki Kanayama, Naoko Kano, and I gathered in my research room in
Tsinghau University School of Law.  After discussing the possibility of a
PACL co-operate project, we reached a common view, which I call the
Beijing Agreement.  According to the Agreement, Wang, Lee, Kanayama,
and Han each will establish a research team and organize future PACL
5. See Shiyuan Han [ ], Cong PECL kan Dongya he tong fa xie tiao hua
zhi lu [A Path to the Harmonization of East Asian Contract Law: With an Inspiration of
the PECL], in 4 Zhong ri min shang fa yan jiu [STUDIES ON CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL
LAW OF CHINA AND JAPAN] 198–209 (Tao Ju ed., Law Press China 2006).
6. Id.
7. Reports by European Scholars include: Christiane C. Wendehorst, The
Quest for a Coherent Civil Code: Comparing EC and PRC, 4 TSINGHUA L. J. 7 (Yinsheng
Zhai trans., 2010); Bernhard A. Koch, Tort Liability in the “Draft Common Frame
of Reference” (DCFR) and in the Principles of European Tort Law (PETL)—Simi-
larities and Differences (2005) (on file with author); Knut Benjamin Pissler, Service
Contracts in Chinese Contract Law: An Approach according to the European Draft Common
Frame of Reference, in TOWARDS A CHINESE CIVIL CODE 273 (Lei Chen & C.H.
(Remco) van Rhee eds., 2012).
8. Lee, supra note 3.
9. Sang Yong Kim, Possibility of Restoration and Creation of Ius Commune in the
North East Asian Region, in Higashi Asian shihou no syosou [MANY ASPECTS OF EAST
ASIAN PRIVATE LAWS] 283 (Takashi Oka, Masami Okino & Yoshikazu Yamashita
eds., 2009).
10. Naoki Kanayama [ ], [Challenge to PACL].
11. Naoko Kano [ ], [Recent Development of Japanese Consumer Law &
Policy].
12. Kunihiro Nakata [ ], [Contents and Performance of Contract and Con-
sumer Law in Japan—The Role of Consumer Contract Law].
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\58-4\VLR407.txt unknown Seq: 3 10-JUL-13 16:18
2013] PRINCIPLES OF ASIAN CONTRACT LAW 591
forums.  This was the start of the international/regional co-operation on
PACL in East Asia.13
The formation of the PACL project was based on an agreement
among scholars from three East Asian countries.  The three countries have
their own unique history of private law.  It is difficult to say which coun-
try’s law is better; however, if the law is appropriate for the conditions of a
country, then it is a good law.  The aim of the PACL is to create a set of
rules and principles appropriate for Asian countries.
III. WHY HAVE THE PACL?
If China, the world’s second largest economy, Japan, the world’s third
largest economy, and South Korea will cooperate, it will absolutely attract
the world’s attention.  We have to admit, however, that the situation in
East Asia is very complicated, considering the history, the public senti-
ment, and the international relations among the countries.  We also can-
not ignore the important role of economic and commercial exchange
among the countries.  For the past several years, relations among the three
countries can be accurately described as politically cold, but economically
warm.
The significant volume of transactions among the three countries
calls for common rules.  After China joined the CISG as one of the origi-
nal member states, South Korea and Japan became member states of the
CISG in the years 2004 and 2008, respectively.  Since the CISG is now a
common rule of the three countries, is it still necessary to have the PACL?
This is a very natural question; however, the following points illustrate
the necessity of the PACL.  First, the CISG covers only sales contracts.  For
other kinds of contracts, it is still necessary to have the PACL as a set of
common general rules.  Second, even with sales contracts, the CISG does
not cover every aspect of a contract.  For example, validity and transfer of
ownership have not been regulated by the CISG.  Third, the CISG is more
than thirty years old.  In the past thirty years, the world has changed signif-
icantly.  New challenges call for new rules.  Fourth, the CISG was designed
by European and American scholars and specialists.  It reflects mainly the
experiences of the western world.  For East Asian people, it is still neces-
sary for Asian scholars to produce an Asian voice.
Furthermore, the PACL differs in some ways from the CISG.  The dif-
ferences may be analyzed from two perspectives: form and content.
First, it is clear that the PACL has some differences in form when
compared with the CISG.  The PACL is not a convention.  It does not have
any binding force of law.  It regulates the general part of contract law,
including the validity of contract.  Therefore, the PACL may be a good
supplement to the CISG in practice.
13. See Naoki Kanayama, PACL [On the Meaning and Questions of a PACL] [in
Japanese], 1406 JURIST 102, 105 (2010).
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Second, the differences in content between the PACL and the CISG,
if any, should be analyzed carefully.  Such analysis would be good both for
the PACL and the CISG.  When writing the PACL, the drafter must pro-
vide reasons that support the drafter’s position.  Moreover, the drafting of
the PACL may provide an opportune time to re-evaluate the content of
the CISG.  For example, if the PACL’s position is consistent with the cus-
tom of Asia and different from the position of the CISG, we should re-
think whether the CISG sufficiently addresses Asian customs.
IV. WHAT HAS BEEN DONE ABOUT THE PACL?
Several meetings have been held regarding the PACL, including:
March 7–8, 2010, Keio University, Tokyo, the First PACL Forum, General
Principles and Interpretation of Contracts; August 25–26, 2010, Ho Chi
Minh University, Vietnam, the Second PACL Forum, Formation of Con-
tract; December 14–15, 2010, Seoul University, South Korea, the Third
PACL Forum, Non-performance; May 21–22, 2011, Osaka, the Fourth
PACL Forum, Validity of Contract; September 17–18, 2011, Tsinghua Uni-
versity, Beijing, the Fifth PACL Forum, Performance; December 17–18,
2011, Seoul University, South Korea, the Sixth PACL Forum, Non-per-
formance; March 4–6, 2012, Keio University, Tokyo, the Seventh PACL
Forum, General Matters, Performance and Non-performance; December
14–15, 2012, Seoul University, South Korea, the Eighth PACL Forum, Per-
formance and Non-performance.
V. SOME BASIC ISSUES ABOUT THE PACL
A. The Nature of the PACL
1. Nongovernmental and Private Initiative
The PACL project has not been supported or authorized by any gov-
ernment.  It is a purely private initiative that is independent of politics.  In
principle, the participants have not obtained any financial gain from their
involvement in the project.  They took part in the meetings at their own
expense; however, this does not mean that the national/regional teams
could not find financial support for their involvement.  For example, Pro-
fessor Kanayama obtained financial support from the Fondation pour le
droit continental and the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science
and Technology of Japan.  Professor Lee obtained financial support from
the Humboldt Foundation.  I obtained financial support from Tsinghua
University.  Thus, the specific participant or national/regional team re-
ceives the financial support, not the PACL project as a whole.  The PACL,
as a common research result, collectively belongs to all participants in the
project,14 and not solely to one person or one national/regional team.
14. This point was discussed and affirmed during the 2012 Tokyo PACL
Forum.
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2.  Academic Product
The PACL is a product of academic exchange and co-operation.  The
participants of the PACL are mainly professors and, to a lesser extent, law-
yers from different Asian countries or regions.  They come together shar-
ing a common academic ideal: the pursuit of academic democracy and
freedom.  They have different academic backgrounds, but they are not
spokespeople for any specific legal family, either their own or that of any
western legal family.
B. The Aimed Position of the PACL
Since the PACL is a nongovernmental private initiative and an aca-
demic product, it does not have any “binding force of law.”  It is only a
“model law” or “soft law.”15  So the force of the PACL, if there is any, is not
from ratione imperii, but from imperio rationis.16  In Asia there is no organi-
zation like the European Commission or European Union.  People cannot
pin their hopes on any external authority.  If the PACL can play a role in
practice, it can rely only on its own force of persuasion.
Professor Michael Joachim Bonell has analyzed the UNIDROIT Prin-
ciples in practice as: (1) Reception in academic and professional circles;
(2) Model for national and international legislation; (3) Guide in contract
negotiations; (4) Law chosen by the parties to govern their contract; (5)
Rules of law referred to in judicial proceedings.17  The success of
UNIDROIT’s Principles of International Commercial Contracts (PICC) in
practice has gone beyond all expectations.
As to the PACL, of course people may optimistically expect it has a
similar function in practice.  However, such optimistic possibilities and
ambitious ideals depend on the crux of the matter—the quality of the
final result.  In other words, the PACL as a model law should not be a
simple copy of the PICC or the PECL.
C. Work Methods of the PACL
1. Sketch of Work Methods of the PACL
The current structure of the PACL project includes three chairmen,
several national/regional teams, and a voting system.  English has been
15. See Kanayama, supra note 13, at 103.
16. Professor Reinhard Zimmermann has pointed out that the DCFR is in-
tended to be a reference text which, unlike the PECL, is to secure its authority not
from imperio rationis but ratione imperii, i.e., by virtue of the European Community
endorsing or adopting it in one form or another. See Reinhard Zimmermann, The
Present State of European Private Law, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 479, 491 (2009).
17. See Michael Joachim Bonell, The UNIDROIT Principles in Practice—The Expe-
rience of the First Two Years, UNIF. L. REV. 34 (1997); see also Michael Joachim Bonell,
UNIDROIT Principles 2004—The New Edition of the Principles of International Commer-
cial Contracts Adopted by the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law,
UNIF. L. REV. 5 (2004).
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the working language of the project from the very beginning.  The three
current chairmen are Shiyuan Han (China), Naoki Kanayama (Japan) and
Young Jun Lee (South Korea).  National/regional teams include Cambo-
dia, China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Indonesia, Japan, Myanmar, Nepal, Sin-
gapore, South Korea, Thailand, and Vietnam.  The PACL forums utilize a
voting system to resolve differences of opinion.  The above methods have
been used successfully for three years, producing several positive results.
Nevertheless, the methods also have several problems.
2. Efforts to Improve the Work Methods of the PACL
After an investigation of the methods of the PECL Commission,18 I
made a proposal to the participants of the 2012 Tokyo Forum regarding
possible improvements to the methods of the PACL.  The central ideas of
the proposal include the following points.
a. Using Reporters Instead of National/Regional Teams
The PACL project needs reporters instead of national teams.  The re-
porters would play several important roles.  For example, the reporters
would be in charge of drafting the articles, comments, and notes.  If a task
were given to a specific person, such as the reporter, rather than a na-
tional team, it would be much clearer what the individual should do.
The participants in the PACL project are not really representatives of
their own nations.  National teams are also suboptimal due to sensitive
historical issues in East Asia.  The final result of the project should not be
a result of “political quarrels” between Asian nations.  It is imperio rationis
which will give the PACL strength.  The PACL project should follow ra-
tionalism rather than nationalism.
A reporter should be a specialist in contract and comparative law—a
professor proficient in English and able to participate in the PACL Forum
frequently.  The reporter should be nominated by the PACL project (or
the commission).
b. Setting up a Drafting Group
The drafting group is composed by the reporters.  The drafting group
may hold small meetings (compared to the forum’s larger meeting) if it is
necessary.  If the small meetings are separate from the larger one, it will be
much more efficient for the project, at least from the perspectives of time
and money.  It is not necessary to hold the forum three times a year.  How-
ever, in terms of similarities, both the small meetings and the larger meet-
ing may adopt a “voting system.”
18. See COMM’N ON EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW, PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CON-
TRACT LAW PARTS I & II xi–xvi (Ole Lando & Hugh Beale eds., 2000).
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c. Setting up an Editing Group
Native English speakers should be in charge of the editing group.
3. Final Thoughts Regarding the PACL’s Methods
The above proposal has been discussed at the forum, and many of the
ideas have been adopted.  The “national reporter” has been re-labeled the
“jurisdictional reporter” so as to take into account the status of Hong
Kong, Taiwan, and Macau.  The “nominated reporter” has been instituted
to review the current drafts.  Nominated reporters are to work closely with
the original drafters.  Any disagreements between a nominated reporter
and an original drafter should be set out in writing and considered by the
drafting committee.  Nominated reporters are not bound by the current
draft articles because nominated reporters should take into account the
jurisdictional reporters, as well as generally consider coherence and the
level of detail across the five chapters of the PACL.
Without the original drafters’ transcending the limitations of nation-
alism and following rationalism, it is impossible to introduce a nominated
reporter system.  Currently, the South Korean team’s original draft is re-
viewed by a nominated reporter from Taiwan.  Moreover, China’s team’s
original draft is reviewed by a nominated reporter from Singapore.
Through such collaboration, the quality of the drafts will improve.
D. Strategies of the PACL
1.  A Quick Draft?
Compared to the PECL, the pace of work of the PACL is very quick.
In the past three years there have been eight PACL forums.  Five chapters
of the PACL have been drafted.  However, my hope is actually to slow
down the work, because most of the participants in the project are part-
time contributors.  With limited time and energy, it is difficult for them to
maintain that pace while still preserving quality.
Before the Seoul Forum of December 2010, I raised this issue with
Professors Kanayama and Lee.19  By the end of the forum, when the three
of us gathered to discuss the future agenda, both of them expressed a
desire for a “quick” draft.  Professor Lee mentioned that, as a man in his
seventies, he wished to see the PACL finished as soon as possible.  As a
substantive matter, I do not know why Professor Kanayama supported that
approach.  One possibility is that he needed to demonstrate progress to
his financial supporters in order to maintain funding.
19. The first meeting of the First Commission of the PECL was in December
1980.  The main result of the First Commission was sections regarding perform-
ance, non–performance, and remedies, which were published in the year 1995.
The PECL Commission spent more than ten years on performance and non-per-
formance; compared with the PECL, the speed of the PACL was astonishing.
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I respect their concerns, but I support a more measured approach.
There is an old Chinese saying, “slow work brings fine result” (literally, the
saying is “Man gong chu xi huo”—soft fire makes sweet malt).  Being anx-
ious to achieve rapid success may bring bad results.  Until now the project
has resulted in five chapters, but they are only a rough draft.  In order to
ensure quality and persuasiveness, we will need to carefully review these
drafts in the future.
2. Brief Principles or Detailed Rules?
Different drafters from different countries prepared the five chapters
of the PACL.  Generally speaking, the drafts by the Japanese drafting team
(including a section regarding the interpretation, formation, and validity
of contracts) are comparatively simple, while the drafts by the South Ko-
rean team (non-performance) and the Chinese team (performance) are
much more detailed.
If the PACL, as a model law, is too simple,20 what is its value to judges
or legislatures?  How attractive will the PACL be to the parties of a con-
tract?  Although they are called “principles,” actually the PECL’s provi-
sions are more similar to general rules.  And the PICC may constitute the
same character,21 insofar as it is not limited to “principles.”  According to
Article I of the PACL, “[t]hese Principles are intended to be applied as
general rules of contract law in the Asian Countries.”  The reality should
correspond to its name.
3. Restatement or Innovation?
The concept of a restatement of law is a product of American law.
For a civilian, the “restatement” is no more than a systematic tidying-up of
the existing legal rules and principles.  Restatements generally do not con-
tain “new” proposals.  If we inspect the PECL as an example, on one hand,
it may say that it is a kind of “restatement” of European contract law.
From the format of the PECL—article, comment, illustration, and
note22—it is clear that the American Restatement of Law has its impact on
the PECL.  On the other hand, the PECL is not merely a “restatement” of
law—it contains some new proposals.23  Thus, the PECL’s success should
20. For example, the current draft of “Formation of Contract” by the Japa-
nese team contains only nine articles, while its counterpart, the Contract Law of
China contains thirty-five articles.  The provisions of the PACL here are much sim-
pler compared with the Chinese Contract Law; thus, it will not be attractive to
Chinese legislature, judges, or contractual parties.  I recommend that this part of
the PACL be re-drafted.
21. See PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW art. 1:101 (1994) (“These
Principles are intended to be applied as general rules of contract law in the Euro-
pean Union.”).
22. See Ole Lando, Principles of European Contract Law: An Alternative to or a
Precursor of European Legislation?, 40 AM. J. COMP. L. 573, 579 (1992).
23. While comparing the PECL and the American Restatements, Professor
Zimmermann has pointed out that “[t]he American Restatements, obviously, pro-
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not be separated from a path the PECL followed—namely by utilizing the
restatement as the basis for the PECL and then going beyond such a
restatement.
Turning to the existing results of the PACL project, many observers
might consider the PACL insufficient in restating existing Asian law.  Such
a restatement of Asian law would need to be based on a comparative study
of the existing Asian laws in an attempt to find their common core.  With-
out an adequate comparative study, the PACL will lack a strong
foundation.24
Why should the PACL project try to find and restate the common
core of existing Asian law?  One reason may be that, in doing so, the PACL
can become a modern lex mercatoria or Asian ius commune.  Generally
speaking, merchants are familiar with their domestic laws.  The closer the
rules of the PACL are to the merchants’ domestic rules, the more likely it
is that the merchants will accept it.  Another reason may be that compara-
tive studies will make the final results of the PACL project unique and
attractive.  For example, the national reports, prepared by Asian scholars,
will serve as rare academic resources.
One additional point must be made.  By emphasizing the restatement
of Asian laws, the author does not indicate that he objects to innovation.
The participants of the PACL project should uphold the ideal of a restate-
ment and, at the same time, respect the practical reality.  Here, to “uphold
the ideal of a restatement” means to draft a set of rules and principles
appropriate for Asian people.  “Respecting the practical reality” means
building the ideal of a PACL on the basis of the reality of Asian laws.  An
ideal PACL can only be obtained by utilizing the restatement as the basis
for the PACL and then going beyond that base.
E. Any Distinguishing Asian Feature of the PACL?
Since the CISG, the PECL, the PICC, and the Draft Common Frame
of Reference (DCFR) already exist, the PACL, as a latecomer, should have
a distinguishing feature to demonstrate its necessity.  Is there any distin-
guishing Asian feature in the PACL?  This question is in heated dispute.
vided a source of inspiration for the draftsmen of the PECL.”  Zimmermann, supra
note 16, at 512 n.24.  Compared to that with which the authors of the American
Restatement were faced, the task undertaken by the draftsmen of the PECL has a
more creative nature. See id. at 483 (“Divergences between the national legal sys-
tems had to be resolved, decisions implying value judgments and policy choices
had to be taken, and sometimes unconventional solutions were adopted which the
draftsmen of the PECL themselves describe as ‘a progressive development from
[the] common core.’”); see also Reinhard Zimmermann, The Present State of Euro-
pean Private Law, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 483 (2009).
24. See Won Lim Jee ( ) [On the Harmonization of Contract Law in Asia],
83 HORITSU JIHO [LAW TIMES] 82, 89 (2011) (emphasizing importance of compara-
tive study as premise of PACL).
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Some think that the “distinguishing Asian feature” of the PACL is no
more than an illusion.25  As a threshold matter, I reject the validity of that
concern altogether.  So long as the PACL is a product of comparative law
study and is built on the basis of the existing Asian laws, there is no need
to worry that there is not any distinguishing Asian feature.
However, I am not so pessimistic about whether the PACL contains
Asian characteristics.  For example, when the Chinese team prepared the
“Performance of Contract” portion of the PACL, the participants found
that a creditor’s right of subrogation and right of revocation are two com-
mon cores of the laws of Japan, South Korea, and China (including Tai-
wan).26  Accordingly, the Chinese team drafted articles to reflect those
rights.  Since there is no corresponding part in both the PECL and the
PICC, such rights can justifiably be considered a distinctly Asian feature in
the PACL.
Although the PACL project has not dealt with the release of claims
yet, that would be another distinguishing Asian feature.  There is a notice-
able difference between the idea of release between the West and the East.
In the West, release is normally understood as a contract requiring an
agreement of the two parties.  The basic idea is that a “favor should not be
forced.”  In the East, in contrast, release is a unilateral act.
The PACL is not merely a set of rules and principles.  It should be
viewed as a whole, and the black letter rules are an integral part of the
whole.  Thus, the above question regarding distinctly Asian features may
be divided into two parts.
First, is there any distinguishing Asian feature in the black letter rules
of the PACL?  The answer is “not exactly”; however, we should not be dis-
appointed about that answer, because it is not desirable for the black letter
rules of the PACL to have an excessively Asian character.  Such an out-
come would signify that the PACL runs contrary to the harmonization or
unification of global contract law.
Second, is there any distinguishing Asian feature in other parts of the
PACL, including the commentary, the notes, and the national reports?
This question involves the underpinnings of the black letter rules of the
PACL.  It reveals the rationale, the understanding, and the logic of the
rules.  It also reveals the practical experiences of the rules.  This part of
the PACL can and should have a distinguishing Asian feature.
Behind the phenomenon of the controversial issue of “distinguishing
Asian feature” lies a divergence of the understanding about work methods
of the PACL.  Unfortunately, its logic is that Asian features—including
25. See Naoki Kanayama ( ), [From Comparative Law to PACL], 973
NBL 8, 14 (2012).
26. For provisions on the creditor’s right of subrogation, see Japanese Civil
Code art. 423; South Korean Civil Code art. 404; Taiwan Civil Code arts. 242–243;
Chinese Contract Law art. 73.  For provisions on the creditor’s right of revocation,
see Japanese Civil Code arts. 424–26; South Korean Civil Code art. 404; Taiwan
Civil Code arts. 244–245; Chinese Contract Law arts. 74–75.
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Asian law—are no more than results of the reception of western laws, a
mere copy that created a quick product “made in Asia.”  On the other
hand, finding Asian laws will lead to careful comparative studies, thus al-
lowing researchers to find a common core of Asian laws, and finally, yield-
ing a possible Asian common law.
F. The Prospects
What may one expect to be the result of our efforts?  Will the Princi-
ples of Asian Contract Law become rules written in the sand?27
The PACL is a part of the academic discourse in Asia.  We are now
reviewing and finalizing its articles and preparing comments and notes for
it.  It is not easy, but we are trying our best to finish and publish it.  We aim
to publish Part I of the PACL—“Performance and Non-performance”—
and a European publisher will publish the English version.  In Asia, Chi-
nese, Japanese, and Korean versions will also be published.
There will be no Asian equivalent of the European Union in Asia in
the near future, and it is therefore impossible for the PACL to become the
actual law of the entire Asian continent.  However, some Asian countries,
including Japan and South Korea, are amending their national civil laws.
The PACL can serve as a model for such work.  In that way, we may realize
the harmonization of national contract laws in at least East Asia.  Addition-
ally, the PACL may also eventually play a role in both arbitration and trial
law.
27. This was the question faced by professor Ole Lando when he worked with
his colleague to draft the PECL. See Lando, supra note 22, at 584.
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THE United Nations Convention on Contracts for the InternationalSale of Goods (CISG)1 came into effect in Mexico on January 1,
1989.2  The purpose of this Article is to assess the manner in which the
CISG has been applied by the Mexican courts.  Unfortunately, and despite
that it has been more than twenty-four years during which international
sales involving parties in Mexico have likely been governed by the CISG,
very few cases applying the CISG have come to light.
Finding Mexican CISG cases is complicated.  The Mexican judicial sys-
tem poses the biggest obstacle, since state and federal decisions are gener-
ally not reported.  Nevertheless, I have been able to obtain twenty-six
decisions (at the trial and appellate levels) derived from some nine court
cases,3 but I am certain that there are more CISG cases out there.
* Alejandro Osuna-Gonza´lez practices law in Tijuana, Baja California,
Mexico.  He obtained his J.D. degree from the Law School of the Universidad
Iberoamericana in Tijuana in 1995.  He obtained an LL.M. from the University of
Pittsburgh’s School of Law in 1998.  Mr. Osuna teaches at Universidad
Iberoamericana Tijuana, where he lectures on International Sales Law, Foreign
Investments, and Commercial Arbitration.  For comments on this presentation he
can be contacted at alejandro@osunalegal.com.
1. U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, United Nations Convention on Con-
tracts for the International Sale of Goods art. 35, Apr. 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter CISG], available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/sales/
cisg/V1056997-CISG-e-book.pdf.
2. See Diario Oficial de la Federacio´n [DO] [Official Diary of the Federation],
Mar. 17, 1988 (Mex.).
3. The cases are: Peterman Lumber, Inc. v. Encinos Rossy, S.A. de C.V., Juz-
gado Sexto de Primera Instancia del Partido de Estado de Baja California [Sixth
Civil Court of First Instance of the State of Baja California], July 2001; Banks Hard-
woods v. Jorge Angel Kyriakidez Garcı´a, Segunda Sala del Tribunal Superior de
Justicia de Baja California [Second Court of the Superior Tribunal of Justice, Baja
California], Mar. 24, 2006; Georgia Pacific Resins, Inc. v. Grupo Bajaplay, S.A. de
C.V., Baja California, Cuarto Tribunal Colegiado del Decimoquinto Circuito [Baja
California, Fourth Panel of the Fifteenth Circuit Court], Aug. 2007; Kolmar Petro-
chemicals Americas, Inc. v. Idesa Petroquı´mica S.A. de C.V., Primer Tribunal
Colegiado en Materia Civil del Primer Circuito [First Civil Court of the First Cir-
cuit], Mar. 2005; Agrofrut Rengo, S.A. v. Levadura Azteca, S.A. de C.V., Quinto
Tribunal Colegiado en Materia Civil del Primer Circuito [Fifth Civil Court of the
First Circuit], May 2005; Barcel, S.A. v. Steve Kliff [Second Panel of the Superior
Court of Justice], Mar. 2007; Wolf Metals, Inc. v. Fetasa de Mexicalia, S.A.  Also,
there are two cases where the CISG clearly applied, but the judges ignored its
application: Texas CCC, Inc., v. A&J Cheese Co. de Mexico, S. de R.L. de C.V.,
decided by the Fifth Civil Court in Tijuana, Baja California; and Gerhard Deutsch
(601)
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Most of the state court decisions were provided to me by acquaint-
ances that are actively involved in litigating collection cases and know of
my interest in CISG decisions.  A couple of them, I argued myself.
The federal CISG decisions were obtained through contacts in the
federal judiciary who assisted me in locating cases in the judiciary’s in-
tranet, which is not open to the public.  There are three references to the
CISG in the Supreme Court-administered JUS case law database, but two
of them are derived from administrative cases applying customs legisla-
tion, while the other case is in reference to a cosigner of a debt, who se-
cured a CISG governed transaction with real property.
The scope of this Article is rather limited.  Instead of discussing each
and every one of the Mexican CISG decisions—most of which I have al-
ready discussed elsewhere4—I have limited my discussion to four cases
that address the issues of contract formation, the standard of proof to
show a contract exists, contract performance, and damages: Kolmar Petro-
chemicals Americas, Inc. v. Grupo Idesa; Georgia Pacific Resins, Inc. v.
Grupo Bajaplay, S.A. de C.V.; Banks Hardwoods Inc. v. Jorge Angel Kyria-
kidez; and Agrofrut Rengo, S.A. v. Levadura Azteca, S.A. de C.V.
II. A SAMPLING OF MEXICAN CISG CASES
A. Kolmar Petrochemicals Americas, Inc. v. Grupo Idesa, S.A. de C.V.5
1. Background
This case involves an American purchaser-plaintiff and a Mexican
seller.  A purchase representative at Kolmar, after ending a phone conver-
sation with seller’s agent, sent seller an email confirming their discussions,
which included: that the contract was for 3,000 metric tons of MEG at
$392.50 FOB/seller’s terminal at Coatzacoalcos; payment as of thirty days
from the date on the bill of lading; and goods to be delivered in January
2003.  Seller then emailed confirming the purchase order, but stating that
it needed to get confirmation that their loading terminal would be availa-
ble in 2003.  Seller further added that it would contact buyer by the follow-
ing Monday.
Three days later (December 2, 2002), buyer sent another email re-
questing clarification of seller’s comments regarding the availability of the
terminal.  On December 19, buyer sent another email designating the ship
Produktions und Vertriebsges, M.B.H v. Artiken, S.A. de C.V., from Leon, Guana-
juato, Mexico.
4. See Alejandro Osuna-Gonza´lez, La Interpretacio´n Judicial en Me´xico Relativa a
la Convencio´n de las Naciones Unidas sobre los Contratos de Compraventa Internacional de
Mercaderı´as, CONTRATACIO´N Y ARBITRAJE INTERNACIONALES 91–129 (Universidad Na-
cional Auto´noma de Me´xico, 2005).
5. See Kolmar Petrochemicals Americas, Inc. v. Idesa Petroquı´mica S.A. de
C.V., Quincuage´simo Juzgado Civil de Primera Instancia del Distrito Federal
[Fiftieth Civil Court of First Instance in the Federal District], Oct. 2004.  I thank
attorney Miguel Bernal for providing me with a copy of the decisions rendered in
this case, without whose help this Article would not have been possible.
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that would pick up the 3,000 tons of MEG, and requesting that seller con-
firm its nomination of the ship that afternoon.  More than twenty days
after buyer’s last communication (January 10, 2003), Idesa’s agent sent an
email claiming that the situation had gotten complicated, that he was fight-
ing to save the transaction, but that the 3,000 tons of MEG had already
been reserved.  Seller further indicated that it was under a lot of pressure
so that its company did not lose money, and made a new offer to deliver to
buyer at the same terminal but at a price of $400 per ton, or at $415 per
ton delivered at an alternate terminal in the port of Altamira.  Agent for
Idesa acknowledged in his email that he was not honoring their original
agreement.  Agent for Kolmar refused to renegotiate the terms of what he
believed was a closed deal, and considered the seller’s conduct a breach of
their agreement made in late November.  Kolmar filed a lawsuit in Mexico
City for damages suffered as a consequence of seller’s refusal to deliver the
goods at the agreed upon price.  Idesa defended on the grounds that no
contract had been formed because, according to their internal proce-
dures, it was not in their own standard form.  Idesa also defended by stat-
ing that their January 10th proposal had not been accepted by the buyer.
In his ruling, the first-instance judge qualified Kolmar’s November
2002 email as a proposal to Idesa to enter into a contract, and that Idesa’s
email of January 10, 2003 was a counteroffer per CISG Article 19.6  The
judge also reasoned that Idesa never issued a final confirmation of all of
the conditions established in Kolmar’s “offer,” because Kolmar’s proposal
not only concerned the price, goods, and quality, but it also referred to
the time and manner of delivery, and that not all of these terms had been
unconditionally accepted by seller.  The judge further argued that seller
never consented to delivering the goods at its terminal in Coatzacoalcos,
nor did it agree that this delivery would take place in January 2003.  In my
opinion, the court’s first mistake was qualifying Kolmar’s agent’s confirma-
tory email as an offer when it was merely putting in writing what was likely
a verbal agreement that had been made over the phone.7  The court’s
6. CISG, supra note 1, art. 19 reads:
(1) A reply to an offer which purports to be an acceptance but contains
additions, limitations or other modifications is a rejection of the offer
and constitutes a counter-offer.
(2) However, a reply to an offer which purports to be an acceptance but
contains additional or different terms which do not materially alter the
terms of the offer constitutes an acceptance, unless the offeror, without
undue delay, objects orally to the discrepancy or dispatches a notice to
that effect. If he does not so object, the terms of the contract are the
terms of the offer with the modifications contained in the acceptance.
(3) Additional or different terms relating, among other things, to the
price, payment, quality and quantity of the goods, place and time of deliv-
ery, extent of one party’s liability to the other or the settlement of dis-
putes are considered to alter the terms of the offer materially.
Id.
7. Professor Marı´a del Pilar Perales Viscasillas arrived at this same conclusion
on this case. See Marı´a del Pilar Perales Viscasillas, Modification and Termination of
the Contract (Art. 29 CISG), 25 J.L. & COM. 167, 173 n.30 (2005).  This source also
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decision should have included an analysis of CISG Article 8 (regarding
interpretation of a party’s intent),8 and CISG Article 14 (on what consti-
tutes an offer)9 to see if buyer’s email actually qualified as a proposal to
make a contract, or if from reading its contents an alternate interpretation
was possible.  This did not take place.
It was only logical that after this initial snafu by the court, any other
communication by Kolmar’s agent would very likely be qualified as a
counteroffer per CISG Article 19.  But even this view is questionable.  After
rereading seller’s email of January 10, 2003, agent for Idesa was in fact
admitting to Kolmar that it would not be honoring the agreement it had
originally made by phone, and recognized that this would surely cause
problems.  Idesa was now attempting to extract a higher price from
Kolmar.  Unfortunately, the court did a terrible job of using CISG Article 8
to interpret the statements made by both buyer and seller.  In my opinion,
the parties agreed on all of the basic terms (goods, quantity, and quality),
and only left pending the issue of confirming the availability of seller’s
terminal.  Also, the fact that seller remained silent after buyer emailed
seller twice—once to request clarification on issue of the terminal, and
later to designate the ship that would pick up the goods—could have been
interpreted to mean that seller was in agreement with buyer10—at least
this is the only reasonable understanding that I can extract per CISG Arti-
cle 8(2).  If the contrary were true, Idesa would have immediately con-
appears on UNCITRAL’s website at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/CISG
25/Viscasillas.pdf (last visited Apr. 12, 2013).
8. CISG, supra note 1, art. 8 provides:
(1) For the purposes of this Convention statements made by and other
conduct of a party are to be interpreted according to his intent where the
other party knew or could not have been unaware what that intent was.
(2) If the preceding paragraph is not applicable, statements made by and
other conduct of a party are to be interpreted according to the under-
standing that a reasonable person of the same kind as the other party
would have had in the same circumstances.
(3) In determining the intent of a party or the understanding a reasona-
ble person would have had, due consideration is to be given to all rele-
vant circumstances of the case including the negotiations, any practices
which the parties have established between themselves, usages and any
subsequent conduct of the parties.
Id.
9. CISG, supra note 1, art. 14 reads:
(1) A proposal for concluding a contract addressed to one or more spe-
cific persons constitutes an offer if it is sufficiently definite and indicates
the intention of the offeror to be bound in case of acceptance. A propo-
sal is sufficiently definite if it indicates the goods and expressly or implic-
itly fixes or makes provision for determining the quantity and the price.
(2) A proposal other than one addressed to one or more specific persons
is to be considered merely as an invitation to make offers, unless the con-
trary is clearly indicated by the person making the proposal.
Id.
10. I am not particularly troubled with CISG Article 18(1) regarding the si-
lence issue, because in this case, buyer was not making a proposal, but was request-
ing clarification and advising seller of the ship that would pick up the goods.
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tacted Kolmar to clarify that no contract had yet been concluded after
Kolmar’s emails.  Instead, Idesa’s agent would not email until the second
week of January 2003, and only to advise Kolmar that it wanted to increase
the price and possibly change the place of delivery, aware that this would
potentially cause problems.  My opinion is further supported by the fact
that Idesa never mentioned that there was an issue regarding the availabil-
ity of the terminal; it was all about the price.
With regards to the interpretative mandates under CISG’s Article 7
(internationality, uniformity, and good faith) the judge used the civilian
expression aceptacio´n lisa y llana (roughly full and unconditional acceptance),
a phrase that has a clear local law connotation, although the decision does
acknowledge that in matters governed by the CISG, there is no room for
the Federal Civil Code to apply.  With regard to the need to promote uni-
formity, the judge did not cite any case law interpreting the CISG, nor
does it seem that buyer made any attempt to do so in an attempt to per-
suade the judge.11  It is also evident that no effort was made by the court
to interpret the CISG in a manner that promotes the observance of good
faith, although it is likely that the court assumed it was by not allowing
Kolmar to go after Idesa, with whom (the court believed) it never con-
cluded a contract.
2. Kolmar Appeals the Decision
Kolmar appealed to Mexico City’s Superior Court,12 claiming that the
trial court had erred when analyzing the evidence and applying the CISG
to the facts.  According to buyer, the court should have found, by a proper
interpretation of CISG Articles 7 and 8, that the parties had in fact made a
verbal agreement, and that seller failed to object to the emails sent after
they negotiated the contract.  Kolmar also claimed that the court miscon-
strued seller’s lack of response to Idesa’s email, designating the ship as a
non-acceptance, and that in doing so, the trial court had also violated Arti-
cle 9 of the CISG.13  Kolmar further added that CISG Article 19(3) was not
applicable.
11. See Zivilgericht Kanton Basel-Stadt [ZG] [Civil Court] Dec. 21, 1992,
docket no. P4 1991/238 (Switz.), available at http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?id=
104; Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt am Main [OLG] [higher regional court] July 5,
1995 (Ger.), available at http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?id=169.
12. See Kolmar Petrochemicals America, Inc. v. Grupo Idesa, S.A. de C.V., Sala
Civil del Tribunal Superior de Justicia del Distrito Federal [Superior Civil Court of
Justice of the Federal District], Jan. 2005.
13. This issue arose because Kolmar claimed that the court had misinter-
preted Kolmar’s email advising it of the name of the ship that would pick up the
goods in Altamira, and that in fact, in spite of the email’s wording, it was not
necessary for Idesa to approve of the ship.  This constituted a violation of CISG
Article 9, which incorporates commercial usages and practices either followed by
the parties or that is widely observed in international trade.
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In its decision, the Superior Court affirmed the ruling and reasoned
that the trial court had given proper weight to the emails submitted by
buyer-plaintiff, and that is was “evident” that:
The parties had not agreed on the price, payment, quality and
quantity and place and time of delivery, thus triggering the pro-
viso contained in paragraph 3 of article 19 of the United Nations’
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (Vi-
enna, nineteen eighty); therefore, it is incorrect to even talk
about the existence of a contract.
Unfortunately, the Superior Court read CISG Article 19(3) as a check-
list of items which the parties must fully satisfy for a contract to be con-
cluded, an interpretation that is clearly wrong.  The Appellate Court fur-
ther reasoned that, because seller never responded to buyer’s request for
clarification on the issue of seller’s terminal, nor to acceptance of the ship
designated by buyer to pick up the goods, that this was a clear indication
that buyer’s offer had not been accepted.  The Superior Court further ar-
gued that the parties had not agreed on the price and place of delivery,
and in doing so, the Superior Court went back to Idesa’s email in which it
was attempting to renegotiate the price.  Just like the trial court, the Supe-
rior Court failed to analyze this issue properly.  As noted in my discussion
of the trial court’s decision, the parties had already agreed to the goods,
the price, and date and place of delivery; the only thing that was pending
was the availability of seller’s terminal.
Echoing the view of the trial court, the Superior Court denied that
the good faith principle provided for under Article 7 of the CISG had
been violated in any way because the parties had never arrived at a consen-
sus with regard to the price of the goods, nor regarding the place and time
of delivery, making it improper for buyer to attempt to enforce a contract
that was never legally concluded.  In its view, the Superior Court probably
thought it was in fact enforcing the mandate for the promotion of good
faith.
The Superior Court dismissed the claim that the trial court had made
a wrongful interpretation of CISG Article 8, instead reasoning that the
court had disposed of this issue correctly, and that the exchange of emails
showed that the parties were merely negotiating.  In my opinion, the Supe-
rior Court should have analyzed CISG Article 8 in tandem with Articles 14
and 19, not in an isolated manner as it did.
The Superior Court did not include any citations to case law or trea-
tises, nor does it appear that Kolmar’s counsel attempted to sway the court
by doing so.  I believe a different result could have been achieved had this
occurred.
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3. The Decision at the Circuit Court Level14
Finally, buyer appealed before the Circuit Court (amparo proceed-
ing), claiming that the trial and appellate courts had infringed Kolmar’s
fundamental rights due to the lower courts’ erroneous interpretation of
Article 1853 of the Federal Civil Code and Articles 7, 8, and 9 of the CISG.
Unfortunately for buyer, the First Panel of the First Circuit found that
neither the trial nor the appellate courts had committed any violations
when interpreting CISG Articles 7, 8, and 9, because seller never made an
unconditional acceptance (aceptacio´n lisa y llana) of buyer’s proposal to
conclude a contract, and that therefore no violation of buyer’s fundamen-
tal rights had taken place.
B. Georgia Pacific Resins, Inc. v. Grupo Bajaplay, S.A. de C.V.15
1. Background
In this case, Georgia Pacific Resins, Inc., (GPR), an American seller-
plaintiff, filed a complaint in Tijuana against Grupo Bajaplay, S.A. de C.V.
(Bajaplay), a Mexican buyer demanding U.S. $139,696.98 for various ship-
ments of resins.  According to the facts as recited in the decision, the com-
mercial relationship began in 1997 when a corporate officer of buyer
completed a sale on a credit application that was transmitted by fax to
seller.  This application for sale on credit contained a few standard clauses
with some general terms.  During a period spanning a few years, buyer
would fax purchase orders to acquire the resins it would use in its indus-
trial process.  The goods would later be shipped from the United States to
the Mexican buyer by way of a carrier unrelated to the parties.
In their response, Bajaplay denied having completed the credit appli-
cation, and also denied faxing any purchase orders to GPR.  Buyer also
refused to acknowledge it had received the resins seller had sold and deliv-
ered, even though evidence such as original invoices and shipping docu-
ments issued by the trucking company had been submitted and indicated
Bajaplay was the buyer and consignee.
In his decision, the judge agreed with Bajaplay’s argument.  Accord-
ing to the court, GPR did not meet its burden of proving that it had deliv-
ered the goods to Bajaplay nor that Bajaplay had actually received them.
The fax printouts, invoices, and shipping documents provided by seller
were given no weight, which denied seller the right to receive the payment
it was due.  Clearly, the judge made a bad decision by setting the eviden-
tiary threshold wrongfully high.  In issuing his decision, the judge did not
look at the CISG as the law applicable to the merits (nor did he mention
14. Kolmar Petrochemicals Americas, Inc. v. Idesa Petroquı´mica, S.A. de C.V.,
Primer Tribunal Colegiado en Materia Civil del Primer Circuito [First Civil Court
of the First Circuit], Mar. 2005.
15. Georgia Pacific Resins, Inc. v. Grupo Bajaplay, S.A. de C.V., Juzgado
Primero Civil del Partido Judicial de Tijuana [Sixth Civil Court of Tijuana], Mar.
2006.
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any other law for that matter).  A proper methodology applying the CISG
would have yielded a different result, and would have ultimately saved
GPR a lot of time.  The CISG’s Article 11 provides that a contract’s conclu-
sion or evidence of its existence need not be reduced to a writing.  In fact,
its existence may be proved by witnesses, a minimum threshold that is
clearly surpassed when a party is able to provide invoices, faxed purchase
orders, and evidence that the goods were placed in the hands of a carrier
for shipment to buyer.16  Also, commentary to the draft of CISG Article 11
clearly noted that this provision had been included because contracts for
the international sale of goods are often concluded by means of communi-
cation that do not always involve a written contract.17  The purpose was to
facilitate the showing that a contract exists.
Even from a procedural perspective, the judge contradicted the evi-
dence, weighing rules that were already part of the Commerce Code at the
time the judgment was issued,18 which were heavily influenced by UNCI-
TRAL’s Model Law on Electronic Commerce.19
Another aspect that was evident was the judge’s inability to distinguish
between seller’s obligation to deliver the goods and the arrival of the
goods at buyer’s premises.  Under both the CISG20 and the Commerce
Code (enacted in 1889),21 goods can be deemed as delivered when the
seller places them at a buyer’s disposal, or in the hands of a carrier.  Had
the judge looked at the CISG, he could have easily avoided committing
this horrendous mistake.
2. The Judgment on Appeal
If the ruling by the trial level court was deficient, the decision ren-
dered by the Second Chamber of the Superior Court of Baja California
was worse.22  GPR argued that the trial level judge had failed to give due
regard to evidence such as the invoices, transport documents, and the
16. See Jose Luis Morales y/o Son Export, S.A. de C.V., de Hermosillo Sonora,
Me´xico v. Nez Marketing de Los Angeles, California, Mexican Commission for the
Protection of Foreign Trade (COMPROMEX), May 1993.
17. See JOHN HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE UNIFORM LAW FOR IN-
TERNATIONAL SALES 410 (1989) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY].
18. See Co´digo de Comercio [CCo.] [Commercial Code], arts. 1205, 1298-A
(Mex.); Diario Oficial de la Federacio´n [DO] [Official Diary of the Federation], 27
de Agosto de 2009.  The judge also did not consider that buyer failed to make a
proper objection to the documents submitted as evidence.
19. See UNCITRAL Secretariat, UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce
with Guide to Enactment 1996, with Additional Article 5 bis as Adopted in 1998 (1999),
available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/electcom/05-89450_
Ebook.pdf (last visited June 12, 2013).
20. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 31.
21. The Mexican Commerce Code was heavily influenced by the Spanish
Commerce Code.
22. See Georgia Pacific Resins, Inc. v. Grupo Bajaplay, S.A. de C.V., Segunda
Sala del Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Baja California [Second Panel of the
Superior Court, Baja California], Jan. 2007.
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purchase orders that buyer had sent by fax.  GPR also argued that the trial
level judge had erred by failing to apply the CISG.
In its decision, the Second Chamber considered that the invoices had
been unilaterally prepared by the GPR; thus, they lacked any evidentiary
value.  With regard to the transport documents, the Second Chamber rea-
soned that because these did not have a signature or a stamp indicating
receipt by Bajaplay, the Second Chamber could not consider that the
goods had been received; therefore, the existence of the contract had not
been proven.23  Evidently, the Second Chamber committed the same mis-
take, by refusing to recognize the existence of the contract, and by confus-
ing the delivery of the goods with buyer actually taking possession of them.
The biggest blunder was the Second Chamber’s wrong-headed con-
clusion that, because Article 1 of the CISG provides that it applies to con-
tracts for the international sale of goods, and because seller had not shown
that a contract even existed, it was senseless to look into this body of law.
This is equivalent to refusing to analyze the U.C.C. to determine whether a
contract has been formed under its rules, when a reading of the statute
would be necessary in order to make such a determination.
In another part of its opinion, the Second Chamber stated that “from
the record it is evident that none of the parties cited the CISG as being
applicable.”  In my opinion, this represents an abdication of the court’s
obligation to know the law—a duty that stems not just from a rule of pro-
cedure,24 but is a fundamental right specifically recognized under the
Constitution, that every person appearing before a Mexican court is enti-
tled to receive a decision that is “reasoned in accordance with the letter of the
Law, its legal interpretation, or the general principles of law.”25
3. The Decision at the Circuit Court Level (Amparo)26
Seller then appeared before the Federal Circuit Court claiming that
the decision rendered by the Baja California appellate court was in viola-
tion of its fundamental right to receive a judgment in accordance with the
law because the trial and appellate courts had failed to apply the CISG to
the merits of the dispute.  The Circuit Court agreed with seller, and or-
dered the appellate court to issue a new judgment based on the CISG,
after reiterating that a judge is under an obligation to apply the law based
23. See Handelsgericht des Kantons St. Gallen [HG] [Commercial Court]
Dec. 5, 1995 docket no. HG 45/1994 (Switz.), available at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.
org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/V00/550/47/PDF/V0055047.pdf?OpenElement.
24. See Co´digo de Comercio [CCo.] [Commercial Code], art. 1324.
25. See Constitucio´n Polı`tica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.], Diario
Oficial de la Federacio´n [DO], 5 de Febrero de 1917, art. 14, ¶ 4 (“In civil cases,
the final decision shall be issued pursuant to the letter of law or its legal interpreta-
tion, and lacking such law, it shall be rendered based on general principles of
law.”).
26. Quejoso [Complaint], Georgia Pacific Resins, Inc. Amparo Directo 225/
2007, Cuarto Tribunal Colegiado del Decimoquinto Circuito [Fourth Court of the
Fifteenth Circuit].
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on the legal principle of “da mihi factum, dabo tibi ius” (“give me the facts, I
shall give you the law”) and “iura novit curia” (“the judge knows the law”).
According to the Circuit Court, the parties were not required to request
that the court of first instance or the Second Chamber apply the CISG,
because it was not a foreign body of law, but rather a national law because
of its status as a treaty ratified by the Mexican Senate.27
However, the Circuit Court was not exempt from committing its own
mistakes.  It reasoned that when a contract is concluded abroad, but will
have effects in Mexico, a court must first look into the validity of the trans-
action prior to analyzing the application of the CISG.  Clearly, the Circuit
Court confused the facts because the contract was not made abroad.  Addi-
tionally, the invalidity of the contract was never raised as a defense by
buyer, but rather that the contract had never even existed, which are two
very distinct issues.  The case would not end here.  The Second Chamber
later issued a new decision claiming to apply the CISG, but once again
found for buyer on the same evidentiary grounds, refusing to acknowledge
the validity of faxed documents.
Seller would once again appeal to the Federal Circuit claiming that
the Second Chamber Court was refusing to apply the law and acknowledge
the existence of the contract based on the evidence that GPR had submit-
ted.  Seller also argued that the CISG did not require that GPR show that
the goods actually arrived in Tijuana, and that it would suffice to show that
they were delivered to a carrier to deem that GPR had performed its obli-
gations.  The Circuit Court agreed with GPR.  It would reason that seller
had in fact submitted original invoices that were never properly objected
to by buyer; that seller performed its obligation to deliver the goods per
CISG Article 31 by placing them with a carrier, and that the faxed docu-
ments along with parts of the testimony rendered by an officer of Bajaplay
were sufficient to deem the contract as existing.  The Circuit Court then
ordered the Second Chamber to issue a new decision.
Finally, on April 29, 2008,28 the Second Chamber issued a second and
final decision consistent with that of the Circuit Court.  In that decision,
the Second Chamber starts by acknowledging that the dispute is governed
by the CISG because seller and buyer have their domiciles in contracting
states.  Clearly, the Second Chamber’s use of the word domicile was wrong,
since the CISG intentionally left out this word and instead opted for the
more neutral phrase “place of business.”
27. Professor Alejandro Garro shed some light on the fact that in some legal
systems the parties’ failure to cite the CISG could be interpreted as a tacit exclu-
sion under CISG Article 6.  The common law system does not follow the “jura novit
curia” principle and a decision from the Oregon Court of Appeals found that it was
extemporaneous for parties to cite the CISG if they did not do so at the trial level.
The case is GPL Treatment, Ltd. v. Louisiana-Pacific Corporation, 914 P.2d 682
(Or. 1995).
28. This is an unpublished decision of the Judgment of the Second Chamber
of the Baja California Superior Court, dated April 29, 2008.
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The Second Chamber then went on to explain that seller had ap-
peared to demand specific performance under CISG Article 61(b).  With
regards to the existence of the contract, it cited CISG Article 11’s stipula-
tion that the contract need not be evidenced by writing, and that notwith-
standing, seller had submitted twenty invoices that proved its existence.
The Chamber also reasoned that seller had performed its obligations per
CISG Articles 30 and 31, as evidenced by the shipping documents when it
delivered the goods to the trucking company for shipping.  The Second
Chamber also ruled that per CISG Article 59, payment was not condi-
tioned on a formal request or compliance with any other formality.  Were
it not for the fact that the Second Chamber was forced to issue the deci-
sion, I would have to acknowledge that it was not that the ruling was not
bad in terms of its structure and reasoning.  Of course, there were no cita-
tions to foreign case law to promote uniform interpretation, but then
again, is a court always to do so when the language of a CISG provision is
clear, or should a judge only do so in what Dworkin would call hard cases?29
C. Banks Hardwoods Inc. v. Jorge Angel Kyriakidez30
This case was brought by an American plaintiff, Banks Hardwoods,
Inc. (BHI), against a Mexican buyer, Jorge Angel Kyriakidez (JAK), who
made a verbal agreement to buy various shipments of timber.  It went gen-
erally undisputed that the parties had established the practice of entering
into verbal agreements for the sale of timber, and that for each order
made to BHI, JAK would issue a postdated check as a form security.  BHI
would make the wood available at its place of business in San Diego, Cali-
fornia, where JAK would appear to pick up the timber for its import to
Tijuana, Mexico.  BHI claimed it was owed a total of U.S. $9,287.00 worth
of goods.  JAK raised a defense that is typically raised in such agreements:
that they had not agreed on the date of payment and, thus, JAK’s obliga-
tion would not become due until BHI served JAK with a formal demand
for payment, as provided for under Article 2080 of the Federal Civil
Code.31  That argument—as made by buyer—would make the complaint
filed by seller flounder.
29. See generally H. Allen Blair, Hard Cases Under the Convention on the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods: A Proposed Taxonomy of Interpretive Challenges, 21 DUKE J. COMP. &
INT’L L. 269 (2011).
30. See Banks Hardwoods v. Jorge Angel Kyriakidez Garcı´a, Juzgado Sexto de
lo Civil de la Ciudad de Tijuana [Sixth Civil Court of the City of Tijuana], Aug.
2005.  I would like to thank Romelio Herna´ndez for sharing copies of his
decisions.
31. Co´digo Civil Federal [CC] [Federal Civil Code], Diario Oficial de la
Federacio´n [DO], 30 de Agosto de 1931.  The Federal Civil Code’s Article 2080
reads:
If the time to make payment has not been fixed and if such obligation is
one to deliver, the creditor may not demand payment until after thirty
days following a formal request, either with the assistance of the court, or,
with the assistance of a notary or two witnesses.  Regarding obligations to
perform, it must be complied with when so demanded by the creditor,
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The trial court found for BHI.  In reaching its decision, however, the
judge considered that the documents submitted were of the kind contem-
plated under Articles 371, 372, and 373 of the Commerce Code, when in
fact none of these provisions were applicable because they were displaced
by the CISG.  With regard to the defense raised by buyer—that no formal
demand had been previously made—the judge dismissed buyer’s argu-
ment citing CISG Article 58, ruled that payment became due when the
goods were placed at buyer’s disposal in San Diego, California, and or-
dered JAK to pay the outstanding amount plus interest.  In doing so, the
trial court did not discuss CISG Articles 61 and 62 (nor any other statute)
to justify BHI’s right to require that JAK pay the price, making the deci-
sion incomplete and legally defective, because the relief granted was not
reasoned in law.  The same can be said about the court’s order that JAK
pay BHI interest at a rate of 6% per annum, because seller was unable to
prove that they had agreed to a 2% monthly interest as claimed.  Clearly,
in spite of the fact that this could be a favorable decision from seller’s
perspective, the methodology that was followed leaves much to be desired.
The Superior Court of Baja California continued this odd “mix ‘n match”
practice of internal and international rules, even though the Commerce
Code is clearly inapplicable in cases involving international sales.
On appeal, JAK argued that the trial level judge had failed to consider
its argument that no formal demand had been made by BHI, and that
therefore BHI’s complaint should not have succeeded.32  The Superior
Court dismissed this argument, and affirmed the judgment issued by the
trial court, but committed the same mistake of citing provisions from the
Commerce Code.  Regarding the issue of the prerequisite formal demand
required under the Civil Code, the Superior Court found that this formal-
ity was not applicable, as this matter was governed by Articles 58 and 59 of
the CISG, which provide that payment was not subject to the compliance
of any type of formality.33  The Superior Court then went on to discuss the
importance of promoting the observance of good faith in international
trade, as provided for under Article 7 of the Convention, and even in-
cluded a passage from the CISG’s preamble,34 when it stated that:
provided sufficient time has transpired for the performance of the
obligation.
Id.
32. See Banks Hardwoods v. Jorge Angel Kyriakidez Garcı´a, Segunda Sala del
Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Baja California [Second Panel of the Superior
Court of Justice of Baja California], Mar. 2006.
33. CISG, supra note 1, art. 59 (“The buyer must pay the price on the date
fixed by or determinable from the contract and this Convention without the need
for any request or compliance with any formality on the part of the seller.”).
34. Although the Preamble was added in the latter part of the discussions, it
consequently has a very relative value. See John Honnold, UNIFORM LAW FOR INTER-
NATIONAL SALES 598 (2d ed. 1991) (“UNCITRAL did not prepare a preamble nor
was this matter considered by the committees of the Vienna Conference that con-
sidered its Convention’s substantive provisions . . . .  [A] preamble was first consid-
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The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods, entered into on the eleventh day of April of
nineteen eighty, has as its primary objective the creation of com-
mon provisions to govern said legal act, based on the premise
that international trade must be based on principles of equality
and mutual benefit, which constitutes an important element to
Foster friendly relations amongst member States, and therefore,
taking into account the New International Economic Order, as
the Contracting States, by way of this Convention, adopted uni-
form rules, applicable to the international sale of goods, taking
into account different social, economic and legal backgrounds,
to contribute to the removal of legal obstacles in international
trade.
In spite of its attempt to improve on the judgment issued by the trial
court, the Superior Court’s decision was just as flawed.  It reiterated the
practice of issuing judgments citing provisions from the CISG and the
Commerce Code that the CISG displaces, even though the Superior Court
acknowledged that the domestic statute was displaced.  In another part of
its decision, the Superior Court said that the CISG includes its own rules
of interpretation, requiring that it be applied uniformly and in a manner
that assures the observance of good faith in international trade.  Clearly,
in spite of the fact that the Superior Court referred to all of the interpreta-
tive criteria, the reality is that it failed to observe at least two criteria: the
mandates to apply both an international and uniform interpretation of
the CISG, which can only be achieved when judges (or arbitrators) take
into account international case law in applying it.
D. Agrofrut Rengo, S.A. v. Levadura Azteca, S.A. de C.V.
1. Background
In this case, Agrofrut Rengo, S.A. (Rengo) a Chilean seller, filed an
action against Levadura Azteca, S.A. de C.V. (Azteca), a Mexican buyer of
eighty containers of canned peaches.  After receiving the first twenty-two
containers—and refusing to pay for them—Azteca cancelled the contract
for the remainder.  The contract was evidenced by a purchase order that
was sent in December of 2002, in which buyer requested eighty containers
that would each carry nine hundred boxes of canned peaches at a price of
$15.65 per box, payable thirty days after each shipment’s date of arrival.
The parties agreed that seller would first send eleven containers per
month starting in February and ending in July of 2003, and a final ship-
ment of fourteen containers in August 2003, for a total price of
$1,126,800.00.
ered and prepared by the Drafting Committee on April 9, two days before
adjournment of the Conference . . . .”).
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The first shipment of eleven containers arrived on February 28, 2003,
while a second shipment arrived a mere two weeks later, on April 17.
Claiming late delivery of the second shipment, on May 5, 2003, Azteca
advised Rengo that it was cancelling the contract for the remaining fifty-
eight containers, and additionally refused to pay for the twenty-two con-
tainers it had previously received.  Rengo filed a complaint with the
Twelfth Civil Court in Mexico City35 demanding payment for the twenty-
two containers and interest, as well as damages for the loss of profits from
the balance of the cancelled shipment.  In its response, Azteca raised as a
defense that the parties had not agreed on a place and time for payment,
per Articles 2080 and 2082 of the Federal Civil Code.  Buyer also counter-
claimed for specific performance for the fifty-eight containers due under
the contract, as well as damages it claimed to have suffered as a result of
the late delivery of the other two shipments.
In its decision, the court ordered Azteca to pay seller $309,870.00 U.S.
for the twenty-two containers it had received plus interest, but denied
Rengo’s claim for loss of profit damages.  The court reasoned that buyer’s
acceptance of the two late deliveries, per Articles 374, 375, and 376 of the
Commerce Code, had made the sale final,36 particularly because there was
no dispute with regard to the quality of the goods.  In spite of the appar-
ent correctness of the result, it is clear that the trial court made a mistake
by not applying the CISG to the case.  This issue required an analysis of
CISG Article 33 regarding the time of delivery37 to first determine if the
contract provided that the goods were to be delivered on a fixed date or
within a period of time, and then decide whether seller had breached.
The next step in the analysis required that the judge assess whether the
alleged delay in delivering the second shipment amounted to a fundamen-
tal breach per CISG Article 25 (which would have allowed buyer to avoid
the contract),38 or if the delay would merely allow buyer to claim damages.
Once this occurred, the judge should have ordered Azteca to pay per
CISG Articles 61 and 62.  Unfortunately, the judge seemed comfortable
with applying a law that had already been displaced by the CISG some
fifteen years earlier.
With regard to the loss of profit damages claimed by Rengo, the judge
considered these to be tantamount to interest and that an order to pay
interest had already been made when it ordered Azteca to pay for the two
shipments.  Clearly, CISG Article 74 authorizes loss of profit damages,39
35. Quejoso [Complaint], Juzgado De´cimo Segundo Civil del Distrito Federal
[Tenth Civil Court of the Second Federal District], Expediente 30/2004.
36. See Co´digo de Comercio [CCo] [Commercial Code], art. 375, Diario
Oficial de la Federacio´n [DO], 27 de Agosto de 2009 (Mex.) (“Si se ha pactado la
entrega de las mercancı´as en cantidad y plazos determinados, el comprador no
estara´ obligado a recibirlos fuera de ellos; pero si aceptare entregas parciales,
quedara´ consumada la venta en lo que a e´stas se refiere.”).
37. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 33.
38. See id. art. 25.
39. See id. art. 74.
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while CISG Article 78 provides that interest does not prejudice the right to
any other damages a party may have.40  However, the judge seems to have
ignored the applicability of the CISG to this issue and made what was
clearly a bad decision.  The judge further reasoned that Rengo was barred
from obtaining damages because no evidence had been submitted to show
that these had actually been suffered.
In addressing buyer’s defenses (that the time and place for payment
had not been fixed in the contract), the judge found this to be a matter
governed by the CISG, and that absent an agreement, and per CISG Arti-
cle 57, seller’s place of business is the place to effect payment,41 while the
obligation to pay arises once the seller delivers the goods to the buyer or
delivers the documents as provided for under the contract and the
CISG.42  Unfortunately, the judge did not explain why he decided that
some issues should be disposed of based on the Commerce Code (i.e.,
time of delivery or finality of the sale), while other issues (i.e., right to
receive payment even if no place or time have been fixed) were to be
decided based on the CISG.  The only answer is that the judge was unfa-
miliar with the scope of the CISG, and opted to travel down a road he was
more familiar with, clearly violating not just the CISG, but also a constitu-
tional mandate that judges are obligated to render their decisions based
on the applicable law or its legal interpretation.  Here, that clearly did not
happen.
2. The Appeal
Both Rengo and Azteca appealed the trial court’s decision to Mexico
City’s Superior Court.43  In Rengo’s appeal, it claimed that the trial court
wrongfully applied the Federal Civil Code’s Articles 1949, 2104, 2108,
2109, and 2110, and that the trial court did not provide a reasoned deci-
sion as to why seller was being denied loss of profit damages.  Clearly,
Rengo committed a major error in citing these provisions as the applicable
law to the merits of the dispute, when these issues (i.e., rights of seller
against a breaching buyer and the entitlement to damages) all fall within
the CISG.  Buyer made a similar error when it appealed arguing (based on
the Civil Code) that the trial court had erred in ordering Azteca to pay
seller, when neither the date nor the place of payment had been fixed in
the contract, that prior to instituting its complaint, Rengo should have
made a formal demand for payment, and that the matter was not yet ripe
for a lawsuit.
In its decision, the Superior Court made a grandiose statement that it
would apply the CISG—an announcement that causes nothing but disap-
40. See id. art. 78.
41. See id. art. 57.
42. See id. art. 58.
43. See Agrofrut Rengo, S.A. v. Levadura Azteca, S.A. de C.V.  The appeals
were lodged under file numbers 767/04/09 and 767/04/10, and were decided by
the Superior Court of the Federal District (Mexico City) on March 16, 2005.
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pointment after reading it.  Most of the issues raised on appeal were dis-
posed of with the Superior Court relying on the Federal Civil Code—a
body of law that was (for this case at least) irrelevant.  Regarding Rengo’s
claim to loss of profit damages, the Superior Court affirmed the trial
court’s decision, restating that, when the trial court ordered Azteca to pay
interest on the amounts due for the twenty-two containers, seller’s request
had been satisfied by the trial court.  Clearly, the Superior Court repeated
the same mistake of confusing such distinct items as damages and inter-
ests, and obviously failed to even look at the CISG, though it is not surpris-
ing, considering that not even the seller was claiming that it was the
applicable law.
In its wrong-headed analysis, the Superior Court also reasoned that
Rengo needed to prove there was a direct nexus between the breach and
the damages it claimed to have suffered, and that Rengo had failed to
show a deprivation of a profit as a direct result of the breach.  The court
further argued that Rengo did not even provide evidence showing that it
had purchased additional machinery to perform its obligations under the
contract, nor that it had manufactured the goods.  The court’s reasoning
is not only wrong, it is also blatantly absurd.  Parties enter into sales con-
tracts to make a profit.  If breached, this will typically cause a loss to the
non-breaching party.  CISG Article 74 clearly authorizes a party to demand
damages,44 including loss of profits, which, in the case of a seller, could be
calculated by taking into account the seller’s sales price minus its expenses
in producing the goods.  With regard to the issue that seller did not prove
it had produced the goods pending delivery under the contract, it is evi-
dent that the Superior Court, showing absolute ignorance, failed to take
into account that under CISG Article 77,45 a non-breaching party is re-
quired to take measures to mitigate its losses (including loss of profit), at
the risk of having the other party claim a reduction.  Because buyer had
cancelled the contract, it is very likely that Rengo refrained from produc-
ing the canned fruit.  Clearly, it was not under a duty to produce the
goods, and had it acted otherwise, this would have increased damages.
Another mistake that is evident from the Superior Court’s reasoning
is its interpretation of what the limit for damages should be.  It stated that
a party may be entitled to damages that are an immediate and direct result of
the breach—a rule that is provided for under the Civil Code that was su-
perseded in cases governed by the CISG.  It is not surprising, given the
inconsistent application of the CISG, that the Superior Court would not
understand that this matter was not governed by the Civil Code.  The mis-
take is not trivial.  The limits set forth under the Mexican Civil Code’s
Article 2110 and Article 74 of the CISG are different.  While under the
Civil Code damages are subject to an immediacy and directness require-
ment (which severely limits the amounts that a party may be entitled to
44. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 74.
45. See id. art. 77.
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receive), the CISG takes a more liberal approach.  By allowing a party to
claim damages that the breaching party knew would be a possible conse-
quence of his or her breach of contract, the CISG includes a foreseeability
requirement that considers what the contracting party knew at the time it
was making the contract.
The Superior Court committed another error by violating the three
CISG interpretative commandments provided for under Article 7.  First, it
relied on case law interpreting the Federal Civil Code’s Article 1949 in
order to deny Rengo its claim to loss of profit damages, in a clear violation
of the CISG’s mandate to take into account its international character.  It
also failed to promote uniformity, because not a single case or treatise on
the CISG was cited, which could have assisted the Superior Court in mak-
ing a correct decision.  Finally, it allowed Azteca to walk away without
properly compensating Rengo after it had wrongfully terminated the con-
tract (depriving Rengo of its profits), which clearly does not do much in
terms of promoting the observance of good faith in international trade.
With regard to Azteca’s counterclaim for specific performance for the
remainder of the fifty-eight containers, the Superior Court ruled against
Azteca because it had not performed its part of the bargain, and in reach-
ing this decision, it also mistakenly relied on Article 1949 of the Federal
Civil Code.46  Even if there is an apparent soundness in the result, the
reasoning is evidently flawed because this provision did not even apply.  A
correct methodology would have included a discussion of CISG Article
81,47 which relieved Rengo from any pending performance that was due
under the contract because of Azteca’s notice that it was cancelling it.48
This decision once again shows a complete misunderstanding of the CISG
and how it displaces the Commerce and Civil Codes.  Of the few salvage-
able fragments from the decision on appeal is the confirmation that Arti-
cle 57 of the CISG provides a gap filling rule for those cases where the
parties do not agree on the place of payment.
46. See Co´digo Civil Federal [CC] [Federal Civil Code], art. 1949, Diario
Oficial de la Federacio´n [DO], 30 de Agosto de 1931.  This provision reads:
Article 1949—The right to avoid contractual obligations is implicit in re-
ciprocal agreements, in the event that one of the parties fails to perform
what it is obliged to.
The non-breaching party may choose between demanding specific per-
formance or avoidance, and will be entitled to damages in any case.  A
party may also request avoidance even after it has chosen specific per-
formance, when it is impossible to perform.
Id.  It is worth noting that even the application of this provision was wrong from a
domestic perspective.  The applicable provision should have been Article 376 of
the Commerce Code.
47. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 81(1).
48. See id. art. 72.
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3. Federal Court Review of the Superior Court’s Decision
As a consequence of the decision rendered by the Superior Court,
both Rengo and Azteca appealed before the Fifth Panel of the First Cir-
cuit.49  In a nutshell, seller’s issue was that its fundamental rights had been
violated when the courts refused to grant Rengo’s claim for damages, be-
cause it was being deprived of earnings it was rightfully entitled to receive
from the cancelled contract.  According to Rengo, neither the judge at the
trial level nor the magistrates on appeal took into account that there was
evidence on record showing Azteca’s breach for failure to pay, as well as
the cancellation of the contract, and that therefore, the courts should
have ordered buyer to pay damages.  The Panel from the Circuit Court did
not agree.
In its decision, the Circuit Court made an interpretation of Articles
1949, 2108, 2109, and 2110 of the Federal Civil Code and refused to find
for Rengo, claiming that no evidence had been submitted to allow the
calculation to be made.  As with the trial and Superior Court, this decision
was wrong because it continued to apply the Federal Civil Code when it
was not even applicable,50 as if it in some way superseded the CISG.  The
Circuit Court was also wrong in setting such a high standard for the proof
of damages.  According to an opinion of the CISG Advisory Council, it
would suffice to show the facts in a reasonable manner, not with mathe-
matic precision;51 otherwise, one of the purposes of the CISG—uniform
application—would be undermined,52 because some countries may have
varying standards to prove damages.  Such varying standards would in turn
49. See Agrofrut Rengo, S.A., amparo No. 292/2005, and Levadura Azteca,
S.A. de C.V., amparo No. 293/2005, both before el Quinto Tribunal Colegiado en
Materia Civil del Primer Circuito.
50. Seller’s rights can be enforced under the CISG per Article 61, which in-
cludes a catalogue of available remedies that a seller can use to enforce its rights
against the buyer, such as the right to demand performance of the payment obliga-
tion.  Articles 74 and 76 include rules that permit the parties to calculate their
damages.  CISG Article 78 explains the cumulative nature of damages and interest.
51. See CISG Advisory Council, Opinion No. 6, Calculation of Damages under
CISG Article 74, available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/CISG-AC-op6.html.
52. See id.  The CISG opinion provides the following:
2.3 The existence of differing rules concerning the proof of damage
could lead to the differential treatment of similarly situated parties.  For
example, buyers attempting to prove future losses often rely on assump-
tions about market prices and the amount of future sales.  If a seller
wrongfully refuses to deliver a new product or a product that the buyer
had not previously been in the business of selling, there may be little
concrete evidence on which the aggrieved buyer can base its damages
claim, which would mainly consist of loss of profit.  In such a case, coun-
tries requiring a high level of proof with regard to the fact that the ag-
grieved party suffered a loss would likely not allow the recovery of lost
profits under Article 74.  However, in countries that have a more relaxed
level of proof, the aggrieved party may be able to recover such damages
under Article 74.  This result would be unfair and undermine the goal of
the CISG to provide a uniform law on the sale of goods.  In addition, the
former approach would be contrary to the principle of full compensa-
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invite breach of contracts, undermining the principle of full compensa-
tion on which the CISG is based.  In this case, that is exactly what has
happened.  All the courts involved in this matter set the standard unrea-
sonably high, and ruled in accordance with the local “immediate and direct
consequence” standard, not the “possible consequence” standard provided
for under Article 74 of the CISG.
The Circuit Court, parroting the trial and the Superior Court, opined
that seller was not entitled to receive loss of profit damages, because seller
had not shown that it had made the pending delivery of goods under the
contract.53  However, buyer’s notice that it would no longer receive
seller’s goods was wrongful avoidance, which freed seller from any pend-
ing obligation under the contract and also left its rights to claim damages
intact.54  Furthermore, had seller manufactured the goods (as the court
implied was a prerequisite), this would have constituted a violation of the
duty to mitigate provided for under CISG Article 77, which I have already
addressed.
With regard to the claims asserted by Azteca stemming from what it
considered to be a flawed application of Article 375 of the Commerce
Code,55 Rengo was entitled to obtain payment because it was under an
obligation to show that it had complied with all of its obligations under
the contract—namely, the production of the remaining fifty-eight contain-
ers of canned peaches.  Buyer also insisted that its fundamental rights were
being violated becuase Rengo had not served Azteca with a formal de-
mand for payment, and that therefore the case was not ripe and should
have been dismissed.  The Circuit Court dismissed buyer’s claim—but for
the wrong reasons—and simply parroted the argument from the trial and
appellate courts regarding the time of payment, but did not mention Arti-
cle 59 of the CISG, which was also relevant.56
III. THE MISAPPLICATION OF THE CISG IN MEXICO
After this sampling of Mexican cases, one should wonder whether this
uniform sales law endeavor makes any sense, at least from the Mexican
perspective.  All of the cases that I have found have been particularly bad
examples of CISG application.  There was an abundant use (and abuse) of
tion.  It also could provide an incentive for a party to breach its contrac-
tual obligations.
Id.
53. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 72.
54. See id. art. 81.
55. This Article provides that if delivery has been agreed to, in certain
amounts and at a certain time, the buyer is not obligated to receive the goods if
they are late, but if the buyer accepts partial delivery, the sale shall be deemed final
with regard to these goods.
56. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 59 (“El comprador debera´ pagar el precio en
la fecha fijada o que pueda determinarse con arreglo al contrato y a la presente
Convencio´n, sin necesidad de requerimiento ni de ninguna otra formalidad por
parte del vendedor.”).
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expressions typical of Mexican contract law, as well as excessive court reli-
ance on the Mexican Commercial and Civil Codes and case law interpret-
ing them, even when issues were clearly governed by the CISG.  Even in
those cases where judges made a grandiose announcement that they
would apply the CISG, it would all end in a hollow promise—judges con-
tinued to reason their cases based on domestic statutes.
From this sample, it was also clear that the lawyers involved in these
disputes were not citing the CISG properly, nor were they attempting to
persuade judges with foreign case law interpreting the CISG or treatises
discussing it.  I believe that part of the problem may be cultural.  As I have
mentioned on other occasions, the responsibility for this abandonment of
the CISG cannot be placed on the shoulders of judges alone; some of it
must be shared by the Mexican bar and law schools.  Law schools must
teach the CISG and make it part of their mandatory curricula, and it must
also be included by the publishers of commercial statutes in Mexico.  Save
for one publisher, none of them include the CISG as part of their com-
mercial law compilations.
The same problem the CISG faces has also affected other uniform
laws that we have adopted.  Take for example UNCITRAL’s Model Law of
Arbitration adopted in Mexico’s Commerce Code in 1993.  In 2006, the
Mexican Supreme Court addressed the issue of Kompetenz-Kompetenz in a
manner that caused more than a few eyebrows to rise.57  In a divided deci-
sion, the majority held that courts had jurisdiction to address the validity
of arbitration clauses, and not arbitrators.  The minority cited ample au-
thority, including the Model Law, as well as various rules from major arbi-
tration institutions showing how this was a uniform standard.
Unfortunately, the majority was not swayed, and issued a judgment that is
contrary to the international consensus that arbitrators have jurisdiction to
rule on their own jurisdiction.
In another example, Mexico adopted various rules on electronic com-
merce (clearly inspired by UNCITRAL’s Model Law on Electronic Com-
merce), which were dispersedly included in various statutes such as the
Federal and Civil and Commercial Codes and the Federal Code of Civil
Procedures.  To this date, courts still struggle with the proper weight to be
given to electronic communications.
In spite of my somewhat bleak assessment, I still believe there is hope.
Recent changes to Mexico’s Constitution have incorporated by reference
those rights afforded under human rights treaties that Mexico has ratified,
which has caused an interesting effect: Mexican lawyers and judges are
now becoming aware of the need to take into account these international
instruments and now look at decisions from human rights courts.  The
57. See Competencia para conocer de la accio´n de nulidad del acuerdo de
arbitraje prevista en el primer pa´rrafo del art. 1424 del co´digo de comercio,
Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nacio´n [SCJN] [Supreme Court of Justice of the
Nation], Novena E´poca, tomo XXIV, Sept. 2006, Materia: Civil, Tesis: 1a./J. 25/
2006, Pagina 5 (Mex.).
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question is how to replicate this effect in the international commercial law
field.
I close with two suggestions.  First, I propose that UNCITRAL prepare
a practical handbook for judges to interpret the CISG and other uniform
laws.  This could be done in collaboration with other organizations such as
UNIDROIT or the Hague Conference on Private International Law, which
has published numerous handbooks on the international treaties it has
promoted.  Second, I propose that UNCITRAL promote training on the
use and interpretation of its international treaties and uniform laws to
reach the goal of promoting the uniform interpretation of international
trade law.
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LAW WARS: AUSTRALIAN CONTRACT LAW REFORM
vs. CISG vs. CESL
LISA SPAGNOLO*
I. INTRODUCTION
IT is an interesting time to be an academic in the field of contract law inAustralia.  From our remote island, we look to the changes taking place
in European contract law.  We look to the development of Asian initiative
in the Principles of Asian Contract Law (PACL), the worldwide growth
and influence of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the In-
ternational Sale of Goods (CISG) and UNIDROIT Principles, and the
Swiss Proposal before the United Nations regarding the CISG.  From the
perspective of Australian lawyers, even those who primarily are interested
only in domestic contract law, all of this has recently become more than a
passing interest since Australia is potentially about to begin its own reform
process.  Accordingly, now, for the first time, Australian governments are
considering the spread of uniform law in the context of potential reform
of Australian law.  This paper considers briefly the Australian background,
the status of the current reform process, and the possible influences of
uniform law and harmonization efforts on the Australian position.
II. AUSTRALIAN BACKGROUND
Australia operates on the basis of a federal system which unified prior
colonies of the British Empire in 1900.  Under the Australian Federal Con-
stitution, specific areas of law are reserved to the national federal legisla-
ture, while some matters are said to be governed concurrently with the
provinces (states).  Residual concerns not specified in the Federal Consti-
tution are matters of state law.  Contract law falls into this category.
Accordingly, Australian contract law, which was based on the com-
mon law of England, has since federation been subjected to piecemeal
(and differing) legislative reform in each state, and to divergent court de-
cisions in each state.  Naturally, this has resulted in a number of diver-
gences between the law of contract in the different states.  It would be
wrong to overstate the significance of these differences.  Nonetheless, they
do result in unnecessary compliance and information costs.  Furthermore,
even where the substance of the law is exactly the same, the simple fact of
multiple sources of law—both legislative and judicial case law—creates
costs for those who must deal with the law applicable to domestic contracts
in Australia.  Moreover, much of Australian domestic contract law has in-
* LLB (1st class), B. Com., PhD.  Faculty of Law, Monash University,
Australia. Contact lisa.spagnolo@monash.edu.
(623)
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creasingly proved anachronistic and complex, creating further unneces-
sary transaction costs for commercial parties.
A. Divergences in Australian Domestic Contract Law
While perhaps not the “chaotic mess” characteristic of the situation
that culminated in the publication of the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC) in the United States in 1952,1 Australia’s various states have man-
aged to develop a number of different rules in relation to contract.  Unfor-
tunately, unlike the United States, we do not have a body in the nature of
the American Law Institute (ALI).  It is also probably relevant that we only
have six states and two mainland territories, whereas the variations leading
to the UCC were spread across fifty states.
It is interesting that the ALI noted that the main defects in American
law at that time were “uncertainty and complexity.”2  Again, a federal sys-
tem, indeed, one which strongly influenced Australia’s constitutional
structure, had created a recipe for divergence.  The answer in that case
had been to harmonize by codification, driven by an independent non-
profit and well-respected scholarly organization.3
Australian jurisdictions differ in many regards:
• Degrees of Legislation: Some have contract law statutes, others do not
(for example, writing requirements).
• Privity: Following from the High Court decision in Trident4 almost
thirty years ago, the rules relating to third party benefit remain con-
fusing and in need of harmonization.  Some jurisdictions within
Australia (Queensland, Western Australia, Northern Territory)
have now eroded the privity rule, and now recognize contracts for
the benefit of third parties in some circumstances by means of stat-
ute,5 but these reforms are not uniform, and the circumstances in
which they apply are confusing.6  Moreover, other jurisdictions con-
tinue to rely upon the slow, confusing, and limited common law
1. See Larry A. DiMatteo, The Curious Case of Transborder Sales Law: A Compara-
tive Analysis of CESL, CISG, and the UCC, in CISG VS. REGIONAL SALES LAW UNIFICA-
TION: WITH A FOCUS ON THE NEW COMMON EUROPEAN SALES LAW 25, 27, 32 (Ulrich
Magnus ed., 2012).
2. See id. at 27.
3. See id. at 27–28.
4. Trident General Insurance Co. Ltd. v McNiece Bros. Pty. Ltd. (1988) 165 CLR
107 (Austl.).
5. See, e.g., Property Law Act 1974 (NT) s 56 (Austl.); Property Law Act 1974
(Qld) s 55 (Austl.); Property Law Act 1969 (WA) s 11 (Austl.).
6. See Bryan Horrigan, Emmanuel Laryea & Lisa Spagnolo, Submission in Re-
sponse to Federal Attorney-General’s Discussion Paper ‘Improving Australia’s Law
and Justice Framework: A Discussion Paper to Explore the Scope for Reforming
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developments, which on the whole do not reflect modern commer-
cial realities.7  Only for insurance contracts is there federal legisla-
tion to enable third party beneficiaries to take enforcement action.8
• Capacity: “The law relating to the capacity of natural persons to
enter into, or be bound by contracts they enter into, vary greatly
among the jurisdictions in Australia.”  Specifically, “[t]he categories
of incapacity are minority, mental incapacity, and intoxication.  Of
these, minority is the main issue . . . [and] the effect of a contract
with a minor and the consequences for the parties vary greatly
among the jurisdictions.”9  The reason is that “[t]he law on minor-
ity consists of a combination of common law (inconsistently ap-
plied) and state and territory legislation of varying content.”10
While “capacity may not be an issue in business to business (B2B)
contracts . . . it can be an issue in business to consumer (B2C) con-
tracts.  In online B2C contracts, where the parties may be located in
different jurisdictions, difficult issues may arise.”11
• Proportionate Liability: This differs across the various jurisdictions.
• Inconsistent Legislation: Some retain inconsistent legislation, or have
not enacted legislation despite agreement between the jurisdictions
to act in a uniform manner.12
7. Following from the Trident case, where limited third party rights were rec-
ognized for an insurance contract.  However, reasons for the High Court decision
varied in their scope and basis, and the law still remains underdeveloped and
uncertain.
8. See Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth), s 48 (Austl.).
9. Horrigan, Laryea & Spagnolo, supra note 6, § 1.1.4.
10. See id.  The Submission further notes:
NSW has a comprehensive statute, the Minors (Property and Contracts) Act
1970 (NSW).  Victorian law needs to be gleaned from the Age of Majority
Act 1977 (Vic) and some provisions in Goods Act 1958 (Vic) and the Su-
preme Court Act 1986 (Vic).  Queensland’s law consist of Law Reform Act
1995 (QLD), and the common law.  In SA, the law is to be found in Age of
Majority (Reduction) Act 1971 (SA) and the Minors’ Contracts (Miscellaneous
Provisions) Act 1979 (SA).  WA’s law comprises Age of Majority Act 1972
(WA) and the Statute of Frauds (Amendment) Act 1828 (UK) (“Lord
Tenterden’s Act”) in its original form as imperial legislation.  Tasmania,
ACT and NT all have a combination of statutes and the common law.
Id.
11. Id. § 1.1.5.
12. Two examples should suffice: NSW “curiously” retains the Contracts Review
Act 1980 despite the fact that an agreement was reached between states to repeal
all inconsistent legislation upon enactment of the ACL. See Luke Nottage, The
Government’s Proposed “Review of Australian Contract Law”: A Preliminary Posi-
tive Response 5 (July 16, 2012), available at http://www.ag.gov.au/Consultations/
Documents/SubmissionstotheReviewofAustralianContractLaw/Submission%2000
8%20-%20Contract%20Law%20Review%20-%20Dr%20Luke%20Nottage.pdf.
Also, despite agreement five years ago amongst the State Attorneys General
(SCAG) to implement the ECC, the process is still incomplete, with Queensland
still not having yet passed the legislation to update its ETA.
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B. Complex and Antiquated Australian Contract Law
Australia’s sales laws imply certain non-mandatory terms concerning
domestic commercial sales law contracts, such as the need for goods to
meet their description, merchantable quality, and fitness for purpose.13
These laws, however, date from the early 19th century.14  Even this is
painting far too kind a picture, because the provisions of those laws were
themselves drawn from the English legislation with its origins at the time
of the industrial revolution.  It goes without saying that commercial do-
mestic sales laws in Australia are rather antiquated.
Overlaid onto this regime is the Australian Consumer and Competition
Act 2010, which incorporates the Australian Consumer Law (ACL).  This is
a far-reaching federal statute, which implements Australia’s competition
law, but which also contains consumer protection measures, including
rules on misleading conduct in all trade and commerce, and rules on un-
conscionable conduct.  The law also provides for mandatory implied
terms, for example warranting quality, in relation to consumer contracts.
Recently updated, the law maintains the basic structures in relation to im-
plied terms present in its predecessor from 1974,15 with a few tweaks.16
Australia suffers from many legislative and common law overlaps.
The existence of legislation often will not prevent application of the com-
mon law, resulting in a range of remedies pursuant to statute and com-
mon law (including equitable relief).  This can seriously compound the
complexity of the law related to, for example, enforceability of contracts of
indemnity and guarantees, which can not only be rendered unenforceable
on grounds of unconscionable conduct under common law (particularly
on the basis of equitable relief), but also on statutory grounds arising pur-
suant to the new legislative definition of unconscionability.17
The High Court of Australia has not helped clarify many areas where
this would be desirable.  In matters of state law, unlike the US Supreme
Court, the Australian High Court has the capacity to resolve differences
between the case law in various jurisdictions, or to clarify areas in which
confusion has arisen.  However, for many reasons, it frequently fails to do
so.
One such area is the parol evidence rule, which has remained stuck in
a time warp in Australia, despite its progression in the U.K.  While the
House of Lords under Lord Hoffman has broadened the test, Australia
still requires “ambiguity” to exist before extrinsic evidence is admissible to
interpret the intention of the parties.  The High Court has consistently
said that a time will come when this rule will be revisited, amid attempts by
13. As this is a matter of state law, a different statute applies in each state and
territory.
14. See Sale of Goods Act 1896 (Tas) (Austl.).
15. See Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (Austl.) (repealed 2011).
16. One was the change from “merchantable quality” to “acceptable quality.”
17. See Horrigan, Laryea & Spagnolo, supra note 6, § 2.10.
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lower courts to forge ahead and recognize the utility of extrinsic evidence
such as conversations.  However, the High Court has been saying this for
almost thirty years, and as recently as last year, repeated its mantra of
preventing further development until it had re-examined the issue, simul-
taneously refusing to take on a case which raised just such a question.18
The High Court has also failed to clarify whether a general duty to per-
form contractual obligations in good faith exists,19 whether terms of ear-
lier contracts can be incorporated into later contracts by conduct,20 and
what will suffice for consideration.
The “prior legal duty” or “existing legal duty” rule states that where an
obligation is already owed, that obligation cannot be offered as good con-
sideration to support a new promise.  To overcome this strict rule, the
“practical benefit” exception eliminates the effect of the prior legal duty
rule in certain circumstances.  However, this rule, originally developed in
the U.K.,21 is troublesome to say the least.  Furthermore, it has been modi-
fied where applied in Australia,22 and is not applied consistently through-
out all Australian jurisdictions.  It appears that New South Wales’ courts
are more willing to find the exception exists, but courts in other jurisdic-
tions are less willing, and in any event the rule is very uncertain, and theo-
retically hard to justify.
Indeed, given the growth in equitable concepts of estoppel, the entire
concept of consideration may need a more major overhaul, as it has
caused serious problems in variations of contract, where often commercial
practices are such that modifications lack consideration.
It should be noted that consideration is not a requirement of contract
in the CISG or in civil law jurisdictions.  Thus, the problem posed by the
existing legal duty rule in Australia (and some other common law jurisdic-
tions) does not arise in contracts governed by the CISG or the contract law
of civil law jurisdictions.
As Luke Nottage discusses in his submission to the Attorney-General’s
Department, High Court rulings in the area of contract law often seem
18. See Western Export Servs., Inc. v Jireh International Pty. Ltd. [2011] HCA 45
(Austl.), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/2011/45.html.
19. See AUSTRALIAN ATTORNEY-GENERAL’S DEP’T, IMPROVING AUSTRALIA’S LAW
AND JUSTICE FRAMEWORK: A DISCUSSION PAPER TO EXPLORE THE SCOPE FOR RE-
FORMING AUSTRALIAN CONTRACT LAW 8 (2012) [hereinafter ATTORNEY-GENERAL’S
DEP’T DISCUSSION PAPER], available at http://www.ag.gov.au/Consultations/Docu
ments/ReviewofAustraliancontractlaw/DiscussionpaperImprovingAustraliaslaw
andjusticeframeworkAdiscussionpaperexploringthescopeforreformingAustralian
contractlaw.pdf; see also Horrigan, Laryea & Spagnolo, supra note 6, at 18 n.57
(“High Court expressly declined to address the status, content, and limits of good
faith under Australian contract law in Royal Botanic Gardens and Domain Trust v
South Sydney City Council”).  No suitable test case for revisiting such issues had
reached the High Court by mid-2012.
20. See ATTORNEY-GENERAL’S DEP’T DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 19, at 8.
21. See Williams v. Roffey Bros. & Nicholls (Contractors) Ltd., [1991] 1 Q.B. 1
(Eng.).
22. See Musumeci v Winadell Pty Ltd. [1994] 34 NSWLR 723 (Austl.).
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antiquated in many respects by comparison with international standards.23
One such finding is the refusal of the High Court to recognize the admissi-
bility of subsequent conduct as evidence of what parties originally in-
tended in relation to the interpretation of contractual terms,24 the
requirement of impossibility rather than commercial impracticability to
trigger frustration, and “insistence that the only relief available is auto-
matic termination of the contract” should frustration be found.25
In Australia, there has been an unfortunate tendency for multiple
judgements even amongst majority and minority decisions in the High
Court.  The result has been, even in decisions meant to “clarify” previously
confusing areas of law, or where the law has been advanced to a degree,
such as the incremental recognition of third party enforcement in Trident,
a confusing array of reasoning and lack of direction in the law.26  In other
words, more complexity.  This can lead to injustice, with parties able to
behave opportunistically.27
There is one respect in which Australian law is certainly not anti-
quated.  Electronic Transactions Acts have been enacted in each of the
states and territories except for Queensland, which reflect the 2005
United Nations Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in
International Contracts (ECC).28  Furthermore, it is anticipated at the
time of writing that Queensland is about to introduce a bill to enact the
latter.  This means that Australia is one of the jurisdictions at the forefront
of modernization in relation to electronic transactions.  Ironically, this
does not address the many fundamental problems already indicated, al-
though it gives some indication that where a need for reform is perceived,
Australian lawmakers can implement change, albeit slowly and not always
uniformly.
III. AUSTRALIAN REFORM AGENDA
A. Preface to 2012: The Profession
Until recent times, despite these problems, there has been little appe-
tite for law reform for Australian contract law.  The legal profession has
appeared content to live with anachronism, complexity, and divergence,
in an attitude of “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it!”  Undoubtedly, the succes-
sive waves of legislative reform in relation to specific subject matters—con-
sumer law, credit codes, tenancies, securities law—were enough to keep
23. See generally Nottage, supra note 12. R
24. See ATTORNEY-GENERAL’S DEP’T DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 19, at 8.
25. See Nottage, supra note 12, at 5. R
26. See Horrigan, Laryea & Spagnolo, supra note 6, § 1.1.2 (explaining situa-
tion for other jurisdictions that have not implemented statutes dealing with privity
rule remains confusing, and federal legislation only removes uncertainty in Trident
for insurance contracts).
27. See id. § 1.1.1.
28. See G.A. Res. 60/21, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/21, (Dec. 9, 2005).
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both the profession and academics well-occupied, and most probably have
dampened the capacity for change to something as fundamental as con-
tract law.
In particular, despite the pivotal role played by key Australians in the
development of uniform law at the international level—first, in relation to
the CISG, then the UNIDROIT Principles—it has been interesting to note
the time warp in the Australian legal profession’s recognition of the im-
portance and utility of the CISG.  Likewise, while case numbers slowly
grow in frequency in Australia, the judiciary has consistently shown a lack
of understanding or interest in the correct application of the CISG.  Fre-
quently, counsel fail to plead the CISG where it is the applicable law, and
it is overlooked by the court.  The profession still maintains the practice of
routinely excluding the CISG in drafting contracts.  This is almost poign-
ant, given the widespread participation of many Australian teams in the
Vis Moot, and the tremendous success which Australian law schools enjoy
in the Moot.  This author has previously explained this lack of uptake on a
number of bases, including failure to include the CISG in general contract
law curricula, and on law firm culture as a group dynamic, influencing
young lawyers against advising the use of the CISG.
Around 2010, a number of senior judicial officers and academics be-
gan to point out the lack of engagement of the profession in Australia with
international law.  Justice Paul Finn, a judge of the Australian Federal
Court and academic who has been instrumental in the UNIDROIT move-
ment,29 Justice Michael Kirby of the Australian High Court,30 and Chief
Justice Robert French of the Australian High Court31 each remarked in
different papers on Australia’s “isolationist” legal attitude.  The current
author’s own summary of the manner in which the CISG had been re-
ceived in Australia was published in 2009.32  These laments were picked
up in academic and extra-curial commentary, but little progress seemed
apparent.
Since that time, Australian law firms, themselves with high hopes of
expanding into Asia and beyond, have increasingly merged with global law
firms.  Almost all of the former “big four” firms have merged; Linklaters
with the former Allens Arthur Robinson, King & Wood with the former
29. See Paul Finn, Internationalisation or Isolation: The Australian Cul De Sac?  The
Case of Contract, in THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF LAW: LEGISLATING, DECISION-MAK-
ING, PRACTICE AND EDUCATION 145 (Mary Hiscock & William Van Caenegem eds.,
2010).
30. See Justice Michael Kirby, Overcoming Australia’s Equity Isolationism, 3 J. EQ.
1 (2009) (Austl.).
31. See Robert French, Chief Justice, High Court of Austl., Speech at Supreme
Court of New South Wales Annual Conference: International Law and Australian
Domestic Law 6–8 nn.9–11, 13 (Aug. 21, 2009), available at http://www.hcourt.gov.
au/assets/publications/speeches/current-justices/frenchcj/frenchcj21aug09.pdf.
32. See Lisa Spagnolo, The Last Outpost: Automatic CISG Opt Outs, Misapplica-
tions and the Costs of Ignoring the Vienna Sales Convention for Australian Lawyers, 10
MELBOURNE J. OF INT’L LAW 141 (2009).
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Mallesons, Ashurst with Blake Dawson, and Herbert Smith with Freehills.
Allen & Overy, Clifford Chance, and Norton Rose have all entered the
Australian market.33  Australia seemed to have escaped the global finan-
cial crisis relatively unscathed, but it was felt amongst the legal profession.
The face of the profession has changed under pressure from slowing eco-
nomic activity, a booming mining industry, and large growth in trade with
Asia.
B. Events of 2012
Somewhat surprisingly, on March 22, 2012, the Australian Federal At-
torney-General issued a discussion paper canvassing the possibility of re-
forming Australian contract law.  The stated aim of the discussion paper
was to assist the Australian government “[to] explor[e] the scope for re-
forming Australian contract law” to make it simpler, fairer, and more
efficient.34
The discussion paper refers to reasons for considering reform of Aus-




• setting standards of conduct;
• supporting innovation;
• e-commerce;
• supporting relational contracts;
• small and medium-sized businesses;
• internal harmonisation; and
• internationalisation.
The possibility of a codified law modernized to reflect international
trends was mooted.  The discussion paper noted the judicial and academic
criticisms mentioned above.  A number of “infolets” were issued, each de-
tailing specific areas of potential reform, including one of which referred
comprehensively to the UNIDROIT Principles.  The CISG’s role in Austra-
lia was also noted.  Specifically, the discussion paper called for submissions
from academics, the profession, and others on the following questions:
1. What are the main problems experienced by users of Australian
contract law?  Which drivers of reform are the most important for
contract law?  Are there any other drivers of reform that should be
considered?
2. What costs, difficulties, inefficiencies, or lost opportunities do busi-
nesses experience as a result of the domestic operation of Austra-
lian contract law?
33. See Nottage, supra note 12, at 4.
34. See ATTORNEY-GENERAL’S DEP’T DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 19.
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3. How can Australian contract law better meet the emerging needs
of the digital economy?  In what circumstances should online
terms and conditions be given effect?
4. To what extent do businesses experience costs, difficulties, ineffi-
ciencies, or lost opportunities as a result of differences between
Australian and foreign contract law?
5. What are the costs and benefits of internationalising Australian
contract law?
6. Which reform options (restatement, simplification, or substantial
reform of contract law) would be preferable? What benefits and
costs would result from each?
7. How should any reform of contract law be implemented?
8. What next steps should be conducted? Who should be involved?
A number of months were allowed for submissions on the discussion
paper, and submissions closed on July 20, 2012.  The submissions received
were predominantly from academics, non-lawyer professional/business
groups, lawyer associations, and law firms (in that order).35  There were
fifty-eight written submissions and sixty-five online survey responses from
the public.36
In June 2012 two open consultations forums were held and these were
attended by representatives of peak bodies, as well as consumer, business,
academic, legal, and professional stakeholders.37  Five further consulta-
tions were held with individuals unable to attend the open sessions.  At-
tendees from the legal profession were in general terms in favour of
specific piecemeal reform, but opposed to a code, and not in favour of
utilizing international instruments of harmonized law if reforms were to
be implemented.
35.  Non-confidential submissions were published online on November 21,
2012. See Submissions to the Review of Australian Contract Law, ATTORNEY-GENERAL’S
DEPARTMENT, http://www.ag.gov.au/Consultations/Pages/SubmissionstotheRe
viewofAustralianContractLaw.aspx (last visited Apr. 9, 2013).  The Attorney-Gen-
eral’s Department Report to Senate Standing Committee lists the authors of for-
mal submissions.  There were submissions from academics (16); non-lawyer
professional/business associations (15); lawyer associations/peak bodies (9); law-
yers/law firms (6) as well as corporations/in-house lawyers (2); government (2)
and a further eight submissions. See ATTORNEY-GENERAL’S DEPARTMENT, REPORT TO
SENATE STANDING COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS (2012)
[hereinafter REPORT TO STANDING COMMITTEE], available at http://www.aph.gov.
au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate_Committees?url=legcon_ctte/
estimates/sup_1213/ag/QoN_57-CLD.pdf.
36. See REPORT TO STANDING COMMITTEE, supra note 35.
37. Notably, a few large law firms and legal professional associations partici-
pated in the process including Ashurst (formerly Blake Dawson Waldron), Herbert
Smith Freehills (formerly Freehills), King & Wood Mallesons and the Law Council
of Australia, Australian Academy of Law, Australian Business Lawyers and Advisers,
Australian Corporate Lawyers Association, Australian Government Solicitor, and
the NSW Young Lawyers. See id.
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It is interesting to also reflect upon the nature of the written submis-
sions.  There were a number of submissions from non-legal professional
bodies which were concerned with single points, such as the need to ad-
dress fairness of contractual terms for the protection of their members.38
Some called for specific harmonization legislation in respect of the diver-
gent areas mentioned above.39  Those that addressed the issue at all,
tended to oppose federal codification generally on rather vague bases.40
As one would expect, the legal profession tended to be more specific.
For example, the peak body representing in-house lawyers working for
corporations in Australia mentioned the issues of divergence and the need
for harmonization between the states in the areas discussed earlier.41  It
also called for simplification and centralization of contract law, but op-
posed internationalization along the lines of the CISG.
Codification or centralization of contract law at the federal level
found more favour amongst academics.  The Australian Academy of Law,
comprised of academics and judges, simply pointed out that the process
would be difficult due to overlaps, and would require extensive consulta-
tion (after arguing for rectification of divergences between states).42
Many preferred codification and/or a soft law restatement of principles.43
Justice Bathurst in his personal submission expressed doubt that a na-
tional code would improve predictability, and argued it may lead to confu-
sion and rigidity.44  His Honour noted that any code would need to be
interpreted and would become overlaid with case law in any event, thus
38. See Ass’n of Prof’l Eng’rs, Scientists & Managers, Austl., Review of Austra-
lian Contract Law (July 2012), available at http://www.ag.gov.au/Consultations/
Documents/SubmissionstotheReviewofAustralianContractLaw/Submission%2000
9%20-%20Contract%20Law%20Review%20-%20APESMA.pdf.
39. See, e.g., Austl. Bankers’ Ass’n, Improving Australia’s Law and Justice
Framework—Discussion Paper Scope for Reforming Australian Contract Law 4
(Aug. 7, 2012), available at http://www.ag.gov.au/Consultations/Documents/Sub
missionstotheReviewofAustralianContractLaw/Submission%20057%20-%20Con-
tract%20Law%20Review%20-%20Australian%20Bankers%20Association.pdf;
Austl. Chamber of Commerce & Indus., Response to Attorney-General’s Depart-
ment Discussion Paper (July 27, 2012), available at http://www.ag.gov.au/Consulta
tions/Documents/SubmissionstotheReviewofAustralianContractLaw/Submission
%20049%20-%20ACCI%20-%20for%20publication.pdf.
40. See Austl. Bankers’ Ass’n, supra note 39, at 3–4.
41. See Austl. Corporate Lawyers Ass’n, Improving Australia’s Law and Justice
Framework: Reforming Australian Contract Law 3 (July 20, 2012) [hereinafter
ACLA], available at http://www.acla.com.au/documents/item/1023.
42. See generally Australian Academy of Law, Response to Attorney-General’s




43. See, e.g., Horrigan, Laryea & Spagnolo, supra note 6, at 23; Nottage, supra
note 12, at 12–14.
44. See Thomas Frederick Bathurst, Codification of Contract Law—A Flawed Pro-
posal, CONT. L. REV. 1, 6–8 [hereinafter Bathurst Submission], available at http://
www.ag.gov.au/Consultations/Documents/SubmissionstotheReviewofAustralian-
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becoming unpredictable.  Further, a code could never be fully compre-
hensive without becoming far too detailed.
While these arguments are quite valid, in truth they are not reasons
why a code should not be adopted per se.  No one code can ever provide
all the answers.  Neither the common law nor a code can ever be totally
predictable.  The real question must be directed to whether a code can
bring relative improvements in predictability, reduction of complexity,
and gains in accessibility by comparison with what we have presently.
The argument attributes little weight to the benefit of reducing the
number of sources of law (by comparison with various pieces of state and
federal legislation, state case law and federal case law), and resultant im-
provement in the accessibility of the law.  Of course, post-code, the law
must continue to be developed by court interpretation, and must respond
to sociological, economic, and technological change.45  With respect, this
fact cannot serve as an argument in favour of common law and against
codification, since such adaptations must occur irrespective of whether the
basic rule or principle derives from a case or legislative text—in other
words, the law must grow in either case to fit new circumstances regardless
of its form.  However, even after the law continues to develop by means of
judicial interpretation, one significant benefit of codification is the overall
ordering of concepts within a single framework, to which cases themselves
refer and to which those cases, regardless of court system, become refera-
ble, indexed, and more easily accessible.
This is not to say that such benefits are worth the transition costs of
reform.  However, a balanced perspective needs to be maintained between
the costs and benefits of a single centralized consolidation, especially if a
large part of the problem is the complexity and overlap of sources of laws
and remedies across and within jurisdictions in Australia.  If a code is
aimed at removing existing problems of divergence, or more importantly,
reforming the rules of contract law in a way the present system has been
unable to achieve, then perhaps the price may be worth it.
As Australia debates and weighs its options in relation to “internation-
alizing” its domestic law of contract, various questions arise.
IV. DOES AUSTRALIAN NEED LAW REFORM?
The first question must be whether any reform to Australian contract
law is necessary, useful, or even worthwhile.  Clearly, the profession as a
whole appears to think little needs to be done.
There can always be an easy argument against change.  Every change
involves costs.  However, this must be weighed against the background of
the ageing and complexity of certain parts of Australian contract law, and
the areas in which divergences occur.  Furthermore, as various jurisdic-
ContractLaw/Submission%20055%20-%20Contract%20Law%20Review%20-%20
Bathurst.pdf (last visited Mar. 14, 2013).
45. See id. at 6.
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tions around the world adopt domestic laws that are based upon the same
harmonized uniform models, Australian law may well increasingly stand
out as different from the rest.
Difference in and of itself is not necessarily bad, and may even en-
courage some parties to select Australian law to govern their contracts.
However, the reality is that difference involves learning costs and uncer-
tainty.  Coupled with the need to modernize and harmonize across the
states, this may motivate any future reform of domestic contract law to
seriously look at harmonized instruments as a basis for any new rules.
As some commentators observe, there are other reasons prompting a
revisiting of Australian contract law.  Nottage points out that consumer law
growth is one driver, as well as the changes to the legal landscape through
widespread mergers of large home-grown law firms with the major mul-
tinational legal firms and/or entry of those firms into the Australian law
market, prompted by the mining boom and high levels of trade with
Asia.46
There are significant complexities in Australian contract law which
simply don’t need to be there—as discussed earlier, for example, the need
for consideration, the admissibility of various forms of evidence about in-
tention, and divergence on questions of capacity, frustration, and third
parties.  There are issues which should be addressed and modernized—for
example, consideration and good faith.  However, it may be the case that
some actors within the Australian law market also stand to benefit most
from the maintenance of such divergence and complexity.
Australian legal practice has boomed in recent decades as the level of
complexity in the law has increased.  Obviously this is not solely attributa-
ble to growth in legal complexity alone, but as anticipated by several com-
mentators, it is noteworthy that some of the most vocal opposition to
simplification comes from law firms.47  Like any economic actor, path de-
pendent behaviour within law firms and opposition to change within the
legal profession must be anticipated as a normal heuristic behaviour and
group dynamic, even where the change would be substantively efficient for
clients.  Previously, the author has analysed exactly such behaviour at
length in relation to choices to opt out of the CISG, despite its compara-
tive efficiency.48
46. See Nottage, supra note 12, at 4.
47. This was predicted in some submissions. See, e.g., Horrigan, Laryea &
Spagnolo, supra note 6, § 1.8 (“For contract law . . . there are . . . conflicting eco-
nomic interests . . . in relation to . . . reform . . . entail[ing] moral hazard issues
and path dependent behaviours . . . .  [Thus] any change will . . . meet resistance
from the bulk of the legal profession, irrespective of benefits to business.”); Not-
tage, supra note 12, at 7.
48. See Lisa Spagnolo, Truth or Dare? The Interrelatedness of the Efficiency of the
CISG, Influences on Lawyers’ Choice of Law and Interpretation 174, 189, 202–16 (Ph.D.
Thesis, 2012) [hereinafter Truth or Dare]; see also Lisa Spagnolo, Green Eggs & Ham:
The CISG, Path Dependence, and the Behavioural Economics of Lawyers’ Choices of Law in
International Sales Contracts 6 J. PRIVATE INT’L LAW 417, 435–39, 445–53, 456 (2010)
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Therefore, opposition from the profession is not altogether surpris-
ing given the learning costs involved for firms and the self-reinforcing risk-
reward structures created by the complex environment, despite the fact
that change may significantly improve the transaction costs and efficiency
of doing business for their clients.49  Costs of inefficiency are presently not
borne by the profession, but by business which may contract sub-optimally
as a result of inefficient laws, therefore there is little incentive for law firms
to support change.50
Furthermore, the law market is one of specialist expertise, and lawyers
control that expertise.  Information asymmetry may have a powerful im-
pact on the potential for any efficient reform.51  Consequently, while loss
of GDP contributions from legal services might be far outweighed by
growth in general business contributions to GDP due to reforms,52 the
vocal and organized lobbying of the legal profession is likely to carry more
weight in the reform process.
V. WHAT MODEL FOR AUSTRALIAN REFORM?
If Australian contract law should indeed be reformed, then the sec-
ond question that arises is to which model should it look for inspiration?
There are a number of competing models of harmonized laws on the mar-
ket.  Each has its advantages and disadvantages, and each is shaped by the
times and institutional influences that led to its creation.53
Additionally, the CISG has clearly influenced law reform in many ju-
risdictions, and that influence has prompted the present Australian re-
view.  However, another influential harmonizing law reform is on the
horizon—the Draft Common European Sales Law (CESL).  Therefore,
this paper asks a final question: Will the CISG still be able to influence
non-European domestic law reform projects, such as the one being consid-
ered in Australia?  Or—will CESL be more influential on future non-Euro-
pean law reform?
[hereinafter Green Eggs] (discussing reasons for lawyer persistence in exclusion of
CISG despite its efficiency at substantive and procedural levels compared with rela-
tive efficiency of alternative choices of law).
49. See Truth or Dare, supra note 48, at 202–16; see also Green Eggs, supra note 48,
at 444–53.
50. See Nottage, supra note 12, at 6. R
51. See Truth or Dare, supra note 48, at 196–202; see also Green Eggs, supra note
48, 439–44.
52. See Nottage, supra note 12, at 6. R
53. See generally Sandeep Gopalan, A Demandeur-Centric Approach to Regime De-
sign in Transnational Commercial Law, 39 GEO. J. INT’L L. 327 (2008); see also Clayton
P. Gillette & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of International Sales Law, 25 INT’L
REV. L. ECON. 446, 479–84 (2005).
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\58-4\VLR409.txt unknown Seq: 14 11-JUL-13 8:20
636 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58: p. 623
A. CISG
Synchronizing Australian domestic law with the law applicable to in-
ternational sales in Australia and with the law forming the basis for many
domestic law reform initiatives throughout the world seems a sensible ap-
proach.  It would minimize transaction costs and improve predictability
for outcomes.  It would also address a considerable problem in Australia—
resistance to the use and application of the CISG by practitioners and
courts.  The negative attitude of the profession toward the CISG was noted
by the Attorney-General’s Department.54
Some of the submissions indeed demonstrate disquiet about using the
CISG as the basis for domestic law reform.55  However, as might be ex-
pected given the low levels of familiarity with CISG in Australia, such con-
cerns frequently demonstrate a level of ignorance about the CISG rather
than any serious substantive problem with it.  Indeed, it could not other-
wise have already served as the model for reform in many jurisdictions.56
The rules in the CISG have been tried and tested and found generally
successful enough to form the basis for domestic reform elsewhere.  The
CISG is the basis for domestic reforms including the African OHADA,57
the Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR), the Draft European
Union CESL Regulation, the modernized German Law of Obligations, the
Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China, the law of Estonia and
most modern Eastern European sales laws, as well as the Nordic sales legis-
lation, and the New Draft Japanese Civil Code.58  For commercial transac-
tions, the CISG is an appropriate basis for reform in Australia.  The
54. See ATTORNEY-GENERAL’S DEP’T DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 19, at 8.
55. See ACLA, supra note 41, at 4 (arguing that it would mean that goods
could not be returned on basis of failure of fitness for purpose).  This is incorrect.
If the breach is a fundamental breach pursuant to Article 25 then the contract can
be avoided. See id.
56. The CISG has had direct impact on domestic law in China, Germany,
Scandinavia, Japan, Que´bec, Czech Republic, Russia, and Estonia.  It has affected
reforms in the Netherlands, Germany, Japan, Greece, and the African OHADA
member states.  It has had an indirect impact on the domestic law of Denmark,
France, and Italy via the European Union Directive on certain aspects of the sale of
consumer goods and associated guarantees. See Council Directive 99/44, 1999 O.J.
(L 171) 12 (EC) (European Union Directive on Sale of Consumer Goods and As-
sociated Guarantees).
57. See ORG. FOR THE HARMONIZATION OF BUS. LAW IN AFRICA (OHADA), DO-
ING BUSINESS 2011: MAKING A DIFFERENCE FOR ENTREPRENEURS (2011), http://www.
eisourcebook.org/cms/Organisation%20for%20the%20Harmonization%20of%
20Business%20Law%20in%20Africa.pdf.  In particular, see the section on sales,
which the Swiss Proposal refers to as “practically a transcript” of the CISG. See U.N.
G.A. Rep. of the Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Proposal by Switzerland on Possible
Future Work by UNCITRAL in the Area of International Contract Law, 3, U.N. Doc. A/
CN.9/758, 45th Sess. (May 8, 2012) [hereinafter Swiss Proposal].  However, the
Swiss Proposal also notes modifications in the OHADA sales section, and that a
further project on broader contract law drawing from UNIDROIT Principles
seems to have stalled. See id. at 5–6.
58. See Swiss Proposal, supra note 57, at 3.
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\58-4\VLR409.txt unknown Seq: 15 11-JUL-13 8:20
2013] LAW WARS 637
Attorney-General’s discussion paper gives the impression that the depart-
ment is aware of the CISG’s influence elsewhere on reform projects, but is
wary and seeking to test the waters.
B. UNIDROIT Principles
Modelling Australian domestic law on the UNIDROIT Principles of
Commercial Contracts would similarly align the domestic law with other
reformed domestic laws that have drawn from UNIDROIT, including most
relevantly for Australia, China.  Naturally, since UNIDROIT is structured
upon the CISG, this also largely achieves the alignment of laws applicable
to domestic contracts with those applicable to international contracts
within Australia.
Notably, the UNIDROIT Principles go further than the CISG, so mod-
elling upon UNIDROIT Principles would introduce new concepts hitherto
not known to Australian domestic law.  They deal with validity, agency,
contracts benefiting third parties, set-off, limitation periods, assignment,
illegality, multi-party contracts, and contractual unwinding.  UNIDROIT
Principles are drafted by non-government representatives who are aiming
for an “ideal” solution.  Not being restricted by the need to represent na-
tional interests, obviously the UNIDROIT Principles have been capable of
a more expansive reach.  However, for nations uncomfortable with the
CISG for its civilian overtones, some of these “ideal” solutions, while logi-
cally attractive, may nonetheless be a step too far.
The UNIDROIT Principles have rightfully had a significant influence
on the Attorney-General’s discussion paper, and have themselves formed
the basis for an entire “infolet” attachment to the discussion paper.59
C. CESL
The proposed Common European Sales Law (CESL) is “a major ad-
vancement of the idea of a European cont[r]act [sic] law.”60  It has been
claimed that the CESL is “an attempt at harmonizing an increasing[ly]
chaotic set of Directives.”61
The proposed regulation of the European Union avoids the political
minefields of a comprehensive civil code, or even general contract law,
and instead targets consumer protection harmonization as well as online
trading and related services.62  Consequently, it attempts to provide for
cross-border transactions by consumers and small-to-medium sized enter-
prises (SMEs), and can be applicable to all commercial transactions if the
59. See generally ATTORNEY-GENERAL’S DEP’T, THE UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES: LES-
SONS FOR AUSTRALIA? (2012), http://www.ag.gov.au/Consultations/Documents/
ReviewofAustraliancontractlaw/TheUNIDROITPrincipleslessonsforAustralia.pdf
(infolet attached to Attorney-General’s discussion paper).
60. See DiMatteo, supra note 1, at 25. R
61. See id. at 33.
62. See id.
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adopting member state so wishes.63  Nonetheless, its application is pro-
posed as an “opt-in” regime; that is, parties will need to select CESL to
govern their contract.  The inclusion of a “review clause” in the CESL
hints that it is a stepping-stone to a broader future contract code.64
Thus, like the CISG, it is an instrument aimed at harmonization.  The
CESL has been strongly influenced by the CISG,65 as was its formative
predecessor, the DCFR.  Unlike the CISG, mandatory rules predominate
the CESL.  As one might expect, the CESL consumer provisions are
mandatory, but additionally, the CESL cannot be opted into in part, even
for non-consumer transactions.66
The CESL has its advantages and disadvantages, which are examined
in far more detail elsewhere.  Its interpretive sections build upon those in
the CISG, in particular, autonomous interpretation, resort to general prin-
ciples, and trade usages and practices.  These sections of the CESL help-
fully and expressly enunciate principles, and refer expressly to purposive
interpretation “having regard to the nature and purpose of the contract,”
something only implicit in the CISG.67  The CESL’s reference to trade
usages is not limited to international usages like the CISG, and CESL ex-
pressly refers to a “reasonableness” standard in its interpretive
methodology.68
Much has been said about the CESL’s structure, which is complex
because it attempts to regulate both B2B and B2C transactions separately
when it might have been simpler to regulate them within a unified set of
remedial provisions.69  Many critics believe it was manifestly unwise to try
to regulate both types of transactions in the one instrument at all, includ-
ing the present writer.  As Castellani notes:
63. See Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the
Council on a Common European Sales Law, art. 13(a), COM (2011) 635 final (Nov. 10,
2011) [hereinafter CESL], available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/Lex
UriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0635:FIN:en:PDF.
64. See id. art. 15.
65. See Swiss Proposal, supra note 57, at 5 (comparing CISG with CESL); see also
DiMatteo, supra note 1, at 31 (arguing this is especially so in relation to formation R
of contract).  The CISG directly influenced the Draft Common Frame of Refer-
ence for the European Union, especially IV.A on sales, but also II on contract
formation, and III on obligations and remedies. See PRINCIPLES, DEFINITIONS AND
MODEL RULES OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW: DRAFT COMMON FRAME OF REFERENCE
(DCFR) (Christian von Bar et al. eds., 2009); see also id. at 1329–30, § IV.A.-2:306
n.1 (discussing third party rights or claims based on industrial property or other
intellectual property, which subsequently formed basis for CESL)
66. See CESL, supra note 63, art. 11.
67. See id. art. 5; see also id. arts. 1–4; DiMatteo, supra note 1, at 41. R
68. Compare CESL, supra note 63, art. 5, with U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law,
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods art.
9, Apr. 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CISG], available at http://
www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/sales/cisg/V1056997-CISG-e-book.pdf.
69. See DiMatteo, supra note 1, at 33. R
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Consumer protection rules should be of mandatory application
in order to be effective, while rules applicable to business-to-busi-
ness transactions need to be optional in order to ensure freedom
of contract.  This explains why the two sets of rules are usually
kept separate.  How the two goals could be pursued in the same
instrument remains unclear given the optional nature of the
[CESL].70
The idea of treating SMEs differently than larger business is not com-
pletely new to Australian “consumer” protection laws.  Despite the obvi-
ous, inherent problem of defining an SME, the effect of drawing various
lines often fails to deal with the underlying aim of correcting for various
informational asymmetries or differences in bargaining power.71  Further-
more, one must query the difficulty of isolating SMEs in an environment
where corporate acquisition and restructuring are not at all uncommon.
Nonetheless, it appears that the regulation of SMEs may in part be moti-
vated by a desire to capture some B2B relationships within the CESL
framework.  Unfortunately, this would tend to encroach upon the B2B
transactions harmonized under CISG, thereby increasing, rather than re-
ducing, fragmentation.72  The inclusion of “standard terms” as opposed to
“negotiated terms” also presents considerable confusion, and the varying
manner in which they are dealt with throughout the CESL is somewhat
perplexing.73
Given that Australia presently implies terms into commercial and con-
sumer sales under separate statutes, and relies upon common law for gen-
eral rules of contract, it would be a vast and unwise step for Australia to
adopt a combined and therefore problematic regime like the CESL.  How-
ever, given that the CESL is the most recent harmonized regime in the
area, there should be no doubt that it will be examined in the process of
reform in Australia.
Significantly, as was noted in the Attorney-General’s discussion paper,
optional regimes for contractual rules will often fail to succeed in Australia
due to practitioner resistance.74  The comment was originally made in re-
lation to the CISG, which Australian practitioners frequently exclude.75
However, one would imagine that the CESL model of opting in would be
70. Luca Castellani, CISG in Time of Crisis: An Opportunity for Increased Efficiency,
in 4TH ANNUAL MAA SCHLECHTRIEM CONFERENCE: GLOBALIZATION VERSUS REGION-
ALIZATION 44 (Ingeborg Schwenzer & Lisa Spagnolo eds., 2013).
71. See DiMatteo, supra note 1, at 25. R
72. See CISG Advisory Council Declaration No. 1, The CISG and Regional
Harmonization (Aug. 3, 2012), available at http://www.cisgac.com/default.php?
ipkCat=128&ifkCat=217&sid=217.
73. See Ingeborg Schwenzer, CESL and CISG, in 4TH ANNUAL MAA SCHLECH-
TRIEM CONFERENCE: GLOBALIZATION VERSUS REGIONALIZATION 109–11 (Ingeborg
Schwenzer & Lisa Spagnolo, eds. 2013).
74. See ATTORNEY-GENERAL’S DEP’T DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 19, at 20.
75. See id. at 17.
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even less effective unless widespread support from lobby groups was gar-
nered first, something that might be unlikely for any code resembling the
CESL in Australia.  Furthermore, the comment in the discussion paper
makes it clear that the Attorney-General is well aware of the potential
weakness in such a model.
The CESL as a consumer law regime has considerable potential to
protect consumers (and SMEs).  Like UNIDROIT Principles, it also goes
far further than the CISG, but it does so by implementing provisions on
issues with consent, unfair terms, pre-contractual disclosure requirements,
and electronic contracts.  The CESL is structurally challenging, very far
reaching, and simultaneously, does not govern some areas which it might
have dealt with (such as capacity, ownership, the concurrent possibility of
tort/contract liability, or illegality).76
Above all else, the CESL is not a suitable regime for commercial trans-
actions.  Its far reaching provisions, significant intrusions into party auton-
omy, and pre-contractual disclosure requirements should be carefully
weighed up in determining if it would be a suitable model for commercial
transactions.  Furthermore, even as a consumer-protective measure, its
suitability should be measured against existing protections within the
ACL.  Finally, it must be doubted that even a suitably crafted opt-in struc-
ture would work within Australia.
A related issue for any reform structure—if it were to govern commer-
cial transactions—is how it would operate alongside the CISG, the law in
Australia for international sales.  The Australian government has an inter-
national obligation to implement the CISG.  Any design that covers both
cross border and domestic sales, even if it allowed parties to “opt out,”
would therefore involve a potential breach of this obligation.77
D. Swiss Proposal
The “Swiss Proposal” refers to a proposal put to the General Assembly
of the United Nations on May 8, 2012 by the Swiss government concerning
the CISG.78  The proposal supports “future work in the area of interna-
tional contract law.”79
Essentially, it suggests that, given the huge increase in the volume of
world trade over the past thirty years, perhaps:
[The] time has come for UNCITRAL (i) to undertake an assess-
ment of the operation of the [CISG] and related UNCITRAL in-
struments in light of practical needs of international business
parties today and tomorrow, and (ii) to discuss whether further
work both in these areas and in the broader context of general
76. See Schwenzer, supra note 73, at 101.
77. See Horrigan, Laryea & Spagnolo, supra note 6, § 7.7.
78. See generally Swiss Proposal, supra note 57.
79. Id. at 1.
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contract law is desirable and feasible on a global level to meet
those needs.80
The proposal draws attention to the fact that the CISG does not gov-
ern certain important areas, but leaves them to domestic law.81  One such
area is validity, another is ownership of goods.  Naturally, the remaining
differences in ascertaining the content of different domestic laws, and
drafting standard terms to deal with them, involves transaction costs.
The proposal highlights a few key aspects for possible future work.
First, the areas left of the CISG’s coverage: agency, validity, battle of the
forms, specific performance, applicable interest rates, mistake, fraud, du-
ress, gross disparity, illegality, unfair terms, third party rights, set-off, as-
signment, and multi-party contracts.82  The proposal also points out that
regional harmonization efforts have the potential to cause
fragmentation.83
Essentially then, the Swiss Proposal seeks support for the notion of
extending the subject matter of the CISG to closely associated areas that
were previously avoided in the belief that the work should be done in a
different instrument, or that consensus was unlikely at the time.  It does
not seek to overhaul the structure of the CISG in any way that might jeop-
ardize its, so far, largely successful operation around the world.
The proposal was considered in June–July 2012, and met with mixed
responses.  Therefore, the Swiss Proposal remains, although future direc-
tions for it have not yet been agreed upon.  An UNCITRAL Expert Group
Meeting held in February 2013 in Seoul, Korea, further discussed the
issue.
VI. PROCESS INTO THE FUTURE
Given Australia’s resistance to reform in the past, it would be more
surprising still if Australia moved to a national contract law code, let alone
one based on any international instrument.  While this author would most
favour a slowly developed, centralized, and easily accessible contract code
based on CISG, and drawing on UNIDROIT Principles where appropriate,
as the solution most likely to lead to an efficient and modern law of con-
tract for Australia, this outcome is unfortunately unlikely.
More likely is the potential for a gradual movement, perhaps with the
issue of an initial persuasive “restatement of contract principles,” in the
hope that this will sway courts and practitioners to adjust to the potential
for hard law changes in the future.  The importance of building a wide
consensus for harmonized change amongst powerful lobby groups such as
practitioner bodies, law firms, and business and industry associations, has
80. Id. at 2.
81. See id.
82. See id. at 6–7 n.3.
83. See id. at 7.
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\58-4\VLR409.txt unknown Seq: 20 11-JUL-13 8:20
642 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58: p. 623
been proven time and again.  One need only look at the failure of Revised
Article 2 of the UCC, “which was published in 2003 and . . . soundly re-
jected by the [U.S.] states,”84 or the recent success of Brazilian industry
and professional groups in convincing the Brazilian government to accede
to the CISG.  Another possibility will be more modest hard law reforms
implemented by cooperation in each of the states.
No decision has yet been made on whether reform of any type should
take place.  No comment has been made in relation to the submissions or
public responses at all.  The deafening silence has now continued for
some nine months.
On October 16, 2012, in answer to a number of questions posed to
the Minister in a parliamentary committee about the status of the review,
the Minister presented a report on the review and simply stated, “[t]he
Government will consider the feedback received during the review to de-
termine the need for any reform and possible next steps.”85
As of January 18, 2013 there were still no further developments ema-
nating from within the department.86  Furthermore, at the time of writing,
the Federal Attorney-General had resigned, and a new Attorney-General
recently has begun his term in office.  The department is continuing in its
deliberations, and nothing is likely to be announced until later this year.
Moreover, a federal election looms large in September 2013.  Anyone still
holding their breath might be well advised to stop.
VII. CONCLUSION
One might expect that, one way or another, diversity between Austra-
lian states will be addressed, and furthermore, Australia may well move to
some soft law implementation of a more international set of contract rules
in place of the overly complex rules that exist today for domestic con-
tracts.  While one might logically expect the CISG and/or UNIDROIT
Principles to be the primary influence on this development, this will de-
pend on how far the federal government perceives a need for mandatory
consumer protective measures beyond those in existence under the Aus-
tralian ACL presently.  Should it make this a priority, one can expect that
84. See DiMatteo, supra note 1, at 35. R
85. REPORT TO STANDING COMMITTEE, supra note 35, at 5.  This was the Minis-
ter’s response to each and every one of the following questions posed in the Senate
Standing Committee by Senator Brandis, including:
6. When will the review be finalised and released publicly?
7. Is an Australian contract code a possible outcome/recommendation of
the review?
8. What is the view of the Department on the possibility of an Australian
Contract code?
9. Does the Department subscribe to the view that a contract code will
add complexity and inefficiency to contracts in Australia?
See id. at 1–2.
86. Email from Attorney-General’s Department, to the author and Luke Not-
tage (Jan. 18, 2013) (on file with author).
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the CESL will be examined, although it may carry less influence given its
many detractors.
If the government were to create a broad restatement of principles,
the influence of the CISG and/or UNIDROIT Principles will have to be
tempered by the need for the government to navigate the skepticism with
which these have been received within Australia.  However, if this process
is conducted with a realist’s eye to the competing economic pressures
within the Australian legal environment, and the significant influence the
CISG has already had on domestic law reform in so many countries, then
one suspects that they will be given significant weight.
The Swiss Proposal may have some effect on this process.  While on
the one hand, it may eventually lead to the CISG being even more attrac-
tive as an international standard for law reform, on the other hand, it may
add some (largely unjustified) gravitas to the numerous and vocal detrac-
tors within the Australian legal profession.  It might wrongfully be per-
ceived as demonstrating that there is something “wrong” with the CISG.
In fact, the conservatism and simplicity that underscores its solutions are
its strength to date.  The CISG presents a well-accepted basis for reform.
By comparison to the ambitious but highly criticized CESL, this means
that, at least for commercial transactions, the CISG continues to provide a
widely accepted modern standard and steady blueprint.  The perception,
therefore, would be wrong.
However, especially in a country like Australia, perception is reality.
If the profession is already wary of the CISG on the ill-conceived basis that
it is “vague” or “unknown,” then inevitably, the news that it may be
amended will make such detractors even more uncomfortable with using
the CISG as a basis for domestic reform.
As yet, most at this stage have not learned of the Swiss Proposal.  It is
therefore of great importance that the Swiss Proposal is explained in a
pragmatic and open way to audiences within Australia.  Should the Austra-
lian government actively participate in the ongoing debate on the propo-
sal, this may assist in disseminating appropriate information to prevent
such a perception from arising.
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AN ASSESSMENT OF THE CONVENTION ON THE LIMITATION
PERIOD IN THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS
THROUGH CASE LAW
LUCA G. CASTELLANI*
THE first product of the work of the United Nations Commission onInternational Trade Law (UNCITRAL) in the area of international
sale of goods was the Convention on the Limitation Period in the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods (Limitation Convention),1 which intended to consoli-
date a limited, but complex area of the law of sale of goods.2  The
Limitation Convention was a forerunner and indeed functionally forms a
part of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods (CISG).3  It was finalized and adopted as a separate treaty
due to the uncertainty surrounding the possibility to conclude rapidly the
preparation of the CISG.4
* Luca G. Castellani is a legal officer with the UNCITRAL Secretariat.  The
views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the
views of the United Nations.
1. See Convention on the Limitation Period in the International Sale of
Goods, June 14, 1974, 13 I.L.M. 952 [hereinafter Unamended Limitation Conven-
tion], available at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/sale_
goods/1974Convention_limitation_period.html; Protocol Amending the Conven-
tion on the Limitation Period in the International Sale of Goods, Apr. 11, 1980, 19
I.L.M. 696 [hereinafter Amended Limitation Convention]; see also Entry Into
Force for the United States of the Convention on the Limitation Period in the
International Sale of Goods, With Protocol, 60 Fed. Reg. 3484-01 (Jan. 17, 1995).
2. For selected articles discussing the Limitation Convention, see Katharina
Boele-Woelki, The Limitation of Rights and Actions in the International Sale of Goods, 4
UNIF. L. REV. 621, 621–50 (1999); Anita F. Hill, A Comparative Study of the United
Nations Convention on the Limitation Period in the International Sale of Goods and Section
2-725 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 25 TEX. INT’L L.J. 1, 1–22 (1990); Hans Smit,
The Convention on the Limitation Period in the International Sale of Goods: UNCITRAL’s
First-Born, 23 AM. J. COMP. L. 337, 337–62 (1975); Kazuaki Sono, Unification of Limi-
tation Period in the International Sale of Goods, 35 LA. L. REV. 1127 (1975); Peter Win-
ship, The Convention on the Limitation Period in the International Sale of Goods: The
United States Adopts UNCITRAL’s Firstborn, 28 INT’L L. 1071 (1994); see also REINHARD
ZIMMERMANN, COMPARATIVE FOUNDATIONS OF A EUROPEAN LAW OF SET-OFF AND PRE-
SCRIPTION 1 (2002).  Moreover, the provisions of the Limitation Convention are
commented on in, SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHWENZER: COMMENTARY ON THE UN CON-
VENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) 1215–70 (Ingeborg
Schwenzer ed., 3d ed. 2010).
3. See Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods art. 35,
Apr. 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CISG], available at http://www.uncit
ral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/sale_goods/1980CISG.html.  The CISG con-
cluded in 1980.
4. However, a sudden acceleration in the drafting process brought the adop-
tion of the CISG in 1980.
(645)
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As of January 1, 2013, the Limitation Convention had been adopted
by twenty-nine states, including the United States of America.  However,
until recently case law interpreting and applying the Limitation Conven-
tion was not readily available to a wide audience.  This article will assess
the relevance of the Limitation Convention through a preliminary analysis
of the case law applying that treaty.  This study will assist in evaluating the
contribution of the Limitation Convention to current and future law re-
form initiatives in the field of contract law.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE SUBSTANTIVE CONTENT
OF THE LIMITATION CONVENTION
The Limitation Convention establishes uniform rules governing the
period of time within which a party to a contract for the international sale
of goods must commence legal proceedings against another party to assert
a claim arising from that contract, or relating to its breach, termination, or
validity.  By doing so, the Limitation Convention brings clarity and predict-
ability to an aspect of great importance for the adjudication of a claim.
Most legal systems limit or proscribe a claim being asserted after the
lapse of a certain period of time.  This is done to prevent the institution of
legal proceedings at such a late date that the evidence relating to the
claim is likely to be unreliable or lost, and to protect against the uncer-
tainty that would result if a party were to remain exposed to unasserted
claims for an extensive period of time or even forever.5  However, numer-
ous disparities exist among legal systems with respect to the conceptual
basis for doing so, resulting in significant variations in the length of the
limitation period and in the rules governing the claims after that period.
Those differences have the potential to greatly complicate the adjudica-
tion of claims arising from international sales transactions.  In an attempt
to address those difficulties, the Limitation Convention was prepared and
then adopted in 1974.  The Convention was amended by a protocol
adopted in 1980 in order to harmonize its text with that of the CISG, in
particular, with regard to scope of application and admissible treaty
declarations.
The Limitation Convention applies to contracts for the sale of goods
between parties whose places of business are in different states if both of
those states are contracting states, or—but only in its amended version—
when the rules of private international law lead to the application of the
law of a contracting state.  It may also apply by virtue of parties’ choice.
The Convention sets the limitation period at four years in Article 8.6
In certain cases, such as acknowledgment of the debt in writing or per-
5. This may not, however, be the case of those legal systems influenced by
Islamic law. See Fatima Akaddaf, Application of the United Nations Convention on Con-
tracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) to Arab Islamic Countries: Is the CISG
Compatible with Islamic Law Principles?, 13 PACE INT’L L. REV. 1, 42–46 (2001) (con-
cluding, however, compatibility of Limitation Convention with Islamic law).
6. See Unamended Limitation Convention, supra note 1, art. 8.
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formance of an act that has the effect of recommencing the limitation
period, that period may be extended to a maximum of ten years.7  The
Limitation Convention also regulates certain questions pertaining to the
effect of commencing proceedings in a contracting state.
The Limitation Convention further provides rules on the cessation
and extension of the limitation period, which ceases when the claimant
commences judicial or arbitral proceedings or when it asserts claims in an
existing process.  If the proceedings end without a binding decision on the
merits, it is deemed that the limitation period continued to run during the
proceedings.  However, if the period has expired during the proceedings
or has less than one year to run, the claimant is granted an additional year
to commence new proceedings.8
No claim shall be recognized or enforced in legal proceedings com-
menced after the expiration of the limitation period.9  Such expiration is
not to be taken into consideration unless invoked by parties to the pro-
ceedings;10 however, states may lodge a declaration allowing for courts to
take into account the expiration of the limitation period on their own
initiative.11  An exception to the rule barring recognition and enforce-
ment after the expiration of the limitation period occurs when the party
raises its claim as a defense to or set-off against a claim asserted by the
other party.12
II. CASE LAW ON THE LIMITATION CONVENTION
A. A` la recherche de la jurisprudence perdue
Article 7 of the Limitation Convention sets forth the duty to interpret
and apply the text in light of its international character and the need to
promote uniformity.  Reporting and disseminating relevant cases are activ-
ities critical to achieving the goal of uniform interpretation and applica-
tion of the treaty.  However, case law applying the Limitation Convention
has not been readily available for several years.  This has affected the gen-
eral opinion on the relevance and effective application of the Convention:
the lack of decisions was explained as evidence of a lack of relevance of
the treaty, an observation that, in turn, may have discouraged active advo-
cacy in favor of the adoption of this text.
UNCITRAL is tasked with the promotion not only of the adoption of
the texts that are the product of its work, but also with their uniform inter-
pretation.  In order to discharge this function, UNCITRAL has requested
its secretariat maintain Case Law on the UNCITRAL Texts (CLOUT) case
reporting system.  CLOUT collects and publishes abstracts of decisions ap-
7. See id. art. 23.
8. See id. art. 17.
9. See id. art. 25(1).
10. See id. art. 24.
11. See id. art. 36.
12. See id. art. 25(2).
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plying UNCITRAL texts, making them available at no cost in the six offi-
cial languages of the United Nations.13  More recently, CLOUT abstracts
have been compiled in digests of case law, presenting main interpretative
trends in a neutral and accessible manner.
However, no case on the Limitation Convention had been reported
for about two decades after the entry into force of the treaty in 1988.  An
interesting question then arose: Was the lack of cases due to the inexis-
tence of those cases, or rather to the fact that cases were not reported to
the UNCITRAL secretariat?  Hence, the secretariat embarked on a global
search for cases, alerting correspondents and other experts of the issue,
and asking for their cooperation.  Cases started to emerge; the most mean-
ingful were selected for publication in CLOUT.  Currently, CLOUT con-
tains cases applying the Limitation Convention from Croatia, Cuba,
Hungary, Montenegro, Poland, Serbia, Slovenia, Ukraine, and the United
States.  Cases referring to the Limitation Convention have been reported
also from the Slovak Republic and Switzerland.  Certainly, many more
cases exist but are not yet easily accessible by an international audience.  It
seems therefore appropriate to conclude that the Limitation Convention
is indeed relevant and applied, but that case reporting systems in the juris-
dictions where it is applied are not easy to access for foreigners due to
linguistic and other reasons.  Additional work is desirable in order to high-
light the importance of sharing precedents interpreting uniform law, both
for future guidance and to inform the global trade law community of the
commitment to the uniform interpretation of texts of supranational
origin.
Improved availability of case law may, on the one hand, raise practi-
tioners’ awareness of the Limitation Convention, thus leading to its wider
application, and, on the other hand, highlight the importance of report-
ing existing cases, thus paving the way to collecting further material to be
used for orientation and guidance.  The first case from the United States
mentioning the Limitation Convention, albeit to discard its applicability,14
may be seen as a promising sign of this new attitude.
B. La jurisprudence retrouve´e
1. Scope of Application
Not surprisingly, the vast majority of the cases reported discuss the
scope of application of the Limitation Convention.  In this respect, a sig-
nificant issue arises from the fact that Yugoslavia had become a party to
the Convention in 1978, and therefore necessarily adopted its unamended
version.  Moreover, Yugoslavia did not adopt the amended version of the
Limitation Convention when ratifying the CISG.  Thus, the successor
13. See Case Law on UNCITRAL Texts (CLOUT), UNCITRAL, http://www.uncit
ral.org/uncitral/en/case_law.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2013).
14. See Maxxsonics USA, Inc. v. Fengshun Peiying Electro Acoustic Co., No. 10
C 1174, 2012 WL 962698, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 21, 2012) [CLOUT Case 1186].
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states to Yugoslavia need to explicitly state that they intend to adopt the
amended version of the treaty when becoming a party to the Limitation
Convention.  This was done by Slovenia and, more recently, by Montene-
gro.  The matter is relevant because one major difference between the
unamended and amended versions of the Limitation Convention is the
possibility to apply the treaty by virtue of rules of private international law:
in states that are parties to the unamended text, the Limitation Conven-
tion may apply only if all contractual parties have their place of business in
contracting states.
The rule seems clear, but the case law offers a remarkable variety of
options and solutions.  A Slovenian court pointed out the fact that the
Limitation Convention should apply since all the contractual parties had
their places of business in contracting states.15  Conversely, another Slove-
nian court ruled out the application of the Convention when one party to
the contract had its place of business in a non-contracting state.16  How-
ever, the court did not verify if the Limitation Convention could have ap-
plied by virtue of its Article 3(1)(b).17
Likewise, a Slovak court considering a case where a party was not in a
contracting state, decided for the non-applicability of the Limitation Con-
vention.  However, it did not discuss Article 3 of the Limitation Conven-
tion, and, in particular, the declaration lodged by the Slovak Republic on
Article 3(1)(b), but rather pointed at the fact that Austrian law was appli-
cable by virtue of private international law rules, and that Austria is not a
party to the Limitation Convention.18
A similar statement on the need for all contractual parties to have
their place of business in contracting states for the Limitation Convention
to apply was made by a Serbian arbitrator; here, however, this is the only
case in which the Convention may apply, as Serbia is a party to the un-
amended version of the Convention.19  Likewise, another Serbian decision
did not apply the Limitation Convention when one party had its place of
15. See Vis˘je sodis˘cˇe v Ljubljani [Ljubljana High Ct.], Oct. 13, 2010, VSL sodba
I Cpg 972/2010 (Slovn.) [CLOUT Case 1154], available at http://www.sodisce.si/
znanje/sodna_praksa/visja_sodisca/2010040815253998.  The parties were located
in Belarus and Slovenia.
16. See Vis˘je sodis˘ce v Ljubljani [Ljubljana High Ct.], Apr. 8, 2010, VSL
odlocba II Cpg 260/2010 (Slovn.), available at http://www.sodisce.si/vislj/
odlocitve/2010040815245114/.  The parties were located in Italy and Slovenia.
17. Slovenia is a party to the amended version of the Convention.  In this
case, since the court found that Italian law applied, and Italy is not a party to the
Limitation Convention, the outcome of the decision would have been similar.
18. See Krajsky´ su´d v Bratislave [Regional Ct. Bratislava], Oct. 11, 2005, KS BA-
26CB/114/1995 (Slovk.), translation available at http://www.cisg.sk/en/26CB-114-
1995.html.  The parties were from Austria and the Slovak Republic.
19. See [Foreign Trade Ct. of Arbitration attached to the Serbian Chamber of
Commerce in Belgrade], Jan. 5, 2007, No. T-13/05 (Serb.) [CLOUT Case 1138],
available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/070105sb.html.
One party had its place of business in Serbia and the other in the United States.
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business in a contracting state and the other did not, but the decision did
not discuss explicitly the applicability of the Limitation Convention.20
Another application of the same rule by a Serbian court21 contains an
element of special interest: the contract had been concluded by a com-
pany with its place of business in Serbia (a state party to the Limitation
Convention) and a company with its place of business in the German
Democratic Republic (another state party to the Limitation Convention)
on December 12, 1989.22  Since the Federal Republic of Germany did not
become a party to the Limitation Convention, the court concluded that
the requirements for the application of the Convention are not met.  How-
ever, the matter deserves further analysis on the application of inter-tem-
poral treaty law as the Limitation Convention was, indeed, in force in both
states at the moment of the conclusion of the contract.23
In line with the above cases, a Montenegrin court observed that Mon-
tenegro was a party to the unamended text of the Limitation Conven-
tion,24 and therefore all parties had to have their places of business in
contracting states for the Convention to apply.25  However, another Mon-
tenegrin court applied the Limitation Convention in a case where one of
the parties had its place of business in a non-contracting state, despite the
fact that Montenegro was, at the time of the judgment, still a party to the
unamended Limitation Convention.26  The court justified its decision with
the international nature of the transaction.
The Polish Supreme Court observed that the Limitation Convention
is not applicable under Article 3(1)(a) and (b) in a case involving an Ital-
20. See [Foreign Trade Ct. of Arbitration attached to the Serbian Chamber of
Commerce in Belgrade], Jan. 24, 2006, No. T-12/04 (Serb.), available at http://
cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/060124sb.html.  The parties were located in Australia
and Serbia.  Serbia is a party to the unamended version of the Limitation
Convention.
21. See Vrhovni sud Srbije u Beogradu, May 28, 2003, Prev. 112/2003 (Serb.)
[CLOUT Case 1131].
22. The German Democratic Republic acceded to the Federal Republic of
Germany effective October 3, 1990.
23. See Martin Karollus, Judicial Interpretation and Application of the CISG in Ger-
many 1988–1994, 1 CORNELL REV. CISG 51, 51 n.11, 52 (1995).  The matter has
been debated by German scholars. See  Fritz Enderlein, Das UN-verja¨hrungsu¨ber-
einkommen und seine Geltung in Deutschland [The UN-Limitation Convention and Its
Applicability in Germany], in DER WEG ZUR DEUTSCHEN RECHTSEINHEIT: INTERNATI-
ONALE UND INTERNE AUSWIRKUNGEN IM PRIVATRECHT 65, 65–81 (Erik Jayme & Oliver
Furtak eds., 1991) (Ger.); Ulrich Magnus, Aktuelle Fragen des UN-Kaufrechts [Current
Issues of UN-Sales Law], 1 ZEITSCHRIFT FU¨R EUROPA¨ISCHES PRIVATRECHT 79, 92–94
(1993) (Ger.); Karsten Thorn, Die UN-Verja¨hrungskonvention und ihre Geltung in
Deutschland [The UN Limitation Convention and Its Validity in Germany], 13
IPRAX 215, 215–16 (1993) (Ger.).
24. The statement was correct at the time the judgment was rendered.
25. See Enker and Zenicˇko-dobojski kanton v. Zeljezara Niksic Lld [Ct. App.
Montenegro], Oct. 8, 2010, Ca. No. Mal. 341/10 (Montenegro) [CLOUT Case
1050].
26. See Mi-Rad Int’l, Inc. v. Top Art Lld [Ct. App. Montenegro], Jan. 22, 2009,
Ca. No. Mal. 418/07 (Montenegro) [CLOUT Case 1053].
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ian party “since Italy is not a party to the Convention.”27  However, it re-
mains unclear which law would be applicable.28  If Polish law were
applicable, the Limitation Convention might apply by virtue of Article
3(1)(b).
A United States court indicated that the Limitation Convention is not
applicable when a party has its place of business in a non-contracting state.
In fact, when the United States acceded to the amended version of the
Convention, it lodged a declaration preventing the application of Article
3(1)(b).29
Article 3(1)(b) of the Limitation Convention refers to the applicabil-
ity of the law of a contracting state to contracts for the sale of goods.  A
Swiss decision illustrated the point by explaining that:
If the conflict of laws rules of the forum State lead to the applica-
tion of the substantive law of a Contracting State to the United
Nations Convention on the Limitation Period in the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods of 14 June 1974, the issue of limitation is to
be determined in accordance with this Convention.30
The court ultimately concluded that the Convention did not apply.
A Hungarian court applied the Limitation Convention on the basis of
the agreement of the parties.31  This argument evokes a rather complex
matter.  The CISG may be applied by virtue of the parties’ choice of law, to
the extent that a choice of non-national law is permissible under applica-
ble law, or that the chosen national law incorporates the CISG; it may also
apply within the limits recognized to contractual freedom, and in that case
its provisions are incorporated in the contract.32  However, similar applica-
tion mechanisms in the field of prescription law, which is more sensitive to
27. See “O.O.” AG in M. v. Leszek W. & Zbigniew W. [Pol. Sup. Ct.], Dec. 19,
2003, Case No. III CK 80/02 (Pol.) [CLOUT Case 1081].  Other cases were de-
cided similarly; see, e.g., [Pol. Sup. Ct.], Nov. 17, 2008, Case No. I CSK 105/08
(Pol.); [Poznan App. Ct.], Jan. 24, 2006, Case No. I ACa 795/05 (Pol.) (between
Polish and Italian parties); see also [Poznan App. Ct.], Aug. 5, 2009, Case No. I ACa
483/09 (between a Polish party and a Belgian party, before the entry into force of
the Limitation Convention for Belgium).
28. The analysis carried out on secondary sources, such as CLOUT abstracts,
is necessarily limited by the amount of information available in those sources.  Ac-
cess to the original texts would, of course, greatly improve the quality of the analy-
sis, which is therefore to be intended as a call to elicit further work on those
original sources.
29. See Maxxsonics USA, Inc. v. Fengshun Peiying Electro Acoustic Co., No. 10
C 1174, 2012 WL 962698, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 21, 2012) [CLOUT Case 1186].
30. See Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal Supreme Court], May 18, 2009, docket
no. 4A_68/2009 (Switz.), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/090518s1.
html.  The private international law rules pointed at Swiss law, and Switzerland is
not a party to the Limitation Convention.
31. See [Heves Cnty. Ct.], Apr. 8, 2008, Case No. 4.G.20.305/2007/20 (Hung.)
[CLOUT Case 1055].
32. See PETER HUBER & ALASTAIR MULLIS, THE CISG: A NEW TEXTBOOK FOR
STUDENTS AND PRACTITIONERS 65–66 (2007).
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matters of public policy, might incur additional hurdles.  In other words,
limitation matters might be more likely to be deemed of mandatory appli-
cation than substantive rules on sale of goods.  Therefore, limitation mat-
ters might be excluded from those left to party autonomy.
Another Hungarian decision seems to exclude the applicability of the
Limitation Convention on the basis of the fact that one party does not
have its place of business in a contracting state.33  However, in the abstract
there is no reference to a discussion of the possible application via rules of
private international law, which is, in principle, possible given that Hun-
gary is a party to the amended version of the Convention.
Interesting examples of the expansive application of the Limitation
Convention come from Croatia, a state that is not a party to the Limitation
Convention.34  In two cases, a Croatian court found that the Limitation
Convention applied, in conjunction with the CISG, where both parties had
their place of business in states where the Limitation Convention is not in
force.35
Similarly, in Cuba the Limitation Convention was applied although
one of the parties was not located in a contracting state.  Cuba is a party to
the amended version of the Limitation Convention.  The court argued in
favor of the applicability of the convention on the basis of its nature of lex
specialis, allowing the provisions of a treaty to prevail over those of national
legislation, as well as the fact that the parties had not opted out of it.  The
CISG was also applied to the case.36
This survey, albeit brief, provides some significant results.  The provi-
sions on the scope of application of the Limitation Convention are not
easily applied.  From the case law available, it may seem that indirect appli-
cation under Article 3(1)(b) is sometimes neglected.  At the same time, a
significant trend towards expansive application is also present.
One possible reason for such expansive application of the Limitation
Convention is the attraction exercised by the CISG.  Another reason is the
desire to apply rules deemed more suitable for transnational matters than
domestic ones.  A third reason could relate to the desire to simplify the
quest for applicable law by preventing the resort to private international
law rules, which are particularly complex in the case of limitation law.
Hence, if the application of a supranational text can be invoked, the
33. See [Hajdu´-Bihar Cnty. Ct. in Debrecen], Apr. 26, 2007, Case No.
5.G.40.127/2007/31 (Hung.) [CLOUT Case 1056].
34. The adoption of the Limitation Convention might be considered by that
country in the near future.
35. See Jelen d.d. v. Malinplast GmbH [High Commercial Ct.], Oct. 30, 2007,
Case No. Pzˇ-1134/05-3 (Croat.) [CLOUT Case 912]; Industria Conciaria S.p.A. v.
Sˇimecki d.o.o. [High Commercial Ct.], July 26, 2005, Pzˇ-2728/04-3 (Croat.)
[CLOUT Case 919].  The abstracts do not provide further information on the judi-
cial reasoning.
36. See Nelson Servizi S.r.l. v. Empresa RC Comercial [Sala de lo Econo´mico
de lo Tribunal Supremo Popular], Apr. 30, 2009, Case No. 3 (Cuba) [CLOUT
Case 1052].
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courts might have a preference for doing so.  At a general level, it should
not be forgotten that cases involving issues of limitation are often difficult
to deal with given the practical challenges of gathering evidence as time
passes.  Therefore, simplification in the form of applicability of uniform
texts may be particularly welcome.
Similar considerations were made with respect to arbitration proceed-
ings,37 where it was suggested that the Limitation Convention should ap-
ply not only under its own terms, but also through the discretionary power
attributed by provisions enacting Article 19(2) of the UNCITRAL Model
Law on International Commercial Arbitration.38
2. Other Issues
While most reported cases on the Limitation Convention deal exclu-
sively or partially with the scope of application, additional issues, touching
on the substance of the treaty, have also been discussed.
With respect to the commencement of the limitation period, dealt
with in Article 10(1) of the Limitation Convention, it was indicated that
the right to a claim arising from a breach of contract begins to run from
the date when the breach of contract occurs.39  In a case relating to partial
payment of the price, the court deemed the date of the order of the goods
to be the date of the breach of contract.40  In another case relating to
partial payment of price, the sole arbitrator considered the dates of deliv-
ery of the goods as relevant for the commencement of the limitation
period.41
Article 19 of the Limitation Convention indicates that a new limita-
tion period shall commence when the creditor performs, under certain
conditions, acts which, under the law of the state in which the debtor has
its place of business, have the effects of recommencing the limitation pe-
riod.  This article needs therefore to be complemented with the relevant
national legislation.  In Hungary, that national legislation was identified in
Articles 327 and 329 of the Civil Code, referring, inter alia, to the suspen-
sion of the limitation period due to a written notice requesting perform-
ance of a claim, the judicial enforcement of a claim, the acknowledgment
of a debt by the obligor, and the assignment of a claim.42
37. See Benjamin Hayward, New Dog, Old Tricks: Solving a Conflict of Laws Prob-
lem in CISG Arbitrations, 26 J. INT’L ARB. 405, 432 (2009).
38. See UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration,
G.A. Res. 61/33, 61st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/33 (Dec. 18, 2006).
39. See Mi-Rad Int’l, Inc. v. Top Art Lld [Ct. App. Montenegro], Jan. 22, 2009,
Ca. No. Mal. 418/07 (Montenegro) [CLOUT Case 1053].
40. Further information on the agreed date of payment is unfortunately not
available in the abstract.
41. See [Foreign Trade Ct. of Arbitration Attached to the Serbian Chamber of
Commerce in Belgrade], Jan. 5, 2007, No. T-13/05 (Serb.) [CLOUT Case 1138].
42. See Fova´rosi Ite´lota´bla [Metropolitan Judicial Board in Budapest], Oct. 9,
2008, Decision No. 14.Gf.40.225/2008/3 (Hung.) [CLOUT Case 1054]; [Heves
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Under Article 20(1) of the Limitation Convention, the limitation pe-
riod shall commence again if the debtor acknowledges in writing its obli-
gation to the creditor before the expiration of the previous limitation
period.  A decision correctly equates the data message (in this case, an e-
mail) to the written form in presence of legislation establishing such func-
tional equivalence.43  Functional equivalence between electronic and pa-
per media is achieved through the identification of the relevant provision
in national legislation, after application of the rules of private interna-
tional law.  At a general level, it should be noted that matters of equiva-
lence between electronic and written form in the Limitation Convention
may be fully addressed by the 2005 United Nations Convention on the Use
of Electronic Communications in International Contracts,44 and, in partic-
ular, its Article 20.
A further matter of special interest relates to the application of the
Limitation Convention to trade taking place in the former Yugoslavia.
Armed conflicts necessarily disrupt commercial relations.  The post-con-
flict peace-building process should bear in mind the necessity of bringing
fairness and predictability to disputes related to commercial relations that
took place before the breaking out of the conflict.  Due to the significant
amount of time often elapsed during the conflict, limitation issues are
likely to be particularly relevant in those cases.
In this regard, it was indicated that Article 21 of the Convention, relat-
ing to cases when the creditor is prevented from causing the limitation
period to cease to run due to circumstances beyond the control of the
creditor and which he could neither avoid nor overcome, applies in cases
of war.45
Article 24 of the Limitation Convention requires that a party shall
invoke the expiration of the limitation period for it to be taken into con-
sideration.  It was clarified that the party should provide evidence of when
the limitation period commences and expires.46  Last, but not least, Arti-
cle 27 of the Limitation Convention has been explicitly cited as a persua-
sive model in a case decided by the Polish Supreme Court and relating to
Cnty. Ct.], Apr. 8, 2008, Case No. 4.G.20.305/2007/20 (Hung.) [CLOUT Case
1055].
43. See LLC Horizont Marketing-Finance-Logistika v. LLC Terkyrii-2 [High
Commercial Ct. of Ukraine], Dec. 17, 2009, Case No. 2009/17/140-3571 (9/56-
1492) (Ukr.) [CLOUT Case 1051].
44. See United Nations Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications
in International Contracts art. 20, Nov. 23, 2005, U.N. Doc. A/60/515 (registration
pending; treaty entered into force on Mar. 1, 2013).
45. See Enker and Zenicˇko-dobojski kanton v. Zeljezara Niksic Lld [Ct. App.
Montenegro], Oct. 8, 2010, Ca. No. Mal. 341/10 (Montenegro) [CLOUT Case
1050].
46. See Vis˘je sodis˘cˇe v. Ljubljani [Ljubljana High Ct.], Oct. 13, 2010, VSL
sodba I Cpg 972/2010 (Slovn.) [CLOUT Case 1154].
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the limitation of claims relating to interests.47  Thus, a provision contained
in the Limitation Convention contributed to fill a legislative gap in Polish
domestic law.
III. CURRENT STATUS OF THE LIMITATION CONVENTION
AND PROSPECTS FOR WIDER ADOPTION
Although the CISG and the Limitation Convention clearly comple-
ment each other, the former has been significantly more successful in
terms of adoption by states than the latter.  Several reasons contribute to
this: lack of resources, including parliamentary time, for international
trade law reform may induce states to prioritize the adoption of the CISG
over that of the Limitation Convention, given the broader scope of the
CISG;48 moreover, the public policy concerns associated with limitation
may mean that additional caution is necessary when considering suprana-
tional uniform texts in this field; finally, at the outset, the Limitation Con-
vention was perceived as a product of the interests of socialist countries
and as such was received with caution in Western and Central Europe.
The adoption of the Limitation Convention in some capitalist countries,
including the United States of America, did not sufficiently change this
perception.49
The Limitation Convention is particularly relevant in certain regions
of the world, namely Eastern Europe and North and Central America,
where it enjoys significant adoption.50  Further expansion of its applica-
tion in those regions would therefore be particularly useful to strengthen
certainty in regional commercial relations.
Additional states became parties to the Limitation Convention at a
regular, albeit reduced pace, and usually in conjunction with the adoption
of the CISG or following that adoption.  In other cases, the consideration
process is still at an early stage.  Thus, in certain countries, such as Japan
and the People’s Republic of China, academics have recommended the
adoption of the Convention.51  In Canada, the Uniform Law Commission
47. See Sad Najwyzszy Izba Cywilna [Civ. Chamber of Sup. Ct.], Jan. 26, 2005,
Case No. III CZP 42/04 (Pol.).
48. See generally Kazuaki Sono, The Limitation Convention: The Forerunner to Es-
tablish UNCITRAL Credibility, 16 PACE INT’L L. REV. 147 (2004).
49. The United States ratified the Limitation Convention on May 5, 1994, i.e.,
twenty years after the adoption of the treaty by a diplomatic conference.
50. The application of the Limitation Convention (as well as that of the
CISG) in Mexico was extended to all contracts for international sale of goods in-
volving a Mexican party and a maritime carriage leg. See Ley de Navegacio´n y
Comercio Marı´timos [LNCM] [Law of Navigation and Maritime Commerce] art.
255, June 1, 2006 (Mex.), available at http://info4.juridicas.unam.mx/ijure/fed/
67/256.htm?s=.
51. See H. Song & J. Zhao, Comments on the Convention on the Limitation Period in
the International Sale of Goods—Discussing the Possibility of Ratifying the Convention, 6 J.
INT’L TRADE 48–52 (1984); Yasutomo Sugiura, Japan After Acceding to the CISG—
Should We Consider Ratifying the Limitation Convention Next?, in TOWARDS UNIFORMITY:
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prepared in 2000 a new Uniform International Sales Conventions Act
meant to deal with several conventions.52  However, the Uniform Interna-
tional Sales Conventions Act has not yet been adopted by any Canadian
jurisdiction for several reasons: limited political visibility and therefore low
priority on the legislative agenda; complexity of dealing with multiple trea-
ties (including the two versions of the Limitation Convention) simultane-
ously; and on-going reform towards even shorter prescription periods (two
years) at the domestic level.  Those arguments do not preclude further
legislative action, provided adequate reasoning and support are given.
One current trend relates to the adoption of the amended version of
the Limitation Convention by those states that have already adopted the
unamended one.  The Dominican Republic and Montenegro have re-
cently done so, in the context of a wider effort to modernize their interna-
tional trade law framework.
Another trend relates to the possible reconsideration of certain decla-
rations lodged upon becoming a party to the treaty, and, in particular, the
one lodged under Article 36 bis of the Limitation Convention (Article XII
of the Protocol), relating to the exclusion of the application of the con-
vention under its Article 3(1)(b) when only one party to a contract for sale
of goods is from a contracting state and that state’s law applies by virtue of
private international law rules.53  This declaration was entered into by
Czechoslovakia and the United States of America.  By introducing this dec-
laration, Socialist Czechoslovakia wished to ensure the application of its
special legislation for foreign trade; reciprocity may have influenced the
adoption of the declaration in the United States.54  The Czech Republic
and Slovakia have carried over the original declarations upon succession
to Czechoslovakia, but have subsequently opted for other forms of eco-
nomic organization and the special legislation meant to be protected has
been abolished for some time.55  As similar declarations lodged when be-
coming a party to the CISG are being reviewed, it is desirable that the
same process is carried out with respect to the Limitation Convention.
Moreover, the Limitation Convention is interesting not only for its
intrinsic technical qualities and for the fact that it sheds light on a particu-
THE 2ND ANNUAL MAA SCHLECHTRIEM CISG CONFERENCE (Ingeborg Schwenzer &
Lisa Spagnolo eds., 2011).
52. See INTERNATIONAL SALES CONVENTIONS ACT (Unif. Law Conference of
Can. 2000), available at http://www.ulcc.ca/en/uniform-acts-en-gb-1/473-interna-
tional-sales-conventions-act/674-international-sales-conventions-act.
53. This mechanism was introduced to reproduce the scope of application
adopted in the CISG.  Kazuaki Sono points out that Article 3 of the Limitation
Convention, as amended, refers to the law applicable to the contract of sale, and
not to the law applicable to the limitation period. See Sono, supra note 48, § IV.C.
54. See Gary F. Bell, Why Singapore Should Withdraw Its Reservation to the United
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG), 9 SING. Y.B.
INT’L L. 55 (2005).
55. See JOSEF FIALA, JAN HURDI´K & KATARINA KIRSTOVA´, CONTRACT LAW IN THE
SLOVAK REPUBLIC 22 (2010).
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larly intricate area of the law of sale of goods.  At times of repeated calls
for further codification of uniform texts, it seems particularly advisable to
seek careful coordination between regional and global levels, and to capi-
talize on existing texts by using them as building blocks towards the estab-
lishment of a broader legislative framework.  Hence, the Limitation
Convention is now receiving renewed interest in light of a global trend
that sees legislative reform towards a reduction of the time period neces-
sary for limitation and, at the same time, increased difficulty in ascertain-
ing applicable law, in part due to that legislative reform activity.
Some recent efforts to modernize limitation law have given due recog-
nition to the existence of the Limitation Convention, though they have
not necessarily led to new adoptions of that Convention.56  However, this
was not always the case.  Recently, the Explanatory Memorandum of the
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council
on a Common European Sales Law explains, with respect to the CISG, that
“[t]he Vienna Convention regulates certain aspects in contracts of sales of
goods but leaves important matters outside its scope, such as defects in
consent, unfair contract terms and prescription,”57 but does not mention
the existence of the Limitation Convention, despite the fact that eight of
the twenty-seven European Union member states are a party to it.58
A detailed comparison of the draft provisions of the Common Euro-
pean Sales Law with those of the Limitation Convention would be highly
useful.  Awareness of the need for this type of work seems to be growing.59
At a very preliminary level, it should be noted that draft Articles 178
and 179 of the Common European Sales Law introduce the notion of a
short period of prescription, applicable to the creditor, and of a long pe-
riod of prescription, applicable to the debtor, as well as that of presump-
tive commencement of the prescription period from the time when the
creditor “could be expected to have become aware of the facts as a result
of which the right can be exercised.”60  However, long-distance commer-
cial relations require certainty and therefore are based, to the extent possi-
ble, on objective, rather than subjective circumstances.  This approach was
56. See CONFE´DE´RATION SUISSE [SWISS CONFEDERATION], CODE DES OBLIGATIONS
[CO] [CODE OF OBLIGATIONS], RAPPORT RELATIF A` L’AVANT-PROJET, § 3.2.2 (2011)
(Switz.), available at http://www.ejpd.admin.ch/content/dam/data/wirtschaft/
gesetzgebung/verjaehrungsfristen/vn-ber-f.pdf.
57. Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the
Council on a Common European Sales Law, at 5, COM (2011) 635 final (Oct. 11,
2011).
58. Those eight states are: Belgium, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Norway,
Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.  Bulgaria is a signatory of the un-
amended version of the Limitation Convention but has not yet ratified it.
59. See Prescription in the Proposal for a Common European Sales Law, PARL.
EUR. DOC. PE 462.466 (2012).  This document, which formulates a number of re-
marks on the draft articles on prescription of the Common European Sales Law,
also makes reference to certain provisions of the Limitation Convention.
60. Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a Common Euro-
pean Sales Law, at 108, COM (2011) 635 final (Nov. 10, 2011).
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adopted in Article 10 of the Limitation Convention and seems preferable.
The mechanism adopted in the draft Common European Sales Law seems
more adequate for consumer protection, which is a main goal of that text.
Legislative techniques for consumer protection and long-range commer-
cial transactions seem, however, still remarkably different.61
IV. CONCLUSION
The relevance of the Limitation Convention in judicial practice seems
higher than the attention it usually receives from doctrine and practition-
ers.  While a significant number of states have already adopted the treaty,
additional effort should be made to promote it.62  Moreover, special atten-
tion should be given to coordinate law reform efforts in the field of pre-
scription of contractual actions with the provisions of this text.
Case law indicates that there is a desire on the part of courts to take
advantage of the existence of the Convention.  Cases dealing with limita-
tion in cross-border trade are particularly complex, and accordingly the
contribution to the predictability of the rule of law provided by a uniform
text is appreciated.  Hence, states that are already parties to the CISG, or
that are considering becoming parties, should take into consideration the
possibility of adopting the Limitation Convention, too.  Statistically, it is
interesting to note that, due to the pattern of regional and sub-regional
trade, often the Limitation Convention has not been applied in cases in
which one party has its place of business in a contracting state, and the
other party has its place of business in Austria or Italy.  If the provisions of
the Limitation Convention are considered adequate for the needs of cross-
border trade, those two states, both already parties to the CISG, might
wish to give careful consideration to the benefits arising from the adop-
tion of the Convention.
61. The Draft Common European Sales Law has generated significant discus-
sion.  The difficulty of reconciling the goals of consumer protection and facilita-
tion of cross-border trade among professionals is one point often made among
many commentators. See Vincent Heuze´, Le technocrate et l’imbe´cile: Essai d’explication
du droit commun europe´en de la vente, 25 SEMAINE JURIDIQUE 1225, 1225–32 (2012)
(Fr.); Nicole Kornet, The Common European Sales Law and the CISG—Complicating or
Simplifying the Legal Environment?, 19 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 164, 164–79
(2012) (Neth.).
62. See Ingeborg Schwenzer & Simon Manner, The Claim is Time-Barred: The
Proper Limitation Regime for International Sales Contracts in International Commercial Ar-
bitration, 23 ARB. INT’L 293, 307 (2007) (discussing limitation period issues in arbi-
tral proceedings, recognizing that Limitation Convention “would be appropriate
in the overwhelming majority of cases,” but adding that Limitation Convention
finds rare application due to its limited acceptance, and suggesting therefore re-
course to provisions on limitation of Unidroit Principles of International Commer-
cial Contracts).  While that solution might be acceptable given the flexibility of
arbitrators and parties to arbitral proceedings in identifying the applicable law,
judges and parties to court proceedings may not enjoy a similar freedom.  Formal
adoption of the treaty seems therefore the most desirable solution.
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The existence of two different versions of the Limitation Convention
adds complexity to its interpretation.  To avoid such complications, states
that are parties to the unamended version of the Limitation Convention
should become parties to the amended text.  This applies, in particular, to
those states that are already parties to the CISG.
Finally, when a state becomes a party to the Limitation Convention,
special attention should be given to the rule contained in Article 43 bis of
the Convention, indicating that, unless otherwise specified, the state be-
comes a party to the unamended version of the Convention only.  This
might lead to a result contrary to the intention of the state as well as to the
prevailing trend towards expansion of the scope of application of the Lim-
itation Convention and its alignment with that of the CISG.
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UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES AS A SOURCE FOR GLOBAL SALES LAW
HENRY DEEB GABRIEL*
THE germination period for the United Nations Convention on Con-tracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) was forty-five years,
and once it was completed it was slow to be adopted.  It is now showing its
age, and the question has been posed as to whether it is time to revise or
expand its scope.  Given its history, though, whether a revision or expan-
sion of the CISG is a viable project that justifies the resources is subject to
serious question.
Among the problems this project might encounter is a lack of re-
sources, a clear articulation of the need for the project, the inability to
define its scope, and the likelihood of widespread ratification within a rea-
sonable time.  Recent attempts to revise domestic and regional laws are
instructive about the possible problems this project may have.
It may be that the barriers for a future convention on global contract
law is not a realistic project, and the more recent path of soft law instru-
ments, such as the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial
Contracts (Principles), is a more viable method of providing global uni-
formity in contracts.  Alternatively, another path is to replicate the crea-
tion of the CISG by relying on an initial product from UNIDROIT that
provides for UNIDROIT’s distinct working methods, and then have that
work as the basis for a convention on global contract law, through the
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL).
This would entail a close working relationship between UNIDROIT and
UNCITRAL.
I. A NEW PROJECT?
At the last Plenary Meeting of UNCITRAL in the summer of 2012, the
government of Switzerland proposed that UNCITRAL undertake a project
to develop an instrument, presumably a binding convention,1 to harmo-
nize principles of contract law (hereinafter the proposal).2  The scope of
the project proposed is very ambitious.3
* Professor of Law, Elon University; member of the drafting committee and
chair of the editorial committee of the 2010 UNIDROIT Principles of
International Commercial Contracts.
1. The proposal cites as one of the faults of the UNIDROIT Principles of In-
ternational Commercial Contracts, and therefore as a justification of the new pro-
ject, the fact that the Principles are not binding law. See UNCITRAL, Possible Future
Work in the Area of International Contract Law: Proposal by Switzerland on Possible Future
Work by UNCITRAL in the Area of International Contract Law, at 4–5, U.N. Doc. A/
CN.9/758 (May 8, 2012) [hereinafter Proposal].
2. See id. at 3.
3. The proposal sets out the following as possible topics:
(661)
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The proposal was met with some strong opposition, and there was no
strong support for it.4  Regardless, it was concluded that the Secretariat
should organize colloquia and undertake further study of the project.5
This conference is part of the Secretariat’s mandate.  In this paper I ex-
amine whether this project is a feasible one, and if so, whether UNIDROIT
and its work can play a significant role in the forging of a global contract
law.
Initially it must be recognized that the proposal asserts, but does not
demonstrate a need for, an international convention on contract law.
Before discussing the possible need for the project, as an initial inquiry, I
would like to address what may be some drawbacks to UNCITRAL under-
taking this project.
[G]eneral provisions, among others: freedom of contract, freedom of
form; formation of contract, among others: offer, acceptance, modifica-
tion, discharge by assent, standard terms, battle of forms, electronic con-
tracting; agency, among others: authority, disclosed/undisclosed agency,
liability of the agent; validity, among others: mistake, fraud, duress, gross
disparity, unfair terms, illegality; construction of contract, among others:
interpretation, supplementation, practices and usages; conditions; third
party rights; performance of contract, among others: time, place, cur-
rency, costs; remedies for breach of contract, among others: right to with-
hold performance, specific performance, avoidance, damages,
exemptions; consequences of unwinding; set-off; assignment and delega-
tion, among others: assignment of rights, delegation of performance of
duty, transfer of contracts; limitation; joint and several obligors and
obligees.
Id. at 7 n.4.
4. A summary of the debate is contained in the Report of the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law. See Rep. of United Nations Comm’n on
Int’l Trade, June 25–July 6, 2012, ¶¶ 127–32, U.N. Doc. A/67/17, 45th Sess. [here-
inafter UNCITRAL Report].  In the United States, the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws has also come out against the proposal.
There are several areas for suggested coverage in the proposal that would be of
particular concern for American law.  These include the general difficulty with
reconciling American law and the common law with other legal traditions—for
example, defects of consent, the nature of software contracts, consumer contracts,
unfair contracts, and, pre-contractual information duties.
5. The official report states the following:
After discussion, it was determined that there was a prevailing view in
support of requesting the Secretariat to organize symposiums and other
meetings, including at the regional level and within available resources,
maintaining close cooperation with U[NIDROIT], with a view to compil-
ing further information to assist the Commission in the assessment of the
desirability and feasibility of future work in the field of general contract
law at a future session.  Many delegates, however, urged that priority
should be given to other work of the Commission, in particular in the
area of microfinance.  A number of delegates expressed clear opposition
and strong reservations with regard to further work in the field of general
contract law.  In addition, several delegates, noting the significant opposi-
tion to the proposal by Switzerland, objected to the characterization of
the debate on that topic as reflecting a prevailing majority view in favour
of additional work.
Id. ¶ 132.
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A. Limited Resources
UNCITRAL is facing significant budget pressures, as are many of its
member states.  Given this, the proposal, which would take many years to
complete and which would use significant resources of UNCITRAL, would
appear to need a strong justification for moving forward.  Because the
member states will have the final decision whether to go forward with the
proposal, those states that have raised the issue of resources for this pro-
ject6 can be expected to continue with this objection.
It should also be noted that after several decades of work, UNIDROIT
has recently completed Part III of the UNIDROIT Principles at a substan-
tial allocation of the financial resources available to UNIDROIT.  Several
countries that are members of both UNIDROIT and UNCITRAL have sug-
gested that this project would be redundant and repetitive of work already
completed, and therefore would be a waste of limited resources available
for UNCITRAL’s other work.7
B. Flawed Justifications
The proposal suggests two major reasons for the need of a new instru-
ment.  Neither is supported by any empirical evidence.  First, it is sug-
gested that “[i]t goes without saying that different domestic laws form an
obstacle for international trade . . . .”8  At best, this is anecdotal and un-
proven.  The fact that parties still routinely opt out of the CISG would
belie this assertion.  Second, it is suggested that “[t]oday’s international
sales practice shows that contracts—by the choice of the parties—tend to
be governed by a closed circle of domestic laws . . . .”9  Assuming this is
true, it alone does not justify a global contract law, as there is no evidence
that parties who choose a specific domestic law to govern their transac-
tions are unhappy with their choices.
Evidence suggests just the opposite.  It is not the specific law gov-
erning the transaction that parties are normally concerned about.  Usu-
ally, the concern by parties is knowing with certainty in advance which law
will govern the transaction in order to be able to contract around the de-
fault provisions.
Implicit, but not stated in the proposal, is the assumption that one
party may be disadvantaged by current choice of law provisions that favor
an existing law.  Yet there is no evidence that a specific commonly used law
of contract actually disfavors any parties.  Nor is there any evidence that
the parties that are now choosing a specific law under a choice of law
6. See id. ¶ 130.
7. See id. ¶ 131.
8. Proposal, supra note 1, at 2.
9. Id. at 3.
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clause will somehow be dissuaded from making the same choice in the
future.10
C. Need
The proposal suggests the need for both a revision of the present pro-
visions of the CISG as well as an expansion of the scope of the sales con-
vention.11  The probability of either occurring is not likely.
1. Revising the CISG
Before undertaking a revision of the CISG, two considerations must
be examined: whether there are substantial existing flaws in the CISG that
need to be remedied, and the likelihood that the project would be success-
ful.  As to the first question, there is no evidence that serious flaws in the
existing CISG have been articulated.12  It is neutral and does not favor any
particular party.  Its wide use suggests it has not found any major detrac-
tors among potential users.  In fact, the CISG has been “a worldwide suc-
cess.”13  At present, with seventy-eight contracting states, it has been one
of the most successful private international law treaties ever entered into
force.14
Moreover, to the extent that parties are dissatisfied with any of the
provisions of the CISG, these provisions can be easily and effectively modi-
fied to meet the parties’ requirements.15  The CISG, as with all modern
sales codes, is primarily a set of default rules that can easily be modified or
disclaimed.16  This inherent flexibility allows the maximum in party auton-
omy and therefore militates against the need for revision.
The larger problem that arises is not the substance of the CISG, but
the process by which it would be revised.  Although the CISG is one of the
more successful international commercial instruments, having been rati-
fied by seventy-eight countries, it took years before it became widely rati-
fied.  Promulgated by UNCITRAL in 1980, the United States became a
party only in 1989, Japan in 2008.  The Scandinavian countries have just
ratified Part II this year.  Given this slow and uneven adoption, there has
justifiably been great reluctance to reopen the CISG.
10. If the parties have bothered to put in a choice of law clause, the parties
presumably know to contract around those provisions of the law they have chosen
that do not reflect the agreement they wish to have.
11. See Proposal, supra note 1, at 6–8.
12. See, e.g., Henry Deeb Gabriel, The CISG: Raising the Fear of Nothing, 9
VINDOBONA J. INT’L COM. L. & ARB. 219, 219 (2005).
13. INGEBORG SCHWENZER, PASCAL HACHEM & CHRISTOPHER KEE, GLOBAL
SALES AND CONTRACT LAW ¶ 3.20 (2012).
14. For a discussion on how the CISG has been a source for other law, see
supra note 13, ¶¶ 3.20–.24.
15. See Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods art. 6,
Apr. 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CISG], available at http://www.uncitral
.org/pdf/english/texts/sales/cisg/V1056997-CISG-e-book.pdf.
16. See id.
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It is worthwhile to remember that originally the 2005 UNCITRAL
Electronic Commerce Convention was intended to amend the CISG, but
quickly morphed into a free-standing instrument because of the fear of
reopening the CISG.  These reservations still justifiably exist.  The particu-
lar concern is the possibility of two competing instruments—an original
and a revised CISG.
2. Expanding Scope Beyond the CISG
To draft a global contracts law convention more expansive than the
CISG, as suggested in the proposal,17 will require coverage of subject areas
specifically chosen not to be covered by the CISG, and many of these areas
were not covered because of the difficulty of universal consensus.  Thus,
for example, the proposal suggests rules to govern the validity of con-
tracts.18  This is one area that the drafters of the CISG not only did not
provide for, but specifically added an article to exclude it from the scope
of the convention.19
It is not persuasive that because some of these topics are covered in
the UNIDROIT Principles, that they are easily accommodated in a binding
17. See Proposal, supra note 1, at 3.
18. For example, issues of substantive validity were generally excluded from
the scope of the CISG pursuant to Article 4, based primarily on a Secretariat report
finding that: (1) these issues rarely arise, and that there was no indication that
differences in the laws in respect to contract validity lead to significant problems in
international trade; and (2) “rules on duress, or similar rules on usury, uncon-
scionable contracts, good faith in performance and the like serve as a vehicle by
which the political, social, and economic philosophy of the society is made effec-
tive in respect of contracts,” and:
[I]t is by the extensive or the restrictive interpretation of such rules that
many legal systems have effected the balance between a philosophy of
sanctity of contract with the security of transactions which that affords
and a philosophy of protecting the weaker party to a transaction at the
cost of rendering contracts less secure.
U.N. Secretary-General, Formation and Validity of Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods: Rep. of the Secretary-General, ¶¶ 25–26, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/128, Annex II (Feb.
3, 1977), reprinted in [1977] 8 Y.B. Comm’n on Int’l Trade L. 93, U.N. Doc. A/
CN.9/SER.A/1977.  States subsequently decided to exclude specific rules on valid-
ity with regard to mistake because of their inconsistent treatment under various
legal systems. See Rep. of the Working Group, Sept. 19–Sept. 30, 1977, ¶¶ 48–69, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.9/142, 9th Sess., reprinted in [1978] 9 Y.B. Comm’n on Int’l Trade L.
61, 65–66, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/SER.A/1978 (discussing decision to exclude specific
rules on validity, particularly with regard to mistake).  Similarly, efforts to address
issues related to agency were not successful. See, e.g., Rep. of the Working Group, Jan.
27–Feb. 7, 1975, ¶ 47, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/100, 6th Sess., reprinted in [1975] 6 Y.B.
Comm’n on Int’l Trade L. 49, 53, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/SER.A/1975 (“There was
opposition to a special article on agency relationships in a convention on sales and
no consensus was reached on the adoption of this proposal.  At the same time it
was agreed to delete any reference to agency relationship in other articles of the
Convention . . . .”).  UNIDROIT subsequently developed a Convention on Agency
in the International Sale of Goods, but only a few countries have ratified it and it
has never entered into force. See United Nations Convention on Agency in the
International Sale of Goods, Feb. 17, 1983, 22 I.L.M. 249.
19. See CISG, supra note 15, art. 4.
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convention.  As is discussed below, both the working methods of
UNIDROIT, as well as the differences between the soft law nature of the
UNIDROIT Principles and the binding nature of the CISG as a conven-
tion, do not allow for an easy adaptation in convention form of all of the
areas covered in the UNIDROIT Principles.
It is worth noting that the proposal also suggests some areas of cover-
age that are beyond what would normally be found in general contract
law.20  For example, shipping terms are suggested as a topic.21  This seems
an odd addition.  Shipping terms are not part of the general law of con-
tract, and there is no international consensus on standard shipping terms.
The INCOTERMS22 come close, and there appears to be no problem that
needs to be addressed in this area.
II. HAS UNIDROIT ALREADY DONE THE WORK?
If the proposal becomes a working project, as the proposal is, to a
significant extent, a proposal to cover areas already covered in the
UNIDROIT Principles, the result of the project would be to create a bind-
ing convention out of what is presently a soft law instrument.23  Thus, any
significant justification for the proposal must be based on the need to sup-
plement or supplant the UNIDROIT Principles with a similar binding
convention.
It must also be noted that the UNIDROIT Principles have had rela-
tively little usage and impact since first promulgated in 1994.  Unless there
is some compelling distinction between the Principles and a binding con-
vention that suggests a greater likelihood of party usage of the convention,
the need for the convention would appear already to be shown as
minimal.
That the convention would be binding where the UNIDROIT Princi-
ples are not does not suggest a need for the project.  Moreover, even with
a binding convention, there is the question of whether parties would rou-
tinely opt out of its application, or whether countries would even see the
need to ratify the convention in the first place.  Both of the concerns go to
the larger question of whether the members of UNCITRAL are willing to
commit to the long process of drafting a global sales law convention with-
out more evidence of a compelling need.
The proposal suggests that a convention is necessary to supplant the
UNIDROIT Principles because courts are reluctant to give effect to soft
law instruments.24  However, lawyers appreciate the difference between a
20. See Proposal, supra note 1, at 7 n.4.
21. See id.  For an exhaustive list of Switzerland’s proposed areas of coverage,
see supra note 3.
22. Int’l Chamber of Commerce, Incoterms 2000, ICC Pub. no. 560 (2000).
23. See Proposal, supra note 1, at 4–5 (explicitly stating that goal of project is to
create binding convention out of soft law instrument).
24. See id. at 5.
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choice of law provision and the incorporation of the Principles as terms to
an agreement, and it is quite easy to choose the Principles as governing
the contractual relationship if parties wish.
There is an assumption in the proposal that if UNIDROIT could
agree on these areas of contract, a convention could be negotiated along
the same lines.  As will be discussed below, this ignores core differences
between the UNIDROIT Principles and a binding UNCITRAL convention.
The fact that the UNIDROIT Principles are non-binding and therefore do
not have the same importance and urgency, a binding convention creates
some distinct advantages.
However, before addressing the questions of whether the convention
would serve important functions not met by the UNIDROIT Principles
and whether the drafting of a convention on global contract law in and of
itself is a feasible project, I want to first examine the advantages that the
UNIDROIT Principles have as a soft law instrument.
A. General Advantages
In many circumstances, particularly in the area of private interna-
tional law, soft law instruments,25 such as the Principles, have advantages
over conventions and treaties.  For example, non-binding general princi-
ples can achieve the goal of uniform, or at least harmonized law,26 be-
25. Non-binding legal principles are often referred to as “soft law.”  “ ‘[S]oft
law’ is understood as referring in general to instruments of a normative nature
with no legally binding force, and which are applied only through voluntary ac-
ceptance . . . .”  Michael Joachim Bonell, Soft Law and Party Autonomy: The Case of the
UNIDROIT Principles, 51 LOY. L. REV. 229, 229 (2005).  These are generally estab-
lished legal rules that are not positive law and are therefore not judicially binding.
See id.  The various soft law instruments in international commercial law include
model laws, a codification of custom and usage promulgated by an international
non-governmental organization, the promulgation of international trade terms,
model forms, contracts, restatements by leading scholars and experts, or interna-
tional conventions. See id.  Although soft law principles do not begin as positive
law, they can of course become positive law both by adoption by courts or tribunals
or by adoption in the agreements of transactional parties. See id.
26. UNCITRAL notes the following distinction between harmonization and
unification:
“Harmonization” and “unification” of the law of international trade refers
to the process through which the law facilitating international commerce
is created and adopted.  International commerce may be hindered by fac-
tors such as the lack of a predictable governing law or out-of-date laws
unsuited to commercial practice.  The United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law identifies such problems and then carefully
crafts solutions which are acceptable to States having different legal sys-
tems and levels of economic and social development.
“Harmonization” may conceptually be thought of as the process
through which domestic laws may be modified to enhance predictability
in cross-border commercial transactions.  “Unification” may be seen as
the adoption by States of a common legal standard governing particular
aspects of international business transactions.  A model law or a legislative
guide is an example of a text which is drafted to harmonize domestic law,
while a convention is an international instrument which is adopted by
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cause there is less necessity to accommodate various legal traditions or
domestic laws.  Also, they may be adopted in part as well as a whole,
thereby providing flexibility for an easier basis for adoption in a given
court or arbitration because there is less conflict between the international
and the domestic law as there would be in the case of a binding conven-
tion.27  In addition, because there is no need to have principles adopted
by a given jurisdiction, the principles are more easily and readily available
for use.  Since these principles are not binding, their likely effect is more
to set norms instead of hard and fast rules, while still achieving the goal of
creating broad international standards.28
States for the unification of the law at an international level.  Texts result-
ing from the work of UNCITRAL include conventions, model laws, legal
guides, legislative guides, rules, and practice notes.  In practice, the two
concepts are closely related.
FAQ—Origin, Mandate and Composition of UNCITRAL, UNCITRAL, http://www.un
citral.org/uncitral/en/about/origin_faq.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2013).  I think
this distinction is important because many, including myself, see true international
unification as a goal that may not be possible given the different legal traditions in
the world.  Harmonization, on the other hand, is a much more reachable goal.
27. In addition to the UNIDROIT Principles, some of the other more success-
ful soft law instruments are the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, the more recent
UNIDROIT Principles and Rules of Transnational Civil Procedure, and the UNCI-
TRAL legislative guide to secured transactions.  Private organizations, such as the
International Chamber of Commerce, have a long history of drafting very success-
ful soft law documents.  In the case of the ICC, this would include the highly influ-
ential INCOTERMS (shipping terms) and the Uniform Customs and Practice for
Documentary Credits (letters of credit).
28. Of the three major international governmental organizations that are del-
egated the task to produce international commercial law instruments—UNCI-
TRAL, UNIDROIT, and the Hague Conference on Private International Law—two
of the organizations, UNIDROIT and UNCITRAL, have been quite active in pro-
ducing soft law instruments because of these broad advantages for soft law
instruments.
UNCITRAL is a subsidiary body of the General Assembly of the United Na-
tions, established in 1966.  The Commission has a general mandate to harmonize
and unify the law of international trade.  Since its founding, UNCITRAL has pre-
pared a wide range of conventions, model laws, and other instruments that deal
with the substantive law that governs trade transactions or other aspects of business
law which have an impact on international trade.  UNCITRAL is made up of sixty
member states from five regional groups.  Members of the Commission are elected
for terms of six years.  The terms of half the members expire every three years.
Membership will increase to sixty member states over the next few years to provide
greater representation.
UNIDROIT is an independent intergovernmental organization with its seat in
Rome.  The purpose of UNIDROIT is to study the needs and the methods for
modernizing and harmonizing private law, particularly commercial law, at the in-
ternational level.  UNIDROIT was created in 1926 as an auxiliary organ of the
League of Nations.  Following the demise of the League of Nations, UNIDROIT
was reestablished in 1940 on the basis of a multilateral agreement.  This agreement
is known as the UNIDROIT Statute, and the membership of UNIDROIT is re-
stricted to states that have acceded to the statute.  There are presently fifty-nine
member states.
The Hague Conference on Private International Law consists of sixty-four
member states.  The First Session of the Hague Conference on Private Interna-
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Although suggested in the proposal that parties are disadvantaged by
non-binding rules such as the Principles,29 the proposal presents no evi-
dence of this.  In fact, in many areas, well-known soft law instruments have
become the international standards, and there has never been any sugges-
tion that these instruments suffer any usage or recognition disabilities.
Thus, for example, the UCP 60030 and the INCOTERMS,31 are so com-
monly used and accepted today that they often govern by default, absent a
contrary party agreement.
B. Harmonization of the Positive Law Is Fraught with Difficulties
A UNCITRAL convention on global sales law would not be drafted in
a vacuum, but would be drafted with the backdrop of the CISG as well as
the various domestic laws of the member states.  In the case of a new treaty
or convention, there is the strong desire by the adopting jurisdictions to
have the treaty or convention be consistent with the domestic law of the
jurisdiction.32  Yet, the ability to harmonize a new treaty or convention
with existing domestic or international law is subject to a variety of difficul-
ties.33  This is particularly the case if there is an existing convention or
treaty such as the CISG being revised instead of being drafted anew.  Con-
tional Law was convened in 1893 by the Netherlands on the initiative of T.M.C.
Asser, who won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1911.  Subsequent sessions were held in
1894, 1900, 1904, 1925, and 1928.  The Seventh Session was held in 1951, and this
session culminated with the preparation of a statute, which made the Conference a
permanent intergovernmental organization.  The statute entered into force on
July 15, 1955.  Since 1956, regular Plenary Sessions have been held every four
years.  Under the statute, the Netherlands Standing Government Committee on
Private International Law ensures the operation of the Conference.
29. See Proposal, supra note 1, at 5.
30. Int’l Chamber of Commerce, Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary
Credits 600, ICC Pub. no. 600 (July 1, 2007).
31. Incoterms 2000, supra note 22.
32. This, of course, may include international laws that are part of the domes-
tic law of a given jurisdiction.
33. Thus, for example, after twelve years of work revising the American Uni-
form Commercial Code, the fruits of attempting to harmonize the Uniform Com-
mercial Code with the CISG were reduced to the following prefatory comment:
When the parties enter into an agreement for the international sale of
goods, because the United States is a party to the Convention, the appli-
cable law may be the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods (CISG).  Since many of the provisions of the
CISG appear quite similar to provisions in Article 2, early in the process
of drafting the amendments the drafting committee considered making
references in the Official Comments to similar provisions in the CISG.
However, upon reflection, the drafting committee concluded that these
references should not be included because their inclusion might suggest
a greater similarity between the Article 2 and the CISG than in fact exists.
Henry Deeb Gabriel, Universalism and Tradition: The Use of Non-Binding Principles in
International Commercial Law, in LIBER MEMORIALIS: UNIVERSALISM, TRADITION, AND
THE INDIVIDUAL 474 n.15 (Petar Sˇarcˇevic´ ed., 2006).
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versely, soft law instruments such as the UNIDROIT Principles were not
subject to the same pressure to be harmonized with existing law.
As for a private international law convention such as the proposal for
a global sales law, inevitably the actual and perceived problems of the ex-
isting statute, which will be primarily the CISG, would have to be ad-
dressed.  With the revision of an existing convention or treaty, the focus
tends to be inward-looking and focused on the existing convention or
treaty itself.  In addition, the revisers of an existing convention or treaty
will bring to the process their familiarity with the existing convention or
treaty.  As such, it is likely that they are less familiar with other laws that
might be appropriate to consider for purposes of drafting the ideal instru-
ment that is most compatible with modern business practices.  Moreover,
to the extent that there is a push to harmonize across the different legal
traditions of the various states involved in the drafting of the convention
or treaty, compromises, both in the language as well as the legal concepts,
may have to be made which do not necessarily reflect the best view, but
simply a view that all parties can agree upon as consistent with their inter-
nal law.34
This is not the case with soft law instruments, and the UNIDROIT
Principles are an example of this.  With the Principles, it was not necessary
to attempt to harmonize the entirety of any specific jurisdiction or any
international convention, such as the CISG.  Instead, without the internal
pressure to conform to a specific law, the drafters were able to pick provi-
sions selectively among many sources to meet a specific need.  This pro-
cess of picking and choosing provided for systematic reflection on what
should be the best result, and not simply a possible result.
C. No Need to Accommodate Specific Legal Traditions or National Laws
As will certainly be the case in the proposed global contract law con-
vention, there would be a strong tendency toward the creation of an in-
strument that would reflect the legal traditions of the potential adopting
states because treaties and conventions must be fashioned in a way to en-
courage adoption by various states, in order to create a high comfort level
with the appropriateness of the instrument.  This would inevitably result in
an attempt to reconcile differing legal traditions, and would create
problems both in terms of the time necessary to finish the instrument as
well as the actual substance of the resulting convention.
Preparation of international commercial law conventions and treaties
tends to be a long process, and part of the long length of time is attributa-
ble to the incessant search for common principles and the reconciliation
34. Much of the success of the CISG, for example, is based on the fact that the
CISG is not based on any particular set of underlying established domestic legal
principles, and instead, was drafted to be independent of, rather than to work in
conjunction with, any particular domestic law.  To the extent that one can attach a
specific legal tradition to the CISG, it is a blend of both the common law and
civilian traditions.
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of established principles from different legal systems and traditions.  This
need was a large part of the reason why the CISG took years to prepare
even though it began with the template of the Hague Sales Convention.
Moreover, the CISG is fairly limited in its coverage, and to a large
extent this is due to the inability to reconcile the major legal traditions.
For example, questions of validity, title, and property rights35 are specifi-
cally excluded from the CISG, as are consumer contracts36 and product
liability actions.37  Yet, these are some of the proposed coverage areas in
the global contract law proposal.38
Possibly more important, the need to accommodate specific legal tra-
ditions locks the drafters into a straightjacket of limited possibilities that
often prevents the examination for the best solution.  This is often politi-
cally driven.  The late Professor Allan Farnsworth, for example, describes
what distinguished the work leading to the CISG, in which he was an
American delegate, and the work leading to the UNIDROIT Principles, in
which he was a member of the working group: “While the atmosphere in
UNCITRAL was political (because delegates represented governments,
which were grouped in regional blocs), that in UNIDROIT was apolitical
(because participants appeared in their private capacity).”39
For this reason, the UNIDROIT Principles are viewed as “neutral”
contract law principles in that they reflect a balance of interests and have
not been formulated by any government.  It is not clear that the CISG has
this level of neutrality or whether a new expanded draft could be neutral
either.
D. No Need for Ratification
Soft law, unlike treaties and conventions, are not subject to the
lengthy process of ratification that can hold up enforcement for years.40
For example, one of the most successful international conventions in re-
cent times, the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and En-
forcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention), was
completed in 1958 but not ratified by the United States until 1970.  More-
over, although the New York Convention has been very successful, this has
not been the case with many recent international commercial law conven-
35. See CISG, supra note 15, arts. 4(a)–(b).
36. See id. art. 2(a).
37. See id. art. 5.
38. See Proposal, supra note 1, at 7 n.4.
39. E. Allan Farnsworth, The American Provenance of the UNIDROIT Principles, 72
TUL. L. REV. 1985, 1989 (1998).
40. This can be the case with domestic law as well.  For example, after a thir-
teen year drafting process of the revisions of Article Two of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code, the revisions were withdrawn from consideration a decade later after
there had been no adoptions by any states. See Henry Deeb Gabriel, The 2003
Amendments of Article Two of the Uniform Commercial Code: Eight Years or a Lifetime After
Completion, 52 S. TEX. L. REV. 487, 493 (2011).
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tions.41  In addition, in a federal system, such as the United States, Ca-
nada, or Mexico, ratification often entails complicated political
maneuvering between the federal and the state or provincial
governments.42
It has been suggested that soft law instruments, such as the Principles,
have been successful precisely because:
[T]hey are not binding, have not been influenced by govern-
ments and do not pose any threat to national legal systems.  Like
the UNCITRAL Model Law on Arbitration, they are designed to
be a unifying influence and a resource, but it is left to legisla-
tures, courts and arbitral tribunals to decide to what extent they
assist in the solution of problems.43
E. Flexible Guidance for Tribunals
Soft law instruments, such as principles and restatements, have been
widely used by courts and arbitrations as a basis for forging new legal rules,
as well as interpreting existing ones.  In the common law world, particu-
larly the United States, courts have long relied upon the various Restate-
ments of the Law produced by the American Law Institute as a source of
law.  Moreover, arbitration tribunals, which are generally not bound by
domestic choice of law restrictions, often adopt legal rules, such as the
UNIDROIT Principles, because of the neutrality of the rules.  This flexible
use, which allows dynamic growth of the law, is not possible through a
fixed, adopted text such as a convention.
Moreover, soft law is often used as a basis for gap fillers when the
otherwise applicable international or domestic law does not address the
specific question.  For example, because the UNIDROIT Principles have a
broader scope than the CISG, the Principles have been used to resolve
questions not addressed by the CISG.44
41. The 1964 Convention relating to a Uniform Law on the International Sale
of Goods, which was the basis for the CISG, has only been ratified by eight coun-
tries. See Convention on International Sale of Goods and Formation of Contracts
for International Sale of Goods, July 1, 1964, 3 I.L.M. 854.
42. Obviously, a similar problem exists between the European Union and its
member states.
43. Roy Goode, Communication on European Contract Law (n.d.), available
at http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/cons_int/safe_shop/fair_bus_pract/cont_
law/comments/5.6.pdf.
44. See, e.g., Hideo Yoshimoto v. Canterbury Golf Int’l Ltd. (2001) 1 NZLR
523 (CA) 547 (N.Z.), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/001127n6.
html; Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Grenoble, Oct. 23, 1996 (Fr.),
available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/961023f1.html.  Whether this gui-
dance is always useful may be questioned because, with the convenience of having
existing rules in place, there is some reported tendency of tribunals to follow soft
law principles blindly without any analysis of why the rules are appropriate or
whether the rules are better suited for the issue than competing rules. See, e.g.,
Gregory E. Maggs, Ipse Dixit: The Restatement (Second) of Contracts and the Modern
Development of Contract Law, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 508, 508–14 (1998); Symeon C.
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III. WHAT COULD BE ACHIEVED WITH THE UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS MIGHT NOT BE
SUBJECT TO REPLICATION AT UNCITRAL
Putting aside the question of whether the Principles themselves have
largely achieved what might be gained from a global contract law conven-
tion, there is also the question of whether UNCITRAL would be able to
replicate the work and product of UNIDROIT.  A comparison between the
working methods of UNIDROIT and UNCITRAL may suggest difficulties
that UNCITRAL would have with this project that were not present in
UNIDROIT’s drafting of the Principles.
The working methods of UNIDROIT may be better suited for this
type of project.  The UNIDROIT Principles were drafted by a select group
of contract specialists from around the world who knew their own coun-
try’s law, were fluent in comparative law, and therefore were able to bal-
ance competing legal traditions.  The members of the UNIDROIT
working group did not have the task of supporting and defending their
respective domestic laws.  This type of work is much harder to accomplish
at UNCITRAL because members of the UNCITRAL working groups re-
present their respective governments.  Thus, both the working methods of
UNIDROIT, a small group of highly specialized experts in the field, as well
as the lack of the need to accommodate any particular nation’s domestic
laws, allowed for a more neutral process and result than might be ex-
pected out of a UNCITRAL drafting process.  Moreover, the scope of the
Principles covers a variety of subjects that a UNCITRAL convention is not
likely to be able to resolve because the mandatory nature of a convention
will have individual countries disagreeing over some issues that were not
contentious in UNIDROIT.
It is also important to keep in mind that the drafting of the
UNIDROIT Principles had some difficulties that the uninitiated may not
appreciate.  An example is illegal contracts.  The UNIDROIT Working
Group spent five years on this subject and was unable to come up with any
rule to govern illegal contracts.45  It should be borne in mind that this was
Symeonides, The Judicial Acceptance of the Second Conflicts Restatement: A Mixed Bless-
ing, 56 MD. L. REV. 1248, 1272–73 (1997).  There is the question of whether the
instrument is intended to reflect current commercial practice or whether the in-
strument is intended to reflect the drafters’ aspirations as to what the law should
be.  Sometimes an instrument can be both.  This is certainly the case with the
American Restatements of the Law, which are drafted by the American Law Insti-
tute. See, e.g., E. Allan Farnsworth, Ingredients in the Redaction of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Contracts, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1 (1981).  However, to the extent that the
principles were drafted carefully and thoughtfully, this concern should be mini-
mal.  The courts, in effect, are likely to stumble upon the best rule.
45. The result is an article that repeats the pre-existing rule that the Princi-
ples are “concerned only with a contract infringing mandatory rules.” INT’L INST.
FOR THE UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAW, UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS (2010), available at http://www.unidroit.org/english/
principles/contracts/main.htm.
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from a working group that did not have any need to replicate the concepts
of illegality from their respective jurisdictions.46  One can only imagine
the difficulty this would pose if a convention attempted to accommodate
the laws of over sixty jurisdictions.
IV. COULD THE UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES SERVE AS THE SOURCE
OF A NEW CONVENTION?
If UNCITRAL moves forward with a project on global contract law,
the UNIDROIT Principles may serve as a model and a starting point for
the project.  Although a global contract law project would not necessarily
retain the scope in the Swiss proposal, it is important to remember that
the possible scope set out in the Swiss proposal, for the most part, repli-
cates the scope of the UNIDROIT Principles.47
Furthermore, the UNCITRAL plenary, when considering the possibil-
ity of the proposal, expressly provided for coordination between UNCI-
TRAL and UNIDROIT on the project.48  Thus, UNCITRAL already
recognizes the work of UNIDROIT and its importance for a possible
project.
Moreover, the history of the CISG shows the long-term historical rela-
tionship between the work of UNIDROIT and UNCITRAL in the area of
international sales law.  In fact, the text of the CISG is derived to a large
extent from the Hague Convention relating to a Uniform Law on the In-
ternational Sale of Goods,49 a convention drafted and promulgated by
UNIDROIT.50
But unlike the earlier transformation of one international conven-
tion—the Hague Convention on International Sale of Goods—to a revised
convention—the CISG—what is proposed is the general adaptation of a
non-binding set of principles into a binding convention.  Thus, it is worth
exploring whether there are distinct advantages to a binding convention
that justifies this project as a supplement to the UNIDROIT Principles.
Soft law instruments, such as the Principles, generally fall into one of
two categories: those that are intended as the basis for legislation, and
those that are not.  For those soft law instruments, such as model laws, that
are specifically intended to be the basis for adoption by individual jurisdic-
46. This balancing of different legal traditions and domestic laws is not simply
a distinction between common law and civil law.  For example, the new provisions
in the Principles on conditions are not only inconsistent with the common law, but
also the law of Germany.
47. See Proposal, supra note 1, at 7.
48. See UNCITRAL Report, supra note 4, ¶ 131.
49. Id. ¶¶ 128–30.
50. For a discussion of the history of the CISG from its beginnings at
UNIDROIT in 1929, see MICHAEL JOACHIM BONELL, AN INTERNATIONAL RESTATE-
MENT OF CONTRACT LAW 301–05 (3d ed. 2005).
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tions, many51 have been most successful in setting international and do-
mestic standards for legislation.52
Moreover, as with a treaty or convention, those model laws that are
intended to be adopted as drafted or with minor revisions are often sub-
ject to the same political pressures of harmonization and the same need to
conform to specific legal traditions of domestic laws because the drafters
of the model law have the same concerns of ratification and
coordination.53
Conversely, statements of principles such as the UNIDROIT Princi-
ples, the UNIDROIT and American Law Institute Principles of Transna-
tional Civil Procedure, and the many American Law Institute Restatements
of the Law have all been drafted without the express purpose of adoption
and therefore were not drafted with the external demands of harmoniza-
tion.  For this reason they have often achieved a neutrality and balance
that would not otherwise be possible with the demands for harmonization.
This was the case with the UNIDROIT Principles, and it is not clear that
this same level of drafting independence could be achieved in the political
context of the drafting of a binding convention.
However, even with this limitation, the Principles could be highly in-
fluential in the drafting of a convention.  Various soft law instruments,
once completed, have often been influential in the further development
of the positive law.54  This can occur simply because they are a convenient
and ready source of law and therefore eliminate the difficulty of drafting
51. For example, legislation based on the UNCITRAL Model Law on Elec-
tronic Commerce has been adopted in Australia, Bermuda, Canada, Colombia,
France, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of
China, Ireland, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Slovenia, part of the
United Kingdom, and the United States of America.
52. Of course, actual conventions can sometimes be useful for setting interna-
tional commercial standards for further conventions.  This was clearly the case with
the UNIDROIT Convention relating to a Uniform Law on the International Sale of
Goods in 1964, which was the basis for the CISG.
53. Thus, many model laws, such as the Model Law on Electronic Commerce,
have been used for domestic legislation because they were determined to be well-
drafted.  Moreover, model laws can be used as a template for related legislation.
Thus for example, the Model Law of Electronic Commerce was a source for the
American Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, the Canadian Uniform Electronic
Commerce Act, and the Australian Electronic Transactions Act.
The history and development of the UNCITRAL Model Law of Electronic
Commerce differed from and influenced the American Uniform Electronic Trans-
actions Act. See Henry Deeb Gabriel, The New United States Uniform Electronic Trans-
actions Act: Substantive Provisions, Drafting History and Comparison to the UNCITRAL
Model Law on Electronic Commerce, 5 UNIF. L. REV. 651, 651–64 (2000).  The Model
Law of Electronic Commerce also influenced the Canadian and Australian legisla-
tion. See Henry D. Gabriel, The Fear of the Unknown: The Need to Provide Special Proce-
dural Protections in International Electronic Commerce, 50 LOY. L. REV. 307, 322–31
(2004).
54. That the Principles might be used as the basis for legislation has long
been acknowledged. See, e.g., BONELL, supra note 50, at 243–48.
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new law,55 but there also can be a more conscious adoption because it is
thought that soft law instruments represent the correct result.56
A. Benefits of a Binding Convention
As to the specific advantages of a convention over the non-binding
Principles, there are two significant drawbacks to soft law instruments.
The first drawback is the inability to meet the need for certainty of en-
forcement, and the second is the concern that the soft law instruments
have not been tested in the political process.
In some areas of international commercial law, certainty of the law
and the enforcement of the specific rules is a necessity.  Because interna-
tional conventions are binding, once they are ratified they have the advan-
tage of instant uniformity and enforceability.  Thus, for example, the Cape
Town Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment Con-
vention57 and the accompanying Protocol to the Convention on Interna-
tional Interests in Mobile Equipment on Matters Specific to Aircraft
Equipment58 give an enforceable basis for secured financing of an aircraft
in the international market.  It would now be unreasonable to expect in-
ternational financing of a multi-billion dollar aircraft without the level of
certainty and protection afforded parties by the clear enforceable rules
and remedies provided for by the convention.
Conversely, an agreement to use a particular set of rules, such as the
UNIDROIT Principles, is not self-enforcing, but rather requires some do-
mestic law for its enforcement.  This, in many circumstances could lead to
uncertainty because the parties may not know in advance whether the gov-
55. Describing the influence of the American Uniform Commercial Code and
the Restatement Second of Contracts on the drafting of the UNIDROIT Principles,
the late Professor Allan Farnsworth noted, “[U]nlike any other common lawyer, I
came with texts in statutory form: the Uniform Commercial Code and the Restate-
ment (Second) of Contracts.  No decision of a common law tribunal—not even
the House of Lords—was as persuasive as a bit of blackletter text.”  Farnsworth,
supra note 39, at 1990 (footnote omitted).
56. Of course some of the most successful soft law instruments, such as the
Uniform Customs and Practices for Documentary Credits and the INCOTERMS,
were specifically drafted for use by a large number of contracting parties because
they reflect common well-established business practices, and for this reason they
are in fact the de facto legal standards for the transactions they govern.  Thus,
although not designed as models for further legislation, they have in fact become
such.  For example, the letter of credit provisions of the American Uniform Com-
mercial Code draw heavily from the Uniform Customs and Practice for Documen-
tary Credits. See Katherine A. Barski, Letters of Credit: A Comparison of Article 5 of the
Uniform Commercial Code and the Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits,
41 LOY. L. REV. 735, 736 (1996).
57. International Institute for the Unification of Private Law, Convention on
International Interests in Mobile Equipment, Nov. 16, 2001, 2307 U.N.T.S. 285.
58. Protocol to the Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equip-
ment on Matters Specific to Aircraft Equipment, Nov. 16, 2001, 2307 U.N.T.S. 285.
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erning terms of the agreement will be enforced according to their express
wishes.59
It may well be that a convention has some attractiveness over the Prin-
ciples because it would be vetted in the political process and therefore it
may reflect concerns that might not have surfaced or been articulated in
the more isolated drafting process of the Principles.  With the drafting of a
convention, political forces will strongly influence the process at two
stages—during the drafting, and during the ratification process.  During
the drafting, representative governments will have a strong sense of what is
in their best interests, and these interests will be strongly argued, debated,
and lobbied during the drafting process.  Moreover, it is common in orga-
nizations, such as UNCITRAL, to have wide representation by industry and
business organizations that will also press their concerns.  This process of
vetting, compromise, and ultimate acceptance usually reflects instruments
that are acceptable to the various constituencies and therefore are likely to
result in a wide acceptance.
It is too early to tell whether the Principles will have a wide level of
acceptance and use, but the Principles did evolve through a more insular
process than can be expected in a UNCITRAL working group.  It may also
be the case that a UNCITRAL convention, which would likely reflect prac-
tical, specific problems that call for fact-specific rules, as opposed to ab-
stract principles, could lend more certainty and less divergence in
interpretation.
However, because of the various compromises for acceptable results, a
convention may not reflect the best practices but merely reflect acceptable
practices.  Moreover, irrespective of the quality of a convention, such an
agreement has no force unless it is adopted.  That of course, presupposes
that the various constituencies do not bring the project to a standstill and
death before the completion of the project because of an inability of the
various stakeholders to agree upon a final text at all.
B. UNIDROIT Principles as a Template for a Convention
on Global Contract Law
If the proposal for a new global contract law convention proceeds at
UNCITRAL, the UNIDROIT Principles may serve as an ideal template
both for those areas covered by the CISG60 as well as those areas outside
the CISG’s scope.  The Principles have the advantage of being contempo-
rary as well as having been drafted with a universal, and not a regional,
59. This problem should not be overstated.  A large proportion of interna-
tional legal disputes are resolved in arbitration, and generally the party’s choice of
law will control in arbitration irrespective of the underlying substantive domestic
law.  Moreover, absent some direct conflict with domestic policy, most domestic
laws provide for a strong rule of party autonomy.
60. Presumably both the CISG and the UNIDROIT Principles would be possi-
ble sources for a new convention that covered the areas already covered by the
CISG.
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perspective.  The gestation period for the Principles expanded over thirty
years.  During that time, not only did the various working groups61 have
the luxury of time and reflection, but there have also been innumerable
sources of scholarly and professional commentary as well as a growing
body of judicial opinions and arbitral awards that have analyzed the Princi-
ples.62  The Principles have been tested and have been shown as clear,
balanced, and reflective of contemporary international business practices.
Thus, if the project is viable, a realistic way forward is to replicate the
creation of the CISG by relying on an initial product from UNIDROIT
that provides for UNIDROIT’s distinct working methods, and then use
that work as the basis for a UNCITRAL convention on global contract
law.63  This would entail a close working relationship between UNIDROIT
and UNCITRAL.
To the extent that a new convention would include and supersede the
scope of the CISG, there is precedent for this, for as noted above, the
CISG is based on a pre-existing UNIDROIT text, the 1964 Hague Conven-
tion on the International Sale of Goods.  The growth of the law is cumula-
tive, and as with the CISG, the law is often best served by expanding on its
existing foundations and not by attempting to develop law as if it were
from a blank slate.64
61. The Principles were drafted in three versions: 1994, 2004, and 2010, with
each new version adding to the work’s prior version.  Although with some overlap-
ping membership, each version had its own working group.
62. These judicial opinions and arbitral awards are collected on the UNILAW
database maintained by UNIDROIT. See Instruments Adopted by UNIDROIT, INT’L
INST. FOR THE UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE L., http://www.unidroit.info/program.cfm?
menu=subject&file=convention&lang=en (last visited Apr.11, 2013).
63. This, of course, was the method for the drafting of the CISG.
64. It may be that UNCITRAL has already accepted the UNIDROIT Princi-
ples as the proper source of law in those areas where the scope of the CISG does
not extend.  For the 2010 Commission decision, see UNCITRAL Report, supra
note 4, ¶ 140.  For the 2007 Commission decision, see Rep. of United Nations
Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, June 25–July 12, 2007, ¶ 213, UN Doc. A/62/17 (Part
I).  The 2007 UNCITRAL Report states:
[The UNIDROIT Principles] shall be applied when the parties have
agreed that their contract be governed by them,
They may be applied when parties have agreed that their contract be gov-
erned by general principles of law, the lex mercatoria or the like, . . . [and]
when the parties have not chosen any law to govern their contract,
They may be used to interpret or supplement international uniform law
instruments, . . . [and] to interpret or supplement domestic law,
They may serve as a model for national and international legislators.
Id.  In this respect, it would appear to be redundant for UNCITRAL to embark on
drafting law that already exists as far as UNCITRAL is concerned.
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V. FEASIBILITY AND DESIRABILITY OF A CONVENTION
ON GLOBAL SALES LAW
Where does this leave us?  The proposal asserts, but gives no evidence,
that a global contract law is needed.65  This alone is likely to be the most
important consideration among the member states of UNCITRAL in the
deliberations about whether to move forward.
It has been argued by some that the project merely replicates the
work accomplished by the UNIDROIT Principles, and therefore would be
an unnecessary waste of resources.  To this, there may be the response that
the benefits of a binding convention justify the new project.  This has yet
to be shown, but may well be the case.
What might be the major hurdles if the project moves forward?  First,
it is worth noting that the CISG took over thirty years to complete and it is
very limited in scope.  A new global contract law convention would inevita-
bly have within its scope the coverage of the CISG.  Second, there has
been no serious discussion that the CISG itself needs to be revised.  A revi-
sion of the CISG would entail a major disruption of existing international
commercial law and would create the problem of inconsistent duplicate
conventions when no substantial problems with the current CISG have
been articulated.  As noted above, this specific fear was the basis for the
United Nations Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in
International Contracts66 serving as a free-standing convention instead of
an addendum to the CISG.
The broader scope of the proposed convention on global contract law
would additionally expand into areas specifically avoided by the CISG.  Al-
though many of these areas of contract law are covered in the UNIDROIT
Principles, as has been discussed above, these subjects are not necessarily
subject to easy agreement in a binding convention.  In fact, it is not clear
that the working methods of UNCITRAL lend themselves to the level of
detail needed for a convention along the lines set out in the proposal.
Before beginning any endeavor such as the one proposed, it may well
be worth considering the difficulty in contract law revision that has oc-
curred domestically and regionally.  For example, in the United States, the
revision of the sales provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code failed
after thirteen years of work because various vested interests feared the ef-
fect of a new statute.67  Conversely, the most contentious aspects of the
65. This is certainly the position proffered by the United States Department
of State, as well as the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws. See Keith Loken, A New Global Initiative on Contract Law in UNCITRAL: Right
Project, Right Forum?, 58 VILL. L. REV. 509, 509 (2013).
66. United Nations Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in
International Contracts, Nov. 23, 2005, available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/
english/texts/electcom/06-57452_Ebook.pdf.
67. These revisions should have been successful. See Henry Deeb Gabriel, The
Revision of the Uniform Commercial Code—How Successful Has It Been?, 52 HASTINGS
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revisions, those dealing with computer software contracts, were hardly no-
ticed when they were incorporated into a non-binding instrument.68
There have been difficulties at the regional level as well.  For exam-
ple, we need only look at the recent work in Europe to come up with a
European contract law.  Starting work in 1982, the Commission on Euro-
pean Contract Law began work on the Principles of European Contract
Law.  After twenty years of work, this project was completed in 2002.  It has
not been adopted as positive law.  In 2009, another attempt at European
contract law was created with the Draft Common Frame of Reference.  At
this time, the Draft Common Frame of Reference is considered too un-
wieldy and has been placed on the academic top shelf to collect dust.
There is now the more recent Common European Sales Law that is pres-
ently being vetted.  It has yet to gain any traction.  All of these projects
were in the context of a somewhat similar civil law framework.  How this
could be achieved across other legal traditions is not clear.
VI. CONCLUSION
UNCITRAL is now looking at the serious question of whether a revi-
sion or expansion of the CISG is a viable project that justifies the re-
sources.  Among the problems this project might encounter is a lack of
resources, a clear articulation of the need for the project, the inability to
define its scope, and the likelihood of widespread ratification within a rea-
sonable time.  Recent attempts to revise domestic and regional laws are
instructive about the possible problems this project may have.
It may be that the barriers for a future convention on global contract
law is not a realistic project, and the more recent path of soft law instru-
ments, such as the UNIDROIT Principles, is a more viable method of pro-
viding global uniformity in contract.  Alternatively, another path is to
replicate the creation of the CISG by relying on an initial product from
UNIDROIT that provides for UNIDROIT’s distinct working methods, and
then have that work as the basis for a UNCITRAL convention on global
contract law.  This would entail a close working relationship between
UNIDROIT and UNCITRAL.
L.J. 653, 655–57 (2001).  Unfortunately, the revisions were not successful. See
Gabriel, supra note 40, at 489–91.
68. See AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF SOFTWARE CONTRACTS (Ten-
tative Draft No. 1, 2008).
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CISG AND UPICC AS THE BASIS FOR AN INTERNATIONAL
CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS
JAN RAMBERG*
I. INTRODUCTION
CONVENTION states tend to regard international conventions as ex-ceptions from their domestic legal regimes which therefore, when-
ever possible, are preferred.  Nevertheless, under Article 7 of the CISG, all
convention states commit themselves to truthfully regard the international
character of the CISG by abstaining from using concepts and variants of
their domestic law.  Also, in the application of the CISG, “[T]he general
principles upon which it is based” should be used with respect to “matters
governed” by it, although they have not been “expressly settled in it.”1
Although the aim to achieve uniformity is expressed in Article 7, this
does not ensure that all states develop their understanding of the CISG in
the same manner.  As a first step to establishing an internationally recog-
nized understanding of the CISG, not only with respect to its detailed pro-
visions but also general principles, awareness of court decisions and
arbitral awards in the convention states is needed.  For this purpose, re-
ports are submitted to UNCITRAL for its Case Law on UNCITRAL Texts
(CLOUT) and CISG Digest.  In addition, UNIDROIT assembles CISG
cases in its Unilex and an even more extensive case law report is provided
by Pace Law School in New York in its database with more than 2,000
cases.2  Awareness of decisions may be helpful but more is needed to de-
termine to what extent cases are generally accepted as authoritative.  UN-
CITRAL could not provide assistance in this respect as the convention
states may take offense if their decisions would be downgraded or even
criticized.  Likewise, the understanding of legal scholars in some countries
may not be regarded as internationally generally recognized.
In order to remedy the situation, the Advisory Council3 was inaugu-
rated in 2001 and has now, as of January 2013, provided thirteen unani-
* Professor Emeritus.  Former Dean of the Law Faculty of Stockholm
University and First Rector of Riga Graduate School of Law.
1. JAN RAMBERG & JOHNNY HERRE, INTERNATIONELLA KO¨PLAGEN (CISG): EN
KOMMENTAR 114–115 (Norstedts juridik, 3d ed. 2009); JOSEPH LOOKOFSKY, UNDER-
STANDING THE CISG: A COMPACT GUIDE TO THE 1980 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION
ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 38–42 (Kluwer Int’l Law,
3d ed. 2008); Jan Hellner, Gap-Filling by Analogy: Art. 7 of the U.N. Sales Convention in
Its Historical Context, in STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: FESTSKRIFT TILL LARS
HJERNER 219 (Norstedts juridik, Jan Ramberg ed., 1990).
2. See Albert H. Kritzer, CISG Database, INST. OF INT’L COMMERCIAL LAW,
www.cisg.law.pace.edu (last visited Mar. 6, 2013).
3. See Welcome to International Sales Convention Advisory Council, CISG ADVISORY
COUNCIL, www.cisgac.com (last visited Mar. 6, 2013).
(681)
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\58-4\VLR412.txt unknown Seq: 2 23-JUL-13 11:49
682 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58: p. 681
mous opinions on various articles and concepts of the CISG and a number
of additional opinions are presently under preparation.
• Opinion 1 on Electronic Communications under the CISG.
• Opinion 2 on Examination of the Goods and Notice of Non-Con-
formity (Articles 38 and 39).
• Opinion 3 on the Parol Evidence Rule, Plain Meaning Rule, Con-
tractual Merger Clause under the CISG (Article 11).
• Opinion 4 on Contracts for Sale of Goods to be Manufactured or
Produced and Mixed Contracts (Article 3).
• Opinion 5 on the Buyer’s Right to Avoid the Contract in Case of
Non-conforming Goods or Documents (Article 25).
• Opinion 6 on Calculation of Damages under the CISG (Article 74).
• Opinion 7 on Exemption of Liability for Damages under Article 79
of the CISG (Article 79).
• Opinion 8 on Calculation of Damages under the CISG (Articles 75
and 76).
• Opinion 9 on Consequences of Avoidance of the Contract (Articles
81–84).
• Opinion 10 on Agreed Sums Payable upon breach of an Obligation
in CISG Contracts (Articles 6, 8, 9, 77, 79.1, 80, and 81).
• Opinion 11 on Issues Raised by Documents under the CISG Focus-
ing on the Buyer’s Payment Duty (Articles 7.2, 9, 30, 34, and 58).
• Opinion 12 on the Liability of the Seller for Damages Arising out of
Personal Injuries and Property Damage Caused by Goods or Ser-
vices under the CISG (Articles 3.2 and 5).
• Opinion 13 on Inclusion of Standard Terms under the CISG (Arti-
cles 8, 9, 14, 18, and 19).
The opinions are frequently referred to in scholarly writing and to an
increasing extent used as guidance in court decisions and arbitral awards.
Hopefully, in the long-term perspective, the opinions may contribute to
turn the “homeward trend” in the application of the CISG towards an in-
ternationally recognized understanding, and thus to ensure uniformity
not only in form but also in fact.
II. SPILL-OVER EFFECT OF FUNDAMENTAL CISG PRINCIPLES
The CISG has now been ratified by seventy-eight states and a further
increase is expected following Japan’s ratification, which will induce other
states in the Far East to ratify.  The same goes for South America, where
Brazil has taken all necessary steps for ratification.  No doubt, the CISG
constitutes world law and it remains to be seen how long important
states—such as the United Kingdom—will retain their position as
outsiders.
The contract of sale is a dominant contract in every legal system.  In
the Scandinavian countries, where other important contracts (such as con-
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tracts for services and erections of buildings and plants) are not generally
subjected to statutory law, it is particularly important to assess whether the
CISG could be used as guidance.  In other words, would the provisions
and principles of the CISG have any effect, not in form but in fact?  Some
fundamental approaches to be found in the CISG may well be recognized
also for other types of contract than contracts of sale or, perhaps, for con-
tract law generally.
III. DISAPPEARANCE OF THE CONCEPT OF NEGLIGENCE IN CONTRACT
It is expected that the removal of the concept of negligence from the
CISG will influence the general attitude to breach of contract.  An analysis
would have to be made of the contractual promise as such, and on the
basis of such analysis, it could be decided whether there is a breach.  And,
if there is a breach, liability follows automatically with the exception for
impediments beyond control.  While the obligations of sellers and buyers
obviously entail that they must reach the result to deliver conforming
goods and pay, it is equally obvious that contracts for services—such as the
service of a lawyer—is limited to an obligation of best efforts under Article
5.1.4 of the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts
(UPICC).  Once it has been established that there has been a failure to
exercise best efforts, it is unnecessary to perform yet another test, namely
if the failing party has been guilty of negligence.  Irrespective of the nature
of the obligation, the breach as such suffices.  The traditional reliance on
remedies similar to those available in non-contractual relations (i.e., tort
law) will probably be replaced by an analysis of the contractual obligation.
IV. DOWNGRADING SUBJECTIVE CRITERIA IN CONTRACT INTERPRETATION
The methods of interpretation of contracts traditionally used in most
jurisdictions correspond to Articles 8 and 9 of the CISG.  However, so far
contract interpretation has been performed mainly as suggested in schol-
arly writing and there has been some reluctance to rely on other data than
those assumed to have been in the minds of the contracting parties them-
selves.  It is reasonable to expect that the objective criteria mentioned in
Article 8 will invite a certain departure from the traditional over-reliance
on the possibility to extract reliable data from what is referred to as the
common intention of the parties or, alternatively, the intention of one
party of which the other party could not reasonably have been unaware.
In most cases, an objective test would have to be made on the basis of an
analysis of the contractual situation relying upon how it is understood in
the market place.  Thus, the understanding of a “reasonable person of the
same kind as the other party . . . in the same circumstances” would for all
practical purposes replace an assumption of a subjective intention of a
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party or, alternatively, an assumed awareness of such intention by the
other party.4
The objective approach also appears in Article 14 of the CISG and is
used to determine whether a party has given an offer to the other party.  It
follows from that article that it would be impractical to perform an analysis
of the subjective intention of the prospective offeror and that it is suffi-
cient to look for his indication of intention.  Further, an analysis of the
indication as such will rest upon whether it is sufficiently definite in indi-
cating the goods, the quantity, and the price under Article 14.1 of the
CISG.
V. OBJECTIVE METHODOLOGY IN DEALING WITH LATE AND
NON-CONFORMING ACCEPTANCE
While a subjective approach based upon assumptions on what was in
the minds of offerors and offerees is favoured in many jurisdictions, the
objective approach of the CISG Article 21.2, which focuses on what could
be reasonably concluded from the acceptance letter as such (appearance
of abnormal transmission) and Article 19, which addresses whether the
non-conformity is sufficiently material, is preferred.  If so, the non-con-
formity must be regarded as a rejection of the offer and constitutes a
counter-offer under Article 19.1.  However, if the materiality test shows
that the discrepancy was not sufficiently material, then the non-conformity
does not constitute an immediate rejection of the offer.  Instead, if there is
no objection by the offeror without undue delay, the non-conforming ac-
ceptance will constitute the terms of the contract.  The practical impor-
tance of Article 19 is rather limited in view of the extensive enumeration
of material terms in Article 19.3.  Nevertheless, the objective methodology
is clear and is a more practical approach than the hopeless task of finding
real contractual intent or awareness in the minds of any one of the con-
tracting parties.
VI. LOSS OF POSSIBILITY TO WITHDRAW AN OFFER OR ACCEPTANCE
Another example of the subjective methodology follows from the
Scandinavian Contracts Act that appears in Section 7, determining when
an offer or acceptance can no longer be withdrawn.  Here, reference is
made not only to the time when the offer or acceptance reaches the other
party but also to the time when the recipient becomes aware of it.  Thus,
under this principle, it is possible to withdraw the offer or acceptance if it
could be proven that the message had not actually come to the knowledge
of the addressee.  It goes without saying that the definition of “reaches” in
Article 24 of the CISG is the only practical possibility to deal with the
problem.
4. See Jan Ramberg, Avtalstolkningsmetoder, in FESTSKRIFT TILL GOSTA WALIN
499, 511 (2002).
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The recent (2012) withdrawal by Denmark, Finland, and Sweden of
the Article 92 reservation, excluding Chapter II on formation of the con-
tract, would undoubtedly also in this respect be a further step in the right
direction.5
VII. IS THERE A LEGAL BASIS FOR EXPANDING THE PRINCIPLES OF CISG?
As a follow-up to the success of the CISG, general principles have
been developed partly as a supplement to the CISG but also extending far
beyond into the broad ambit of general contract law.  On the global level,
UPICC are well-known and frequently referred to in court decisions and
arbitral awards.6  The same ambition to cover the whole field of contract
law is evidenced by the Principles of European Contract Law (PECL).7
Would, in the distant future, PECL materialize into a European Civil
Code?  Or would, on the regional level, PECL function more or less as
UPICC?
Although UPICC and PECL are similar, both in structure, form, and
content, they should not be regarded as competitors.  They contribute to
the development of a common understanding of general contract law
principles and their application in practice.  Regardless of whether PECL
will become law in form, they will remain as law in fact to the extent that
they are actually used in decision-making.  Also, they have formed the ba-
sis for further studies purporting to foster a common understanding
within the European Union as demonstrated by the Draft Common Frame
of Reference in the E.U.
But is use of UPICC and PECL really possible without solid contrac-
tual incorporation?8  I remember an interesting discussion with a former
Judge of the House of Lords in England, and nowadays an experienced
arbitrator, regarding the possibility to apply lex mercatoria.  He had made
an interesting presentation asking himself whether the lex mercatoria could
be regarded in the same manner as statutory law.  He concluded: “Of
course, it cannot exist” and continued “yet, it is there.”  I asked him
whether I could apply it as an arbitrator and he answered “Of course you
can . . . if you do not tell anybody.”  Indeed, in this sense, UPICC, PECL,
and the CISG outside their scope of application exist as rules of law in so
far as they provide guidance to the judge or arbitrator, regardless of
5. See CISG PART II CONFERENCE STOCKHOLM, SEPTEMBER 4–5 2008 (Jan
Kleineman ed., Stockholm Ctr. for Commercial Law Ser. No. 11, 2009).
6. See Michael Joachim Bonell, The UNIDROIT Principles as a Means of Interpret-
ing and Supplementing International Uniform Law, in ICC INTERNATIONAL COURT OF
ARBITRATION BULLETIN, SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT 29–38 (2002).
7. See Michael Joachim Bonell & Roberta Peleggi, UNIDROIT Principles on In-
ternational Commercial Contracts and Principles of European Contract Law: A Synoptical
Table, 9 UNIF. L. REV. 315, 315–96 (2004).
8. Incorporation may be made by the use of standard contract forms, such as
those elaborated by the ICC. See FABIO BORTOLOTTI, DRAFTING AND NEGOTIATING
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE (ICC Pub. No. 671,
2008).
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whether they are referred to or appear from the decision.9  When the par-
ties have not agreed on a national law, the ICC Rules of Arbitration, as well
as the Rules of the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of
Commerce, allow the arbitrators to by-pass choice of law rules and directly
to choose any “rule of law” which they find “appropriate.”10  This provides
a basis for using the provisions of UPICC, PECL, and the CISG outside
their scope of application as internationally generally recognized princi-
ples of law and may encourage arbitrators to candidly disclose such use in
the reasons for their awards.  In some instances, arbitrators are particularly
prone to do so.
So, is it true that the CISG will have an effect outside its scope of
application?  Will courts and arbitral tribunals continue to focus exclu-
sively on national law chosen by application of choice of law rules or will
they at least to some extent be influenced by the general principles of law
appearing from UPICC, PECL, and the CISG?  I had a particular reason to
consider this problem because of the Article 94 reservation made by the
Scandinavian states replacing the CISG with national law in intra-Scandi-
navian trade.  The situation became further aggravated by Denmark re-
taining its Sale of Goods Act from 1906, while Finland, Iceland, Norway,
and Sweden have introduced new Sale of Goods Acts based upon the main
principles of the CISG.
Indeed, it can hardly be said that nowadays the sales law of Denmark
is closely related to the sales law of the other Scandinavian states.  Yet, the
Article 94 reservation includes Denmark.11  This being so, would a court
of law in a dispute involving a Danish seller and a buyer in one of the
other Scandinavian states uphold the rigor commercialis of the Acts from the
early 1900s and allow the buyer in a commercial sale to avoid the contract
immediately in case of a breach however insignificant?  Or would a buyer
lose the claim failing immediate notice to the seller?  I have candidly dis-
closed that even if Danish law applied to the contract I would, as an arbi-
trator, at least in some cases, relax the rigor commercialis in favour of a
decision influenced by the general principles of the CISG.12
My answer to the question of whether the principles of the CISG
could also be applied outside its scope of application would therefore be
in the affirmative.  Regrettably, it is hard to prove to what extent this actu-
ally occurs in practice, because only a few judges and arbitrators have the
courage to disclose in their reasons for the award to what extent they have
9. See Jan Ramberg, The Creativity of Arbitrators in the Context of UNIDROIT Prin-
ciples of International Commercial Contracts, 3 UNIF. L. REV. 651, 656 (1998).
10. The International Chamber of Commerce, ARBITRATION AND ADR RULES
art. 17.1 (2012); Stockholm Chamber of Commerce Arbitration Rules art. 24.1
(2010).
11. See RAMBERG & HERRE, supra note 1, at 652 (explaining views on validity of
reservation suggesting that reservation should not be set aside even if contrary to
requirements set forth in CISG).
12. See Jan Ramberg, Samnordisk ko¨pra¨tt-finns den?, in HYLDESTSKRIFT JøRGEN
NøRGAARD 835, 844 (2003).
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been influenced by other sources than those following from the applicable
law.
VIII. THE RULE-MAKING APPROACH OF UPICC
AS COMPARED WITH THE CISG
Needless to say, in elaborating UPICC, it became important to avoid
unnecessary deviations from the pattern set by the CISG.  Any differences
can be explained by the mere fact that UPICC cover international com-
mercial contracts generally and not merely contracts of sale and to a lim-
ited extent by the efforts to find better solutions.  A comparison between
UPICC Chapters 5 and 6 will show that only a few sections cover the same
substance,13 while in other areas some differences deserve to be noted.
One much debated issue concerns the rather strange formulation of CISG
Article 7.1 which, like UPICC Article 1.7, refers to good faith but only “in
the interpretation of this Convention.”14  Semantically, this expression is
meaningless as, in the absence of these words, it cannot very well be that
the convention should be interpreted otherwise than to give effect to the
provisions as intended by the draftsmen.15  At least, the reference to good
faith must mean not only in the “interpretation” but also in the “applica-
13. UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts Article
5.1.7 (on open price) corresponds to CISG Article 55, and UPICC Article 6.1.1 (on
time of performance) corresponds to CISG Article 33.
14. See C. MASSIMO BIANCA & MICHAEL JOACHIM BONELL, COMMENTARY ON THE
INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW: THE 1980 VIENNA SALES CONVENTION 83 (1987); PETER
SCHLECHTRIEM & INGEBORG SCHWENZER, COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION ON
THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) 127–28 (2005); John Felemegas, The
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: Article 7 and
Uniform Interpretation, in REVIEW OF THE CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL SALE OF
GOODS (CISG) 115, 115–265 (Kluwer Int’l Law 2001); Franco Ferrari, Interpretation
of the Convention and Gap-Filling: Article 7, in THE DRAFT UNCITRAL DIGEST AND
BEYOND 138, 151 (Franco Ferrari et al. eds., 2004); Peter M. Gerhart, The Sales
Convention in Courts: Uniformity, Adaptability, and Adoptability, in THE INTERNATIONAL
SALE OF GOODS REVISITED 77 (Petar Sarcevic & Paul Volken eds., 2002); Sylvette
Guillemard, A Comparative Study of the UNIDROIT Principles and the Principles of Euro-
pean Contracts and Some Dispositions of the CISG Applicable to the Formation of Interna-
tional Contracts from the Perspective of Harmonisation of Law, in REVIEW OF THE
CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) 83,
100–13 (Kluwer Int’l Law 2001); Ole Lando, Eight Principles of European Contract
Law, in MAKING COMMERCIAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF ROY GOODE 103 (Ross
Cranston ed., 1997); E. Allan Farnsworth, Duties of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Under
the UNIDROIT Principles, Relevant International Conventions, and National Laws, 3
TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 47 (1995); Alexander S. Komarov, Internationality, Uniform-
ity and Observance of Good Faith as Criteria in Interpretation of CISG: Some Remarks on
Article 7(1), 25 J.L. & COM. 75 (2005); Fredrik Liljeblad, The Status of Good Faith
in the 1980 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods 263 (2002) (unpublished Master’s Thesis, Lund University), available at
http://lup.lub.lu.se/luur/download?func=downloadFile&recordOId=1559579&
fileOId=1565031; Peter Schlechtriem, Good Faith in German Law and in Interna-
tional Uniform Laws, Remarks at Saggi Conferenze e Seminari 24 in Rome (Feb.
1997).
15. See RAMBERG & HERRE, supra note 1, at 116.
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tion” of the convention when choosing between applying the provisions
strictly or in a manner maintaining a fair relationship between the inter-
ests of the contracting parties.16  Although the wording of Article 7.1 may
be explained by an opposition to a general application of good faith, an
understanding of Article 7.1 as suggested here would reduce the differ-
ence between UPICC Article 1.7 and CISG Article 7.1.
It follows from UPICC Article 1.9 that usages should not be applied
unless “reasonable.”  Although there is no reference to reasonableness in
CISG Article 9, an application of the notion of good faith would lead to
the same result as it could seldom be acceptable to apply an unreasonable
usage to the detriment of one of the contracting parties.
Also, in UPICC Article 2.1.18, there is a reference to “reasonableness”
so that a party may be precluded by his conduct from invoking an “in
writing” requirement, if the other party has “reasonably” acted in reliance
on such conduct.  Again, there is no requirement in CISG Article 29(2)
that the action in reliance must be reasonable but, in practice, there is no
difference, because an unreasonable action must be qualified as an inde-
pendent action rather than an action in reliance on the other party’s state-
ment or conduct.
The word “reasonably” appears in the foreseeability test under UPICC
Article 7.4.4 but not in CISG Article 74.  Again, there is no difference in
practice, because what a party “ought to have foreseen . . . as a possible
consequence” allows an assessment of all relevant circumstances.  Thus, it
is not excluded that the consequence of a breach, although it may be gen-
erally difficult to foresee the consequences of a breach of the relevant
kind, is nevertheless foreseeable if the party would have such special
knowledge that it ought to have foreseen the possible consequence.  If so,
it would be unreasonable to relieve him from paying damages when the
possible consequence materializes.
The wording of UPICC Article 7.4.4 differs from CISG Article 74.  Se-
mantically, there is a difference between consequences “being likely to re-
sult” and “possible” consequences.  The former expression signifies a mere
probability, while the latter could include “the worst case scenario.”  Ap-
parently, no difference is expected in the practical application of the re-
spective provisions, as both allow an assessment considering all
circumstances.17
The efforts to reach consensus on the right to specific performance
under the CISG were unsuccessful.  Although the CISG, in Articles 46 and
62, allows specific performance, this is modified by Article 28 stipulating:
16. See id. at 117.
17. See INT’L INST. FOR THE UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAW, UNIDROIT PRINCI-
PLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS 271 (2010) (noting comment sug-
gests that principle of Article 7.4.4 “corresponds to the solution adopted in Article
74 CISG”).
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If, in accordance with the provisions of this Convention, one
party is entitled to require performance of any obligation by the
other party, a court is not bound to enter a judgement for spe-
cific performance unless the court would do so under its own law
in respect of similar contracts of sale not governed by this
Convention.18
There is no corresponding modification, and rightly so, under UPICC Ar-
ticles 7.2.2 and 7.2.3.
UPICC Article 2.1.11 and CISG Article 19 both deal with the effect of
a modified acceptance of an offer.  Although a modified acceptance is in-
sufficient for the creation of a contract, it would be unfortunate to leave it
as a rejection signifying game over.  The parties may fail to observe or
react against the modification and simply continue as if there were a valid
contract.  An unwinding of what has been performed without a valid con-
tract would normally be an impracticable and undesirable measure.  As it
is sometimes suggested, you cannot unscramble the eggs.  Therefore, it is
provided that the modified acceptance results in a contract including the
modification provided there is no timely objection.  However, the CISG
has added a definition of materiality in Article 19.3 while UPICC Article
2.1.11 has not.  Unfortunately, the definition of materiality, as one could
expect from a definition, is sufficiently wide to include most modifications
occurring in practice.  Thus, in order to find that a contract has been val-
idly concluded in spite of the modification, it would frequently be neces-
sary to use another basis than failure to timely object, such as an implied
consent to the contract but not necessarily on the terms of the modified
acceptance.
Although there is disagreement whether the CISG Article 19 should
be used to resolve the “battle of the forms” where the modified acceptance
constitutes a reference to another standard form contract than the stan-
dard form referred to in the offer,19 an alternative often suggested would
be to find an implied contract either on the basis of one of these standard
forms or, perhaps even better, by using the “knockout” principle of
UPICC Article 2.1.22 where both standard forms are recognized as con-
18. U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, United Nations Convention on Con-
tracts for the International Sale of Goods art. 35, Apr. 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter CISG], available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/sales/
cisg/V1056997-CISG-e-book.pdf.
19. See John E. Murray, Jr., The Definitive “Battle of the Forms”: Chaos Revisited, 20
J.L. & COM. 1, 41–48 (2000); Maria del Pilar Perales Viscasillas, “Battle of the Forms”
Under the 1980 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods: A Comparison with Section 2-207 UCC and the UNIDROIT Principles, 10 PACE
INT’L L. REV. 97 (1998); Peter Schlechtriem, Battle of the Forms in International
Contract Law: Evaluation of Approaches in German Law, UNIDROIT Principles,
European Principles, CISG; UCC Approaches Under Consideration, in FEST-
SCHRIFT FU¨R ROLF HERBER ZUM 70, 36–49 (Martin Eimer trans., 1999).
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tract terms but only insofar as they are common in substance.20  The sur-
plus is simply “knocked out.”
The important matter of contract interpretation is addressed both in
UPICC and the CISG where UPICC Chapter 4 conforms with CISG Arti-
cles 8 and 9.  UPICC, however, give considerably more guidance in Article
4.4 (contract interpreted as a whole), Article 4.5 (all terms to be given
effect), Article 4.6 (contra proferentem), Article 4.7 (linguistic discrepan-
cies), and Article 4.8 (supplying an omitted term).  I can see no reason not
to accept the added guidance offered by UPICC, albeit the guidance offers
many alternatives and does not require strict appliance.
IX. THE FEASIBILITY OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION
BASED ON UPICC
Some may well feel that such a project stands little chance of success.
But the gradual acceptance of general principles of commercial law as evi-
denced by UPICC and the CISG would at least enhance the chances of
success to such an extent that efforts should indeed be made.  Even if
states would be slow in accepting a global convention on international
commercial contracts, the project as such may have a considerable effect
to unify and consolidate at least the fundamental principles on a global
level.  Nevertheless, it may be questioned whether it is wise already to pro-
ceed directly to launching the project.  In any event, it may be worthwhile
to consider, in addition to the endorsement by UNCITRAL, further mea-
sures in order to encourage judges and arbitrators to use the principles of
UPICC whenever appropriate.
20. See RAMBERG & HERRE, supra note 1, at 166.
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THE articles presented in this symposium range from those that dealwith specific issues relating to the Convention on Contracts for the
International Sales of Goods (CISG), the CISG as an instrument of domes-
tic law reform, the use of soft law (Unidroit Principles), and the “Swiss
Project”1 that aims at creating a uniform international contract or com-
mercial law.  This Article will analyze the idea of developing a more com-
prehensive international sales law using the CISG as its core, or,
alternatively, as a starting point.  Such an undertaking is valuable because
the non-comprehensiveness of the CISG is universally acknowledged and
the likelihood of an international commercial code or contract law is an
unlikely proposition in the near future.  The CISG’s lack of comprehen-
siveness remains its major shortcoming.  This Article will pursue two lines
of research—how best to internally broaden the comprehensiveness of the
CISG and, after maximizing its comprehensiveness, how best to resolve the
remaining shortcomings in CISG coverage.  This Article will examine the
idea of “CISG Plus”—the development of a more comprehensive hard-soft
international sales law with the CISG at its core.
Part II will examine the shortcomings of the CISG’s scope and cover-
age.  These “gaps” in the CISG’s coverage have been widely researched in
the literature.  This review will highlight some of the express and implied
gaps found in the CISG.  The express gaps are those in which the CISG
expressly excludes its reach and are often referred to as “external gaps.”
Other gaps are found in areas within the intended coverage of the CISG,
but the CISG fails to provide specific rules.  These gaps are referred to as
“internal gaps.”  The existence of internal gaps and how they should be
solved is an ongoing problem.
The notion of an internal gap is a bit of a misnomer.  If the inter-
preter is able to work within the CISG’s interpretive methodology to fill in
the gap, then the gap was truly internal because it was filled through inter-
nal methodological means.  However, when the gap is unable to be filled
* Huber Hurst Professor of Contract Law & Legal Studies, Warrington
College of Business Administration; Affiliate Professor of Law, Levin College of
Law, Affiliate Professor, Center for European Studies, University of Florida.  J.D.
Cornell University; LL.M. Harvard Law School; Ph.D. Monash University
(Australia).
1. See UNCITRAL, Possible Future Work in the Area of International Contract Law:
Proposal by Switzerland on Possible Future Work by UNCITRAL in the Area of International
Contract Law, UN Doc. A/CN.9/758 (May 8, 2012) [hereinafter UNCITRAL].
(691)
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by the CISG’s interpretive methodology, the last resort of private interna-
tional law is employed.2  In this case, the internal gap (within coverage of
the CISG) is, in essence, an external gap because recourse is made to
sources found in national law to fill in the gap.  In a more comprehensive
code, the existence of such internal gaps is diminished by the code’s com-
prehensiveness and the interpretive methodologies developed to ensure
that the code is indeed comprehensive.  Part III will explore theories of
interpretation aimed at filling in the gaps found in the CISG.  It will look
briefly at the works of Karl Llewellyn3 and Ronald Dworkin4 to provide a
theoretical base for a more aggressive interpretive methodology to extend
the coverage of the CISG, or, less dramatically stated, to minimize in-
stances of internally unsolvable gaps that lead to the use of domestic law
solutions.  Karl Llewellyn, the Reporter of the American Uniform Com-
mercial Code (U.C.C.),5 worked on the crafting of rules throughout his
career.6  His theory of rules will be examined given the similarities be-
tween the U.C.C. and the CISG.  Ronald Dworkin’s notions of the “integ-
rity of law” and “law as interpretation” also provide a theory of rules that
assert that rules are inherently flexible when viewed as part of a greater
body of law.  His idea of “rule-fit” provides a theoretical construct for deal-
ing with the CISG’s internal gaps.  Llewellyn and Dworkin’s ideas will be
utilized in examining where CISG rules end and where a gap begins.
Part IV acknowledges that extending the comprehensiveness of CISG
coverage through theories of gap-filling, although useful, can only be
modestly successful.  In the end, due to the existence of numerous exter-
nal gaps and the limitations of the language of the CISG in totally elimi-
nating internal gaps, the CISG will always be lacking because it falls short
of being a comprehensive international sales law.  From the perspective of
businesspersons, and their transactional lawyers, efficiency, certainty, and
lower transaction costs can best be achieved by the use of a comprehensive
composite (hard-soft law) that can be recognized as a single source for all
or most issues of international sales law.  Part IV examines existing sources
of content that can be utilized to craft a more comprehensive law of sales.
The use of the Unidroit Principles of International Commercial Contract
2. U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, United Nations Convention on Con-
tracts for the International Sale of Goods art. 7(2), Apr. 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter CISG], available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/sales/
cisg/V1056997-CISG-e-book.pdf (explaining where gap cannot be filled by general
principles it shall be filled “by virtue of the rules of private international law”).
3. See Soia Mentschikoff, Karl N. Llewellyn, 9 INT’L ENCYCLOPEDIA SOC. SCI. 440
(1968) (providing biographical information and importance in American law); see
also Grant Gilmore, In Memoriam: Karl Llewellyn, 71 YALE L.J. 813 (1962); THE OX-
FORD GUIDE TO AMERICAN LAW 534–35 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 2002).
4. See THE OXFORD GUIDE TO AMERICAN LAW, supra note 3, at 451–52 (discuss-
ing biographical information and importance in American law).
5. See William Schnader, A Short History of the Preparation and Enactment of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 22 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1 (1967).
6. See generally KARL N. LLEWELLYN, COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING AP-
PEALS (1960).
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Law (Principles)7 in the interpretation of the CISG has been extensively
explored.  But, this undertaking will focus on its use as a source for a more
comprehensive sales law.  The proposed Common European Sales Law
(CESL)8 will also be reviewed as a complimentary source for a broadened
CISG.  In the end, a consensus over developing a single hard-soft law in-
strument is the best that can be done, at the present time, to remove law as
an obstacle to international trade.
II. CISG AS CORE: RECOGNIZING ITS SHORTCOMINGS
The argument for retaining the CISG untouched is that it is the prod-
uct of many years of work that is not likely to be replicated.  Under this
assumption, this Article will focus on two questions: (1) Is the CISG of
sufficient quality to be the center of a broader sales law?; and (2) If so,
what is the method by which the CISG can be “expanded” to become a
more comprehensive sales law?  The first question invites a pragmatic an-
swer—the tremendous amount of scholarship and case law that has
evolved relating to the CISG makes it the necessary core of a more com-
prehensive sales law.  The answer to the second question is the undertak-
ing of a hard-soft law project that will provide a single comprehensive legal
regiment upon which businesspersons and their lawyers may structure,
with greater certainty, their international sales transactions.  The second
question will be the focus of the later parts of this Article.  The first ques-
tion will be analyzed in the present part.  First, an argument will be made
that the CISG should be the core of any more comprehensive sales law
project.  Second, it will review its shortcomings—gaps in coverage.  This
Part lays the foundation for Parts III and IV’s exploration of methods and
theories of interpretation that provide solutions to the problem of filling
internal gaps.
A. Argument in Favor of CISG as Core
Before focusing on the shortcomings of the CISG, it is important to
recognize the many things the CISG does well.  There is much to like
about the CISG’s substantive rules.  On a whole, the CISG rules provide a
fair balance between seller and buyer rights, as well as providing a coher-
ent remedial scheme.  The CISG blends the two foundational comparative
law methodologies: the “common core” and “better rules” approaches.
The common core approach was championed by Rudolf Schlesinger of
Cornell University beginning in the 1960s,9 and more recently by Ole
7. INT’L INST. FOR THE UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAW, UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES
OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS 2004 (2d ed. 2004) [hereinafter
UNIDROIT 2004], available at http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/con
tracts/principles2004/integralversionprinciples2004-e.pdf.
8. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament on a Common European Sales
Law, COM (2011) 635 final (Nov. 11, 2011) [hereinafter CESL].
9. See RUDOLF B. SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAW: CASES, TEXT, MATERIALS
(1980); UGO MATTEI ET AL., SCHLESINGER’S COMPARATIVE LAW: CASES, TEXT, MATER-
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Lando10 in the Principles of European Contract Law.11  Lando explains
that the common core approach is a method to determine a common core
among different legal systems.12  Mauro Bussani and Ugo Mattei have de-
scribed the aim of the common core approach as a means “to provide with
the highest degree of precision a map of the relevant elements of different
legal systems.”13  The fact that the CISG was a product of negotiations of
representatives from the common and civil law countries necessarily re-
sulted in the embracing of rules that met the common core criterion.14
The large amount of similar rules is not surprising given that the basic
nature of commercial transactions is consistent across legal systems.
However, there were numerous incidents in which the different legal
systems provided conflicting or different rules.  In such situations, three
alternatives presented themselves: selecting one of the rules, crafting a
compromise rule, or abdicating coverage over the subject of the conflict-
ing rules.  For purposes of a comprehensive code, the first two alternatives
need to be maximized.  Failure to select or compromise on rule choice is
what leads to external and internal gaps in the law.  The quality of a spe-
cialized set of rules, such as sales law, is dependent on the quality of its
rules and the comprehensiveness of the law taken as a whole.  The com-
mon core approach is essentially a descriptive enterprise, while the better
rules approach is a normative undertaking.
An evaluation of the CISG, based upon the better rules approach is
mixed.  When the drafters selected between preexisting common and civil
law rules, they generally selected the most efficient rule.15  The classic ex-
ample is the choice of rules for the effectiveness of an acceptance between
the common law’s “mailbox” or dispatch rule16 and the civil law’s receipt
rule.  At the level of general rules, the drafters agreed to adopt the civil law
IALS (7th ed. 2009); Richard M. Buxbaum & Ugo A. Mattei, Rudolph B. Schlesinger
1909–1996, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 1 (1997).
10. Ole Lando, The Common Core of European Private Law and the Principles of
European Contract Law, 21 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 809 (1998).
11. See THE COMMISSION ON EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW, PRINCIPLES OF EURO-
PEAN CONTRACT LAW (Ole Lando & Hugh Beale eds., 2000).
12. See supra note 10, at 809.
13. Mauro Bussani & Ugo Mattei, The Common Core Approach to European Pri-
vate Law, 3 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 339, 347 (1998).
14. See Sara G. Zwart, The New International Law of Sales: A Marriage Between
Socialist, Third World, Common, and Civil Law Principles, 13 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM.
REG. 109, 109–10 (1988).
15. Larry A. DiMatteo & Daniel T. Ostas, Comparative Efficiency in International
Sales Law, 26 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 371 (2011).
16. See 1 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 3.22 (3d ed.
2004) (noting that justifications include offeror authorizing post office as its agent
to receive acceptance, dispatching puts it out of the control of the offeree, and it
limits offeror’s power to revoke).  The mailbox rule is criticized because it places
the risk of loss on the receiving party who is in the less favorable position to insure
its delivery. See Ian Macneil, Time of Acceptance: Too Many Problems for a Single Rule,
112 U. PA. L. REV. 947 (1964).
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rule.17  The civil law’s receipt rule was the better rule because the risk of
the acceptance being lost in transmission should be placed upon the most
efficient insurer, that being the sender.  The offeree is in the best position
to ensure that its acceptance reaches the offeror.  The common law’s
“mailbox” rule places the offeror in a curious position.  The offeror, not
receiving any communication from the offeree within a reasonable time
period, proceeds to sell the goods to another party.  In doing so, the of-
feror has breached its contract with the original offeree.
Interestingly, the CISG’s rule was the product of compromise and not
a wholesale adoption of a pure receipt rule.  Article 16(1) provides an
exception to the receipt rule.  The right of the offeror to revoke its offer is
frozen if an acceptance has been dispatched prior to the receipt of the
revocation by the offeree.  Thus, even if the revocation reaches the offeree
before the acceptance is received by the offeror, a contract is formed.
Under a pure receipt rule, the offer would have terminated upon the re-
ceipt of the revocation by the offeree.  So under this scenario, a function
of the “mailbox rule” is preserved.  Although not effective on dispatch, the
sending of the acceptance becomes critical to the formation of a contract
in that it prevents a revocation of the offer upon receipt of the offeree.
The exception to the receipt rule prevents an injustice when an offeree
incurs expenses in relying on an offer and the expectations that a proper
sending of an acceptance will bind the offeror to a contract.  The placing
of the burden on the offeror, who creates the expectations of a contract by
acceptance, to ensure that its revocation is received prior to the sending of
the acceptance is a fair and efficient compromise.  This examination of
the CISG’s acceptance rules is an example of the integrity of the CISG
rules as meeting the needs of certainty and fairness.
B. CISG Rules and Shortcomings
Due to divergences between the common and civil law legal tradi-
tions, concerns of lesser-developed countries, and the preservation of na-
tional sovereignty, compromises were not obtained in a number of areas
that would be covered in many national sales law regimes.  The result is
the limited scope of the CISG (external gaps) and the somewhat uncer-
tainty of scope within the CISG (internal gaps).  The CISG’s interpretive
methodology, as provided in Article 7, seeks to fill in the internal gaps in
the CISG.18  This section explores the non-comprehensiveness of the
CISG as it relates to external and internal gaps.  It then finishes with the
more difficult issue of determining whether a gap is internal or external.
17. See CISG, supra note 2, art. 18(2) (“[A]n acceptance of an offer becomes
effective at the moment the indication of assent reaches the offeror.”).
18. See Anthony J. McMahon, Note, Differentiating Between Internal and External
Gaps in the U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: A Proposed
Method for Determining “Governed by” in the Context of Article 7(2), 44 COLUM. J. TRANS-
NAT’L L. 992, 993 (2006).
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1. External Gaps
The first approach to the issue of the coverage of a legal instrument is
to ask: What does the instrument intend to cover?  The answer is provided
in Article 4 of the CISG: “This Convention governs only the formation of
the contract of sale and the rights and obligations of the seller and the
buyer arising from such a contract.”19  From this stark statement it can be
implied that the scope of the CISG is narrow considering the many areas
of sales law, such as pre-contractual and post-contractual liability, defects
in consent, and validity of terms, that are outside its coverage.  The state-
ment of coverage is also vague and barren of specific content.  What is the
reach of the “rights and obligations” of the parties?  In looking at the CISG
rules, “rights and obligations” provides the foundation for a more compre-
hensive sales law than is indicated in Article 4.  For example, the CISG
covers formalities;20 contract formation;21 performance and breach;22
conformity of goods;23 buyer’s duties of inspection;24 notice of non-con-
formity;25 mitigation;26 passing of risk;27 remedies28 and damages;29 rights
to time extensions;30 buyer’s and seller’s duties of preservation;31 ex-
cuse;32 and so forth.
The next step in the measurement of comprehensiveness is determin-
ing what the CISG expressly excludes.  Unfortunately, the extent of subject
matter excluded by the CISG is not insubstantial.  The CISG does not ap-
ply to certain types of goods,33 mixed transactions where a preponderant
part of the contract is not for the sale of goods,34 security interests in
goods,35 the validity of contracts or contract terms,36 products liability
19. CISG, supra note 2, art. 4.
20. Id. arts. 11–13 (writing), 29 (modification).
21. Id. arts. 14–24.
22. Id. arts. 25 (fundamental breach), 47, 48, 63 (time extension), 71–73 (an-
ticipatory breach).
23. Id. arts. 35 (conformity of goods), 41–42 (warranty against third-party
claims).
24. Id. art. 38.
25. Id. art. 39.
26. Id. art. 77.
27. Id. arts. 66–70.
28. Id. arts. 46 (buyer’s right to substituted goods), 49, 64 (avoidance) 50
(price reduction remedy), 81–84 (effects of avoidance).
29. Id. arts. 74–76, 78 (interest).
30. Id. arts. 47, 48, 63.
31. Id. arts. 85–88.
32. Id. art. 79.
33. Id. art. 2 (personal goods, consumer transactions, goods sold by auction,
goods sold as collateral, ships, aircraft, and electricity).
34. Id. art. 3.
35. Id. art. 4(b).
36. Id. art. 4(a).
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(personal injury),37 and the remedy of specific performance.38  The most
problematic of the express exclusions of coverage is Article 4’s reservation
to national law all issues relating to “the validity of the contract or of any of
its provisions.”39  In addition, the CISG does not cover the conclusion of
the sales contract through an agent, set-off, assignment of rights, limita-
tion periods, and the use of electronic communications.
2. Internal Gaps
An example of an internal gap is the CISG’s failure to allocate the
burden of proof between the parties to a contract dispute.  In areas where
the CISG provides substantive rules, it has been implied that the allocation
of the burden of proof is covered in those substantive areas.  Thus, the
interpreter making the assumption that the burden of proof falls within
the scope of the CISG must fill the internal gap by allocating the burden
based upon general principles.  The courts and scholarly literature have
generally held that the burden of proof rests with the party that would
benefit from the application of the rule.40
Internal gaps may become external gaps if courts cannot imply a rule
“in conformity with the general principles”41 of the CISG.  Then recourse
must be made to the applicable national law.42
The determination of whether a gap is internal or external is dif-
ficult because it is beset by competing policy objectives. On the
one hand, the more matters are found to be internal, the more
the CISG’s objective of uniformity is advanced.  On the other
hand, Member States have an interest in finding certain matters
outside the purview of the Convention so that they can apply
their own law and give effect to domestic policy choices.  This
friction emerges from the competing needs of uniformity and
flexibility.43
The task becomes the filling of internal gaps internally and thus pre-
serving the autonomous nature of CISG interpretations and rule applica-
tions.  The materials relating to Llewellyn and Dworkin’s theories of gap-
filling, presented in Part III, aim to show how the conversion of an inter-
nal gap to an external can be minimized.
37. Id. art. 5.
38. Id. art. 28.
39. Id. art. 4(a).
40. See, e.g., Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Jan. 9, 2002,
CIVIL PANEL VIII ZR 304/00 (Ger.), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/
020109g1.html; Trib. di Vigevano, 12 luglio 2000, n. 405 (It.), available at http://
cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/000712i3.html.
41. CISG, supra note 2, art. 7(2).
42. See id. (“[I]n conformity with the law applicable by virtue of the rules of
private international law.”).
43. McMahon, supra note 18, at 994.
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3. Reservations
Another form of gap found in the CISG is its enunciated reservations.
There is a deep literature on the problems of countries opting out of pro-
visions or parts of the CISG.  But, reservations are more a problem for
harmonization than of comprehensiveness.  CISG reservations are found
in Articles 92 to 96.  They allow contracting states to opt out of a single
provision (Article 96’s authorization to opt out of the no writing require-
ment of Article 11) to opting out of entire parts of the CISG (Article 92
allows for opting out of Part II—contract formation—and Part III—sale of
goods provisions).  The other important reservations allow for a state to
opt out of one of the two primary grounds of CISG jurisdiction found in
Article 1 (Article 95—application of CISG through operation of interna-
tional private law) and the ability to opt out in relationship to countries
that have closely related domestic laws of sales (Article 94).  Although
these reservations are detrimental to the overall impact of the CISG,44
they do not pertain to the coverage of this Article—filling in internal gaps
through interpretive methodologies and dealing with external gaps
through the development of a comprehensive hard-soft sales law with the
CISG at its core.
4. Core-Periphery Analogy
Whether an internal gap actually exists is a function of the rule itself
and the interpreter of the rule.  Llewellyn often saw the scope of rules as
being more like a field or a zone and not as “a surveyor’s line.”45  Another
metaphor for the reach of the CISG rules would be that rules in general
have a core and a periphery.  The determination of where the periphery
ends is the place where a gap begins.  The closer one is to the core, the
easier the application; the farther afield one goes from the core, the
greater the importance of creativity and context.  The most demanding
part of applying rules is the ability of the court or arbitral tribunal to craft
a rule application (interpretation) at the periphery of a rule that is true to
the rule’s core.  Another way of looking at some rules is that in easy or
clear cases, the rule acts as a fixed, hard rule.  In more difficult cases, the
rule is more open-ended and the rule application (adjustment) needs to
be guided by the core reasons behind the rule.  Part III examines where
such guidance can be procured within the text of the CISG.
III. LLEWELLYN’S AND DWORKIN’S THEORIES OF RULES:
FILLING IN INTERNAL GAPS
It is important to understand that non-comprehensiveness and the
problem of using rules to provide answers to novel fact patterns or real
44. See generally, Laurence R. Helfer, Response: Not Fully Committed?  Reserva-
tions, Risk, and Treaty Design, 31 YALE J. INT’L L. 367 (2006) (discussing problem of
reservations in design of treaties).
45. See LLEWELLYN, supra note 6, at 183.
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world developments are an inherent part of commercial law.  This Part will
provide some theoretical insights—represented by Karl Llewellyn and
Ronald Dworkin’s theories of rules—in which to place the CISG, as a body
of rules, into the context of the role and shortcomings of any body of
private law rules.  Llewellyn’s work is unique in that he was first a rule
skeptic, or at least a severe critic of the sales and commercial law rules of
the early twentieth century.  His rule skepticism and realistic brand of le-
gal philosophy made him the founder of the 1930s legal realist move-
ment.46  Subsequently, he was given the “keys to the kingdom” as the
Chief Reporter of the Uniform Commercial Code Project, and as the
drafter of Article I (General Provisions) and Article II (Sale of Goods).  It
is rare to have a jurisprude and critic of the law of the time to be allowed
to apply his ideas to what amounted to America’s largest and most success-
ful uniform law project.  Ultimately, this dissonance can be explained by
the term of the “later Llewellyn.”47  The later Llewellyn was merely a critic
of the anachronistic rules represented by the Sales Act of 1904, and to a
lesser extent, the First Restatement of the Law of Contracts.  Llewellyn was
a critic of the existing rules, but he believed that the rules could be made
to work.  This brief analysis of Llwellynian thought will look at the “work-
ing rules” of Article II of the U.C.C. as a tool for analyzing the rules of the
CISG.
The work of Ronald Dworkin is much more abstract and will be used
not so much to analyze CISG rules, but to examine CISG interpretive
methodologies.  Dworkin’s view of “law as interpretation” is an idealistic
view of law where rules can be interpreted to “fit” the law as a whole and,
at the same time, provide a correct answer to novel fact patterns or “hard
cases.”  His theory will be used to gain insight on how internal gaps should
be filled in the CISG and ultimately how the CISG can be used as core
international sales law and be fitted into a more comprehensive interna-
tional soft law of sales.  Alternatively stated, the theories of rules presented
by Llewellyn and Dworkin can be used to fabricate an international soft
law that can be used to expand the comprehensiveness of a uniform inter-
national sales law with the CISG at its core.
46. See Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence—The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L.
REV. 431 (1930); Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism—Responding to Dean
Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222 (1931); see also WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN
AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT (1973).
47. Llewellyn scholars generally have divided his work between his more radi-
cal work of the late 1920s and 1930s (legal realist movement) and the “later Llewel-
lyn”—his more idealistic work, including serving as Reporter for the U.C.C.  One
scholar refers to Llewellyn’s early work as being authored by a “lucid realist” and
his later work by a “mystical idealist.”  Takeo Hayakawa, Karl N. Llewellyn as a
Lawman from Japan Sees Him, 18 RUTGERS L. REV. 717, 733 (1964).  Martin Golding
asserts that: “I suspect, though, that Llewellyn became friendlier toward rules as
time went on; the leading spirit behind the Uniform Commercial Code could
hardly be a rule denier.”  Martin P. Golding, Jurisprudence and Legal Philosophy in the
Twentieth-Century America—Major Themes and Developments, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 441,
472 (1986).
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A. The CISG and Llewellyn’s Theory of Rules
Karl Llewellyn’s quest for a functional sales law was heavily influenced
by the civil law, most directly by the German Civil Code.48  For our pur-
poses, his theory of commercial law was that it needed to be dynamic in
nature.  This dynamism was to be found in real world commercial practice
that would be used to continuously refresh the rules of Article II (U.C.C.).
In order to be true to common law legal development the change would
be incremental in nature, but it would be in a consistent state of flux so
that the U.C.C. would not become a creature of obsolescence.  The rule
that would make this possible is the “open-textured” rule.  The repeated
use of the “reasonableness” standard throughout Article II was the means
by which real world “law” would be used to refresh its rules.
Refresh, of course, implies change.  So, Llewellyn’s theory of rules
had another feature that allowed the rule to guide its own change or ad-
justment.  The rule confronted with real world change was not to be con-
sidered a passive, empty vessel subject to the whim of business practice.
The guidance to the rule adjustment would be the reason behind the rule.
This is what has been referred to as the “singing rule.”49  Llewellyn’s view
of the “singing rule”—one that sings with the reason behind the rule—was
also an indication of a broader view of how the rules of the U.C.C. should
be interpreted and applied:
In drafting the Code, Llewellyn continuously . . . employed policy
and purpose as the central device to convey and clarify statutory
meaning.  As a result, purpose, policy, and reason are major de-
terminants of what the language of the text means . . . .  The
patent reason principle also assigns a definite role to the courts
in interpreting and applying the open-ended principles of the
Code.50
Each section of the U.C.C. should be read, “in the light of the pur-
pose and policy of the rule or principle in question, as also of the [U.C.C.]
as a whole, and the application of the language should be construed nar-
rowly or broadly, as the case may be, in conformity with the purposes and
policies involved.”51
The important point is that Llewellyn’s understanding of the ju-
dicial process led him to draft in the language of principle and to
48. See Michael Ansaldi, The German Llewellyn, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 705 (1992);
Shael Herman, Llewellyn the Civilian: Speculations on the Contribution of Continental
Experience to the Uniform Commercial Code, 56 TUL. L. REV. 1125 (1982).
49. See Larry A. DiMatteo, Reason and Context: A Dual Track Theory of Interpreta-
tion, 109 PENN ST. L. REV. 397, 479–82 (2004) (discussing relationship between
singing rule and contextualism in Llewellynian thought).
50. John L. Gedid, U.C.C. Methodology: Taking a Realistic Look at the Code, 29
WM. & MARY L. REV. 341, 385 (1988).
51. U.C.C. § 1-102 cmt. 1 (2002).
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use policy, purpose, and reason to convey meaning.  Faced with
that statutory architecture, courts should not and probably can-
not avoid using policy and purpose in interpreting the Code.52
Under his theory, what made rules anachronistic was the form of the
rule that is characterized as closed and fixed.  This closeness prevented the
introduction of contextual information, such as the creation of novel
transaction types and leads to the creation of a gap between the law in the
books and the law in action.  Such rule formulation quickly resulted in the
rules no longer being in touch with commercial reality.  The solution was
the open-ended rule.
However, Llewellyn understood that the constant changing of rules
would lead to uncertainty and unpredictability in the law.  Such uncer-
tainty is an anathema for business transactions.  Thus, the change had to
be guided within the law.  He saw as the main reason for rules being obso-
lete, and ultimately irrelevant, is when over time the rule becomes de-
tached from its underlying reason.  Fixed, closed rules eventually are
applied as a matter of authority or historical accident.  The judicial arbiter
no longer is informed by the reason behind the rule, but mechanically
applies the rule as precedent, despite the rule application leading to an
irrational result.  But, a different source of detachment of rule from rea-
son can occur from the unfettered influx of new commercial practice re-
sulting in sudden changes to the law.  To balance the need for rule
flexibility and rule certainty, the changes in the rules have to be anchored
in reason.
The court or arbitral panel should first determine the reason for a
rule and use that reason to direct a rule change in a predictable fashion.
For U.C.C. Article II, the reasons are found in the rules themselves and in
the Official Comments to the rules.  An example would be Article II, Sec-
tion 2-206, “Offer and Acceptance.”  Section 2-206(1)(a) provides the
rules for determining a reasonable means of accepting an offer.  It states
that the acceptance, unless stipulated otherwise by the offer, can be made
“by any medium reasonable in the circumstances.”53  This is a quintessen-
tial example of the open-textured rule.  Section 2-206(1)(b) expands the
notion of a reasonable medium of acceptance to include the unilateral
contract: an offer for “prompt or current shipment” may be accepted by a
return promise or “by the prompt or current shipment” of the goods.54
The acceptance by performance (sending the goods) is effective upon the
sending whether the goods are subsequently deemed to be non-con-
forming.  It further provides that the sending of non-conforming goods
will not be construed as an acceptance, but as an accommodation, if “the
52. Gedid, supra note 50, at 386.
53. U.C.C. § 2-206(1)(a) (2012).
54. Id. § 2-206(1)(b).
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seller seasonably notifies the buyer that the shipment is offered only as an
accommodation.”55
Section 2-206 further deals with the issue of acceptance by perform-
ance, where prompt or current shipment is not possible.56  In this case,
the beginning of performance is a “reasonable mode of acceptance”57 and
not the actual performance itself.  However, if the offeree fails to notify
the offeror within a reasonable time of the beginning of performance,
then the offeror “may treat the offer as having lapsed before
acceptance.”58
Thus, the rather short length of Section 2-206 provides numerous
rules and questions relating to the proper means of acceptance.  It is
worth diagramming the section to better understand the rules of accept-
ance.  After providing such a schematic for Section 2-206, the reasons for
the framework of rules embedded in this section will be explored.  Finally,
a comparison to the acceptance rules of CISG will be undertaken.
1. Section 2-206 Diagram
Rule 1: Master of Offer, “unless otherwise unambiguously indicated”
by offer.  (Section 2-206(1)).
Rule 2: Offeree may accept “by any medium reasonable in the cir-
cumstances.”  (Section 2-206(1)(a)).
Rule 3: Medium of acceptance may be expanded by offeror to in-
clude performance.  If offer implicitly allows acceptance by performance,
then offeree has option to accept by “prompt or current shipment.”  (Sec-
tion 2-206(1)(b)).
Rule 3.1: Prompt or current shipment of either conforming or non-
conforming goods is an acceptance.  (Section 2-206(1)(b)).
Rule 3.2: Offeree may change acceptance (by sending non-con-
forming goods) as an accommodation by “seasonably” notifying the of-
feror.  (Section 2-206(1)(b)).
Rule 3.3: If prompt or current shipment is not possible, the begin-
ning of performance (invited in the offer) constitutes acceptance.  (Sec-
tion 2-206(2)).
Exception to Rule 3.3: Offeree must preserve acceptance by begin-
ning performance, by providing notice to offeror within a reasonable
time; if not, then the offer shall be treated as lapsed before acceptance.
(Section 2-206(2)).
2. Questions Presented by Section 2-206
What does Section 2-206(1) mean by “unambiguously indicated”?
55. Id.
56. Id. § 2-206(2).
57. Id.
58. Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\58-4\VLR413.txt unknown Seq: 13 23-JUL-13 11:51
2013] COMPREHENSIVE SALES LAW 703
How does one construe an offer that invites acceptance by any means
under Section 2-206(1)(a)?
What is a “reasonable medium” under Section 2-206(1)(a)?
How does one determine if a notification is “seasonable” under Sec-
tion 2-206(1)(b)?
What is an “accommodation” under Section 2-206(1)(b)?
When is a “beginning of performance” deemed to be a reasonable
mode of acceptance under Section 2-206(2)?
What does “beginning of performance” mean as used under Section
2-206(2)?
What is a reasonable time for notice by offeree after beginning per-
formance to prevent a lapse of the offer under Section 2-206(2)?
Given the numerous rules and sub-rules, as well as the questions they
present, is Section 2-206 a reasonable approach to determining the effec-
tiveness of the mode of acceptance?  Under Llewellyn’s theory of rules, the
use of open-textured terms, such as “reasonable” and “seasonably,” allows
for the ability to adjust the rule based upon the circumstances, including
technological changes relating to the means of acceptance.  This is the
exact reasoning provided by the Official Comment, which states: “This sec-
tion is intended to remain flexible and its applicability to be enlarged as
new media of communication develop or as the more time-saving present
day media come into general use.”59  The word “enlarged” envisions the
rule being adjusted to real world developments.  In this case, the notion of
a reasonable medium of acceptance will need to change to reflect techno-
logical developments in the means of transmission.
Section 2-206 includes an express rule of interpretation that an offer
requesting prompt shipment will be construed as inviting an acceptance
by performance (prompt shipment).  Again, the Official Comment pro-
vides the reason behind the incorporation of this rule of interpretation.  It
states that it is intended to reject “the artificial theory that only a single
mode of acceptance [express words of acceptance] is normally envisaged
by an offer.”60  This is a clear recognition of real world practice in which
commercial parties are often more concerned with prompt delivery, than
binding a contract through an express promise of acceptance.
The meaning of beginning of performance and the importance of
notification of beginning of performance are the most confusing of Sec-
tion 2-206’s rules.  On its face, Section 2-206(b) is an extension of prompt
or current shipment as a means of acceptance found in Section 2-
206(1)(a).  One interpretation would be that the beginning of perform-
ance that leads to a reasonably prompt shipment creates a binding con-
tract.  Alternatively, it can be interpreted that as long as the goods are
delivered within a reasonable period of time, then the beginning of per-
formance constitutes an acceptance.  But, the Official Comment makes
59. Id. § 2-206 cmt. 1.
60. Id. cmt. 2.
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clear that Section 2-206(2) contains two inseparable requirements—begin-
ning of performance and notification of the beginning of performance.61
Thus, the beginning of performance can be a reasonable mode of accept-
ance only if followed by notice to the offeror within a reasonable period of
time.
What is the reason for this performance-notice rule?  If the offer in-
vites the offeree to begin performance immediately, then the rule allows
acceptance by beginning performance as a true reflection of the intent of
the offeror.  However, the difference between immediate performance
(sending the goods) and beginning of performance (manufacturing the
goods) needs to be dealt with in any acceptance by performance rule.  The
problem with the beginning of performance as the means to bind a con-
tract is the lag, sometimes considerable, between the “acceptance” and the
actual sending or delivery of the goods.  The general rule for offers is that
they self-terminate after a reasonable lapse of time.
Thus, hinging acceptance to the beginning of performance brings
two policies into conflict—the offeree’s reasonable reliance on the offer’s
invitation to begin performance and the offeror’s reliance that the power
of another party to bind them to a contract only exists for a reasonable
period of time.  The solution or compromise is the notice requirement of
Section 2-206(2).  The beginning of performance is not really an accept-
ance because it does not bind the offeror to the contract.  It really works to
convert the offer to a firm offer that is irrevocable from the time of the
beginning of performance to the expiration of a reasonable time to give
notice of the beginning of performance.  It is the sending of the notice of
the beginning of performance, in conformity to the mailbox rule that is
the acceptance.  The question remains of what is a reasonable time for
giving the notice of the beginning of performance.  It would seem that the
best criterion for determining the reasonableness of the notice is found
within Section 2-206.  In Section 2-206(1)(b), it notes that an offer may
invite acceptance by prompt shipment of the goods.  The contract is
bound upon the shipment of the goods, but the offeror may not know of
the acceptance until the goods are actually delivered.  From this template,
one can argue that the notice of the beginning of performance would be
considered reasonable if it is received by the time the goods would have
been delivered under the prompt shipment scenario of Section 2-
206(1)(b).
The problem with the above rule interpretation is that the paradox of
the mailbox or dispatch rule presents an obstacle to such a reasoned solu-
tion.  If acceptances are good upon dispatch, then a rule that requires the
notice of beginning of performance to be received by the offeror by the
time goods would have been received under prompt shipment does not
“fit” the overall body of offer-acceptance rules, which is required under
Dworkin’s theory of rule interpretation.  There are a number of possible
61. Id. cmt. 3.
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responses to the issue of reasonable notice.  First, Section 2-206(2) is an
implicit exception to the mailbox rule.  Its exact language is that the of-
feror must be “notified of acceptance within a reasonable time.”  The use
of the word “notified” can be construed as meaning “actual” notice that
only a receipt rule can give.  Second, reasonable time could mean nothing
more than a reasonable time that offers of its kind can reasonably be ex-
pected to remain open.  The unanswered question is whether an invitation
to begin performance extends the time for giving reasonable notice be-
yond what would normally be a reasonable time to accept through a recip-
rocal promise.
The offeree’s ability to convert an acceptance by performance to an
accommodation responds to a number of issues.  First, in the haste to re-
spond as directed by the offer, through prompt shipment increases, the
likelihood of sending non-conforming goods (defective product or im-
proper packaging) increases.  Does the time urgency implied by the offer
provide the basis for a reasonable belief in the offeree that speed is more
important to the offeror than complete conformity of goods?  Section 2-
206 provides the offeree the choice of sending non-conforming goods as
an acceptance or as an accommodation.  In the first instance, the offeree
believes that the non-conforming goods will not be rejected by the offeror.
If the offeree judges wrongly and the offeror rejects the goods, then the
sending of the non-conforming goods serves both to bind the contract and
as the basis of a breach of contract.  Section 2-206(1)(a) provides an inno-
vative solution to the offeree’s dilemma.  The offeree can elect to send the
non-conforming goods and give notice that the sending of the goods is
not an acceptance of the offer, but that the goods are being sent as an
accommodation.62  Hence, the sending of the non-conforming goods is a
counteroffer that the original offeror is free to accept or reject.  At the
same time, the offeree is able to respond to the prompt shipment request
of the offeror without being liable for breach of contract.
Finally, the CISG acceptance rules will be compared to the rules em-
bodied in U.C.C. Section 2-206.  CISG Article 18 rejects the common law’s
dispatch rule in favor of the receipt rule.  It states that an acceptance “be-
comes effective at the moment the indication of assent reaches the of-
feror.”63  As discussed earlier, the CISG’s receipt rule is an example of the
drafters’ selection of the more efficient of the two competing rules—dis-
patch (common law) and receipt (civil law).64  Like Section 2-206, the ac-
ceptance must be received “within a reasonable time.”65  The
reasonableness of the time of acceptance, like under the common law, is a
contextual determination.  However, the CISG provides a bright line rule
not found in the U.C.C.: “An oral offer must be accepted immediately
62. See id. cmt. 4.
63. CISG, supra note 2, art. 18(2).
64. See supra notes 15–17 and accompanying text.
65. CISG, supra note 2, art. 18(2).
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unless the circumstances indicate otherwise.”66  The reasonableness of
such a bright-line rule is open to debate.  In its favor, it provides a measure
of certainty to whether there has been an effective acceptance and
whether the offer has lapsed.  However, the oral acceptance truncates the
courts’ ability to determine the reasonableness of an acceptance that is
provided by the open-ended rule of Article 18(2).  Thus, the general rule
is that the timeliness of an acceptance is determined by the reasonableness
standard, while the immediate acceptance rule for oral offers is the excep-
tion.  But, note that the immediate acceptance rule is conditioned by the
subsequent language that the immediate acceptance may not be required
if “the circumstances indicate otherwise.”67  Despite the oral offer excep-
tion, the superiority of the receipt rule is preserved.
Article 18(3) is the counterpart of U.C.C.’s Section 2-20668 rules that
allow acceptance by prompt shipment or the beginning of performance.
Article 18(3) provides that if provided for in the offer or through practices
developed between the parties, then “the offeree may indicate assent by
performing an act, such as one relating to the dispatch of the goods or
payment of the price, without notice to the offeror.”69  It further states
that the acceptance becomes effective “at the moment the act is per-
formed”70 provided it is performed within a reasonable period of time as
determined under Article 18(2).  Note, Article 18(3) only deals with the
scenario of prompt performance and does not deal with the issue of an
offer that invites acceptance by the beginning of performance.  The lan-
guage of Article 18(3) is the language of complete performance—“dis-
patch of goods or payment of price”—and not the language of the
beginning of performance.  Therefore, just like Section 2-206(1)(b), Arti-
cle 18(3) does not require the offeree to give notice.  All that is required is
that the goods or payment be sent within a reasonable period of time.
Article 18(3) appears to neglect the situation where prompt shipment
is not possible, such as in the case where the goods need to be manufac-
tured.  Under Article 18(3), the beginning of performance is not recog-
nized as an acceptance.  This can easily lead to the injustice in which the
offeree begins performance and the offeror revokes the offer before com-
pletion of the performance (shipment of the goods).  Section 2-206(2)
prevents such an injustice by recognizing the beginning of performance as
an acceptance as long as the offeree follows up by providing notice of the
beginning of performance within a reasonable time.  If the story ended
here, then the CISG looks to be inferior to the U.C.C. in this area.  If the
measure is how well sales rules realize the aims of promoting private order-
ing and preventing contractual injustice, then CISG Article 18 fails on
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. U.C.C. § 2-206(1)(b), (2) (1977).
69. CISG, supra note 2, art. 18(3).
70. Id.
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both accounts.  The ability to promptly respond at the offeror’s invitation
by performance is diminished by Article 18’s failure to use the beginning
of performance as a benchmark.  It would be foolhardy for a party to be-
gin performance without binding the contract with an express acceptance.
However, this may be precluded if the offer allows for acceptance only by
performance.  This retards the free facilitation of contracting.  If the of-
feree goes forward and begins performance without a binding contract it
runs the risk of incurring damages if the offeror timely revokes its offer.
This is surely a case of contractual injustice.
This exercise of comparing the acceptance rules of the U.C.C. and
the CISG shows the difficulty in interpreting and comparing rules in isola-
tion to the overall body of rules.  The breadth of the CISG’s firm offer rule
ameliorates the potential injustice produced by Article 18(3).  But, before
looking at the CISG’s firm offer rule to see how it prevents the inefficiency
and injustice of Article 18(3), the firm offer rule of the U.C.C. will first be
examined.  The firm offer rule of the U.C.C. is an exercise in formality.71
As such, it is narrow in scope and precludes the use of judicial discretion
in crafting a just result.  It provides that an offer is only irrevocable for the
stated time or a reasonable time, not to exceed three months.72  Further,
the offer must be in writing and signed by the offeror.  In contrast, CISG
Article 16(2) allows almost any offer to be construed as an irrevocable firm
offer in certain circumstances.  It states that an offer cannot be revoked “if
it was reasonable for the offeree to rely on the offer as being irrevocable
and the offeree has acted in reliance on the offer.”73  Thus, the scenario
in which an offer invites acceptance by performance and the offeree be-
gins performing would almost always be considered as a firm offer.  As
long as the offeree performs within a reasonable period of time, then the
offer is irrevocable and the contract will be bound at the time of complete
performance.
This exercise of finding the reasons for rules within the context of the
entire body of law—U.C.C. or CISG—is the central tenet in Dworkin’s no-
tion of theory building.  In the area of rule application or rule adjustment,
Dworkin again requires the application be performed within the context
of the entire body of law and not just the rule in isolation.  This provides
insight into how to properly interpret and apply CISG rules.
The CISG can be linked to Llewellynian thought through its use of
open-textured rules.  The open-textured rule recognizes that in commer-
cial law the content of a rule is not internally provided by the law, but is
provided through induction from real life commercial practice.  In con-
trast, rule application from a Dworkinian approach sees the rule applica-
tion as internally driven.  The need to adjust a rule to a change in
commercial practice is guided by an internal, deductive reasoning process
71. See U.C.C. § 2-205 (1977).
72. See id.
73. CISG, supra note 2, art. 16(2)(b).
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in which the rule application must fit the body of law in its entirety.  Alter-
natively stated, when a court is presented with two reasonable rule inter-
pretations, it should apply the one that best fits the CISG as a whole.  For
Llewellyn the fit is guided by the determination of the reasons behind the
rule; for Dworkin the fit is determined by the general principles—express
or implied—that provide the underlying foundation for the integrity of a
given body of law.  This principle-led approach to rule application has a
close affinity to the CISG’s interpretive methodology found in CISG Arti-
cle 7.
B. CISG and Dworkinian Theory Building
Ronald Dworkin provided a theory of interpretation that focused on
filling in gaps in the law.  Llewellyn attempted to do the same thing by
contextual interpretation and through open-textured rules.  Dworkin
starts with the premise that the conceptual or internal part of law can,
through deduction from principles, fill in gaps in the law.  Both ap-
proaches provide a theoretical basis for filling in the gaps found within the
CISG.74
In Dworkinian terms, the integrity of law provides, if not a right an-
swer, then at least a correct answer, to fact situations that illuminate a gap,
previously seen or unseen, in the formal rules of law.  The answer to filling
in the gap comes from within the “entire” structure of the law.75  Dwor-
kin’s principle-based approach to interpretation76 is very much akin to
CISG Article 7’s mandate that the CISG is to be interpreted through the
“general principles on which it is based.”77  Although the CISG is not a
comprehensive sales law (external gaps), it is meant to provide a compre-
hensive body of rules in the areas that it does cover—contract formation,
rights and obligations of buyers and sellers, and remedies for breach.78  It
is in these areas that a Dworkinian mindset is of value.
In the case of a CISG rule application, the application (interpreta-
tion) needs to be done within the entire structure of the CISG.  A rule
application that appears reasonable within the confines of a single CISG
Article may actually be an improper application due to its inability to be
harmonized within the CISG as a whole.  A certain rule application can
only be justified if it provides a proper fit relating to the specific CISG
Article or Articles, as well as the CISG as a whole.  For example, in apply-
ing the CISG’s contract formation Articles, due regard must be given to
the interpretive template provided by Articles 7, 8, and 9.
74. See DiMatteo, supra note 49 (exploring conceptual and contextual aspects
of Llewellynian thought relating to interpretation).
75. See Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057 (1975); Ronald
Dworkin, Law as Interpretation, 60 TEX. L. REV. 527 (1981); see also RONALD DWOR-
KIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986).
76. See RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE (1985).
77. CISG, supra note 2, art. 7(2).
78. See id. art. 4.
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Dworkin’s theory of law as interpretation sees the idea that an inter-
nal gap in the CISG cannot be filled internally as implausible.  Dworkin
believes that the solution to filling in a gap can always be found by “mov-
ing up the pyramid of abstraction or principles.”79  Therefore, any ambi-
guities or gaps in the CISG is filled by working within the body of rules in
which the gap or ambiguity is found, guided by general principles, to find
the best possible interpretation that increases the overall integrity and
value of the entire body of law: “[A]n interpretation of any body or divi-
sion of law . . . must show the value of that body of law in political terms by
demonstrating the best principle or policy it can be taken to serve.”80
It is important to note that Dworkin’s pyramid of principles sees the
recourse to meta-principles as the final step or last resort.  Thus, if an am-
biguity or gap is found in one of the CISG’s formation rules the interpreta-
tion process would begin with determining the implied principles or
purposes that underlie the specific rule.  If that search fails to provide a
reasonable solution (rule-adjustment), then the interpreter would look for
implied principles that underlie the set of closely aligned rules of which
the specific rule is a part.  If that fails, then recourse is to the implied rules
that underlie the entire area of law, such as Articles 14–24 (formation of
contract).  Only then is recourse made to the general meta-principles—
express or implied—of the entire CISG.
The CISG’s express general principles are modest in number—good
faith interpretation, international character of the rules, the need to pro-
mote uniformity, and international trade usage.  The more interesting
proposition is how an interpreter finds and recognizes implied general
principles.  One response is that the interpreter is confined to the express
general principles and the implication of general principles is precluded.
The alternative approach is that nothing prevents an interpreter in imply-
ing other general principles as long as they do not conflict with the ex-
press principles.
The second approach is more reasonable due to a number of reasons.
First, the express general principles are so broad in scope that they offer
the means to imply narrower or ancillary general principles.  Second, due
to the lack of rule density, additional general principles are needed to fill
in the internal gaps and ambiguities found in the CISG.  A number of
implied principles have been offered by the courts—some have been
widely accepted, while others have not been universally accepted.  A tenta-
tive list of implied principles, default rules, or factors analyses81 include:
79. Larry A. DiMatteo, A Theory of Interpretation in the Realm of Idealism, 5
DEPAUL BUS. & COMM. L.J. 17, 43 (2006).
80. DWORKIN, supra note 76, at 160.
81. Factors analyses refer to the idea that rules often do not provide a defini-
tion or criteria to aid in its application.  Over time, the jurisprudence shows that
certain factors are recognized as important to the interpretation and application
of a given rule.
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• As discussed previously, a widely accepted implied principle is that a
party making a claim or who would benefit from a CISG rule appli-
cation has the burden of proof.82
• CISG Article 38(1): inspection “within as short a period as is practi-
cable in the circumstances.”  What are the relevant circumstances
or factors in determining the reasonable promptness of the inspec-
tion?  Courts have recognized a matrix of implied factors, including
number of items to be examined, type of inspection required, na-
ture or uniqueness of the goods, nature of the packaging, method
of delivery, experience of employees receiving goods, if goods are
delivered in installments, and the sophistication and location (re-
moteness, developing country) of the buyer.83
• Particularized consent, especially in the area of derogation, may be
needed to opt out of the CISG or to derogate from a CISG provi-
sion.  For example, an Austrian court rejected a derogation from
the “no writing” requirement of CISG Article 11; it held that such a
derogation required an informed consent from the non-derogating
party.84
• Implied general principle of the need to give fair notice as a gen-
eral practice can be implied from the numerous notice provisions
found in the CISG.85
• Implied duty of cooperation has been derived from CISG Article
80: “A party may not rely on a failure of the other party to perform,
to the extent that such failure was caused by the first party’s act or
omission.”86
• A Helsinki Court of Appeals recognized an implied principle of loy-
alty: “The so-called principle of loyalty has been widely recognized
in scholarly writings.  According to this principle, the parties to a
contract have to act in favour of the common goal; they have to
reasonably consider the interests of the other party.”87  In that case,
the court held that the principle of loyalty required a seller-manu-
facturer to continue a sales relationship beyond the last formal, dis-
82. A highly-regarded Italian case asserted that the “Convention’s general
principle on the burden of proof seems to be ei incumbit probation qui dicit, non qui
negat: The burden of proof rests upon the one who affirms, not the one who denies.”  Trib. di
Vigevano, 12 luglio 2000, n. 450, ¶ 23 (It.), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.
edu/cases/000712i3.html.
83. See LARRY A. DIMATTEO ET AL., INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW: A CRITICAL
ANALYSIS OF CISG JURISPRUDENCE 78–84 (2005).
84. Oberster Gerichtshof [OGH] [Supreme Court] Feb. 6, 1996, docket No.
10 Ob 518/95 (Austria), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/960206a3.
html.
85. See CISG, supra note 2, arts. 19, 21, 26, 27, 32, 39, 43, 46, 47–49, 63, 65, 67,
71, 72, 88.
86. Id. art. 80; see also THOMAS NEUMANN, THE DUTY TO COOPERATE IN INTERNA-
TIONAL SALES: THE SCOPE AND ROLE OF ARTICLE 80 CISG (2012)
87. Helsingin hoviokeus [HO] [Helsinki Court of Appeals], Oct. 26, 2000,
docket No. S 00/82, available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/001026f5.html.
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crete sales contract.  It stated, “the operation cannot be based on a
risk of an abrupt ending of a contract.”88  The implied principle
here may be extrapolated from a combination of the good faith
principle and trade usage.
• An implied general principle can be gleaned from a number of
CISG Articles.  One such principle is that CISG rules, contracts, and
contractual obligations should be interpreted in favor of preserving
the contract and the contractual relationship—favor contractus.
This principle has been derived from CISG Articles 25, 34, 37, 39,
43, 47–49, 63, 64, and 82.89
Finally, it should also be noted that Dworkin’s allusion to the “politi-
cal” refers to the integrity of the law or body of law and not to the external
politics of society.  Dworkin’s theory of interpretation as it would apply to
the CISG partially breaks down because he assumes that the need for rule
adjustments to fill in gaps is infrequently presented because of the “den-
sity” of law.  One of the perceived shortcomings of the CISG is that it lacks
density in its coverage creating numerous internal gaps.  Nonetheless,
Dworkin’s fixation on the use of internally-derived principles offers a simi-
lar framework as is found in the principles-driven CISG interpretive meth-
odology of Article 7.
IV. FILLING IN GAPS: ROAD TO A COMPREHENSIVE SALES LAW
Part III, examined different theoretical approaches to filling in inter-
nal gaps in the CISG.  This Part examines the major external gaps in the
CISG.  It then proposes a modest project to deal with the non-comprehen-
sive nature of the CISG.  Developing a “CISG plus” or “Restatement of
International Sales Law Project” is the next logical step in developing a
more comprehensive, international sales law.  This is especially true given
the unlikelihood of a formal revision of the CISG or the adoption of a
broader international contract or commercial code in the near future.
This Part will focus on two soft law projects—the Unidroit Principles of
International Commercial Contracts (Principles)90 and the proposed
Common European Sales Law (CESL).91  The author fully realizes that
88. Id.
89. Andre´ Janssen & So¨rren Claas Kiene, The CISG and Its General Principles, in
CISG METHODOLOGY 261, 273–74 (Andre´ Janssen & Olaf Meyer eds., 2009).
90. See generally UNIDROIT 2004, supra note 7; see also MICHAEL JOACHIM
BONELL, AN INTERNATIONAL RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACT LAW: THE UNIDROIT
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS (3d ed. 2005).
91. See generally CESL, supra note 8; REINER SCHULZE, COMMON EUROPEAN
SALES LAW (CESL): COMMENTARY (2012) (providing comprehensive commentary
on CISG); REINER SCHULZE & JULES STUYCK, TOWARDS A EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW
(2011) (detailing history and analysis of development of optional (contract law)
instrument that eventually became CESL); see also GUIDO ALPA ET AL., THE PRO-
POSED COMMON EUROPEAN SALES LAW—THE LAWYER’S VIEW (2013) (analyzing posi-
tive and negative implications of CESL).
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the CESL is being proposed as a European Union regulation and has been
more recently reduced in scope, and would be considered a hard law if
enacted.  But, it is being used here as a proposed law under the assump-
tion that even if it fails to be enacted, the instrument would remain a valu-
able source of soft law.
A. External-Internal Gap Dichotomy
Part III provided a theoretically based approach to filling in the inter-
nal gaps of the CISG.  The approaches of two major legal philosophers—
Karl Llewellyn and Ronald Dworkin—were briefly reviewed.  The purpose
of this review was to support the point that when the scope of the CISG’s
coverage is not at issue, then all attempts at filling in a gap within its scope
need to be exhausted to prevent the gap being treated as an external gap
requiring resort to private international law rules.92  Llewellyn’s open-tex-
tured rules (reasonableness standard) exist throughout the CISG.  The
main vehicle for filling in gaps when such rules are being applied is
through induction from the case facts and commercial practice.  In the
case of express and implied principles which centers CISG interpretive
methodology, Dworkin’s theory of interpretation emphasizes the need to
work up a pyramid of abstraction to find express or implied principles that
through deduction can be employed to fill in any gap in the overall body
of rules.  Thus, the first directive of this Part is to recognize the impor-
tance of aggressively seeking solutions to internal gaps without resorting to
private international law.
B. CISG and Unidroit Principles
The rules of the CISG provided the template for correlating rules in
the Principles.  The temptation is to use the commentary on the Principles
in the interpretation of the CISG, especially in areas of internal gaps and
ambiguity.93  But, this would be a misapplication and would contradict the
92. Camilla Baasch Andersen appropriately notes the conflation of the terms
hard and soft law:
The utility of this classification in modern commercial law is negligible.
Not only because these labels belie the political and practical contexts of
the instruments so labeled, but because they are not useful in a func-
tional context . . . .  [R]egardless of the classification of an instrument or
non-law standard, if it becomes part of commercial practice, then it is an
important part of uniform commercial law.
Camilla Baasch Andersen, Macro-Systematic Interpretation of Uniform Commercial Law:
The Interrelation of the CISG and other Uniform Sources, in CISG METHODOLOGY 224
(Andre´ Janssen & Olaf Meyer eds., 2009)
93. See, e.g., Bojidara Borisova, Remarks on the Manner in Which the UNIDROIT
Principles May Be Used to Interpret or Supplement Article 6 of the CISG, 9 VINDOBONA J.
INT’L COM. L. & ARB. 153 (2005); Michael Joachim Bonell, The UNIDROIT Principles
of International Commercial Contracts and CISG—Alternatives or Complementary Instru-
ments?, 26 UNIF. L. REV. 229 (1996); Alejandro M. Garro, The Gap-Filling Role of the
UNIDROIT Principles in International Sales Law: Some Comments on the Interplay Between
the Principles and the CISG, 69 TUL. L. REV. 1149 (1995) (noting UNIDROIT princi-
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CISG’s interpretive methodology that requires autonomous interpretation
of CISG provisions.  However, the Principles provide a more comprehen-
sive coverage and should be used as a source in the formulation of a com-
prehensive sales law.  In fact the father of the Principles, Michael Joachim
Bonell, noted that the adoption of the CISG served as an impetus for the
drafting and for the broader coverage of the Principles:
Both the merits and the shortcomings of the CISG prompted the
International Institute for the Unification of Private Law
(UNIDROIT) to embark upon a project as ambitious as the prep-
aration of the UNIDROIT Principles.  In other words, but for the
world-wide adoption of an international uniform sales law like
the CISG, any attempt at formulating rules for international com-
mercial contracts in general would have been unthinkable.  At
the same time, it was precisely because the negotiations leading
up to the CISG had so amply demonstrated that this Convention
was the maximum that could be achieved on the legislative level,
that UNIDROIT decided to abandon the idea of a binding instru-
ment and instead proceeded merely to “restate” . . . international
contract law and practice.94
Professor Gabriel looks at another possibility for developing a more
comprehensive international sales law.  In his article, UNIDROIT as a
Source for Global Sales Law,95 he explores the use of the well-received com-
mercial contract soft law, Principles, as the basis of a comprehensive sales
law.  This is an attractive idea for a number of reasons.  First, as a general
contract law and as a soft law, free of political compromises, it is inherently
a more comprehensive law.  Second, it is a well-established, respected in-
strument that has been thoroughly researched and vetted.  Third, many of
its rules track those of the CISG, but are more detailed in nature.  The
Principles have been used to interpret CISG rules, mostly by arbitral
tribunals.96
Despite the arguments in favor of using the Principles as the founda-
tion for a comprehensive international sales law, this would be a mistake.
The CISG is the better starting point for such a project.  First, it is a hard
law that has been widely adopted.  Second, the depth of CISG case law and
breadth of scholarly research on the CISG provides a strong base of knowl-
edge to center any such project.  In the words of Michael Joachim Bonell:
“Still, on the whole there can be no doubt that the CISG provides a most
ples are more suitable to international commercial contract than domestic con-
tract rules).
94. Michael Joachim Bonell, The CISG, European Contract Law, and the Develop-
ment of a World Contract Law, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 16 (2008).
95. See generally, Henry Deeb Gabriel, UNIDROIT as a Source for Global Sales
Law, 58 VILL. L. REV. 661 (2013).
96. See Jan Ramberg, Creativity of Arbitrators in the Context of UNIDROIT Princi-
ples of International Commercial Contracts, 3 UNIF. L. REV. 651 (1998).
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valuable and fairly innovative normative regime for international sales
contracts.”97  Nonetheless, it is true that the drafting of the Principles was
unrestrained by the need for political compromise, as characterized the
CISG project.  As a result, the Principles project was able to cover areas not
broached by the drafters of the CISG.  The Principles cover such areas as
authority of agents, validity, third party rights, hardship, set-off (counter-
claims), assignment of rights, transfer of obligations, and assignment of
contracts and limitation periods.98  In the end, the portions of the Princi-
ples not covered in the CISG should be mined in the fabrication of a com-
prehensive sales law document.
C. CISG and CESL
The proposed Common European Sales Law (CESL) presents a num-
ber of issues that will be briefly discussed here.  First, how will such an E.U.
Regulation interrelate with the CISG which is the law of twenty-three of
twenty-seven E.U. countries?99  Second, how do interpreters deal with the
dilemma posed by parallel laws having numerous similar or identical
rules?  The first issue questions the usefulness of the CESL in relationship
to the role currently played by the CISG.  The answer to this question is
multifaceted.  If the CESL was purely a sales law, then the CESL would be
merely redundant and be more problematic than useful due to the inter-
pretive issue presented by the second question.  The only purpose a nar-
rowly focused E.U. sales law would serve is to bring the four outlying E.U.
countries, which are not contracting states to the CISG, into a uniform
sales law regime with the other E.U. countries.  A simpler solution would
be for the four countries to adopt the CISG, which would unify inter-E.U.
sales law.
However, the CESL title is a bit of a misnomer because it covers much
more ground than a sales law-only proposal.  It is this broader scope that
makes the CESL unique.  The CESL provides general contract law provi-
sions that could be used as a basis of further harmonization efforts for
other types of contracts.  The most interesting part of the CESL is its spe-
cialized bodies of rules for the supply of digital content and service related
to the sale of goods.  Thus, the greater comprehensiveness of the CESL
makes it more attractive than the CISG, at least in these areas.  For pur-
poses of this Article, the CESL provides a source for building a soft law
periphery to the CISG core.
The CISG and CESL have been seen as potential competitors.  If the
CESL becomes E.U. law, then parties opting into the CESL would implic-
itly be opting out of the CISG, even when both parties are from CISG
countries.  This is not, itself, a problem for the parties are free to opt in or
97. Bonell, supra note 94, at 4.
98. See BONELL, supra note 90, at 305–08.
99. The four current E.U. countries that have failed to adopt the CISG are
Ireland, Malta, Portugal, and the United Kingdom.
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opt out of most commercial laws, domestic or international.  The problem
results from the fact that many of the CESL rules, especially in the area of
contract formation and rights and obligations of the parties, are duplica-
tive of CISG rules.  This becomes a problem if those similar provisions are
interpreted differently in the applications of the CISG and the CESL.  The
result would be complexity and chaos, as a party using the CESL within
Europe and the CISG internationally would be confronted with different
meanings for identical terms and rules.
Professor Ulrich Magnus sees the creation of such divergent mean-
ings as a real possibility.  The reason is that the CISG employs an interna-
tional interpretative methodology and European law follows distinctively
European-based interpretive methodologies.100  In addition, both the
CISG and the CESL require autonomous interpretations of their provi-
sions.101  Nonetheless, Magnus rightly asserts that where the CISG and
CESL have parallel provisions, the pre-existing meanings found in the in-
depth CISG case law and scholarly literature should be applied to the
CESL.  This type of “inter-conventional interpretation” is necessary to
keep order in European and international sales law.  If the CESL passes
into law, it is best for the legal and business communities’ interests that
the CISG and CESL work as complimentary instruments.  However, they
would likely devolve into competition if parallel provisions were inter-
preted differently under the two instruments.  This would be a disaster for
national courts in the countries having both the CISG and the CESL as the
law of the land.
For the current undertaking, the use of the CESL as soft law is valua-
ble because it covers areas, such as the supply of digital content102 and
trade-related services103 that can be used to fill in the gaps found in the
CISG.  Interestingly, it is plausible that the supply of digital content and
trade-related services may be either an internal or an external gap in the
CISG.  CISG Article 3 states that the CISG does not apply to “contracts”
where the “preponderant part” of a party’s obligations are the supply of
labor or services.104  Notice that the provision simply refers to contracts
and not to contracts for the sale of goods.  So, there is a plausible argu-
100. For a discussion of the differences between European interpretive and
CISG-international style interpretive methodologies, see Ulrich Magnus, Interpreta-
tion and Gap-filling in the CISG and in the CESL, 11 J. INT’L TRADE L. & POL’Y 266,
272–77 (2012).
101. The mandate of autonomous interpretation is implied from CISG Article
7(1), which directs the interpreter to pay due regard to the “international charac-
ter” and the need to “promote uniformity in its application” when interpreting
CISG provisions.  CESL Article 4(1) expressly states that the CESL “is to be inter-
preted autonomously.”
102. See CESL, supra note 8, pt. IV: Obligations and remedies of the parties to
a sales contract.
103. See id. pt. V: Obligations and remedies of the parties to a related service
contract.
104. CISG, supra note 2, art. 3(2).
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ment that the CISG covers trade-related services, as long as they are not a
preponderant part of the contract.  However, it is more difficult to argue
that the CISG would cover the supply of digital content.  The CISG would
cover such contracts if the digital content is determined to be a “good”
and the transaction involves a “sale.”  Most often such transactions involve
licensing of the right to use digital content.  It would be implausible to
argue that the CISG covers such decidedly non-sale transactions.  None-
theless, whether covered under the CISG or not, the CESL provides a
dense body of detailed rules in these areas that can be used directly or by
analogy in developing a more comprehensive instrument.
In addition, the CESL covers other areas not covered by the express
rules under the CISG, such as standard form contracting,105 conflicting
standard terms,106 duty to disclose (pre-contractual information),107 de-
fects in consent,108 unfair terms,109 rate of interest,110 prescription peri-
ods,111 and the excuse of hardship.112
D. Other Sources
There are other conventions that can be used in constructing a com-
posite international sales law doctrine, including the 1974 U.N. Conven-
tion on the Limitation Period in the International Sale of Goods as
amended by the 1980 Protocol, the 1983 Geneva Convention on Agency in
the International Sale of Goods, the 2001 U.N. Convention on Assignment
of Receivables in International Trade, and the 2005 U.N. Convention on
the Use of Electronic Communications in International Contracts.  Finally,
a number of Civil Codes have gone through modern revisions, such as the
German Civil Code (Bu¨rgerliches Gesetzbuch or “B.G.B.”) and the Dutch Civil
Code (Burgerlijk Wetboek or “B.W.”), and should be reviewed as a source for
a comprehensive international sales document.  These laws, as well as the
International Chamber of Commerce’s model agreements, such as its
Model Sales Contract, may provide a menu of alternative rules that com-
mercial parties can choose from in negotiating and drafting their
contracts.
Resorting to well-respected national commercial or contract laws will
be necessary in some areas where national laws vary widely.  This would be
105. See CESL, supra note 8, arts. 7, 62, 70.
106. See id. art. 39.
107. See id. art. 23.
108. See id. arts. 48–57.
109. See id. arts. 9–81, 86, 170.
110. See id. art. 168.
111. See id. pt. VIII: Prescription.
112. See id. art. 89 (covering “excessively onerous” and “duty to enter into
negotiations”).
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in the areas of defects in consent,113 validity,114 and agency contracts.115
In these areas, it is best to provide a number of options that the parties
may select.  Use of national laws, international soft laws, and trade practice
materials should be reviewed in crafting optional rules that parties may
select under the principle of freedom of contract.
E. Comprehensive International Sales Law Project
1. Fusion of Hard and Soft Laws
A comprehensive sales law, as proposed here, would be a combination
hard-soft law instrument.  This Section will provide a brief analysis of the
nature and characteristics of hard and soft laws.  First, the hardness of
hard laws varies across legal subject maters, with the broad range of public
law (constitutional, criminal, tax, and so forth), regulatory, and consumer
protection laws as very hard laws.  Contract and sales law, anchored in the
principle of freedom of contract, are inherently “soft” hard laws.  Despite
the existence of mandatory rules, the overwhelming bodies of such laws
are made up of default rules that the parties can expressly or implicitly opt
out of.  On the other end of the spectrum, soft law is viewed as completely
voluntary in nature.  Parties may choose to utilize soft laws or courts and
arbitral panels may use them to guide or support their decisions.  How-
ever, there are some soft laws that are so universally accepted that they
take on a hard law edge.  The International Chamber of Commerce’s In-
coterms (trade terms) and Uniform Customs and Practices for Documen-
tary Credit Transactions (rules for international letters of credit) manuals
are examples of such “hard” soft laws.
Soft law can be best understood “as a continuum, or spectrum, run-
ning between fully binding treaties and fully political positions.”116  Guz-
man and Meyer note that there are so many types of soft law that it is best
to think of soft law as a variety of categories.  They argue that, despite
many types of soft laws, soft law comes in two general forms—agreements
113. Negotiations over providing rules on mistake were scuttled because of
the variety of rules on the subject found in various domestic laws. See Report of the
Secretary-General: Formation and Validity of Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 8
U.N.Y.B. Comm’n Int’l Trade, A/CN.9/128, annex 11 (1977), available at http://
www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/yearbooks/yb-1977-e/vol8-p90-109-e.pdf.
114. See Rep. of the Working Group, 9 U.N.Y.B. Comm’n Int’l Trade, A/CN.9/
142, ¶¶ 48–69 (1978), reprinted in [1978] IX Y.B. UNCITRAL 61, 65–66, available at
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/yearbooks/yb-1978-e/yb_1978_e.pdf (not-
ing decision to exclude specific rules on validity).
115. Similarly, efforts to address issues related to agency were not successful.
See Rep. of the Working Group, 6 U.N.Y.B. Comm’n Int’l Trade, A/CN.9/100, ¶ 47,
reprinted in [1975] VI Y.B. UNCITRAL 49, 53, available at http://www.uncitral.org/
pdf/english/yearbooks/yb-1975-e/yb_1975_e.pdf.
116. Andrew T. Guzman & Timothy L. Meyer, International Soft Law, 2 J. LE-
GAL ANALYSIS 171, 173 (2010).  Prosper Weil once stated that soft law obligations
“are neither ‘soft law’ nor ‘hard law’: they are simply not law at all.”  Prosper Weil,
Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?, 77 AM. J. INT’L L. 413, 414 n.7
(1983).
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and “international common law.”117  Ultimately, Guzman and Meyer offer
a very interesting definition of soft law “as those nonbinding rules or in-
struments that interpret or inform our understanding of binding legal
rules or represent promises that in turn create expectations about future
conduct.”118  This definition can act as the mantra for a comprehensive
hard-soft international sales law project.
2. Determining Comprehensiveness
Exactly what constitutes a comprehensive international sales law?  The
answer is that it reaches the many issues that are found in a comprehen-
sive national sales law, as well as the terms found in international sales
contracts.  The totality of sales law in a given national legal system is gener-
ally found in a number of statutory instruments and case decisions.  In the
U.S., at the minimum it would include Article II of the U.C.C., common
law of contracts, and various statutory interventions, such as terminations
of franchises, usury, form of warranties, and so forth.
The proposed Swiss Law Project provides a non-exhaustive list of con-
tract law subjects including:
[F]reedom of contract, freedom of form; formation of contract,
among others: offer, acceptance, modification, discharge by as-
sent, standard terms, battle of forms, electronic contracting;
agency, among others: authority, disclosed/undisclosed agency,
liability of the agent; validity, among others: mistake, fraud, du-
ress, gross disparity, unfair terms, illegality; construction of con-
tract, among others: interpretation, supplementation, practices
and usages; conditions; third party rights; performance of con-
tract, among others: time, place, currency, costs; remedies for
breach of contract, among others: right to withhold perform-
ance, specific performance, avoidance, damages, exemptions;
consequences of unwinding; set-off; assignment and delegation,
among others: assignment of rights, delegation of performance
of duty, transfer of contracts; limitation; joint and several obli-
gors and obligees.119
This would be a good place to start, but should also include negotia-
tions and pre-contractual instruments, interest damages, consignment, re-
tention of title, warranties and disclaimer of warranties, and post-
contractual obligations.  However, for a functioning and practical instru-
ment of sales law, it is necessary to avoid too broad of a scope.  The project
should focus only on international commercial sales transactions, such as
is the case with the CISG and Unidroit Principles.  This will help maintain
a level of simplicity that the inclusion of consumer transactions would
117. See Guzman & Meyer, supra note 116, at 173–74.
118. Id. at 174.
119. See UNCITRAL, supra note 1, at 4.
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complicate.  Second, any such document should maintain the private na-
ture of contract law.  The infrequency of mandatory rules found in the
CISG should be retained, but the rest of the document should be sub-
servient to the principle of private autonomy.
3. Approaches to Developing a Comprehensive International Sales Law
There are a number of options or methodologies that can be em-
ployed in developing a comprehensive sales law: (1) the restatement ap-
proach, (2) the compendium approach, and (3) the combined approach.
The “restatement” approach would work off a template, consisting of four
parts: (1) Statement of rule or definition (2) Comments (3) Illustrations,
and (4) Notes.  The restatement approach is both descriptive and pre-
scriptive in nature.  It provides the rule and its meaning based upon the
review of the jurisprudence.  It notes whether there is a consensus in the
case law on a particular meaning.  If not, it elucidates the majority and
minority views or the multiple minority views.  It then takes a position on
the best of the existing rules.  The choice of a best rule helps simplify
chaotic bodies of rule interpretations that are often in conflict.  The pre-
scriptive dimension of restatement approach is also forward-looking by
suggesting what the law “should” be by anticipating future developments.
The compendium approach would entail the sketching of an outline
of all possible issues, rules, or terms relating to international sales transac-
tions.  It would provide the relevant CISG provision with commentary.  If
there are no such provisions, then the document would suggest a provi-
sion.  The sources for the “gap-fillers” could be both hard and soft laws—
CESL, Unidroit Principles, U.C.C., B.G.B., and commercial practice or
customary international law.  This format would likely not entail the pro-
viding of a best rule or a model provision, but would supply alternative
provisions that reflect the characteristics of different contracting parties
and the context of their transactions.  The compendium approach is
purely a descriptive enterprise, while the restatement approach possesses
an important normative element.  Ultimately, the two approaches may
work out to be the same depending on how they are implemented.  The
best method would be to start with the compendium approach for sketch-
ing out a framework, but use the restatement format for determining con-
tent.  This combined approach is likely to be more helpful to the
practitioner.  It starts under the presumption that the CISG is a good foun-
dation for an international sales law, but offers complimentary materials
and approaches to make the CISG more comprehensive and useful.
Both the compendium and restatement approaches could follow a
rule-exception format.  Instead of listing a menu of rule and term options,
each rule could be immediately followed by an exception.  The earlier cov-
erage of the CISG acceptance rule (Article 18) was an example of a rule-
exception approach.  However, in the interest of certainty, the non-CISG
provisions of a comprehensive sales law should require the contracting
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parties to expressly choose between the rule and its exception.  If not, a
rule followed by an overly broad exception essentially leaves “the question
open as to which of the two alternatives will ultimately prevail” in a con-
tract dispute.120  This approach as a vehicle of compromise is preferable
to the use of ambiguous language that masks the failure to reach a consen-
sus view.
4. Restatement First of International Sales Law
Given the previous section, the restatement approach would play the
dominant role in drafting a comprehensive sales law.  The CISG is viewed
as the core document because it has been widely adopted, but the fact
remains that transactional lawyers often opt out.  So, any restatement pro-
ject using the CISG as its core should ask how could it be made better and
more comprehensive?
The restatement approach makes it relatively easy to interweave the
CISG with soft law sources.  The final product would be viewed as a soft
law instrument, the impact of which can be judged by its use in practice
and citations from courts.  The most ambitious expectation is that it would
be viewed as a “manual” that is recognized as customary international law.
Henry Deeb Gabriel’s statement on soft law offers encouragement:
[P]rinciples and restatements, have been widely used by courts
and arbitrations as a basis for forging new legal rules as well as
interpreting existing ones.  In the common law world, particu-
larly the United States, courts have long relied upon the various
Restatements of the Law produced by the American Law Institute
as a source of law.  Moreover, arbitration tribunals, which are
generally not bound by domestic choice of law restrictions, often
adopt legal rules, such as the UNIDROIT Principles of Interna-
tional Commercial Law, because of the presumed neutrality of
the rules.121
A comprehensive international sales law project recognizes that the
CISG lacks the comprehensiveness found in domestic sales laws or codes.
Because of the shortcomings of the CISG and the inspirational quest for a
broader international code, a more robust use of the CISG as the begin-
ning and not the end of the “uniform sales law project” has been ne-
glected.  This Article tries to move the focus on expanding the CISG from
both the theoretical and practical levels to make a comprehensive sales
law.  The goal of such a project is not to reform or amend the CISG, be-
cause that is politically impractical.  Its purpose is to use the CISG as a core
120. Bonell, supra note 94, at 3–4.
121. Henry Deeb Gabriel, Universalism and Tradition: The Use of Non-Binding
Principles in International Commercial Law, in LIBER MEMORIALIS PETAR SˇARCˇEVIC´: UNI-
VERSALISM, TRADITION AND THE INDIVIDUAL 471, 479 (Vesna Tomljenovi et al. eds.,
2006).
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and base document and develop a widely accepted body of customary in-
ternational law to overcome its limited scope.  The CISG, as the only uni-
form law that we have to work with for the foreseeable future, can be made
better by analyzing and applying by analogy other laws including, domestic
and international hard and soft laws.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article travels through the levels of doctrinal analysis of the Con-
vention on Contracts for the International Sales of Goods (CISG), as well
as documenting its limited scope and its other shortcomings.  The middle
part of the Article moves to the level of theory by examining the theories
of interpretation advanced by Karl Llewellyn and Ronald Dworkin.  These
theories are mined for insights on how best to close the internal gaps of
the CISG.  The third part of the Article proposes a new project—the devel-
opment of a hard-soft law document that provides a single place for par-
ties, lawyers, judges, and arbitrators to go for a comprehensive
international sales law.122
122. A team of scholars, led by Ulrich Magnus, Reiner Schulze, Andre´ Jans-
sen, and Larry A. DiMatteo, will convene a meeting (September 27–28, 2013) of a
group of scholars to plan the undertaking of the project described in this Article.
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WHO NEEDS A UNIFORM CONTRACT LAW, AND WHY?
INGEBORG SCHWENZER*
CONTRACT law, especially commercial contract law, has always beenat the forefront of harmonization and unification of private law.  The
reason is that different domestic laws are perceived as an obstacle to inter-
national trade.1  This has always been true and still holds true nowadays as
proven by many recent field studies around the world.2  In the 19th cen-
tury this prompted unification at the nation-state level all over Europe, in
the 20th century the Uniform Commercial Code in the United States is
another prominent example, as well as endeavours not only on the Euro-
pean level3 but also in Africa.4  Most recently we witnessed similar move-
ments in East Asia with the Principles of Asian Contract Law (PACL).5
Let me briefly discuss who is in need of a uniform contract law and
why.  In general, on the international level we may roughly distinguish
three different scenarios of contracting parties.
In the first group we find parties from countries where the same lan-
guage is spoken.  In general, these countries also belong to the same legal
family with differences between their legal systems being minor if not neg-
* Prof. Dr. Ingeborg Schwenzer, LL.M. (Berkeley) is a professor of private law
at the University of Basel in Switzerland.  The author is deeply indebted to Ref. iur.
Lina Ali for editing the footnotes.
1. See Ewan McKendrick, Harmonisation of European Contract Law: The State We
Are In, in THE HARMONISATION OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW: IMPLICATIONS FOR EU-
ROPEAN PRIVATE LAWS, BUSINESS AND LEGAL PRACTICE 5, 14–15 (Stefan Vogenauer
& Stephen Weatherill eds., 2006) (noting that “differences in national contract law
do act as a barrier to trade”).
2. See Stefan Vogenauer & Stephen Weatherill, The European Community’s Com-
petence to Pursue the Harmonisation of Contract Law—An Empirical Contribution to the
Debate, in THE HARMONISATION OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW: IMPLICATIONS FOR EU-
ROPEAN PRIVATE LAWS, BUSINESS AND LEGAL PRACTICE, supra note 1, at 125–27.
3. See, e.g., THE COMM’N OF EUR. CONTRACT LAW, PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN
CONTRACT LAW, PARTS I & II (Ole Lando & Hugh Beale eds., 2000) [hereinafter
PECL]; THE COMM’N OF EUR. CONTRACT LAW, PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT
LAW, PART III (Ole Lando et al. eds., 2003) [hereinafter PECL III].
4. See, e.g., Acte Uniforme portant sur le Droit commercial ge´ne´ral [Uniform
Act on General Commercial Law], Dec. 15, 2010, ORGANIZATION POUR L’HARMONI-
SATION EN AFRIQUE DU DROIT DES AFFAIRES [ORGANIZATION FOR THE HARMONIZATION
OF BUSINESS LAW IN AFRICA] [hereinafter OHADA], available at http://www.ohada.
org/presentation-generale-de-lacte-uniforme/telechargements1.html.
5. For further information on PACL, see Shiyuan Han, Principles of Asian Con-
tract Law: An Endeavor of Regional Harmonization of Contract Law in East Asia, 58 VILL.
L. REV. 589 (2013); see also Harmonization of Regional Laws on Obligations, FONDATION
POUR LE DROIT CONTINENTAL, http://www.fondation-droitcontinental.org/jcms/
c_7718/projet-commun-de-droit-des-contrats-en-asie-du-sud-est (last visited Apr.
15, 2013).
(723)
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ligible.6  This first of all applies to parties from English-speaking common
law countries, like parties from the United States and Canada, from Aus-
tralia and New Zealand, or from India and the United Kingdom.  But it
also holds true for other scenarios like those of parties from France and
Cameroon, from Argentina and Mexico, or from Germany and Austria.
First, it is possible that the parties can agree on one of their respective
legal systems.  If this is not the case they can be expected to choose the law
of a third country with the same language and belonging to the same legal
tradition.  In any case, the outcome of a possible dispute—be it litigated or
arbitrated—will be more or less predictable.  This group comes close to
purely domestic contracts and there is hardly any need for a unification of
contract law as the parties would still prefer the law that is more familiar to
them than any unified law.
In the second group a—most probably western—company with over-
whelming bargaining power contracts with an economically weaker party.
The powerful company usually will be able to impose anything that it
wants on its contract partner.  It has sophisticated in-house lawyers who
carefully draft the contract preferably with a choice of law clause designat-
ing its own domestic law.  If this is combined with a forum selection clause
designating the domestic courts of the economically stronger party usually
there will be no problems, at least not for the powerful party, and thus no
need for a uniform contract law.  The domestic courts apply their domes-
tic law, which in general will yield predictable and satisfactory results for
the company seated in that country.  The picture may immediately
change, however, if the other party brings suit in the domestic courts of its
own country and there the forum selection clause and/or the choice of
law clause is not honoured.7  But even if these courts accept the choice of
law, it is a totally different question of how the courts will apply this for-
eign law.  By agreeing on arbitration many of the aforementioned impon-
derabilities may be circumvented.  Still, problems of ascertaining and
proving the chosen law—as will be described below—can be encountered.
The third group is probably by far the largest one.  It consists of par-
ties from countries where different languages are spoken, be they from a
common law and a civil law country or from two civil law countries.  If
none of the parties has the economic power to impose its own law upon
the other party, i.e., where the parties are dealing at arm’s length with one
another, more often than not they will agree on a third law.  This might be
a law that appears to be closely related to both parties because it influ-
6. For an overview of the legal families with regard to domestic sales laws, see
INGEBORG SCHWENZER ET AL., GLOBAL SALES AND CONTRACT LAW paras. 2.01–.135
(2012).
7. A prominent example is Brazil, where the validity of choice of law and
choice of forum clauses is highly controversial.  For more information, see Dana
Stringer, Note, Choice of Law and Choice of Forum in Brazilian International Commercial
Contracts: Party Autonomy, International Jurisdiction, and the Emerging Third Way, 44
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 959 (2006).
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enced the law of both parties’ countries in one way or the other, like is
true for German law, for example, in relation to Italian and Japanese or
Korean law.8  If no such common background exists, more often than not,
the parties think to solve their problems by resorting to what they believe
is a “neutral law,” thereby often confusing political neutrality with suitabil-
ity of the chosen law for international transactions.9  In particular, this
seems to be the case with Swiss law.
In such a case the first hurdle that the parties have to take, at least
once it comes to litigation or arbitration, is the language problem.  The
parties have to investigate a foreign law in a foreign language.  If the lan-
guage is not the one of the litigation or arbitration in question then all the
legal materials—statutes, case law, and scholarly writings—must be trans-
lated into the language of the court or of the arbitration.  Legal experts
are required to prove the content of the law that is chosen by the parties.
In some countries the experts may be appointed by the court, in others as
well as generally in arbitration each party will have to come forward with
sometimes even several experts.10  Needless to say, these procedures can
be very expensive and may be prohibitive for a party who does not have
the necessary economic power to invest these monies in the first place.
This may even be harsher under a procedural system where each party
bears its own costs regardless of the outcome of the proceedings, as is
especially the case under the so-called “American Rule” as it applies not
only in the United States, but also in Japan.11  However, even if a party is
willing to bear all these costs to prove a foreign law in court or arbitration
the question as to how this law is interpreted and applied can be highly
unpredictable.
Second, the parties will very often be taken by surprise when they real-
ize the true content of the law that they have chosen.  Just to give you one
example that in my view is rather typical for an international contract be-
8. For German influences in the East Asian region see SCHWENZER ET AL.,
supra note 6, ¶¶ 2.123–.127.  For German influences on Italian civil law, see KON-
RAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KO¨TZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW, 102–04
(Tony Weir trans., 3d ed. 1998).
9. Cf. Christiana Fountoulakis, The Parties’ Choice of ‘Neutral Law’ in Interna-
tional Sales Contracts, 7 EUR. J.L. REFORM 303, 306–07 (2005).
10. Cf. Michele Taruffo, Evidence, in 16 INT’L ENCYCLOPEDIA COMP. L. ch. 7,
7.65–.66 (Mauro Cappelletti ed., 2010) (regarding court proceedings); cf. Sieg-
fried H. Elsing & John M. Townsend, Bridging the Common Law-Civil Law Divide in
Arbitration, 18 ARB. INT’L 59, 63–64 (2002) (regarding arbitration proceedings);
INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, RULES OF ARBITRATION art. 25(3) (2012); UNITED
NATIONS COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW [hereinafter UNCITRAL], ARBITRATION
RULES art. 27(2) (2010); Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, Globalization of Arbitral Proce-
dure, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1313, 1330 (2003).
11. For a comparative overview of how litigation costs and attorney fees are
allocated between the parties in civil litigation, see Mathias Reimann, Cost and Fee
Allocation in Civil Procedure: A Synthesis, in COST AND FEE ALLOCATION IN CIVIL PRO-
CEDURE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY, 11 IUS GENTIUM: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE ON LAW
AND JUSTICE (Mathias Reimann ed., 2012).
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\58-4\VLR414.txt unknown Seq: 4 11-JUL-13 8:59
726 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58: p. 723
tween two small and medium enterprises (SMEs); a sales contract between
a Chinese seller and an Italian buyer.  As German law has had great influ-
ence on both Chinese and Italian law,12 the parties—although none of
them speaks German—believe to have a rough idea of German law and
agree on German law to govern their contract.  The Chinese seller, for its
standard form contract, copies a form it finds on the Internet including a
limitation of liability clause.  Whereas the clause may well live up to the
standards of the United States’ Uniform Commercial Code, it is totally
invalid under German law that provides for substantive control of standard
terms even in business-to-business (b2b) relationships.13  This is certainly
not what both parties wanted and expected in choosing German law.
Third, the outcome of the case under the law chosen may be highly
unpredictable.  This especially holds true if the parties choose Swiss law.
As Switzerland is such a small country, the Swiss Supreme Court has not
yet decided many central questions of contract law or if so, the decision
may have been rendered decades ago and is disputed by scholarly writings.
This often makes the outcome of the case rather unpredictable; another
reason that may well prevent a party from pursuing its rights under the
contract.
Furthermore, especially Swiss domestic contract law in core areas is
not suitable for international contracts.  This can be demonstrated by ref-
erence to only two examples.  First, the Swiss Supreme Court distinguishes
between peius, i.e., defective goods, and aliud, i.e., different goods;14 the
latter giving the buyer the right to demand performance during ten years
after the conclusion of the contract notwithstanding whether it gave no-
tice of non-performance or not,15 while the former requires the buyer to
give prompt notice of defect according to Article 201 OR to preserve any
remedies for breach of contract.  Where the line between peius and aliud
will be drawn in a particular case can be extremely difficult to predict.16
The second example is compensation of consequential losses.17  Whether
there is a claim for damages without fault depends on the number of links
12. For further discussion on the influence of German law on Italian law, see
ZWEIGERT & KO¨TZ, supra note 8.
13. Cf. BU¨RGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], Jan. 2, 2002,
BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I [BGBL. I], as amended, §§ 305–310 (Ger.).
14. See Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal Supreme Court] Dec. 5, 1995, 121
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES SCHWEIZERISCHEN BUNDESGERICHTS [BGE] III 453 (Switz.).
15. Cf. OBLIGATIONENRECHT [OR] [CIVIL CODE] Dec. 10, 1907, SR 210, art.
127 (Switz.).  For an English translation, see id., available at http://www.admin.ch/
ch/e/rs/2/210.en.pdf.
16. See Fountoulakis, supra note 9, at 308–09.  For more information on the
differentiation between peius and aliud, see BASLER KOMMENTAR, OBLIGATION-
ENRECHT I art. 206, ¶¶ 2–3 (Heinrich Honsell et al. eds., 5th ed. 2011) [hereinafter
OBLIGATIONENRECHT I].
17. See OBLIGATIONENRECHT [OR] [CIVIL CODE] Dec. 10, 1907, SR 210, art.
208(2) (Switz.).  For a translation, see id., available at http://www.admin.ch/ch/e/
rs/2/210.en.pdf.
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in the chain of causation.18  Extremely short periods for giving notice of
defects19 further militate against domestic Swiss law in the international
context.  Similar examples can also be drawn from many other domestic
legal systems.
This background illustrates the urgent need to further harmonize, if
not unify, general contract law.  The United Nations Commission on Inter-
national Trade Law (UNCITRAL) would be the most appropriate place
for such a project.  Whereas any regional endeavor might mainly focus on
the laws of the respective countries involved, UNCITRAL has the chance
to embark upon a more truly global reflection.  Indeed, UNCITRAL is the
only forum with universal participation, i.e., all the regions of the world
have a chance to contribute on equal footing.20  This is the reason why, in
2012, Switzerland made a proposal for the 45th Session of UNCITRAL on
possible future work by UNCITRAL in the area of international contract
law.21  However, this proposal did not suggest how the possible future
work should be conducted; especially what kind of instrument should be
aimed at if one were to come to the conclusion that such future work is
desirable and feasible.  Let me give some thoughts to this question, em-
phasizing that I am speaking entirely for myself and in no way voicing the
official Swiss opinion.
In principle, there is the choice between a convention and a model
law.  “A convention is designed to unify law by establishing binding legal
obligations.”22  Its aim is to achieve a very high level of harmonization.23
Although there may be the possibility of having some reservations allowing
state parties a certain, but very limited degree of choice, such reservations
are easily discernible without the need to have recourse to the respective
18. See Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal Supreme Court] Nov. 28, 2006, 132
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES SCHWEIZERISCHEN BUNDESGERICHTS [BGE] III 257, 271
(Switz.); see also OBLIGATIONENRECHT I, supra note 16, art. 208, ¶¶ 7–8.
19. Cf. OBLIGATIONENRECHT [OR] [CIVIL CODE] Dec. 10, 1907, SR 210, art.
201(1) (Switz.).  For an English translation, see id., available at http://www.admin.
ch/ch/e/rs/2/210.en.pdf (according to which notice must be made immediately
(“sofort”)); see also Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal Court] June 27, 1950, 76 ENT-
SCHEIDUNGEN DES SCHWEIZERISCHEN BUNDESGERICHTS [BGE] II 221, 225 (Switz.)
(notice within four days was in time as these included Sunday).
20. UNCITRAL’s membership comprises states from Africa, Asia, Eastern Eu-
rope, Western Europe, Latin America, and the Caribbean, thereby ensuring that
the main economic and legal systems of the world are represented.  For an over-
view of the today 60 member states, see UNCITRAL, A Guide to UNCITRAL: Basic
Facts About the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 37–41, Annex II
(2013), available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/general/12-57491-
Guide-to-UNCITRAL-e.pdf [hereinafter A Guide to UNCITRAL 2013].
21. See UNCITRAL, June 25–July 6, 2012, Possible Future Work in the Area of
International Contract Law: Proposal by Switzerland on Possible Future Work by UNCI-
TRAL in the Area of International Contract Law, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/758 (May 8,
2012) [hereinafter Swiss Proposal], available at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/
commission/sessions/45th.html.
22. A Guide to UNCITRAL 2013, supra note 20, at 13.
23. See id. at 14.
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domestic law.24  Thus, a convention provides the highest level of predict-
ability for private parties.  In contrast, a model law only provides for a leg-
islative text that is recommended to state parties.25  It is used where state
parties want to retain flexibility in implementation “or where strict uni-
formity is not necessary or desirable.”26
Furthermore, a model law may be finalized and approved by UNCI-
TRAL at its annual session whereas a convention still, in principle, necessi-
tates a diplomatic conference.27  Although, at the political level it may be
certainly easier to convince state governments to agree to a model law
allowing them more leeway, the needs of international commerce clearly
militate in favor of a convention.  Even if states were to implement a
model law they could still deviate from the text of such a model law, which
would make it difficult to ascertain the content of the applicable law in a
specific case.
Moreover, there is no obligation for courts of a state that has imple-
mented a model law to regard its international character and the need to
promote uniformity in its interpretation, as it is nowadays provided for in
all recent international conventions.28  Thus, a statute implementing a
model law is purely domestic law and is legitimately interpreted against
the respective domestic background.  If a model law may bring about
some harmonization at the beginning this will soon be lost after some
time.  This can especially be expected in a traditional field such as con-
tract law where firm dogmatic conceptions and convictions prevail that
have been shaped over centuries and that every lawyer has internalized
from the very first day in law school.
The scope of the envisaged instrument on general contract law
should be similar to the one of the United Nations Convention on Con-
tracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG), except that it should
apply to all kinds of contracts and not just to sales.  This means, in the first
place, that the instrument should only be concerned with international
contracts and not with purely domestic ones.  There is no reason, and it is
not the mandate of UNCITRAL to interfere with domestic relationships.29
If a state feels the need to simplify the situation for its citizens by having
the same law applied to domestic as well as to international contracts, it is
free to do so and implement corresponding domestic legislation as some
states already have chosen in relation to the CISG.30
24. See, e.g., U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, United Nations Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods arts. 92–96, Apr. 11, 1980, 1489
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CISG], available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/
texts/sales/cisg/V1056997-CISG-e-book.pdf.
25. See A Guide to UNCITRAL 2013, supra note 20, at 14.
26. Id.
27. See id. at 15.
28. See CISG, supra note 24, art. 7(1).
29. Cf. A Guide to UNCITRAL 2013, supra note 20, at 1–2.
30. Cf. Ingeborg Schwenzer & Pascal Hachem, The CISG—Successes and Pitfalls,
57 AM. J. COMP. L. 457, 462–63 (2009).
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Like the CISG, the instrument on general contract law should be con-
fined to b2b contracts without touching business-to-consumer (b2c) rela-
tionships.  Except for Internet transactions that become more and more
international, b2c contracts, to this very day, are mostly domestic con-
tracts.  Consumer protection asks for mandatory rules, which stands in
sharp contrast to the need for freedom of contract in b2b contracts.  It is
not possible to juggle the needs of both—consumers and businesses—in
one single instrument.  The futility of such an endeavor has been demon-
strated lately by the draft of a Common European Sales Law.31  Further-
more, the level of consumer protection still differs considerably around
the world; an international consensus in this field probably cannot be
achieved during the decades to come.
In regard to the different areas of contract law that should be ad-
dressed, it is clear that the future uniform contract instrument should
cover as many areas as possible.  However, there are some fields where
unification is more urgent than in others.  The most important area where
the gaps left by the CISG are most unfortunate, because they endanger
uniformity already reached, are questions of validity.  Although, it is now
unanimously held that the CISG itself defines what is a question of validity
left to domestic law and what is not,32 many day-to-day contract problems
are issues of validity.  To name but a few: questions of consent, such as
mistake, undue influence, or fraud; and validity of individual clauses and
standard terms, such as gross disparity, burdensome obligations, exclusion
and limitation of liability clauses, as well as fixed sums, i.e., penalty and
liquidated damages clauses.33  It is extremely burdensome to have these
questions answered by domestic law, which might well lead to frictions
with unified law.  Also very important are issues relating to consequences
of unwinding of contracts34 and set-offs.35  Other areas of contract law, on
the other hand, such as third party rights, assignment and delegation, or
31. See Ingeborg Schwenzer, The Proposed Common European Sales Law and the
Convention on the International Sale of Goods, 44 UCC L.J. 457 (2012).  The draft
forms Annex I of the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of
the Council on a Common European Sales Law. See Proposal for a Regulation of the
European Parliament and of the Council on a Common European Sales Law COM (2011)
635 final (Oct. 11, 2011), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/Lex
UriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0635:FIN:EN:PDF.
32. See SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHWENZER, COMMENTARY ON THE CONVENTION ON
THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) art. 4, ¶ 31 (Ingeborg Schwenzer ed.,
3d ed. 2010) (with references).
33. For an overview on how the issues of formation and validity of sales con-
tracts are dealt with in the different legal systems see SCHWENZER ET AL., supra note
6, ¶¶ 9.01–22.25.
34. For an overview on how the unwinding of contracts is dealt with in the
different legal systems see id. ¶¶ 50.01–.36.
35. For a comparative discussion on set-offs, see CHRISTIANA FOUNTOULAKIS,
SET-OFF DEFENCES IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: A COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS 7–128 (2011).
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joint and several obligors and obligees, might not be at the forefront of
desirability for unification.
If one considers working on further unification of contract law the
route to be followed seems to be pretty clear.  The starting point must be
the CISG.  It has received such tremendous acceptance that anything that
might interfere with it must be refrained from.36  Other UNCITRAL in-
struments, such as the 1974 Limitation Convention37 or the 1983 Uniform
Rules on Contract Clauses for an Agreed Sum Due Upon Failure of Per-
formance38 should be taken into consideration, and it should be discussed
whether they should be amended.  Certainly, of utmost importance are
the Principles of International Commercial Contracts (PICC).39  The most
valuable work has been completed by the International Institute for the
Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) and any duplication of efforts
must be prevented.  In essence, we face a similar situation as in 1968 when
UNCITRAL started working on the CISG, drawing heavily on the previous
work done by UNIDROIT that had led to the Hague Conventions on the
sale of goods, the Convention relating to a Uniform Law for the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods (ULIS), and the Convention relating to Uniform Law
on the Formation of Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (ULF),
respectively.40  However, there are certain contradictions between CISG
and PICC that need to be eliminated;41 in other areas the possible accept-
ance of PICC rules at a global level must be carefully scrutinized and
discussed.
Considering what has already been achieved at the international level,
global contract law appears to be feasible within a reasonable amount of
36. The CISG now has seventy-eight member states with the number continu-
ously increasing.  Recently, the Brazilian Senate approved the text of the CISG.
Upon completing the accession process Brazil will become the 79th contracting
state.  For a list of the current contracting states to the CISG, see UNCITRAL, CISG
Status, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/sale_goods/1980CISG
_status.html; see also Ingeborg Schwenzer & Pascal Hachem, The CISG—A Story of
Worldwide Success, in CISG PART II CONFERENCE 119 (Jan Kleinemann ed., 2009),
available at https://ius.unibas.ch/uploads/publics/9587/20110913164502_4e6f6c
6e5b746.pdf.
37. See UNCITRAL, Convention on the Limitation Period in the International Sale of
Goods, June 14, 1974, 1511 U.N.T.S. 3, available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/
english/texts/sales/limit/limit_conv_E_Ebook.pdf.
38. See UNCITRAL, Texts on Liquidated Damages and Penalty Clauses, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/243, Annex I, June 29, 1983, available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/
english/texts/sales/contract/vol14-p272-273-e.pdf.
39. See UNIDROIT, UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts
(PICC) (2010), available at http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/con-
tracts/principles2010/integralversionprinciples2010-e.pdf.
40. For more information on the drafting history of the CISG, see PETER
SCHLECHTRIEM, UNIFORM SALES LAW—THE UN-CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR
THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 5, 17–21 (1986).
41. For a comparison of the two instruments, see Michael Joachim Bonell,
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts and the United Nations Con-
vention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods—Alternatives or Complementary
Instruments?, 2000 BUS. L. INT’L 91, 94–96 (2000).
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time and without consuming too many resources needed elsewhere.  How
would the global picture for internationally contracting parties change if
we had an UNCITRAL instrument on general contract law?
First, this instrument—just like the CISG—could be expected to re-
present a good compromise between common and civil law.42  It would be
acceptable to any party regardless of its own legal background.  It would
be a truly neutral law.
Second, it would be drawn up in the six United Nations languages
and it would be translated into the languages of the states adopting this
instrument, and thus be readily available in court and arbitral proceedings
rendering costly translations and expert testimony superfluous.  Similar to
the CISG, it could serve as a model for further harmonization of contract
law, also on a domestic level.43  Furthermore, it could be used to teach
traders, who cannot afford in-house counsel or legal advice, the basics of
contract law.44
Third, it would lead to much more predictability in international con-
tracts.  It can be expected that the same mechanisms that now support and
enhance the uniform application and interpretation of the CISG will also
play a decisive role for such an instrument.  It must be recalled that by now
we have about 3,000 published cases on the CISG,45 we count about 4,000
publications freely accessible on the Internet,46 we have CLOUT47—Case
Law on UNCITRAL Texts, we have the UNCITRAL Digest,48 and further
institutions worldwide such as the CISG Advisory Council,49 that strive to
guard uniformity.  Commentaries with article-by-article comments will be
published in different languages.  Uniform standard forms that facilitate
contracting will soon emerge on the basis of such an instrument and fur-
ther add to its predictability.
42. Cf. Ulrich Magnus, The Vienna Sales Convention (CISG) Between Civil and
Common Law—Best of All Worlds?, 3 J. CIV. L. STUD. 67, 74 (2010) (comparing to
CISG).
43. Cf. SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHWENZER, supra note 32, at 462–63 (comparing
CISG as role model for domestic legislators).
44. As it is true with regard to the CISG; cf. SCHWENZER ET AL., supra note 6, ¶
3.21.
45. For cases on the CISG, see CISG online case database, GLOBAL SALES LAW,
http://www.globalsaleslaw.org/index.cfm?pageID=29 (last visited Apr. 16, 2013);
see also CISG Database, PACE LAW SCHOOL, http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu.
46. For publications freely accessible on the Internet, see CISG Database, PACE
LAW SCHOOL, http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/.
47. See UNCITRAL, Case Law on UNCITRAL Texts (CLOUT), http://www.uncit
ral.org/uncitral/en/case_law.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2013).
48. See UNCITRAL, Digests, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/case_law/
digests.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2013).
49. For more information on the CISG Advisory Council and for the CISG
Advisory Council Opinions, see Welcome to International Sales Convention Advisory
Council (CISG), CISG ADVISORY COUNCIL, http://www.cisgac.com/ (last visited Apr.
16, 2013).
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All in all it can be expected that an UNCITRAL instrument on gen-
eral contract law may considerably save transaction costs.  It may also help
companies with fewer funds to be able to pursue their legal rights under
an international contract and thus further promote international trade.
Finally, it can support the rule of law worldwide.
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APPLICABLE LAW, THE CISG, AND THE FUTURE CONVENTION
ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS
PILAR PERALES VISCASILLAS*
I. INTRODUCTION: A CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS
THERE is no question that the debate on international commercialcontract law has grown following the adoption and subsequent suc-
cess of the 1980 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods (CISG).  The merits of the CISG can be measured not
only in terms of the high number and the economic weight of the coun-
tries that have ratified the Convention, but also by the quality and novelty,
of the worldwide solutions it achieved from a pure technical and legal
perspective.1  However, the CISG’s status as an international treaty has
some drawbacks.  First of all, as an international treaty, it might be quite
difficult to amend or modify it;2 second, despite the wide substantive cov-
erage of the CISG, there are important areas of sale of goods contracts left
to domestic law; third, the CISG only covers international sale of goods
contracts, and thus some other important international commercial con-
tracts do not have an international uniform law regime.
After the success of the CISG, several different instruments, mostly
with a material or a territorial scope different as to the CISG, have tried to
contribute soft law that either can be applied in conjunction with the
CISG, or as an alternative to it if specified by a contract.  These contractual
instruments are mostly based on or inspired by the CISG solutions be-
cause, despite the fact that the CISG is restricted to international sale of
goods contracts, it governs those contracts by regulating areas that belong
to general contract law.  The most well-known instrument of this sort is the
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts (UPICC,
1994, 2004, and 2010) that might be seen as a complementary tool to the
* Professor, Chair of Commercial Law, University Carlos III of Madrid.
1. See U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, United Nations Convention on Con-
tracts for the International Sale of Goods art. 35, Apr. 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter CISG], available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/sales/
cisg/V1056997-CISG-e-book.pdf.  The list of contracting states is now seventy-eight.
Brazil has to be added to the list since it recently adopted the CISG.
2. Notwithstanding the above, there are some indirect mechanisms to update
an International Treaty. See UNCITRAL, Recommendation Regarding the Inter-
pretation of Article II (2), and Article VII (1), of the Convention on the Recogni-
tion and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, U.N. Doc. A/6/17 (July 7,
2006); see also United Nations Convention on the Use of Electronic Communica-
tions in International Contracts, G.A. Res. 60/21, art. 20, U.N. GAOR, 60th Sess.,
Supp. No. 17 U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/21 (Nov. 23, 2005) [hereinafter Electronic
Communications Convention].
(733)
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\58-4\VLR415.txt unknown Seq: 2 23-JUL-13 11:56
734 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58: p. 733
CISG to the extent that it supplements, aids in its interpretation, and even
covers certain areas excluded from the CISG.3  The UNIDROIT Principles
have a wider field of application as compared to the CISG because they
cover international commercial contracts in general.  One of the most re-
cent instruments, is however, in more direct competition with the CISG
because, as a regulation, it will be incorporated into the legislation of the
EU member states, although for the contractual parties it will be an opt-
ing-in instrument: the European Union Proposal for a Regulation on a
Common European Sales Law (CESL) of October 11, 20114 whose ante-
cedents might be found in the Draft Common Frame of Reference
(DCFR, 2009) and the European Principles in Contract Law (PECL, 1995,
1999, and 2003).5  There are also several other regional initiatives such as
in Africa (Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa,
OHADA),6 Asia (Principles of Asian Contract Law, PACL), or Latin
America being the last two still under development.
These instruments have produced a worldwide, intense debate on
general commercial contract law, more generally on private law, on re-
gional versus universal harmonization of the law, as well as on the role of
soft law instruments in regard to hard instruments.  Furthermore, at the
core of the discussion is the role of the CISG, its limits, and its drawbacks,
in the framework of an international commercial contract law
instrument.7
3. In fact the 2004 and 2010 editions cover general contract law institutions
that are not covered by the CISG: authority of agents, contracts for the benefit of
third parties, set-off, limitation periods, assignment of rights and contracts, trans-
fer of obligations, conditions, plurality of obligors and obligees, unwinding of con-
tracts, and illegality.
4. See European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament
and of the Council on a Common European Sales Law, COM (2011) 635 Final (Oct. 11,
2011), available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/contract/files/common_sales_
law/regulation_sales_law_en.pdf.
5. See Pilar Perales Viscasillas & Rafael Illescas Ortiz, The Scope of the Common
European Sales Law: B2B, Goods, Digital Content and Services, 11 J. INT’L TRADE L. &
POL’Y 241 (2012) (offering critical view); see also Ingeborg Schwenzer, The Proposed
Common European Sales Law and The Convention on the International Sale of Goods, 44
UCC L.J. 457 (2012).
6. See Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa, The Uni-
form Act on General Commercial Law, available at http://www.ohadalegis.com/
anglais/tableaudrtcomgb.htm.
7. The idea of elaborating a “Global Commercial Code” was put forward by
Gerold Herrmann. See Gerold Herrmann, Law, International Commerce and the For-
mulating Agencies—The Future of Harmonisation and Formulating Agencies: The Role of
UNCITRAL (June 1, 2000) (unpublished paper presented at the Schmitthoff Sym-
posium: Law and Trade in the 21st Century, Centre of Commercial Law Studies,
London) (on file with author).  Before that, it was suggested that UNCITRAL
should embark on an international convention related to the general part of con-
tract law. See Ole Lando, Principles of European Contract Law and UNIDROIT Princi-
ples: Moving from Harmonisation to Unification?, 8 UNIF. L. REV. 123 (2003) (arguing
in favor of international convention by UNIDROIT); SHARING INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL LAW ACROSS NATIONAL BOUNDARIES, FESTSCHRIFT FOR ALBERT H.
KRITZER ON THE OCCASION OF HIS EIGHTIETH BIRTHDAY (Camilla B. Andersen &
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It is not a surprise that on the occasion of the last Commission session
of UNCITRAL in 20128 a proposal on possible future work by UNCITRAL
in the area of international contract law was put forward by Switzerland.9
The proposal tries to initiate a debate on two areas:10
(i) whether UNCITRAL can undertake an assessment of the op-
eration of the 1980 Convention on Contracts for the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods and related UNCITRAL instruments in light
of practical needs of international business parties today and to-
morrow, and
(ii) To discuss whether further work both in these areas and in
the broader context of general contract law is desirable and feasi-
ble on a global level to meet those needs.11
This proposal was well received by the Commission; however there
were several words of caution,12 and so the decision is still pending on the
Ulrich G. Schroeter eds., 2008); Michael Joachim Bonell, Towards a Legislative Codi-
fication of the UNIDROIT Principles?, 12 UNIF. L. REV. 233 (2007). But see Michael
Joachim Bonell, Do We Need a Global Commercial Code?, 106 DICK. L. REV. 87 (2001).
8. See U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Rep. on its 45th Sess., June 25–July 6,
2012.
9. See UNCITRAL, Possible Future Work in the Area of International Contract Law:
Proposal by Switzerland on Possible Future Work by UNCITRAL in the Area of International
Contract Law, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/758 (May 8, 2012) [hereinafter Swiss Proposal].
10. See id. at 1.
11. The areas identified in the Swiss Proposal are in particular: general provi-
sions (i.e., freedom of contract, freedom of form), formation of contract (i.e., of-
fer, acceptance, modification, discharge by assent, standard terms, battle of forms,
electronic contracting), agency (i.e., authority, disclosed/undisclosed agency, lia-
bility of the agent), validity (i.e., mistake, fraud, duress, gross disparity, unfair
terms, illegality), construction of contract (i.e., interpretation, supplementation,
practices and usages), conditions, third party rights, performance of contract (i.e.,
time, place, currency, costs), remedies for breach of contract (i.e., right to with-
hold performance, specific performance, avoidance, damages, exemptions), con-
sequences of unwinding; set-off; assignment and delegation (i.e., assignment of
rights, delegation of performance of duty, transfer of contracts), limitation, joint
and several obligors and obligees. See id.
12. See Rep. of the U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law on its 45th Sess., U.N.
GAOR, 67th Sess., Supp. No. 17, ¶ 130, U.N. Doc. A/67/17 (2012) [hereinafter
Report of the 45th Session].  The Report stated:
In reply, it was said that it was not evident that existing instruments were
inadequate in actual practice, that the proposal seemed unclear and
overly ambitious and that it could potentially overlap with existing texts,
such as the Unidroit Principles of International Commercial Contracts.
It was added that lacunae in existing texts, such as the United Nations
Sales Convention, were a result of the impossibility of finding an agreed
compromise solution and that there were significant doubts that that
could be overcome in the near future.  Concerns were also expressed
about the implications of such a vast project on the human and financial
resources available to the Commission and to States.  For those reasons, it
was urged that the proposed work should not be undertaken, at least not
at the present time.  It was added that the Commission might reconsider
the matter at a future date in the light of possible developments.
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Commission level.13
It seems that some part of the criticism derives from a misunderstand-
ing on the scope of the Swiss Proposal that it might be perceived as an
intention to create a new instrument that will modify the CISG.  There is
indeed no need to touch the CISG, or to modify it.  A different issue is
where a new instrument would be able to complement the CISG by either
covering areas outside the scope of the CISG, or filling internal gaps in the
CISG.  At the same time, and because of the intended general nature of
the future instrument, it will be applicable to other international commer-
cial contracts as well.
It seems to us that this is the correct approach to assess the viability of
a new instrument on the area of contract law as a project to be undertaken
by UNCITRAL.  One might say that UNIDROIT Principles already do so,
since the Principles touch upon issues outside the scope of the CISG, and
also implement the regulation of areas that are covered by the CISG.  Yet,
that is the case only if parties choose to have the UNIDROIT Principles
govern their contract.  There is no legitimacy behind the UNIDROIT Prin-
ciples to be considered in all and any case as the general principles on
which the CISG is based.14  The Principles, although a very useful text, are
not an international treaty accepted worldwide.  This legitimacy issue is a
very important one to consider in favor of a general contract law instru-
ment in a form of a binding instrument.  To this regard, the endorsement
of UPICC by UNCITRAL is by no means a declaration of intention by
UNCITRAL to consider UPICC in the same foot as the CISG or to con-
sider that they are the general principles of which the CISG is based.15
The Swiss Proposal has been recently endorsed by the CISG Advisory
Council (CISG-AC) Declaration No. 1: The CISG and Regional Harmoni-
zation,16 where it considers some of the shortfalls of regional unification
as opposed to global unification.  The present author, who supported that
declaration as a member of the CISG-AC, did recently consider the idea of
UNCITRAL undertaking a leading role in the area of international com-
mercial contracts.17  If finally a working group within UNCITRAL were to
Id.
13. See id. ¶ 132.  The Report stated:
[I]t was determined that there was a prevailing view in support of request-
ing the Secretariat to organize symposiums and other meetings, includ-
ing at the regional level and within available resources, maintaining close
cooperation with Unidroit, with a view to compiling further information
to assist the Commission in the assessment of the desirability and feasibil-
ity of future work in the field of general contract law at a future session.
Id.
14. See Pilar Perales Viscasillas, The Role of the UNIDROIT Principles and the
PECL in the interpretation and Gap-Filling of CISG, in CISG METHODOLOGY 287–317
(Andre´ Janssen & Olaf Meyer eds., 2009).
15. See Report of the 45th Session, supra note 12, ¶¶ 141–44.
16. See CISG Advisory Council, Welcome to International Sales Convention Advisory
Council (CISG-AC), available at www.cisg-ac.org (last visited Apr. 7, 2013).
17. See Perales Viscasillas & Illescas Ortiz, supra note 5, at 243.
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be established one of the most important questions would be the specific
form the instrument will finally take, an issue which is usually related to
the degree of compromise the states are willing to accept in regard to the
substance of the instrument.
Although the unification through a model law could be as successful
as an international treaty,18 but with a less degree of uniformity since it is
an indirect way of unification by which the states can depart as much as
they wish from the rules of the model law, I am of the opinion that a
model law would not be a good tool for a general contract law instrument
mainly for two reasons.  First, UPICC is already a “model law” available for
the states.19  Second, a General International Commercial Contract Model
Law would not be enough to achieve a desired level of unification because
there still would be a high degree of uncertainty in regard to the applica-
ble law and its influence on domestic laws, particularly since there would
not be a mechanism to ensure international and uniform interpretation.
In regard to a possible soft law instrument, i.e., an optional instru-
ment for the parties, the same reservations as mentioned before applies:
there is again an instrument that from my point of view offers the parties
good solutions, i.e., UPICC.20  In fact, the need for another optional in-
strument is unconvincing given the variety of options available to busi-
nesses.  Also, an optional instrument might be problematic in regard to its
effects, particularly if we think of some countries or even regions of the
world where soft law instruments would not be considered a real choice of
law.21
There is, however, no international treaty in the area of international
commercial contracts, and thus there is no risk of competing instruments;
furthermore, UNCITRAL, preferably in conjunction with UNIDROIT,
would need to take the leading role as an international organization with
enough legislative experience and legitimacy behind it, and with the ca-
pacity to create a universally accepted set of rules through a worldwide
representation during the negotiation of the instrument.22  Furthermore,
18. Indeed one of the most successful model laws is the 1985 UNCITRAL
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, where nearly seventy juris-
dictions all over the world have drafted domestic and/or international arbitration
rules based upon the 1985 Model Law.
19. As considered by the Preamble, UPICC “may serve as a model for national
and international legislators.” INT’L INST. FOR THE UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAW,
UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS art. 1.6(2), pmbl.
1 (2010) [hereinafter UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES], available at http://www.unidroit
.org/english/principles/contracts/main.htm.
20. UPICC Preamble states that: “They shall be applied when the parties have
agreed that their contract be governed by them.” See id.
21. See Rome I Regulation 593/2008, 2008 O.J. (L 177) 6 (EC) [hereinafter
Rome I Regulation].
22. See UNITED NATIONS COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, THE UNCITRAL
GUIDE: BASIC FACTS ABOUT THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL
TRADE LAW 1 (2007), available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/
general/06-50941_Ebook.pdf.  The UNCITRAL Guide states:
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\58-4\VLR415.txt unknown Seq: 6 23-JUL-13 11:56
738 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58: p. 733
the fact that UNCITRAL works in the six official languages of the UN
(Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian, and Spanish), and thus that its
texts are equally official in those languages, also offers a tremendous
advantage.
Therefore, from my point of view, if UNCITRAL were to be helpful in
the efforts of harmonizing and unifying international commercial contract
law, it is probably the time to undertake a more ambitious project that
should take the form of an international convention.23
However, a final consideration—a plan B—if such a project finally
fails: a less ambitious project is also possible.  UNCITRAL might focus its
work on specific contracts such as international distribution contracts.  To
a certain extent, international distribution contracts are covered by the
CISG.24  However several factors make them an ideal subject for an inter-
national convention: the CISG does not cover certain important aspects of
these contracts, they are being used more and more in international trade,
and finally, there is a need to adjust some of the Vienna rules in this con-
text, particularly in regard to remedies, but also the formation of contract
provisions.
These instruments are negotiated through an international process in-
volving a variety of participants, including member States of UNCITRAL,
which represent different legal traditions and levels of economic develop-
ment; non-member States; intergovernmental organizations; and non-
governmental organizations.  Thus, these texts are widely acceptable as
offering solutions appropriate to different legal traditions and to coun-
tries at different stages of economic development.  In the years since its
establishment, UNCITRAL has been recognized as the core legal body of
the United Nations system in the field of international trade law.
Id.
23. The international treaty reservations by states should be kept to the mini-
mum possible since the effect of reservations is to diminish the degree of uniform-
ity.  One has to remember here the famous “British reservation” that was an “opt-
in” mechanism chosen for ULF and ULIS (Convention relating to a Uniform Law
on the International Sale of Goods and Convention relating to a Uniform Law for
the Formation of the Contract (The Hague, July 1, 1964)) and that were adopted
by the UK.  The evolution of the CISG has shown that the reservations are being
withdrawn by the states, and so very recently the four reservation states in regard to
Article 92 CISG (Norway, Finland, Denmark, and Sweden) have withdrawn it, and
China has done so in regard to the written declaration (Article 96 CISG) on the
16th of January 2013.
24. For a treatment of international distribution contracts under CISG, see
Pilar Perales Viscasillas, Los contratos de distribucio´n internacional a la luz de la Conven-
cio´n de Viena de 1980 sobre compraventa internacional de mercaderı´as, in HOMENAJE AL
PROF. FRANCISCO VICENT CHULIA´ (Tirant lo blanch ed., 2013). See also Pilar Perales
Viscasillas, Contratos de distribucio´n internacional y arbitraje, in DISTRIBUCIO´N
COMERCIAL Y DERECHO DE LA COMPETENCIA 44–102 (Arı´stides Jorge Viera Gonza´lez
& Joseba Aitor Echevarrı´a Sa´enz eds., 2011).
In terms of the determination of the applicable law, note that even unified
private international law instruments such as Rome I Regulation can be problem-
atic since it provides for different criteria depending on whether the contract is
characterized as a sale of goods (place of the habitual residence of the seller) or as
a distribution contract (place of the habitual residence of the distributor). See
Rome I Regulation, supra note 21, arts. 4.1(a), (f).
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II. PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PARTY AUTONOMY WITHIN CISG
One of the most important features of the uniform international law
instruments that take the form of a convention is that they provide the
applicable law to the contract, and thus displace the otherwise applicable
domestic law.  Therefore, the majority of the international uniform law
conventions contain a direct way of application, i.e., when both parties
have their place of business in contracting states, the treaty is directly ap-
plicable to the contract.
As a result, an international treaty will be applied directly, avoiding
recourse to the rules of private international law.  However, the rules of
private international law still play an indirect role in the application of
international uniform law instruments by way of an indirect application,
i.e., when only one of the parties has its place of business in a contracting
state and the rules of private international law, i.e., the conflicts of law
rules of the forum, lead to the application of the law of the contracting
state.  The indirect way of application when the conflict of laws points to
the state that has ratified the treaty is a mechanism that extends its applica-
tion, although it brings a certain degree of uncertainty for the parties as it
depends upon the application of the rules of private international law.
Both ways of application, direct and indirect, have been uniformly
adopted in international treaties, such as the CISG,25 and so Article 1.1
states that:
(1) This Convention applies to contracts of sale of goods be-
tween parties whose places of business are in different States:
(a) when the States are Contracting States; or
(b) when the rules of private international law lead to the
application of the law of a Contracting State.26
International uniform legal instruments also clearly recognize the
principle of freedom of contract which means that the parties might ex-
clude the application of an international treaty as a whole or partially der-
ogate or vary the effects of any of its provisions.  CISG Article 6 states that:
“The parties may exclude the application of this Convention or, subject to
article 12, derogate from or vary the effect of any of its provisions.”27
Furthermore, the predominant view in legal literature, as well as in
case law, is that choice of law analyses in CISG contracting states, or in
provinces or territories of CISG contracting states, must apply the CISG,28
25. For an example of similar rules, see Convention on the Limitation Period
in the International Sale of Goods art. 3, June 14, 1974, 13 I.L.M. 952 (1974)
[hereinafter Limitation Convention].
26. CISG, supra note 1, art. 1.1.
27. Id. art. 6.
28. See Michael Bridge, Choice of Law and the CISG: Opting in and Opting Out, in
DRAFTING CONTRACTS UNDER CISG 78 (Harry M. Flechtner et al. eds., 2008); Lou-
kas Mistelis, Article 6, in COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR
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and furthermore, that for a valid exclusion of the CISG there ought to be
a clear indication of its exclusion.29  This proposition derives from a sys-
tematic interpretation of the CISG, which applies ex officio, and it ought to
be considered the default applicable law.  Therefore an exclusion should
be clearly expressed.
As is clear when analyzing Articles 1.1(b) and 6 of the CISG, the Con-
vention fails to recognize party autonomy in regard to the choice of the
law, as well as the role of arbitration in the determination of the applicable
law.
A. Party Autonomy in Regard to the Choice of the Law
Article 6 of the CISG fails to recognize that the parties may opt into
an international convention—a choice that might be more problematic if
the treaty is not yet in force or that might have not yet been ratified by the
states concerned.  The lack of this kind of recognition by the CISG is due
to the fact that for many uniform international instruments the issues re-
garding applicable law, validity of the choice, and effects of such election,
THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) 18 (Ingeborg Schwenzer ed., 2011);
Ingeborg Schwenzer & Pascal Hachem, Article 6, in COMMENTARY ON THE UN CON-
VENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) 14 (Ingeborg Schwenzer
ed., 3d ed. 2010). See also Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am. v. Saint-Gobain Techni-
cal Fabrics Canada Ltd., 474 F. Supp. 2d 1075 (D. Minn. 2007); St. Paul Guardian
Ins. Co. & Travelers Ins. Co. v. Neuromed Med. Sys. & Support, GmbH, No. 00 Civ.
9344(SHS), 2002 WL 465312 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2002). But see Hanwha Corp. v.
Cedar Petrochemicals, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 2d 426 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
29. It is considered that only an express exclusion would be valid. See JOHN O.
HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER THE 1980 UNITED NA-
TIONS CONVENTION art. 6., 77 (2009); Schwenzer & Hachem, supra note 28, at 19.
Note that Article 3.2 of the Limitation Convention provides that: “This Convention
shall not apply when the parties have expressly excluded its application.”  Limita-
tion Convention, supra note 25, art. 3.2.
Some authors advocate at least for a conscious decision that “the parties have
knowingly consented to the exclusion of the Convention.” See Filip De Ly, Opting
Out: Some Observations on the Occasion of the CISG’s 25th Anniversary, in QUO VADIS
CISG?: CELEBRATING THE 25TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION
ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 35–36 (Franco Ferrari ed.,
2005); Franco Ferrari, CISG Rules on Exclusion and Derogation, in THE DRAFT UNCI-
TRAL DIGEST AND BEYOND: CASES, ANALYSIS AND UNRESOLVED ISSUES IN THE U.N.
SALES CONVENTION 122 (Franco Ferrari et al. eds., 2004) (“There must be clear
indications that the parties really wanted such an exclusion, that is, there must be a
real—as opposed to the rhetorical, fictitious or hypothetical—agreement on exclu-
sion.”); Mistelis, supra note 28, at 19; see also Jorge Oviedo Alban, Autonomı´a conflic-
tual en los Contratos de Compraventa Internacional de Mercaderı´as, in COLECCIO´N DE
ESTUDIOS DE DERECHO PRIVADO 23 (2012).
A few cases have also addressed this issue. See Cedar Petrochemicals Inc. v.
Dongbu Hannong Chem. Co., 769 F. Supp. 2d 269 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); BP Int’l, Ltd.
v. Empressa Estatal Petroleos de Ecuador, 332 F.3d 333 (5th Cir. 2003) (“Where
parties seek to apply a signatory’s domestic law in lieu of the CISG, they must
affirmatively opt-out of the CISG.”).
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are left to the specific instruments of private international law and thus to
domestic law.30
B. The Role of Arbitration in the Determination of the Applicable Law
Article 1.1(b) is directed to the judges, but not to arbitrators.  It is
true that the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbi-
tration did not exist at that time, but it is interesting to note that the CISG
did consider arbitration in some provisions,31 and that the ICC Arbitration
Rules applied at that time (1975) recognized that the arbitrators were not
bound by any conflict of law system, not even the one of the place of
arbitration:
“The parties shall be free to determine the law to be applied by
the arbitrator to the merits of the dispute.  In the absence of any
indication by the parties as to the applicable law, the arbitrator
shall apply the law designated as the proper law by the rule of conflict
which he deems appropriate.”32
Furthermore, the concept of private international law within CISG is
not an autonomous concept that ought to be interpreted within the
boundaries of the CISG, but a concept that is to be found in domestic law.
Apart from this obvious drawback of the CISG,33 it is important to
mention that since the CISG’s adoption, the developments in the area of
the applicable law have been significant, and thus if a new instrument
were to be created it would be time to reconsider the solutions typically
provided in international instruments that follows the system articulated
by Article 6 (infra III) and 1.1 CISG (infra IV).  Common to both of them
in our proposal is that this issue of party autonomy in regard to the appli-
cable law as well as to the concept of private international law would be
“transformed” into uniform concepts, i.e., autonomous concepts within
the future instrument that will be exclusively covered by it to the maxi-
30. In fact, Rome Convention—the precedent to Rome I Regulation—on the
law applicable to contractual obligations was also approved in 1980.
31. Pilar Perales Viscasillas & David Ramos Mun˜os, CISG & Arbitration, in PRI-
VATE LAW: NATIONAL—GLOBAL—COMPARATIVE: FESTSCHRIFFT FOR INGEBORG
SCHWENZER ON THE OCCASION OF HER 60TH BIRTHDAY 1355–74 (2011).
32. See INTL’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, RULES OF ARBITRATION (1975).
33. One might need also to mention art. 95 CISG, which contains a reserva-
tion limiting the indirect application of the CISG.  In order not to limit the appli-
cation of the future instrument, the recommendation should be not to include a
provision similar to art. 95 CISG, which is a reservation that should be withdrawn.
See Gary F. Bell, Why Singapore Should Withdraw its Reservation to the United Nations
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG), 2005 SINGAPORE Y.B.
INT’L 55.  For an example of the classical application of art. 95 CISG, see Princesse
D’Isenbourg et CIE Ltd. v. Kinder Caviar, Inc., CIV.A. No. 3:09-29-DCR, 2011 WL
720194, at *4 n.3 (E.D. Ky. Feb. 22, 2011).
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mum extent possible and thus with no interference from domestic con-
cepts or laws.34
The proposal that we will put forward intends to expand the scope of
application of an international convention in the area of general contract
law with an aim to provide recognition to the freedom of choice of the
parties, and also to provide more tools for judges and arbitrators in their
finding of the applicable law.  This is particularly important in light of the
variety of contracts that might be covered under the new instrument.35
34. Having said so, one has to recognize the legal implications for UNCI-
TRAL dealing with this area of the law that we cannot cover in this paper, but it
will be pointed out.  First, a political issue in terms of the relationship between
UNCITRAL and The Hague Conference on Private International Law, and sec-
ond, in regard to the implications upon domestic legal conflict of law rules or
arbitration laws if the Convention were to depart from them.  The first issue is an
easy one to solve through intense cooperation and coordination.  The second is a
more difficult one.  However, it is interesting to note that there are some uniform
international conventions that deal, at least partly, with choice of law issues such as
the UNIDROIT Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment. See
UNIDROIT, Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment, art. 5
(Nov. 16, 2001), http://www.unidroit.org/english/conventions/mobile-equip-
ment/mobile-equipment.pdf (providing interpretation and applicable law).  Arti-
cle 5 states that:
3. References to the applicable law are to the domestic rules of the law
applicable by virtue of the rules of private international law of the forum
State.
4. Where a State comprises several territorial units, each of which has its
own rules of law in respect of the matter to be decided, and where there
is no indication of the relevant territorial unit, the law of that State de-
cides which is the territorial unit whose rules shall govern.  In the absence
of any such rule, the law of the territorial unit with which the case is most
closely connected shall apply.
Id.  Other uniform substantive law conventions also deal with arbitration or juris-
diction issues, such as Chapters 14 and 15 of the 2008 United Nations Convention
on Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea
(“Rotterdam Rules”)—although in that case states have the ability to opt into the
regulation. See United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Car-
riage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea, Dec. 11, 2008, available at http://www.uncit
ral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/transport_goods/2008rotterdam_rules.html
(last visited Apr. 7, 2013).
35. Compare the geographical field of application of the CISG with other
international conventions such as the UNIDROIT Conventions on Factoring (art.
2) or Leasing (art. 3) where a formula similar to art. 1 CISG is used but further
complicated because of the participation of a third party in the contractual scheme
and the presence of an underlying contract. See Convention on International Fac-
toring, art. 2, May 28, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 943 [hereinafter Factoring Convention];
Convention on International Financial Leasing art. 3, May 28, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 931
[hereinafter Leasing Convention].  Article 3 of the Leasing Convention states:
This Convention applies when the lessor and the lessee have their places
of business in different States and: (a) those States and the State in which
the supplier has its place of business are Contracting States; or (b) both
the supply agreement and the leasing agreement are governed by the law
of a Contracting State.
Id.  Article 2 of the Factoring Convention states:
1. This Convention applies whenever the receivables assigned pursuant to
a factoring contract arise from a contract of sale of goods between a sup-
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Although, one has to be aware that the issue of the applicability of the new
instrument would greatly depend on its material scope of application.  If,
for example, the future instrument were to be only a complementary in-
strument to the CISG, then a similar technique to that used on the 2005
UNCITRAL Convention is a possibility.36
For the sake of clarity, we will assume that the future instrument is a
convention in the area of general contract commercial law with only two
contracting parties.
III. THE ROLE OF PARTY AUTONOMY IN A FUTURE INSTRUMENT ON
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS
One of the most important developments in the area of party auton-
omy towards the choice of the applicable law is a progressive recognition
of the freedom of the parties to choose as the governing law of the con-
tract not only the “law” but also the “rules of law.”37  Although this possi-
bility is fully recognized in arbitration laws and rules,38 it is not yet so in
some conflict of law systems.  However, there are important developments
in this area that invite wider recognition of party autonomy.
In our opinion, a wider approach towards the concept of law should
be adopted so as to reflect the possibilities for the parties to choose not
only the law but also the rules of law.  For this reason, our proposal in
regard to the field of application of the new instrument would be to specif-
plier and a debtor whose places of business are in different States and:
(a) those States and the State in which the factor has its place of business
are Contracting States; or (b) both the contract of sale of goods and the
factoring contract are governed by the law of a Contracting State.
Factoring Convention, supra note 35, art. 2. See also Convention on Independent
Guarantees and Stand-by Letters of Credit art. 1, Dec. 11, 1995, 2169 U.N.T.S. 190,
35 I.L.M. 735.  Article 1 states:
This Convention applies to an international undertaking referred to in
article 2: (a) If the place of business of the guarantor/issuer at which the
undertaking is issued is in a Contracting State, or (b) If the rules of pri-
vate international law lead to the application of the law of a Contracting
State, unless the undertaking excludes the application of the Convention.
Id.
36. Article 1.1 of the United Nations Convention on the Use of Electronic
Communications in International Contracts states that: “This Convention applies
to the use of electronic communications in connection with the formation or per-
formance of a contract between parties whose places of business are in different
States.” See Electronics Communications Convention, supra note 2, art. 1.1.
37. The concept of “rules of law” implies not only the law that is in force
domestically or internationally in a state but also the so-called soft law instruments
which are applicable to international commercial contracts, such as the
UNIDROIT Principles on International Commercial Contracts (2010). See Cathe-
rine Kessedjian, Determination and Application of Relevant National and International
Law and Rules, in PERVASIVE PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 74 (Loukas
A. Mistelis & Julian D.M. Lew. eds., 2006).
38. See UNCITRAL, Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, 40
U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 17, U.N. Doc. A/40/17, art. 28.1 (Dec. 11, 1985) [hereinaf-
ter Model Law].
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ically recognize the principle of party autonomy in the selection of the
applicable law which means also the future international convention as
rules of law.39
To this regard, a good starting point for drafting the proposal is actu-
ally reflected in the current work of the Draft Hague Principles on the
Choice of Law in International Contracts as approved by the November
2012 Special Commission meeting on choice of law in international con-
tracts, November 12–16 2012.40  Assuming that the new instrument were
to take the form of a convention41 and taking also into consideration the
39. Note that under Rome I Regulation, this kind of choice would not be
considered as a choice of the applicable law but as an incorporation by reference.
In fact Preamble 13 Rome I Regulation states that: “This Regulation does not pre-
clude parties from incorporating by reference into their contract a non-State body
of law or an international convention.” See Rome I Regulation, supra note 21, at
pmbl. 13.  For a contrary discussion, see infra note 40 and accompanying text.
40. See Draft Hague Principles as Approved by the November 2012 Special Commission
Meeting on Choice of Law in International Contracts and Recommendations for the Com-
mentary (Nov. 12–16, 2012) [hereinafter The Hague Draft], available at http://
www.hcch.net/upload/wop/contracts2012principles_e.pdf.  The Draft Principles
intend to create a universal model of conflict of rules applicable to international
commercial contracts on the basis of reinforcing the principle of party autonomy.
The Preamble of the Draft Principles that uses a similar technique to that of
UNIDROIT Principles states that:
1. This instrument sets forth general principles concerning choice of law
in international commercial contracts.  They affirm the principle of party
autonomy with limited exceptions.
2. They may be used as a model for national, regional, supranational or
international instruments.
3. They may be used to interpret, supplement and develop rules of pri-
vate international law.
4. They may be applied by courts and by arbitral tribunals.
Id. at pmbl. 13.
41. See id. arts. 2–5.  The Draft Hague Principles state that:
Article 2—Freedom of Choice
1. A contract is governed by the law chosen by the parties.
2. The parties may choose (i) the law applicable to the whole contract or
to only part of it and (ii) different laws for different parts of the contract.
3. The choice may be made or modified at any time.  A choice or modifi-
cation made after the contract has been concluded shall not prejudice its
formal validity or the rights of third parties.
4. No connection is required between the law chosen and the parties or
their transaction.
Article 3—Rules of law
In these Principles, a reference to law includes rules of law that are gener-
ally accepted on an international, supranational or regional level as a
neutral and balanced set of rules, unless the law of the forum provides
otherwise.
Article 4—Express and tacit choice
A choice of law, or any modification of a choice of law, must be made
expressly or appear clearly from the provisions of the contract or the cir-
cumstances.  An agreement between the parties to confer jurisdiction on
a court or an arbitral tribunal to determine disputes under the contract is
not in itself equivalent to a choice of law.
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state of affairs developed under the opting in/out of the CISG as the ap-
plicable law, our draft proposal would be as follows:
Freedom of Choice of Law
1. A contract is governed by this convention if chosen by the parties as the law
applicable to the contract either to the whole contract or only part of it.
2. The choice of law of a state (or one of its territorial units) that is part of this
convention implies also its application if the rest of the conditions for its
applicability are met.
3. A choice of law of this convention, any modification of a choice of law, or
its exclusion, must be made expressly or appear clearly from the provisions
of the contract or the circumstances.
4. A choice of law is not subject to any requirement as to form unless otherwise
agreed by the parties.42
5. A choice of law does not refer to rules of private international law of the law
chosen by the parties unless the parties expressly provide otherwise.43
As mentioned before, the proposal is to deal with applicable law is-
sues within the uniform international convention as to make it an autono-
mous concept to the maximum extent possible.  It would not be however a
completely autonomous concept from domestic law and so it has to be
recognized that in certain circumstances resort is to be had to the domes-
tic concepts of private international law rules, particularly in case one of
the offered models where a national judge whose state has not ratified the
convention has to assess the validity of the choice by the parties.  However,
if the judge were to be in a contracting state but the convention were not
to be yet in force, or where the parties choose the convention to relations
not covered by it, this choice would be considered as a valid and real
choice of the applicable law.  The convention as part of the domestic law
would be automatically binding upon the judge who will be bound by the
choice of law by the parties as mandated by it.
Article 5—Formal validity of the choice of law
A choice of law is not subject to any requirement as to form unless other-
wise agreed by the parties.
Id.
42. This provision can be merged into a more general provision applicable to
the contracts covered by the future convention in a similar fashion to art. 11 CISG.
See CISG, supra note 1, art. 11.
43. The clause is derived from Article 8 of The Hague Draft, which states: “A
choice of law does not refer to rules of private international law of the law chosen
by the parties unless the parties expressly provide otherwise.” See The Hague Draft,
supra note 40, art. 8.  The same solution is usually considered in arbitration laws
and rules. See Model Law, supra note 38, art. 28.1 (“Any designation of the law or
legal system of a given State shall be construed, unless otherwise expressed, as
directly referring to the substantive law of that State and not to its conflict of laws
rules.”).
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IV. THE APPLICABLE LAW BY THE JUDGE OR THE ARBITRATOR IN THE
FUTURE INSTRUMENT ON INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS
The relationship between uniform law instruments and the conflict of
law rules is more important at the beginning of the implementation of a
new treaty.  As it is well known the process of entries into force of a con-
vention is usually a long one, and the same can be said until the conven-
tion gets enough state parties so as to make the conflict of law analysis less
important for the application of the treaty.  Therefore, from my point of
view, it is worthwhile to consider mechanisms to improve and enhance the
ways in which an international treaty might be applied in the light of the
discussion on a future instrument of contract law.  This is more so, since
the approach adopted in Article 1.1(b) is a very traditional one.
When a state ratifies an international convention such as the CISG, it
becomes part of the internal domestic legal system, that is, in contracting
states, the CISG is not a foreign law, but a part of the law of the forum.44
It is not, however, to be considered a purely domestic law since its origin,
making-process, interpretation, and application is truly international.45
Taking into account the advantage of (re)examining this provision
after more than thirty years of its approval and considering the develop-
ments in the determination of the applicable law, we believe that the pro-
vision can be improved in several ways.  In order to do so, it is necessary to
first consider the classical way in which international treaties such as CISG
find their application by analyzing Article 1.1 of the CISG, which at a first
glance is a provision that is problematic for several reasons: the determina-
tion of the conflict of law by the judge relies on the concept of private
international law which is to be found in domestic law; the provision does
not expressly recognize the possible application of the rules of law, i.e., a
concept that includes the law but also soft law instruments or international
conventions not applicable to the specific transaction; and the provision
fails to recognize the more flexible way to determine the law/rules of law
applicable to the contract in international commercial arbitration.
A. Automatic Application of the CISG by Virtue of Art. 1.1(a)
This provision is considered a uniform and unilateral conflict of laws
rule,46 and thus domestic conflict of law rules should be disregarded.
44. See Georgia Pacific Resins, Inc. v. Grupo Bajaplay, Cuarto Tribunal
Colegiado del Decimoquinto Circuito [TCC] [Federal Court of Appeals], Amparo
proceeding No. 225/2007, Aug. 9, 2007 (Mex.), available at http://cisgw3.law.
pace.edu/cases/070809m1.html.
45. See, e.g., CISG, supra note 1, art. 7.1 (“(1) In the interpretation of this
Convention, regard is to be had to its international character and to the need to
promote uniformity in its application and the observance of good faith in interna-
tional trade.”).
46. See Mistelis, supra note 28, art. 1, 1.
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Where both parties have their place of business in contracting states to the
Convention, the CISG directly applies.
B. Application of the CISG by Virtue of Article 1.1(b)
According to this provision, the Convention will extend its applica-
tion when only one of the states is a contracting state if the rules of private
international law lead to the application of the law of the contracting state.
On the contrary, if the judge or the arbitral tribunal were to find that the
conflicts of law rules points out to the law of the “non-contracting state”
then CISG will not be applicable.  However, the method of finding the
applicable law would be different depending on the organ entrusted with
its application.
1. The Application of the Rules of Private International Law by a Judge
Article 1.1(b) of the CISG usually finds its normal application when a
judge applies its private international law rules, since it is generally ac-
knowledged that it is the conflicts of law rules of the forum.47  This is a
traditional analysis that would be made by a judge.  For example, in the
case of a judge in an EU country, Rome I Regulation on the Law Applica-
ble to contractual obligations48 would provide the judge with the legal
framework to point out to the applicable law.  Generally, it would be the
law where the seller has his habitual residence because the seller is consid-
ered to affect the characteristic performance of the contract (Art. 4.1(a))
Rome I.
As a consequence it is clear that the concept of private international
law is not an autonomous concept under CISG but a concept that will find
its meaning under the domestic rules of the forum.  As a consequence, the
applicable law would depend upon the judge and its conflict of law system
making the result quite unpredictable and unsatisfactory.
Take the following example based with some departures on a real
case: a CISG dispute between a buyer in Mexico and a seller in Hong Kong
(PRC China) through an independent agent in Mexico.  Payment through
letter of credit (UCP 600, ICC) with an issuing bank in Houston, Texas,
but confirming bank in Hong Kong, China.  Delivery of Goods from Vene-
zuela, Mexico being the place of discharge of the goods.  CFR IN-
COTERMS, ICC (2010) agreed by the parties.  No agreement on the
applicable law or the tribunal competent to hear the dispute.  To shorten
47. See id. at 10, 51. See Peter Schlechtriem, Article 1, in COMMENTARY ON THE
UN CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) 10, 34 (Peter
Schlechtriem & Ingeborg Schwenzer eds., 2005); Schwenzer & Hachem, supra note
28, art. 1, 30; Franco Ferrari, Homeward Trend: What, Why and Why Not, in INTERNATI-
ONALE HANDELSRECHT 13 (Herber et al. eds., 2009).  It is to be noted that besides
art. 1, art. 7.2 CISG refers to the rules of private international law and so it also has
to be amended.  Art. 7.2 is, however, outside the scope of this work.
48. See Rome I Regulation, supra note 21, art. 3.
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the discussion, we assume that Hong Kong is not a contracting state in
regard to CISG application.49
If a judge were to make a typical conflict of law analysis, it will tend to
apply its own conflict of law rules, i.e., those of the forum.  Usually, the
domestic laws will use connecting factors to point out to the specific appli-
cable rule.  One of the most well-known “connecting factors” in the area of
contract law is the “most significant relationship” or “real connection test,”
which is just an undetermined and flexible formula to lead the judge in its
finding of the applicable law.  Other similar formulas are used in conflict
of law rules such as the “closest connection test”50 or the “most closely
connected,”51 etc.  In our example, it is logical to assume that for the
seller the most relevant relationship in the transaction is Hong Kong while
for the buyer it is Mexico.
It is undeniable that the transaction has in our example connecting
factors with both places—Mexico and Hong Kong—apart from the fact of
the parties’ respective places of business.  What is important to consider
for the judge or an arbitral tribunal is the weight and relevance to be given
to these connecting factors.  Let’s first approach the issue using the preva-
lent doctrine under conflicts of law rules, which is to be found in several
domestic or international laws on applicable law.
For example, the Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Laws
Applicable to Foreign-related Civil Relations adopted on October 28, 2010
states in Article 41 that “Absent any choice by the parties, the law of the
habitual residence of a party whose performance of obligation is most character-
istic of the contract or the law that most closely connected with the contract shall be
applied.”52  It does not state, however, which of the parties’ performance
obligations is to be considered the most characteristic one.
The Inter-American Convention on the Law Applicable to Interna-
tional Contracts, signed in Mexico, D.F. Mexico, on March 17, 1994, at the
Fifth Inter-American Specialized Conference on Private International Law
(CIDIP-V) is part of the Law of Mexico by virtue of its ratification and
enactment on December 5, 1996.  Article 9 of the CIDIP-V states that:
49. An issue which is frequently discussed by scholars and case law, although
in our opinion it is to be considered as a CISG contracting State. See, e.g., Ulrich
Schroeter, The Status of Hong Kong and Macao Under the United Nations Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 16 PACE INT’L L. REV. 307, 317–18 n.2
(2004); Fan Yang, Barriers to the Application of the United Nations Convention on Con-
tracts for the International Sale of Goods (1980), in THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
(Jan. 2011) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Center for Commercial Law Studies,
Queen Mary Univ. of London), available at https://qmro.qmul.ac.uk/xmlui/bit-
stream/handle/123456789/2483/YANGBarriersTo2011.pdf?sequence=1.
50. Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China art. 142 (promulgated by
the Nat’l People’s Cong. effective Mar. 15, 1999), available at http://www.novexcn.
com/contract_law_99.html.
51. See Rome I Regulation, supra note 21, art. 3.1.
52. Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Laws Applicable to Foreign-related
Civil Relations art. 41 (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong. effective Oct. 28,
2010).
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If the parties have not selected the applicable law, or if their se-
lection proves ineffective, the contract shall be governed by the
law of the state with which it has the closest ties.  The Court will take
into account all objective and subjective elements of the contract
to determine the law of the state with which it has the closest ties.
It shall also take into account the general principles of interna-
tional commercial law recognized by international
organizations.53
As part of Mexican law, the Inter-American Convention states that the
applicable law to the contract would be the law chosen by the parties and
the guidelines, customs, and principles of international commercial law as
well as commercial usage and practices generally accepted (see Articles 7
and 10).
Rome I Regulation also follows the characteristic performance principle to
assess the choice of law considering that in the case of sale of goods the
governing law is that of the country where the seller has his habitual resi-
dence (art. 3.1 Rome Regulation).  The basis of this rule lies on the rea-
sonable presumption that in a contract of sale when comparing the main
obligations of the parties under the contract (the obligation to deliver the
goods by the seller and the obligation to pay for them by the buyer), the
obligation to deliver the goods is considered the characteristic perform-
ance and thus its connection with the place of business of the seller.  How-
ever, this presumption and connection might be of no importance when
the origin of the goods is in a third country, Venezuela in our example,
which is also the place where the risk is passed from the seller to the buyer
according to the CFR INCOTERMS, and thus there is no connecting point
with Hong Kong.54
53. Inter-American Convention on the Law Applicable to International Con-
tracts art. 7, Mar. 17, 1994, O.A.S.T.S. no. 78, available at http://www.oas.org/
juridico/english/treaties/b-56.html.
54. See Convention on the Law Applicable to Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods art. 8 (Dec. 22, 1986) (stating place of business of seller is to be
disregarded in certain circumstances).  Article 8 states:
(1) To the extent that the law applicable to a contract of sale has not
been chosen by the parties in accordance with Article 7, the contract is
governed by the law of the State where the seller has his place of business
at the time of conclusion of the contract.
(2) However, the contract is governed by the law of the State where the
buyer has his place of business at the time of conclusion of the contract,
if—
a) negotiations were conducted, and the contract concluded by and
in the presence of the parties, in that State; or
b) the contract provides expressly that the seller must perform his
obligation to deliver the goods in that State; or
c) the contract was concluded on terms determined mainly by the
buyer and in response to an invitation directed by the buyer to per-
sons invited to bid (a call for tenders).
(3) By way of exception, where, in the light of the circumstances as a
whole, for instance any business relations between the parties, the con-
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Furthermore, according to CFR term, it is not only the place of deliv-
ery which is important but also the place of taking delivery.  This is so,
because in C terms as opposed to F terms, the delivery and the taking of
delivery are not performed in the same place.55  As is clear from the case
under consideration those places diverge: the place of delivery is Vene-
zuela and the place of taking delivery is Mexico.  It is also to be noted that
the price of the contract is calculated including the transportation costs to
the port of discharge of the goods in accordance with the CFR term where
the seller is obliged to arrange the transportation of the goods to the place
of discharge.
Therefore, in terms of the characteristic performance of the contract,
the place of discharge of the goods, i.e., the place of taking delivery, might
be considered to shift the presumption that the obligation to deliver the
goods is connected with the place of business of the seller when, as it hap-
pens in the example under consideration, this place is situated in a third
country, when the goods have no connection at all with the place of busi-
ness of the seller, and when the seller undertakes obligations connected to
the place of discharge: the seller has the obligation to contract the trans-
portation of the goods from the place of delivery (Venezuela, Port of Ori-
gin) to the place of taking delivery by the buyer (Mexico, Port of
Discharge).  In fact, usually when using a C term, the place of delivery is
not named, but the relevant destination of the main transport is.56
In regard to the place of payment for the goods, this is not a prevalent
connecting factor under a conflict of law analysis.  As mentioned earlier,
the characteristic performance in a sales contract is considered to be tied
to the delivery of the goods.57  The fact that the parties might have agreed
on a documentary credit does not change this fact.  The payment by a
letter of credit refers only to the payment obligation of the buyer and this
does not change the nature of the contract as a sale of goods.  Therefore,
the characteristic performance of a contract of sale when a payment by
letter of credit is also agreed upon is still related to the goods itself.
This is not to say that the place of payment is of no importance.  On
the contrary, it might be important in order to determine other issues,
such as the currency of payment or the jurisdiction of state courts.  How-
ever, as considered in this work, it is not the dominant factor to consider
in a conflict of law analysis.
tract is manifestly more closely connected with a law which is not the law
which would otherwise be applicable to the contract under paragraphs 1
or 2 of this Article, the contract is governed by that other law.
Id.
55. See INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, ICC GUIDE TO INCOTERMS A5, B5
(2010).
56. See Burghard Piltz, Article 31, in COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION ON
CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) 65 (Stefan Kro¨ll et al.
eds., 2011).
57. See Ferrari, supra note 29, at 44–45 (“The monetary obligation is generally
not the characteristic one.”).
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Even if the place of payment were to be considered under a conflict
of law analysis, resort is to be had to the terms to which the parties agreed.
In the example given, there are two relevant places to consider: Houston
(Texas) and Hong Kong.  According to UCP, the issuing bank is also the
place for presentation of the documents, but the confirmation of the L/C
is with a bank in Hong Kong.58
This means that the connecting factor is either Texas or Hong Kong
depending on whether the seller requires confirmation, i.e., a definite un-
dertaking of the confirming bank, in addition to that of the issuing bank,
to honor or negotiate a complying presentation (art. 2 UCP 600).  As is
clearly stated by Article 8(a) UCP, the confirming bank may or may not
exist: “Provided that the stipulated documents are presented to the confirming bank
or to any other nominated bank and that they constitute a complying pres-
entation, the confirming bank must . . . .”59
Finally, among the connecting factors mentioned in the example, the
place where negotiations took place should also be mentioned.  Probably
the buyer will consider that Mexico is the real connection place because it
was in Mexico where it was negotiating the contract with the agent.  This is
a connecting factor that might be of importance if the parties are discuss-
ing the conclusion of the contract and if the main obligations of the sale
of goods contract by the parties were never performed.
The above analysis means that depending upon the circumstances of
the case and the interpretation made by the judge several results are possi-
ble, including the selection of connecting factors that points to either the
law of Mexico or the law of Hong Kong as the parties will probably allege
in court or an arbitral proceedings.60
The conclusion to be derived is that judges are too constrained by the
application of conflict of law rules that at the end might point artificially
to a domestic law which might not be suitable for the parties and their
transaction.61  The use of connecting factors makes the choice of law still
58. See ICC Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits, 2007
revision (UCP 600), art. 6(d)(ii) (2006).
The place of the bank with which the credit is available is the place for
presentation.  The place for presentation under a credit available with
any bank is that of any bank.  A place for presentation other than that of
the issuing bank is in addition to the place of the issuing bank.
Id. Then, the connecting factor is Texas.
59. Id. art. 8(a).
60. But also as shown in the example the laws of Texas and Venezuela.  Those
laws should also be disregarded by the arbitral tribunal for a different reason: the
choice made by the arbitral tribunal should not surprise the parties.
61. See, e.g., Rome I Regulation, supra note 21, pmbl.  Under Rome I Regula-
tion although it provides a flexible way for the judge to determine the applicable
law is an artificial method as shown by Preamble 21:
In the absence of choice, where the applicable law cannot be determined
either on the basis of the fact that the contract can be categorized as one
of the specified types or as being the law of the country of habitual resi-
dence of the party required to effect the characteristic performance of
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unpredictable for the parties.  We are aware that the same can be said in
regard to the freedom of the judge and the arbitral tribunal in the applica-
tion of the rules of law they consider to be most appropriate, but the final
determination of the applicable law must be guided by the appropriate-
ness of the law or rules of law and their content as we will consider below.
2. The Determination of the Conflicts of Law Rules by the Arbitral Tribunal
The arbitral tribunal’s freedom under the arbitration system is wide
enough to allow it to consider the determination of the conflict of law rule
without being bound by the rules of the forum.  The wide discretion of the
arbitrators is derived from the fact that they are not organs of a given state
and are not bound by any rules of private international law, for example
Rome Regulation in the case of Europe.
The determination of the rules of private international law is not,
however, a simple task when an international contract submitted to inter-
national arbitration is considered.
First, the arbitral tribunal does not have a “forum.”62  Although the
place of arbitration determines the arbitration law applicable to the arbi-
tration, this is not to be equivalent to the place of the forum in art. 1.1(b)
CISG, and particularly the conflict rules of the place of arbitration should
be disregarded.63
Second, as pointed out by several authors,64 arbitration tribunals have
applied various different conflicts of law systems including:
• Conflict rules of the place of arbitration.
• Conflict rules most closely connected with the subject matter of the
proceedings.
• Conflict rules the tribunal considers appropriate.
• Converging conflicts of law rules.
• General principles of conflicts of laws.
the contract, the contract should be governed by the law of the country
with which it is most closely connected. In order to determine that coun-
try, account should be taken, inter alia, of whether the contract in ques-
tion has a very close relationship with another contract or contracts.
Id.
62. See ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNA-
TIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 122 (2004).
63. It is generally considered in modern arbitration practice that the applica-
tion of the conflicts of rules of the place of arbitration is illogical. See JULIAN D. M.
LEW ET AL., COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 428 (2003).
See also Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chambers of Commerce, UNILEX
No. 117/1999 (2001), SCC nº117/1999, Arbitral Award 2000, available at http://
www.unilex.info/case.cfm?id=793 (considering it inappropriate to resort to law of
seat).
64. See LEW ET AL., supra note 63, at 428. See also REDFERN & HUNTER, supra
note 62, at 47.
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Among these systems, the application of the conflict rules the tribunal
considers appropriate is the most followed today in arbitration practice.65
What is considered to be the most appropriate conflict of law rule is
of course an issue to be decided on a case-by-case basis.  The arbitral tribu-
nal has discretion to point to the conflict of law rules of a given state in
order to further determine the applicable law, or to apply the connecting
factor it considers more appropriate, for example the one derived from
international conventions, academic writings, or even a rule which the ar-
bitrators consider otherwise appropriate.66
However, this kind of analysis, even when considering a more simpli-
fied analysis under the most appropriated conflict of law rules, and even if
one were to consider that arbitrators will follow a pragmatic approach to
make the determination of the choice of law, and thus they will be able to
choose the conflict of law rules which they prefer,67 is not the one to be
followed by an arbitral tribunal under modern arbitration rules or laws.
Take the example of Article 21 ICC Rules (2012) (Applicable Rules of
Law),68 which states that:
1. The parties shall be free to agree upon the rules of law to be
applied by the arbitral tribunal to the merits of the dispute.  In
the absence of any such agreement, the arbitral tribunal shall ap-
ply the rules of law which it determines to be appropriate.
2. The arbitral tribunal shall take account of the provisions of
the contract, if any, between the parties and of any relevant trade
usages.
65. See Georgios C. Petrochilos, Arbitration Conflict of Laws Rules and the 1980
International Sales Convention, 52 REVUE HELLENIQUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL
191–218 (1999); GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: COM-
MENTARY AND MATERIALS 530 (2002). See also ICC Court of Arbitration—Paris,
UNILEX, No. 7375/1995, June  5, 1996, available at http://www.unilex.info/
case.cfm?id=625 (“The conflict rule which, beyond doubt, has received on a world-
wide basis, the strongest support, is the so-called ‘closest connection rule,’ which
leads to the application of the law where the most characteristic performance of
the contract is performed.”).
66. See LEW ET AL., supra note 63, at 431.
67. See id. at 426.
68. A rule very similar to the old International Chamber of Commerce Rules
art. 17:
1. The parties shall be free to agree upon the rules of law to be applied
by the Arbitral Tribunal to the merits of the dispute. In the absence of
any such agreement, the Arbitral Tribunal shall apply the rules of law
which it determines to be appropriate.
2. In all cases the Arbitral Tribunal shall take account of the provisions of
the contract and the relevant trade usages.
3. The Arbitral Tribunal shall assume the powers of an amiable compositeur
or decide ex aequo et bono only if the parties have agreed to give it such
powers.
INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, RULES OF ARBITRATION (1998).
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3. The arbitral tribunal shall assume the powers of an amiable
compositeur or decide ex aequo et bono only if the parties have
agreed to give it such powers.69
In order for the arbitral tribunal to consider the application of art.
1.1(b) CISG, it has to be clear that it is not subject to any conflict of law
system, as it is evident from art. 21.1 ICC Rules which directs the arbitral
tribunal for a direct application of the law (voie directe), as opposed to the
conflict of law system which is an indirect application of the law (voie in-
directe).  In fact, Article 21.1 ICC Rules offers the arbitral tribunal the possi-
bility to apply directly the rules of law that it considers appropriate.
Therefore, the arbitral tribunal is neither obliged to find the conflicts
of law rules, and certainly it is not convenient for it to do so when the
effort in making this analysis is dispensed by the arbitration rules agreed
upon by the parties and those rules ought to be followed by the arbitral
tribunal.  In fact, the traditional analysis of the conflict of law rule, that
derived from the judicial system, when used in old arbitration was more a
way to justify the decision-making process in choosing the applicable law
and to preserve a conservative method than an appropriate, reasonable, or
convenient way to decide on this issue.70  Precisely the dissatisfaction with
this kind of analysis and the desire to free the arbitrators of the restraints
with a conflict of law analysis was the reason behind the ICC abandoning
the conflict view approach in the 1998 Arbitration Rules; a decision that
has been ratified in the 2012 ICC Rules.
From what we have just explained it is clear that in our opinion a
conflict of law analysis by the arbitral tribunal is not only unnecessary but
probably inconvenient in so far that it does not respond to the agreement
of the parties when choosing arbitration as a method of solving disputes
and in fact it is to a certain extent going back to the past.71
However, there are still arbitration laws and rules that rely on a more
traditional approach towards the application of the law by the arbitral tri-
bunal as shown by art. 28.2 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Com-
mercial Arbitration: “Failing any designation by the parties, the arbitral
tribunal shall apply the law determined by the conflict of law rules which it
considers applicable.”72
69. See INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, RULES OF ARBITRATION (2012).
70. See LEW ET AL., supra note 63, at 426.
71. Compare with INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, RULES OF ARBITRATION, art.
13.3 (1988).
The parties shall be free to determine the law to be applied by the arbitra-
tor to the merits of the dispute.  In the absence of any indication by the
parties as to the applicable law, the arbitrator shall apply the law designated
as the proper law by the rule of conflict which he deems appropriate.
Id. (emphasis added).  It was also the provision under ICC Rules of 1975, 15.2
INT’L LEGAL MATERIALS 395, 395–406 (Mar. 1975).
72. See also UNCITRAL, Arbitration Rules, art. 25 (as revised in 2010).
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Under both systems (ICC Rules and UNCITRAL Model Law) it is im-
portant to note that usages of trade should be taken into account by the
arbitral tribunal, and so an important lesson might be derived from the
way in which the CISG was applied before it entered into force or whether
only one of the parties was in a state that was a contracting state.  The
almost universal recognition of the CISG as a suitable set of rules to gov-
ern international sale of goods contracts between traders with different
legal systems has led some arbitral tribunals to consider the application of
the CISG as trade usages under art. 17.2 ICC Arbitration Rules (1998)
particularly when the conditions for the CISG applicability were not met.
We consider that this kind of consideration is useful particularly for arbi-
tral tribunals as an aid into its finding of the future international conven-
tion as the most appropriate rules of law.  Examples of this kind of
application might be found in several cases: ICC 5713/1989;73 and ICC
8502/1996.74
73. See ICC Court of Arbitration—Paris, UNILEX, No. 5713/1989 (1989),
ttp://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?id=16.  The ICC stated:
The Arbitrators, in accordance with the last paragraph of Art. 13 of the
ICC rules [1988, now ICC Rules 1998], will also take into account the
‘relevant trade usages’ [. . .].  The Tribunal finds that there is no better
source to determine the prevailing trade usages than the terms of the
United Nations Convention on the International Sale of Goods of 11
April 1980, usually called ‘the Vienna Convention.  This is so even though
neither [Buyer’s country] nor [Seller’s country] are parties to that Con-
vention.  If they were, the Convention might be applicable to this case as
a matter of law and not only as reflecting the trade usages.  The Vienna
Convention, which has been given effect to in 17 countries, may be fairly
taken to reflect the generally recognized usages regarding the matter of
the non-conformity of goods in international sales.
Id.
74. See id.  The relevant part of the decision is:
The application of the relevant trade usages is consistent with Article
13(5) of the ICC Rules (now article 17.5) and with the arbitral practice
[. . .].  For the foregoing reasons, the Arbitral Tribunal finds that it shall
decide the present case by applying to the Contract entered into between
the parties trade usages and generally accepted principles of interna-
tional trade.  In particular, the Arbitral Tribunal shall refer, when re-
quired by the circumstances, to the provisions of the 1980 Vienna
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (Vienna
Sales Convention) or to the Principles of International Commercial Con-
tracts enacted by Unidroit, as evidencing admitted practices under inter-
national trade law [. . .].  The Arbitral Tribunal is of the opinion that the
principles embodied in the Vienna Convention reflect widely accepted
trade usages and commercial rules.  Although the Vienna Sales Conven-
tion is not as such directly applicable to the Contract (Vietnam has not
ratified this Convention), the Arbitral Tribunal finds that it may refer to
its provisions as the expression of usages in the world of international
commerce.
Id. See also ICC Court of Arbitration—Paris, UNILEX No. 7331 (1994), http://
www.unilex.info/case.cfm?id=140; ICC Court of Arbitration—Paris, UNILEX No.
8502 (1996), http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?id=395; ICC Court of Arbitration—
Paris, UNILEX No. 9333 (1998), http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?id=400.
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As a conclusion: the application of art. 1.1(b) CISG by the arbitral
tribunal bound by a provision similar to art. 21.1 ICC Rules means that the
tribunal might be able to get around the conflict of law analysis and directly
apply the CISG as the rules of law it considers appropriate.  Therefore, by
choosing ICC Rules the parties have empowered the tribunal to determine
the applicable rules of law without the need to resort to a conflict of law
analysis and applying a liberal and flexible approach toward its determina-
tion.75  This makes the analysis under art. 1.1(b) CISG redundant since a
direct application of the law the arbitral tribunal can directly apply the
CISG.76
3. The Determination of the Rules of Private International Law in the Future
Convention on General Contract Law
Turning to the design of a specific provision for the scope of applica-
tion of the future international convention, our proposal will recognize
both the traditional as well as the more modern way for arbitrators to de-
termine the applicable law to the contract.  Furthermore, it will consider
the feasibility of judges and arbitrators to apply the future instrument as
the appropriate applicable law.
The rule that we propose is as follows:
Article 2 Scope of Application
Absent a choice of law by the parties, this Convention applies to contracts be-
tween parties whose places of business are in different states:
(a) when the states are contracting states; or
(b) when the rules of private international law of the forum lead to the
application of the law of a contracting state; or
(c) when the rules of private international law considered to be applicable by
the arbitrators lead to the application of the law of a contracting state; or
(d) when the judge or the arbitral tribunal consider this Convention to be
the appropriate applicable law.
Subparagraph (d) is the one that deserves further consideration.  The
application of the future convention as the most appropriate rule of law by
the arbitrators or judges would be in itself justified under a test of legiti-
75. See Kessedjian, supra note 37, at 26 (“Indeed, it may be said that by choos-
ing an ICC Arbitration, the parties have chosen Article 17 of the ICC Rules and
have taken the risk that the arbitral tribunal interpret that text in the most liberal
way.”).
76. See Jeffrey Waincymer, The CISG and International Commercial Arbitration:
Promoting a Complimentary Relationship Between Substance and Procedure, in SHARING
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LAW ACROSS NATIONAL BOUNDARIES: FESTSCHRIFT FOR
ALBER H. KRITZER ON THE OCCASION OF HIS EIGHTIETH BIRTHDAY 596 (Camilla B.
Andersen & Ulrich G. Schroeter eds., 2008) (“It has been suggested that it is easier
for an arbitrator with a discretion to get to the CISG via direct approach than via a
conflict approach, so it is preferable to pick a direct procedural model.”).
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macy derived from the negotiation process undertaken under
UNCITRAL.
Furthermore, the arbitrator and the judge might take further criteria
into consideration in order to justify the application of the (future) con-
vention despite the fact that a more conservative method would point out
to a domestic law.  The factors that might lead the arbitral tribunal to de-
cide on the appropriateness of the convention would be those derived
from the particular circumstances of each case.  Examples of such kind of
circumstances are the following:
First.  The possibility that none of the connecting factors pointed out
by a traditional conflict of law analysis, is decisive or prevalent, might lead
the judge or the arbitrator to disregard the method of finding the law
applicable by virtue of the rules of private international law in favor of a
direct application of the rules of law considered to be most appropriate.
Therefore, the judge or the arbitral tribunal should also consider the re-
sult when pointing out to the applicable law by operation of a conflict of
law analysis,77 particularly when none of the connecting factors is found to
be decisive or fully prevalent.
Second.  In this situation to apply a domestic law would probably make
an unjust imbalance between the parties and will defeat the parties’ expec-
tations in international contracts when neither of them is ready to accept
the application of the domestic regime or a close domestic regime of the
other party, particularly if there are other factors that point out to the
application of international rules.
Third.  The silence of the parties in regard to the lack of a choice of
law clause might be indicative of their intention of not to be bound by a
pure domestic law particularly that of the counterparty.78  An implied nega-
tive choice of law by the parties is to be found when the absence in the
contract of a choice of law clause is considered to be intentional, i.e.,
where the parties were not able to agree on any law or rules of law to be
applied.79  This is a rather frequent situation in international commercial
77. The same can be said in order to decide the law applicable by operation
of the direct application of the rules of law.
78. As pointed out by Petrochilos in regard to CISG but the same might be
said for a future international Convention:
The Convention is a set of tailored-made rules for international sales, ac-
ceptable to and applicable as between a significant part of the interna-
tional community of trading nations.  Thus, when in doubt, the
Convention is reasonably the most appropriate and neutral substantive
law—in any event, clearly more appropriate than any domestic law.
Georgios C. Petrochilos, Arbitration Conflict of Laws Rules and the 1980 International
Sales Convention, 52 REVUE HELLENIQUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 191, 191–218
(1999), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/petrochilos.html.
79. As pointed out in ICC 7375/1996, the silence of the contract in regard to
the applicable law:
[T]his must be viewed as a “shouting silence,” at least an “alarming si-
lence,” “un silence inquie´tant;” thus, a silence which must ring a bell and
requires the Tribunal to look “behind” so as to understand why the Par-
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contracts when neither of the parties is ready to accept the law proposed
by the other, usually its own domestic law.  This kind of intention can be
presumed from the mere silence of the parties in the contract or it might
be ascertained through an analysis of the negotiation process of the con-
tract where the parties clearly rejected the legal systems that were the own
legal system or a familiar system to its counterparty.
In some circumstances this negative choice of law has been consid-
ered by some arbitral tribunals and courts as to imply an agreement of the
parties towards the application of an international system of law and obvi-
ously the exclusion of any domestic law.  At a minimum, the intention of
the parties is a valid criterion to be considered in order to analyze whether
a negative agreement might be found so as to exclude any domestic law.
To this point, the intention of the parties in regard to the applicable law
might be ascertained taking into consideration a variety of factors such as
the negotiations between the parties, usages, or the conduct of the
parties.80
Furthermore, the intention of the parties to exclude purely domestic
law might be supported by other factors, for example, if the parties were
able to accept other international rules to be applied to their contract,
and thus making very clear the desire to have neutral and suitable rules for
an international contract,81 such as the agreement on INCOTERMS, ICC,
ties have failed to include “the obvious.”  In the case at hand the arbitral
tribunal considered that the parties were not ready to accept the other
party’s own law, and thus “[t]he Contract should not, according to the
implied negative choice of the Parties, be governed by any of the Parties”
national laws.
ICC International Court of Arbitration—Paris, UNILEX No. 7375 (June 5, 1996),
http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?id=625. See also ICC International Court of Arbi-
tration (First Partial Award), UNILEX No. 7110 (June 1995), http://www.unilex.
info/case.cfm?id=713; ICC Court of Arbitration—Paris, UNILEX No. 8502 (Nov.
1996), http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?id=395; ICC International Court of Arbi-
tration, UNILEX No. 9875 (Jan. 1999), http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?id=675;
ICC 10422/2001; ICC International Court of Arbitration, UNILEX No. 10422
(2001), http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?id=957; International Centre for Settle-
ment of Investment Disputes (ICSID) UNILEX No. ARB?06/18, ILC 424 (Jan.
2010), http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?id=1533. See also Marc Blessing, Choice of
Substantive Law in International Arbitration, 14 J. INT’L ARB. 19 (1997).
80. See UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, supra note 19; CISG, supra note 1, art. 8.3, 4.3.
Of course one has to avoid the circular argument that the intention of the parties
is a matter to be decided in accordance with the applicable law.  There is no need
to complicate the matter further, and so general principles of interpretation might
be used without first finding the applicable law to the interpretation of the con-
tract, or as with the case here, the statements of the parties during negotiation. See
Kessedjian, supra note 37, at 26.
81. In fact arbitral tribunals have sometimes concluded that the absence of a
choice of law clause in the contract coupled with a choice of other international
trade terms such as INCOTERMS meant the parties intended to have general in-
ternational rules to be applied as to the substantive law. See, e.g., ICC Court of
Arbitration—Paris, UNILEX No. 8502 (Nov. 1996), http://www.unilex.info/case.
cfm?id=395.
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or an agreement to submit the dispute to international commercial
arbitration.
Fourth.  The arbitrators and the judges might consider other criteria
in order to find the future convention as the most appropriate rule of law
to be applicable.  For example, the parties’ expectations under the con-
tract, or their particular situation, i.e., where they are sophisticated busi-
ness players or not, where they belong to different systems of law, so the
convention would be the most appropriate set of rules drafted for interna-
tional contracts that takes into account the interest of both parties, that
provides a fair balance between civil and common law systems to which
both parties might belong to, and that enjoys wide international
consensus.
All these factors, in our view, might lead reasonably to assume that the
parties expectations would be that the eventual law chosen by the judge or
the arbitral tribunal would be one that protects their interests in the way
that any reasonable business person doing international business with
partners from a different legal background would consider adequate, fair,
and reasonable, and without any surprise that could result from the appli-
cation of domestic laws that are purely local, unknown to the other party
or whose application is purely accidental.  This would necessarily conduct
the arbitral tribunal and the judge to the application of the rules of law of
the future instrument as such rules that have found their way into an inter-
national codification under the auspices of UNCITRAL, and that enjoy
worldwide consensus and recognition among countries that approved it.82
82. The basic reasoning is to be found in some arbitral awards such as Arbitra-
tion Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, UNILEX No. 117/1999
(2001) in regard to the CISG.  The arbitral award also considered the wide recog-
nition of the CISG among scholars and other legal systems that have found the
CISG as a legal model to other contract codifications due to its high quality, fair-
ness, appropriateness, neutrality, capacity to be adapted to different transactions,
and the fact that it reflects the basic principles of commercial relations in most if
not all developed countries. See Stefan Kro¨ll et al., Introduction to the CISG, in UN
CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) (Ste-
fan Kro¨ll et al. eds., 2011); Franco Ferrari, CISG and Private International Law, in
THE 1980 UNIFORM SALES LAW: OLD ISSUES REVISITED IN THE LIGHT OF RECENT EX-
PERIENCES: VERONA CONFERENCE 2003 19–55 (2003).
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ATTORNEYS’ FEES—LAST DITCH STAND?
BRUNO ZELLER*
I. INTRODUCTION
MILENA –Dor–devic´, in an excellent article, advances very compellingarguments that attorneys’ fees are not governed by the United Na-
tions Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods
(CISG).1  It is correct to say that arguments for and against the CISG gov-
erning attorneys’ fees only go so far, but not all the way—otherwise, there
would be no debate on this point.2  The question that comes to mind after
reading the article is not which of the arguments is correct, but which one
goes the furthest and hence, can potentially resolve the issue.  The fact
that this is an important issue has been noted by Eric Schwartz: “When an
international commercial dispute arises, the cost of resolving it may be as
important to the parties as the merits of the claims themselves.”3  Further-
more, as –Dor–devic´ correctly states:
The possibility of recovering attorneys’ fees as damages is particu-
larly important in countries where legal costs are not recoverable
under the pertinent procedural rules, but it is also important in
“loser pays” countries since such a possibility would require
change of their long established practice of awarding legal costs
under the procedural code and rules (and not as part of the
damages claim).4
If the issue of attorneys’ fees could be resolved, it would enhance the
harmonisation effort of international trade.  The fact that in the majority
of jurisdictions the recovery of legal costs is part of civil procedure does
not render the CISG inapplicable.  It is admitted that the CISG in general
* Bruno Zeller is an Associate Professor and Victoria University Adjunct
Professor at the Murdoch University School of Law in Perth, Australia.  Fellow of
the Australian Institute for Commercial Arbitration, Associate, The Institute for
Logistics and Supply Chain Management, Panel of Arbitrators—MLAANZ.
Visiting Professor Stetson Law School, Florida.
1. See generally Milena –Dor–devic´, “Mexican Revolution” in CISG Jurisprudence and
Case-Law: Attorneys’ Fees as (Non)Recoverable Loss for Breach of Contract, in PRIVATE LAW
REFORM IN SOUTH EAST EUROPE: LIBER AMORCORUM CHRISTA JESSEL-HOLST 199
(Mirko S. Vasiljevic, Rainer Kulms, Tatjana Josipovic & Maja Stanivukovic eds.,
2010).
2. For an excellent article summarising and discussing the issues emanating
from the debate, see Keith William Diener, Recovering Attorneys’ Fees Under CISG: An
Interpretation of Article 74, 2008 NORDIC J. COM. L. 1, 1 (2008), available at http://
www.njcl.utu.fi/1_2008/article3.pdf.
3. Eric A. Schwartz, The ICC Arbitral Process, Part IV: The Costs of ICC Arbitration,
4 ICC INT’L CT. OF ARB. BULL. 8, 8 (1993).
4. –Dor–devic´, supra note 1, at 203.
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is only applicable to resolve substantive issues, but equally well, it is obvi-
ous that if procedural issues are within the four corners of the CISG, these
issues will also be resolved.  The words of Peter Schlechtriem ring true
especially in relation to this debate, as he notes: “The question is often
phrased as a problem of the borderline of substantive (CISG) rules and
the procedural law of the forum, but this is avoiding the real issue in favor
of a conceptual approach, resulting in solutions quite different from coun-
try to country.”5  It is of value to first note all the points that are not in
dispute.  The arguments in this Article can therefore concentrate on the
points of diversion.  There are, in general, two issues that seem to be the
sticking points.  First, and hence the question, is Article 74 applicable?
Second, because attorneys’ fees are part of a procedural rule, are attor-
neys’ fees not covered by the CISG?  However, the real question is if Arti-
cle 74 was applicable, would it draw an otherwise applicable procedural
rule into the now-substantive issues of Article 74?
First, it is acknowledged that Article 74 is based on the principle of
full compensation, and hence, it can be concluded that “all kinds of losses,
suffered by the party and caused by the breach, are recoverable in principle
under the CISG.”6  Furthermore, it is also not in dispute that the CISG
does not expressly exclude attorneys’ fees from the category of losses.  The
most serious challenge against an Article 74 argument has been advanced
by –Dor–devic´, who argues in brief that:
[T]he causal link between the breach and the claim for attor-
neys’ fees [is] interrupted.  Consequently, in my view, once the
litigation is instituted the incurred attorneys’ fees become a loss
that is too distinct from the usual loss suffered as a consequence
of breach of contract thus not allowing for its recovery under
Article 74 of the CISG.7
This issue will be addressed in detail in Part III.  This Article will ar-
gue that only two arguments have a valid claim to be seriously considered
to resolve the issue of attorneys’ fees.  Part II will lay out the main argu-
ment for an inclusion of the fees via Article 74 and Part III will address the
issues brought up by –Dor–devic´, supporting her claim that attorneys’ fees
are not included in the regime of the CISG.
II. ARGUMENTS AGAINST INCLUSION OF ATTORNEYS’ FEES
In essence, –Dor–devic´, after examining the arguments of other au-
thors, lists five major objections against the inclusion of attorneys’ fees, of
which only the first two issues are discussed in this Article.  The other
5. Peter Schlechtriem, Non-Material Damages—Recovery Under the CISG?, 19
PACE INT’L L. REV. 89, 96–97 (2007).
6. –Dor–devic´, supra note 1, at 205.
7. Id. at 216.
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three points are not of prime importance and can be subsumed into the
first two points.  The objections are advanced by:
1. “[T]hose who are basing their argument on the drafter’s intent”
(or lack thereof);
2. “[T]hose who find recovery of attorneys’ fees . . . against the equal-
ity of the parties to the sales contract”;
3. “[T]hose who find the CISG principles not well-suited to deal with
the calculation of attorneys’ fees as recoverable loss”;
4. Those who combine one or two of the above reasons; and
5. The majority of case law is against a recovery under the CISG.8
The first two points arguably can be dismissed without great effort.
Just because the drafters are silent on a point does not automatically sug-
gest that attorneys’ fees are excluded.  The words within the four corners
of any legislation, including the CISG, must be consulted first.  If there is a
gap, or if the words or meaning are not clear, extrinsic material such as
the travaux pre´paratoires can be consulted.  As the drafters did not com-
ment on this particular issue of inclusion, it does not mean that the ques-
tion of attorneys’ fees has been decided in the positive or negative form.
It is left to the interpreter to come to a conclusion and to make sense
of the text of the conventions.  In the case of the CISG this inquiry is
guided by Article 7, which states that the CISG’s general principles should
assist in coming to a conclusion.  It is argued that the full compensation
argument is more compelling in this case than the lack of authority in the
travaux pre´paratoires, as an argument cannot be simply based on a lack of
the drafters’ intent.  The opinion of the CISG Advisory Council supports
this point:
The issue of whether litigation expenses should be considered as
damages for purposes of Article 74 cannot be resolved through a
substance/procedure distinction.  Whether a matter is consid-
ered substantive or procedural may vary from jurisdiction to juris-
diction and may depend on the circumstances of a particular
case.  Relying upon such a distinction in this context is outdated
and unproductive.  Instead, the analysis should focus on whether
the payment of litigation expenses is deliberately excluded from
the Convention and, if not, whether the issue may be resolved “in
conformity with the general principles on which [the Conven-
tion] is based or, in the absence of such principles, in conformity
with law applicable by virtue of the rules of private international
law.”9
8. See id. at 206.
9. Int’l Sales Convention Advisory Council, Calculation of Damages Under
CISG Article 74, Advisory Council Opinion No. 6, cmt. 5.2 (2006) (footnotes omit-
ted), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/CISG-AC-op6.html.
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Closely connected to a lack of the drafters’ intent is the observation
made by the Advisory Committee in relation to the substantive and proce-
dural distinction within the CISG.  This is topical considering that Zapata
Hermanos Sucesores, S.A. v. Hearthside Baking Co.10 in the end was decided
on the procedural issue.  As Judge Posner stated: “The Convention is
about contracts, not about procedure.  The principles for determining
when a losing party must reimburse the winner for the latter’s expense of
litigation are usually not a part of a substantive body of law, such as con-
tract law, but a part of procedural law.”11
However, it is important to draw some parallels to the substantive and
procedural distinction in association with the general principles as noted
in Article 7(2).  A very good example is the burden of proof, and it is of
value to address this issue by analogy.
The question of attorneys’ fees and the burden of proof have in com-
mon that there is no clear “in or out” evidence within the four corners of
the CISG.  However, the distinguishing feature is that the travaux
pre´paratoires are very clear on this point.  In relation to the burden of
proof, the express exclusion of the burden of proof from the text of the
CISG is in itself a deliberate move by the drafters of the CISG to ensure
that the burden of proof is dealt with on a domestic law level.12
In this respect, it has been contended that:
[D]elegations speaking on the burden of proof . . . were all quite
definite that it was not the intention to deal in the Convention
with any questions concerning the burden of proof.  The consen-
sus was that such questions must be left to the court as matters of
procedural law.13
Peter Schlechtriem and Franco Ferrari argue that the burden of
proof issues are governed by the Convention and that, as it is not men-
tioned expressly, there is an “internal gap” which should be resolved with
reference to the two-step methodology in Article 7(2), referring first to the
general principles underlying the CISG, and only in the absence of such
principles, private international law.14  Most compelling are the argu-
ments put forward by Ulrich Magnus, who strongly argues that the burden
of proof is governed by general principles.15  John Gotanda also argues:
Applying national laws to determine the level of proof needed to
recover damages under article 74 can lead to differential treat-
10. 313 F.3d 385 (7th Cir. 2002).
11. Id. at 388.
12. See Stefan Kro¨ll, The Burden of Proof for the Non-Conformity of Goods Under Art.
35 CISG, 3 BELGRADE L. REV. 162, 168 (2011).
13. Harry M. Flechtner, Selected Issues Relating to the CISG’s Scope of Application,
13 VINDOBONA J. INT’L COM. L. & ARB. 91, 102 (2009) (citation omitted).
14. See id. at 103.
15. See generally Ulrich Magnus, General Principles of UN-Sales Law, 3 INT’L
TRADE & BUS. L. ANN. 33 (1997).
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ment of similarly situated parties.  This is because national laws
differ not only on the level of proof needed to recover damages,
but also on whether the matter is governed by substantive or pro-
cedural law.16
The conclusion is that, in relation to the burden of proof—and no
doubt any procedural issues where a general principle can be found—the
observation can be made that the issue is “so closely connected with the
application of the substantive provisions that it would be impracticable to
separate the two.”17  If the argument made by many scholars, that the bur-
den of proof is governed within the CISG, is accepted, then it becomes
difficult to reject the argument that attorneys’ fees cannot potentially be
included as well.
The whole argument hinges on Article 7(2), namely, the gap-filling
function.  It is universally accepted that in order to have a gap, the issue in
question cannot be explicitly governed within the CISG nor explicitly ex-
cluded.  That said, both the burden of proof and attorneys’ fees would
qualify as potentially falling under general principles.  The point is that
the burden of proof has been rejected in the travaux pre´paratoires, whereas
attorneys’ fees have not.  From that point of view alone, the burden of
proof should be excluded and governed by domestic law, which it is not.
The simple fact is that the CISG has not only included substantive
legal issues, but also perhaps inadvertently included procedural issues.
Hence, the argument that an issue is procedural in nature and therefore
must be excluded from the CISG is simply not sustainable.  Stefan Kro¨ll
correctly noted in relation to the burden of proof that it is “not a mere
rule of procedure with no or only limited influence on material justice.
Quite to the contrary it resolves about material considerations which are
comparable to those underlying the substantive requirements for the cre-
ating and existence of rights.”18  The same argument also holds for the
inclusion of attorneys’ fees to be governed by the CISG.  In relation to the
drafters’ intention, Schlechtriem should have the last word on this issue as
he notes: “Codes age.  So do Conventions promulgating Uniform Law.
Provisions on interpretation and gap-filling, like the CISG’s Article 7 . . .
may be used to prevent petrification.”19
The second issue set forth by –Dor–devic´ also does not have any merits,
as the issue of attorneys’ fees is a breach of contract and not a question of
equality.  Admittedly, Articles 45 and 61 provide very similar remedies to
buyers and sellers.  However, the important aspect of both articles is that
the remedies are directly linked to a breach of contract by either buyer or
16. John Y. Gotanda, Awarding Damages Under the United Nations Convention on
the International Sale of Goods: A Matter of Interpretation, 37 GEO. J. INT’L L. 95, 109
(2005).
17. Kro¨ll, supra note 12, at 169 (footnote omitted).
18. Id.
19. Schlechtriem, supra note 5, at 89 (footnote omitted).
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seller.  If the respondent wins the legal issue, then the court in essence
decides that there was no breach.  In this case specifically, the question of
the applicability of Article 74 does not arise.  What has happened is that
now a gap exists which needs to be filled by domestic law.  This is so be-
cause the remedy of claiming attorneys’ fees is not contemplated within
both Articles 45 and 61, and hence falls outside the sphere of the CISG.
Does it create an inequality?  The answer is no.  In the first place, if there
is a breach, then the CISG potentially applies.  If there is no breach—that
is, the defendant wins—the remedy must be sought under the applicable
domestic law, as the CISG is silent on attorneys’ fees.  Equality is guaran-
teed not entirely via the CISG, but by the applicable governing law.
III. ARGUMENTS FOR INCLUSION OF ATTORNEYS’ FEES
The following main arguments are listed in support of the inclusion
of attorneys’ fees under the CISG:
• The plain meaning of Article 74;
• The principle of full compensation;
• The principle of foreseeability;
• The duty to mitigate;
• The general principle of reasonableness; and
• The reading of the preamble that is the endeavour to promote
uniformity.
The district court’s decision in Zapata correctly notes that the
harmonisation of sales law, being a cornerstone of the CISG, must, where
possible, overcome variations in domestic laws.20  The best tool to do so is
Article 7 combined with Article 8.21
It is admitted that court judgements are not a clear indication as to
the recovery of attorneys’ fees under the CISG and hence, it is not a per-
suasive argument to rely on court decisions.22  Case law arguably cannot
fully support one or the other side of the argument, including Zapata.  As
–Dor–devic´ quoted a maxim,23 the liberty is taken here to do so as well,
namely that “one Swallow does not a summer make.”24  David Dixon put it
succinctly when he noted:
20. See Zapata Hermanos Sucesores, S.A. v. Hearthside Baking Co., No. 99 C
4040, 2001 WL 1000927, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 29, 2001) (quoting MCC-Marble Ce-
ramic Ctr., Inc. v. Ceramica Nuova D’Agostino, S.F.A., 144 F.3d 1384, 1391 (11th
Cir. 1998)).
21. It should not be forgotten that Article 8, in effect, excludes the parol evi-
dence rule and hence, to exclude the “American rule” does not create a
precedent.
22. See –Dor–devic´, supra note 1, at 214.
23. See id. at 219.
24. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. I, ch. 7 (W.D. Ross trans., Oxford
Univ. Press 9th ed. 1954).
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Regardless whether scholars are supporters or opponents of
Judge Posner’s opinion, they all agree on three things.  First, that
Judge Posner did not follow the rules of analysis of CISG article
7.  Though some supporters believe that attorneys’ fees are not
governed by the CISG, and the opponents believe that they are,
both sides agree that Judge Posner misapplied the rules of article
7.  Second, though somewhat related to the first, both sides agree
that Judge Posner was careless in not attempting to analyze the
general principle of the CISG.  If attorneys’ fees are governed by
the CISG, then there is an abundance of authority to suggest the
general principle of full compensation would apply, leading to
the conclusion that attorneys’ fees should be included in loss.
Third, both sides agree that Judge Posner improperly cited exclu-
sively to U.S. cases and completely ignored case law from other
CISG state parties.25
Given the above and ignoring the weaknesses in Judge Posner’s judge-
ment, the argument can be boiled down to the fact that the main objec-
tion against attorneys’ fees is that the loss is not a consequence of the
breach of the contract, and the very nature of the recovery of attorneys’
fees speaks against a consequential loss.26  However, it must be noted that
the payment of attorneys’ fees is closely linked to the breach of the con-
tract and is solely caused by that breach.  In other words, but for the
breach, there would be no cost, as this author states:
To put a party into a position—it would have been financially—is
simply asking the question, has the balance sheet changed?  If
the asset base is diminished as a consequence of the breach, then
those items diminishing the asset base must be understood to fall
under the principle of full compensation pursuant to Article
74.27
–Dor–devic´ does agree with the fact that attorneys’ fees constitute a fi-
nancial loss.28  Prevailing opinion notes that Article 74 limits the recovery
to material losses emanating from the breach of contract.  Financial losses
fulfil this requirement.
The question that needs to be looked at is: what is included within
“material losses” and is it directly linked to the breach as well?  This is so
because the main argument against attorneys’ fees being covered by Arti-
cle 74 is that there is no direct link to the breach.  It is argued that the
question which needs to be asked is did the balance sheet change because
25. David B. Dixon, Que Lastima Zapata!  Bad CISG Ruling on Attorneys’ Fees Still
Haunts U.S. Courts, 38 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 405, 428 (2007).
26. See –Dor–devic´, supra note 1, at 215–16.
27. BRUNO ZELLER, DAMAGES UNDER THE CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 151 (2005).
28. See –Dor–devic´, supra note 1, at 215.
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of, or but for, the breach and was such a loss foreseeable?  It is argued
that, as an example, goodwill has been recognised as falling under Article
74 as it fulfils the above requirements.29  In the end, the question is: was
the damage foreseeable?  This can be answered in the positive.
It is of value to briefly look at the question of whether breaches of
ethical standards give rise to a demand of damages under Article 74.  This
is so because those “who [are] interested in compliance with ethical stan-
dards—want[ ] to claim damages from the buyer who does not use the
goods in an ethical way.”30  This is an interesting point because the loss is
not directly attributed to a physical fault of the goods, but rather, a philo-
sophical fault that taints the goods.  Ingeborg Schwenzer and Benjamin
Leisinger argue that:
In this regard, it is submitted that the loss of the seller equals the
eventual difference between the contractual value of the goods—
i.e. the purchase price—and the real value of the goods, taking
into account the unethical use that is intended and the possible
consequences arising there from.  Such claims for damages serve
two functions.  First, the equilibrium of the contract is reestab-
lished.  The seller’s unethically generated profit is transferred to
the buyer who—hypothetically—either would not have con-
cluded the sales contract or would have bought the goods at a
much lower price.31
The authors argue that the balance sheet has been disturbed; hence,
Article 74 will re-establish the necessary equilibrium.  In relation to attor-
neys’ fees, the same argument can be mounted on the grounds that the
buyer would not have bought the goods had he known that they were
unsuitable.
IV. DISCUSSION
–Dor–devic´ indeed advances a very powerful argument, namely:
[T]he recovery of attorneys’ fees incurred in litigation indeed
differs from recovery of such fees before litigation.  The differ-
ence results from the nature of litigation itself, since its initiation
(filing a claim in the court and delivering the claim to the defen-
dant) transforms the two-party relationship i.e. sales contract
(buyer-seller) into a three party relationship i.e. litigation (plain-
tiff-court/arbitration tribunal-defendant).32
29. See ZELLER, supra note 27, at 125.
30. Benjamin Leisinger & Ingeborg Schwenzer, Ethical Values and International
Sales Contracts, in COMMERCIAL LAW CHALLENGES IN THE 21ST CENTURY—JAN HELL-
NER IN MEMORIAM 249, 275 (Ross Cranston, Jan Ramberg & Jacob Ziegel eds.,
2007).
31. Id.
32. –Dor–devic´, supra note 1, at 216.
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The argument, therefore, is that the three-party relationship shifts the
costs onto the court-plaintiff relationship that is focused on the litigation
and not the breach.  Therefore, it is argued that the causal link between
breach and loss is interrupted.33  The point that is made is that a tripartite
relationship has now been created because the court has, at the same time,
a relationship not only with the buyer but also with the seller.  This obser-
vation is correct, and it also supports the argument that awarding attor-
neys’ fees is against the equality of the parties to the sales contract.
However, the problem with the above argument is that it relies on the
fact that the causal link between breach and loss has been interrupted.
Indeed, but for the breach, such a tripartite relationship would not have
been created and attorneys’ fees would not have been incurred.  In other
words, the tripartite relationship is causally linked to the breach of the
contract.
It is obvious that a breach will trigger many tripartite relationships.  As
an example, the party suffering the damages must mitigate the losses pur-
suant to Article 77.  If the party relying on the breach enters into a con-
tract with a warehouse to store the goods, putting them at the seller’s
disposal creates a three party relationship.  The three parties are the seller,
buyer, and the warehouse owner.  There is no debate that the buyer can
recover the costs he incurred as part of the Article 74 argument.  It is also
not disputed if the court finds against the buyer, that he cannot recover
any mitigation costs.  The contract has been confirmed and the buyer
must bear all the costs he incurred.  No inequality arguments have been
raised in this context.
Furthermore, the law often creates inequalities.  As an example, a
seller supplies defective goods, clearly breaching Article 35.  The buyer,
however, does not examine the goods in a timely fashion and hence did
not notify the seller of the defect within a reasonable time.  The CISG
would, in such a case, deny the buyer a right to claim damages.  If it is
asked whether justice has prevailed, the answer is yes, because the buyer
did not follow the law.  Simply put, both parties are in breach of the CISG,
but the breach of Articles 38 and 39 negate the breach of Article 35 be-
cause of policy considerations that are not in dispute.  The difference be-
tween the relationship of breach and notification is akin to the
relationship between breach and costs, particularly with attorneys’ fees.
The exception being, of course, in the latter case, the CISG is not clear.
V. CONCLUSION
The argument of –Dor–devic´ in relation to a tripartite relationship is
very convincing and powerful.  However, it is also argued that the balance
sheet approach is equally convincing because it shows that there is a po-
tential break between the legal action of breach and the court action.
33. See id.
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–Dor–devic´ supports her argument by citing a maxim that reflects the guid-
ing idea: “If it looks like a duck, swims like a duck, and quacks like a duck,
then it probably is a duck.”34  However, it is only “probably a duck,” and in
retort, there is an animal called the wood duck.35  It looks like a duck,
swims like a duck, and also quacks like a duck, but in fact belongs to the
family of geese.
Where does this leave the debate, or would the real duck please stand
up?  A court could follow either argument, which of course is not condu-
cive to a uniform application of the CISG.  It is argued that the solution
lies in the reading of the CISG preamble.  The object of the CISG is to
establish “a New International Economic Order.”36  The parties to the
Convention were also of the opinion that the adoption of the CISG “would
contribute to the removal of legal barriers in international trade and pro-
mote the development of international trade.”37
John Gotanda notes specifically in relation to procedural issues:
The practice of determining whether an issue is governed by ap-
plicable procedural law instead of the Convention is outdated,
counterproductive, and should be abandoned.  Instead, tribunals
should try to fill gaps by trying to find a solution within the Con-
vention itself, through an analogical application of specific provi-
sions or on the basis of principles underlying the Convention as a
whole, before turning to domestic law.  This approach would
lead to more consistent and predictable awards of damages and
would ultimately further the goal of the Convention to create
uniform commercial law.38
The conclusion is that, arguably, only two arguments are viable.  First,
the balance sheet approach, and secondly, the break in causation as advo-
cated by –Dor–devic´.  Which one is the better one?  It depends whether the
court believes that the fundamental underlying principle of Article 74 is
full compensation, namely, the balance sheet approach, or whether, pro-
cedurally, the causation of the breach is broken.  In the end, unfortu-
nately, there are still two competing arguments, and if harmonisation is
the deciding factor, the preamble would lean towards full compensation.
Hence, attorney’s fees are governed by the CISG.
However, it is recognised that the above academic view might be at
odds with the application of Article 74 by courts and tribunals, and will not
find favour.  Unfortunately, the preponderance of case law shows that the
34. Id. at 219.
35. It is an Australian native species of geese, but commonly called a wood
duck.
36. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods pmbl., Apr. 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3, available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.
edu/cisg/text/preamble.html.
37. Id.
38. Gotanda, supra note 16, at 140.
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courts deal with attorneys’ fees pursuant to the relevant domestic procedu-
ral rules and not under the CISG.  The same can be said in arbitration
proceedings, as arbitrators refer to the relevant applicable arbitration
rules to determine the issue of attorneys’ fees.  The possibility to achieve
unification on this issue arguably can come from other sources such as the
American Law Institute and the International Institute for the Unification
of Private Law’s Principles on transnational civil procedure.  However, the
problem with development of soft law instruments is that they seldom
achieve harmonisation.  To that end, time will tell whether the courts and
arbitral tribunals will include attorneys’ fees into the regime of Article 74,
as indicated in this Article.
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